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Part 1 - Chapters I to V - 1spnt10.txt
Part 2 - Chapters VI to X - 2spnt10.txt
Part 3 - Chapters XI to XV - 3spnt10.txt
Part 4 - Chapters XVI to XX - 4spnt10.txt



Sentence Numbers, shown thus (1), have been added by volunteer.





A Theologico-Political Treatise

Part 1 - Chapters I to V

Baruch Spinoza





A Theologico-Political Treatise

Part 1 - Chapters I to V


TABLE OF CONTENTS:


PREFACE.

Origin and consequences of superstition.

Causes that have led the author to write.

Course of his investigation.

For what readers the treatise is designed. Submission of author
to the rulers of his country.



CHAPTER I - Of Prophecy.

Definition of prophecy.

Distinction between revelation to Moses and to the other prophets.

Between Christ and other recipients of revelation.

Ambiguity of the word "Spirit."

The different senses in which things may be referred to God.

Different senses of "Spirit of God."

Prophets perceived revelation by imagination.



CHAPTER II - Of Prophets.

A mistake to suppose that prophecy can give knowledge of phenomena

Certainty of prophecy based on:
(1) Vividness of imagination,
(2) A Sign,
(3) Goodness of the Prophet.

Variation of prophecy with the temperament and opinions of the individual.



CHAPTER III - Of the Vocation of the Hebrews, and whether the Gift of Prophecy was peculiar to them.

Happiness of Hebrews did not consist in the inferiority of the Gentile.

Nor in philosophic knowledge or virtue.

But in their conduct of affairs of state and escape from political dangers.

Even this Distinction did not exist in the time of Abraham.

Testimony from the Old Testament itself to the share of the Gentiles
in the law and favour of God.

Explanation of apparent discrepancy of the Epistle to the Romans.

Answer to the arguments for the eternal election of the Jews.



CHAPTER IV - Of the Divine Law.

Laws either depend on natural necessity or on human decree. The existence
of the latter not inconsistent with the former class of laws.

Divine law a kind of law founded on human decree:
called Divine from its object.

Divine law:
(1) universal;
(2) independent of the truth of any historical narrative;
(3) independent of rites and ceremonies;
(4) its own reward.

Reason does not present God as a law-giver for men.

Such a conception a proof of ignorance - in Adam - in the Israelites -
in Christians.

Testimony of the Scriptures in favour of reason and the
rational view of the Divine.



CHAPTER V. - Of the Ceremonial Law.

Ceremonial law of the Old Testament no part of the Divine universal law,
but partial and temporary. Testimony of the prophets themselves to this
Testimony of the New Testament.

How the ceremonial law tended to preserve the Hebrew kingdom.

Christian rites on a similar footing.

What part of the Scripture narratives is one bound to believe?



Authors Endnotes to the Treatise.



A Theologico-Political Treatise

Part 1 - Chapters I to V




PREFACE.
(1)Men would never be superstitious, if they could govern all their
circumstances by set rules, or if they were always favoured by fortune: but
being frequently driven into straits where rules are useless, and being
often kept fluctuating pitiably between hope and fear by the uncertainty
of fortune's greedily coveted favours, they are consequently, for the most
part, very prone to credulity. (2) The human mind is readily swayed this way
or that in times of doubt, especially when hope and fear are struggling for
the mastery, though usually it is boastful, over - confident, and vain.

(3) This as a general fact I suppose everyone knows, though few, I believe,
know their own nature; no one can have lived in the world without observing
that most people, when in prosperity, are so over-brimming with wisdom
(however inexperienced they may be), that they take every offer of advice as
a personal insult, whereas in adversity they know not where to turn, but beg
and pray for counsel from every passer-by. (4) No plan is then too futile,
too absurd, or too fatuous for their adoption; the most frivolous causes
will raise them to hope, or plunge them into despair - if anything happens
during their fright which reminds them of some past good or ill, they think
it portends a happy or unhappy issue, and therefore (though it may have
proved abortive a hundred times before) style it a lucky or unlucky omen.
(5) Anything which excites their astonishment they believe to be a portent
signifying the anger of the gods or of the Supreme Being, and, mistaking
superstition for religion, account it impious not to avert the evil with
prayer and sacrifice. (6) Signs and wonders of this sort they conjure up
perpetually, till one might think Nature as mad as themselves, they
interpret her so fantastically.

