Book: A Theologico Political Treatise [Part II]

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(139) What we here say of Euclid might equally be said of any book which
treats of things by their nature perceptible: thus we conclude that we can
easily follow the intention of Scripture in moral questions, from the
history we possess of it, and we can be sure of its true meaning.

(140) The precepts of true piety are expressed in very ordinary language,
and are equally simple and easily understood. (141) Further, as true
salvation and blessedness consist in a true assent of the soul - and we
truly assent only to what we clearly understand - it is most plain that we
can follow with certainty the intention of Scripture in matters relating to
salvation and necessary to blessedness; therefore, we need not be much
troubled about what remains: such matters, inasmuch as we generally cannot
grasp them with our reason and understanding, are more curious than
profitable.

(142) I think I have now set forth the true method of Scriptural
interpretation, and have sufficiently explained my own opinion thereon.
(143) Besides, I do not doubt that everyone will see that such a method only
requires the aid of natural reason. (144) The nature and efficacy of the
natural reason consists in deducing and proving the unknown from the known,
or in carrying premises to their legitimate conclusions; and these are the
very processes which our method desiderates. (145) Though we must admit that
it does not suffice to explain everything in the Bible, such imperfection
does not spring from its own nature, but from the fact that the path
which it teaches us, as the true one, has never been tended or trodden by
men, and has thus, by the lapse of time, become very difficult, and almost
impassable, as, indeed, I have shown in the difficulties I draw attention
to.

(146) There only remains to examine the opinions of those who differ from
me. (147) The first which comes under our notice is, that the light of
nature has no power to interpret Scripture, but that a supernatural faculty
is required for the task. (148) What is meant by this supernatural faculty I
will leave to its propounders to explain. (149) Personally, I can only
suppose that they have adopted a very obscure way of stating their complete
uncertainty about the true meaning of Scripture. (150) If we look at their
interpretations, they contain nothing supernatural, at least nothing but the
merest conjectures.

(151) Let them be placed side by side with the interpretations of those who
frankly confess that they have no faculty beyond their natural ones; we
shall see that the two are just alike - both human, both long pondered over,
both laboriously invented. (152) To say that the natural reason is
insufficient for such results is plainly untrue, firstly, for the reasons
above stated, namely, that the difficulty of interpreting Scripture arises
from no defect in human reason, but simply from the carelessness (not to say
malice) of men who neglected the history of the Bible while there were still
materials for inquiry; secondly, from the fact (admitted, I think, by all)
that the supernatural faculty is a Divine gift granted only to the faithful.
(153) But the prophets and apostles did not preach to the faithful only, but
chiefly to the unfaithful and wicked. (154) Such persons, therefore, were
able to understand the intention of the prophets and apostles, otherwise the
prophets and apostles would have seemed to be preaching to little boys and
infants, not to men endowed with reason. (155) Moses, too, would have given
his laws in vain, if they could only be comprehended by the faithful, who
need no law. (156) Indeed, those who demand supernatural faculties for
comprehending the meaning of the prophets and apostles seem truly lacking in
natural faculties, so that we should hardly suppose such persons the
possessors of a Divine supernatural gift.

(157) The opinion of Maimonides was widely different. (158) He asserted
that each passage in Scripture admits of various, nay, contrary,
meanings; but that we could never be certain of any particular one till we
knew that the passage, as we interpreted it, contained nothing contrary or
repugnant to reason. (159) If the literal meaning clashes with reason,
though the passage seems in itself perfectly clear, it must be interpreted
in some metaphorical sense. (160) This doctrine he lays down very plainly in
chap. xxv. part ii. of his book, "More Nebuchim," for he says: "Know that we
shrink not from affirming that the world hath existed from eternity,
because of what Scripture saith concerning the world's creation. (161) For
the texts which teach that the world was created are not more in number than
those which teach that God hath a body; neither are the approaches in this
matter of the world's creation closed, or even made hard to us: so that we
should not be able to explain what is written, as we did when we showed
that God hath no body, nay, peradventure, we could explain and make fast the
doctrine of the world's eternity more easily than we did away with the
doctrines that God hath a beatified body. (162) Yet two things hinder me
from doing as I have said, and believing that the world is eternal.
(163) As it hath been clearly shown that God hath not a body, we must
perforce explain all those passages whereof the literal sense agreeth not
with the demonstration, for sure it is that they can be so explained. (164)
But the eternity of the world hath not been so demonstrated, therefore
it is not necessary to do violence to Scripture in support of some common
opinion, whereof we might, at the bidding of reason, embrace the contrary."