(7) Thus it is brought prominently before us, that superstition's chief
victims are those persons who greedily covet temporal advantages; they it
is, who (especially when they are in danger, and cannot help themselves) are
wont with Prayers and womanish tears to implore help from God: upbraiding
Reason as blind, because she cannot show a sure path to the shadows they
pursue, and rejecting human wisdom as vain; but believing the phantoms of
imagination, dreams, and other childish absurdities, to be the very oracles
of Heaven. (8) As though God had turned away from the wise, and written His
decrees, not in the mind of man but in the entrails of beasts, or left them
to be proclaimed by the inspiration and instinct of fools, madmen, and
birds. Such is the unreason to which terror can drive mankind!

(9) Superstition, then, is engendered, preserved, and fostered by fear. If
anyone desire an example, let him take Alexander, who only began
superstitiously to seek guidance from seers, when he first learnt to fear
fortune in the passes of Sysis (Curtius, v. 4); whereas after he had
conquered Darius he consulted prophets no more, till a second time
frightened by reverses. (10) When the Scythians were provoking a battle, the
Bactrians had deserted, and he himself was lying sick of his wounds, "he
once more turned to superstition, the mockery of human wisdom, and bade
Aristander, to whom he confided his credulity, inquire the issue of affairs
with sacrificed victims." (11) Very numerous examples of a like nature might
be cited, clearly showing the fact, that only while under the dominion of
fear do men fall a prey to superstition; that all the portents ever invested
with the reverence of misguided religion are mere phantoms of dejected and
fearful minds; and lastly, that prophets have most power among the people,
and are most formidable to rulers, precisely at those times when the state
is in most peril. (12) I think this is sufficiently plain to all, and will
therefore say no more on the subject.

(13) The origin of superstition above given affords us a clear reason for
the fact, that it comes to all men naturally, though some refer its rise to
a dim notion of God, universal to mankind, and also tends to show, that it
is no less inconsistent and variable than other mental hallucinations and
emotional impulses, and further that it can only be maintained by hope,
hatred, anger, and deceit; since it springs, not from reason, but solely
from the more powerful phases of emotion. (14) Furthermore, we may readily
understand how difficult it is, to maintain in the same course men prone to
every form of credulity. (15) For, as the mass of mankind remains always at
about the same pitch of misery, it never assents long to any one remedy, but
is always best pleased by a novelty which has not yet proved illusive.

(16) This element of inconsistency has been the cause of many terrible wars
and revolutions; for, as Curtius well says (lib. iv. chap. 10): "The mob has
no ruler more potent than superstition," and is easily led, on the plea of
religion, at one moment to adore its kings as gods, and anon to execrate and
abjure them as humanity's common bane. (17) Immense pains have therefore
been taken to counteract this evil by investing religion, whether true or
false, with such pomp and ceremony, that it may, rise superior to every
shock, and be always observed with studious reverence by the whole people -
a system which has been brought to great perfection by the Turks, for they
consider even controversy impious, and so clog men's minds with dogmatic
formulas, that they leave no room for sound reason, not even enough to doubt
with.

(18) But if, in despotic statecraft, the supreme and essential mystery be to
hoodwink the subjects, and to mask the fear, which keeps them clown, with
the specious garb of religion, so that men may fight as bravely for slavery
as for safety, and count it not shame but highest honour to risk their blood
and their lives for the vainglory of a tyrant; yet in a free state no more
mischievous expedient could be planned or attempted. (19) Wholly repugnant
to the general freedom are such devices as enthralling men's minds with
prejudices, forcing their judgment, or employing any of the weapons of
quasi-religious sedition; indeed, such seditions only spring up, when law
enters the domain of speculative thought, and opinions are put on trial and
condemned on the same footing as crimes, while those who defend and follow
them are sacrificed, not to public safety, but to their opponents'
hatred and cruelty. (20) If deeds only could be made the grounds of
criminal charges, and words were always allowed to pass free, such seditions
would be divested of every semblance of justification, and would be
separated from mere controversies by a hard and fast line.

(20) Now, seeing that we have the rare happiness of living in a republic,
where everyone's judgment is free and unshackled, where each may worship God
as his conscience dictates, and where freedom is esteemed before all things
dear and precious, I have believed that I should be undertaking no
ungrateful or unprofitable task, in demonstrating that not only can
such freedom be granted without prejudice to the public peace, but also,
that without such freedom, piety cannot flourish nor the public peace be
secure.

(21) Such is the chief conclusion I seek to establish in this treatise; but,
in order to reach it, I must first point out the misconceptions which, like
scars of our former bondage, still disfigure our notion of religion, and
must expose the false views about the civil authority which many have most
impudently advocated, endeavouring to turn the mind of the people, still
prone to heathen superstition, away from its legitimate rulers, and so bring
us again into slavery. (22) As to the order of my treatise I will speak
presently, but first I will recount the causes which led me to write.

(23) I have often wondered, that persons who make a boast of professing the
Christian religion, namely, love, joy, peace, temperance, and charity to all
men, should quarrel with such rancorous animosity, and display daily towards
one another such bitter hatred, that this, rather than the virtues they
claim, is the readiest criterion of their faith. (24) Matters have long
since come to such a pass, that one can only pronounce a man Christian,
Turk, Jew, or Heathen, by his general appearance and attire, by his
frequenting this or that place of worship, or employing the phraseology of a
particular sect - as for manner of life, it is in all cases the same. (25)
Inquiry into the cause of this anomaly leads me unhesitatingly to ascribe it
to the fact, that the ministries of the Church are regarded by the masses
merely as dignities, her offices as posts of emolument - in short, popular
religion may be summed up as respect for ecclesiastics. (26) The spread of
this misconception inflamed every worthless fellow with an intense desire to
enter holy orders, and thus the love of diffusing God's religion degenerated
into sordid avarice and ambition. (27) Every church became a theatre, where
orators, instead of church teachers, harangued, caring not to instruct the
people, but striving to attract admiration, to bring opponents to public
scorn, and to preach only novelties and paradoxes, such as would tickle
the ears of their congregation. (28) This state of things necessarily
stirred up an amount of controversy, envy, and hatred, which no lapse of
time could appease; so that we can scarcely wonder that of the old religion
nothing survives but its outward forms (even these, in the mouth of the
multitude, seem rather adulation than adoration of the Deity), and that
faith has become a mere compound of credulity and prejudices - aye,
prejudices too, which degrade man from rational being to beast, which
completely stifle the power of judgment between true and false, which seem,
in fact, carefully fostered for the purpose of extinguishing the last spark
of reason! (29) Piety, great God! and religion are become a tissue of
ridiculous mysteries; men, who flatly despise reason, who reject and turn
away from understanding as naturally corrupt, these, I say, these of all
men, are thought, 0 lie most horrible! to possess light from on High. (30)
Verily, if they had but one spark of light from on High, they would not
insolently rave, but would learn to worship God more wisely, and would be as
marked among their fellows for mercy as they now are for malice; if they
were concerned for their opponents' souls, instead of for their own
reputations, they would no longer fiercely persecute, but rather be filled
with pity and compassion.

(31) Furthermore, if any Divine light were in them, it would appear from
their doctrine. (32) I grant that they are never tired of professing their
wonder at the profound mysteries of Holy Writ; still I cannot discover that
they teach anything but speculations of Platonists and Aristotelians, to
which (in order to save their credit for Christianity) they have made Holy
Writ conform; not content to rave with the Greeks themselves, they want to
make the prophets rave also; showing conclusively, that never even in sleep
have they caught a glimpse of Scripture's Divine nature. (33) The very
vehemence of their admiration for the mysteries plainly attests, that
their belief in the Bible is a formal assent rather than a living faith: and
the fact is made still more apparent by their laying down beforehand, as a
foundation for the study and true interpretation of Scripture, the principle
that it is in every passage true and divine. (34) Such a doctrine should be
reached only after strict scrutiny and thorough comprehension of the Sacred
Books (which would teach it much better, for they stand in need no human
factions), and not be set up on the threshold, as it were, of inquiry.

(35) As I pondered over the facts that the light of reason is not only
despised, but by many even execrated as a source of impiety, that human
commentaries are accepted as divine records, and that credulity is extolled
as faith; as I marked the fierce controversies of philosophers raging in
Church and State, the source of bitter hatred and dissension, the ready
instruments of sedition and other ills innumerable, I determined to examine
the Bible afresh in a careful, impartial, and unfettered spirit, making no
assumptions concerning it, and attributing to it no doctrines, which I do
not find clearly therein set down. (36) With these precautions I constructed
a method of Scriptural interpretation, and thus equipped proceeded to
inquire - what is prophecy? (37) In what sense did God reveal himself to the
prophets, and why were these particular men - chosen by him? (38) Was it on
account of the sublimity of their thoughts about the Deity and nature, or
was it solely on account of their piety? (39) These questions being
answered, I was easily able to conclude, that the authority of the prophets
has weight only in matters of morality, and that their speculative doctrines
affect us little.

(40) Next I inquired, why the Hebrews were called God's chosen people, and
discovering that it was only because God had chosen for them a certain strip
of territory, where they might live peaceably and at ease, I learnt that the
Law revealed by God to Moses was merely the law of the individual Hebrew
state, therefore that it was binding on none but Hebrews, and not even
on Hebrews after the downfall of their nation. (41) Further, in order to
ascertain, whether it could be concluded from Scripture, that the human
understanding standing is naturally corrupt, I inquired whether the
Universal Religion, the Divine Law revealed through the Prophets and
Apostles to the whole human race, differs from that which is taught by the
light of natural reason, whether miracles can take place in violation of the
laws of nature, and if so, whether they imply the existence of God more
surely and clearly than events, which we understand plainly and distinctly
through their immediate natural causes.

(42) Now, as in the whole course of my investigation I found nothing taught
expressly by Scripture, which does not agree with our understanding, or
which is repugnant thereto, and as I saw that the prophets taught nothing,
which is not very simple and easily to be grasped by all, and further, that
they clothed their leaching in the style, and confirmed it with the reasons,
which would most deeply move the mind of the masses to devotion towards God,
I became thoroughly convinced, that the Bible leaves reason absolutely free,
that it has nothing in common with philosophy, in fact, that Revelation and
Philosophy stand on different footings. In order to set this forth
categorically and exhaust the whole question, I point out the way in which
the Bible should be interpreted, and show that all of spiritual questions
should be sought from it alone, and not from the objects of ordinary
knowledge. (43) Thence I pass on to indicate the false notions, which have
from the fact that the multitude - ever prone to superstition, and caring
more for the shreds of antiquity for eternal truths - pays homage to the
Books of the Bible, rather than to the Word of God. (44) I show that the
Word of God has not been revealed as a certain number of books, was
displayed to the prophets as a simple idea of the mind, namely, obedience to
God in singleness of heart, and in the practice of justice and charity; and
I further point out, that this doctrine is set forth in Scripture in
accordance with the opinions and understandings of those, among whom the
Apostles and Prophets preached, to the end that men might receive it
willingly, and with their whole heart.

(45) Having thus laid bare the bases of belief, I draw the conclusion that
Revelation has obedience for its sole object, therefore, in purpose no less
than in foundation and method, stands entirely aloof from ordinary
knowledge; each has its separate province, neither can be called the
handmaid of the other.

(46) Furthermore, as men's habits of mind differ, so that some more readily
embrace one form of faith, some another, for what moves one to pray may move
another only to scoff, I conclude, in accordance with what has gone before,
that everyone should be free to choose for himself the foundations of his
creed, and that faith should be judged only by its fruits; each would then
obey God freely with his whole heart, while nothing would be publicly
honoured save justice and charity.

(47) Having thus drawn attention to the liberty conceded to everyone by the
revealed law of God, I pass on to another part of my subject, and prove that
this same liberty can and should be accorded with safety to the state and
the magisterial authority - in fact, that it cannot be withheld without
great danger to peace and detriment to the community.

(48) In order to establish my point, I start from the natural rights of the
individual, which are co-extensive with his desires and power, and from the
fact that no one is bound to live as another pleases, but is the guardian of
his own liberty. (49) I show that these rights can only be transferred to
those whom we depute to defend us, who acquire with the duties of defence
the power of ordering our lives, and I thence infer that rulers possess
rights only limited by their power, that they are the sole guardians of
justice and liberty, and that their subjects should act in all things as
they dictate: nevertheless, since no one can so utterly abdicate his own
power of self-defence as to cease to be a man, I conclude that no one can be
deprived of his natural rights absolutely, but that subjects, either by
tacit agreement, or by social contract, retain a certain number, which
cannot be taken from them without great danger to the state.

(50) From these considerations I pass on to the Hebrew State, which I
describe at some length, in order to trace the manner in which Religion
acquired the force of law, and to touch on other noteworthy points. (51) I
then prove, that the holders of sovereign power are the depositories and
interpreters of religious no less than of civil ordinances, and that they
alone have the right to decide what is just or unjust, pious or impious;
lastly, I conclude by showing, that they best retain this right and secure
safety to their state by allowing every man to think what he likes, and say
what he thinks.

(52) Such, Philosophical Reader, are the questions I submit to your notice,
counting on your approval, for the subject matter of the whole book and of
the several chapters is important and profitable. (53) I would say more, but
I do not want my preface to extend to a volume, especially as I know that
its leading propositions are to Philosophers but common places. (54) To the
rest of mankind I care not to commend my treatise, for I cannot expect that
it contains anything to please them: I know how deeply rooted are the
prejudices embraced under the name of religion; I am aware that in the mind
of the masses superstition is no less deeply rooted than fear; I recognize
that their constancy is mere obstinacy, and that they are led to praise or
blame by impulse rather than reason. (55) Therefore the multitude, and those
of like passions with the multitude, I ask not to read my book; nay, I would
rather that they should utterly neglect it, than that they should
misinterpret it after their wont. (56) They would gain no good themselves,
and might prove a stumbling-block to others, whose philosophy is hampered by
the belief that Reason is a mere handmaid to Theology, and whom I seek in
this work especially to benefit. (57) But as there will be many who have
neither the leisure, nor, perhaps, the inclination to read through all I
have written, I feel bound here, as at the end of my treatise, to declare
that I have written nothing, which I do not most willingly submit to the
examination and judgment of my country's rulers, and that I am ready to
retract anything, which they shall decide to be repugnant to the laws or
prejudicial to the public good. (58) I know that I am a man and, as a
man, liable to error, but against error I have taken scrupulous care, and
striven to keep in entire accordance with the laws of my country, with
loyalty, and with morality.




CHAPTER I. - Of Prophecy
(1) Prophecy, or revelation is sure knowledge revealed by God to man. (2) A
prophet is one who interprets the revelations of God {insights} to those who
are unable to attain to sure knowledge of the matters revealed, and
therefore can only apprehend them by simple faith.

(3) The Hebrew word for prophet is "naw-vee'", Strong:5030, [Endnote 1]
i.e. speaker or interpreter, but in Scripture its meaning is restricted to
interpreter of God, as we may learn from Exodus vii:1, where God says to
Moses, "See, I have made thee a god to Pharaoh, and Aaron thy brother shall
be thy prophet;" implying that, since in interpreting Moses' words to
Pharaoh, Aaron acted the part of a prophet, Moses would be to Pharaoh as a
god, or in the attitude of a god.

(4) Prophets I will treat of in the next chapter, and at present consider
prophecy.

(5) Now it is evident, from the definition above given, that prophecy really
includes ordinary knowledge; for the knowledge which we acquire by our
natural faculties depends on knowledge of God and His eternal laws; but
ordinary knowledge is common to all men as men, and rests on foundations
which all share, whereas the multitude always strains after rarities
and exceptions, and thinks little of the gifts of nature; so that, when
prophecy is talked of, ordinary knowledge is not supposed to be included.
(6) Nevertheless it has as much right as any other to be called Divine, for
God's nature, in so far as we share therein, and God's laws, dictate it to
us; nor does it suffer from that to which we give the preeminence, except in
so far as the latter transcends its limits and cannot be accounted for by
natural laws taken in themselves. (7) In respect to the certainty it
involves, and the source from which it is derived, i.e. God, ordinary,
knowledge is no whit inferior to prophetic, unless indeed we believe, or
rather dream, that the prophets had human bodies but superhuman minds, and
therefore that their sensations and consciousness were entirely different
from our own.

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