(165) Such are the words of Maimonides, and they are evidently sufficient to
establish our point: for if he had been convinced by reason that the world
is eternal, he would not have hesitated to twist and explain away the words
of Scripture till he made them appear to teach this doctrine. (166) He would
have felt quite sure that Scripture, though everywhere plainly denying the
eternity of the world, really intends to teach it. (167) So that, however
clear the meaning of Scripture may be, he would not feel certain of having
grasped it, so long as he remained doubtful of the truth of what, was
written. (168) For we are in doubt whether a thing is in conformity with
reason, or contrary thereto, so long as we are uncertain of its truth,
and, consequently, we cannot be sure whether the literal meaning of a
passage be true or false.

(169) If such a theory as this were sound, I would certainly grant that some
faculty beyond the natural reason is required for interpreting Scripture.
(170) For nearly all things that we find in Scripture cannot be inferred
from known principles of the natural reason, and, therefore, we should be
unable to come to any conclusion about their truth, or about the real
meaning and intention of Scripture, but should stand in need of some
further assistance.

(171) Further, the truth of this theory would involve that the masses,
having generally no comprehension of, nor leisure for, detailed proofs,
would be reduced to receiving all their knowledge of Scripture on the
authority and testimony of philosophers, and, consequently, would be
compelled to suppose that the interpretations given by philosophers were
infallible.

(172) Truly this would be a new form of ecclesiastical authority, and a new
sort of priests or pontiffs, more likely to excite men's ridicule than their
veneration. (173) Certainly our method demands a knowledge of Hebrew for
which the masses have no leisure; but no such objection as the foregoing can
be brought against us. (174) For the ordinary Jews or Gentiles, to whom the
prophets and apostles preached and wrote, understood the language, and,
consequently, the intention of the prophet or apostle addressing them; but
they did not grasp the intrinsic reason of what was preached, which,
according to Maimonides, would be necessary for an understanding of it.

(175) There is nothing, then, in our method which renders it necessary that
the masses should follow the testimony of commentators, for I point to a set
of unlearned people who understood the language of the prophets and
apostles; whereas Maimonides could not point to any such who could arrive at
the prophetic or apostolic meaning through their knowledge of the causes
of things.

(176) As to the multitude of our own time, we have shown that whatsoever is
necessary to salvation, though its reasons may be unknown, can easily be
understood in any language, because it is thoroughly ordinary and usual; it
is in such understanding as this that the masses acquiesce, not in the
testimony of commentators; with regard to other questions, the ignorant and
the learned fare alike.

(177) But let us return to the opinion of Maimonides, and examine it more
closely. In the first place, he supposes that the prophets were in entire
agreement one with another, and that they were consummate philosophers and
theologians; for he would have them to have based their conclusions on the
absolute truth. (178) Further, he supposes that the sense of Scripture
cannot be made plain from Scripture itself, for the truth of things is not
made plain therein (in that it does not prove any thing, nor teach the
matters of which it speaks through their definitions and first causes),
therefore, according to Maimonides, the true sense of Scripture cannot be
made plain from itself, and must not be there sought.

(179) The falsity of such a doctrine is shown in this very chapter, for we
have shown both by reason and examples that the meaning of Scripture is only
made plain through Scripture itself, and even in questions deducible from
ordinary knowledge should be looked for from no other source.

(180) Lastly, such a theory supposes that we may explain the words of
Scripture according to our preconceived opinions, twisting them about, and
reversing or completely changing the literal sense, however plain it may be.
(181) Such licence is utterly opposed to the teaching of this and the
preceding chapters, and, moreover, will be evident to everyone as rash and
excessive.

(182) But if we grant all this licence, what can it effect after all?
Absolutely nothing. (183) Those things which cannot be demonstrated, and
which make up the greater part of Scripture, cannot be examined by reason,
and cannot therefore be explained or interpreted by this rule; whereas,
on the contrary, by following our own method, we can explain many questions
of this nature, and discuss them on a sure basis, as we have already shown,
by reason and example. (184) Those matters which are by their nature
comprehensible we can easily explain, as has been pointed out, simply by
means of the context.

(185) Therefore, the method of Maimonides is clearly useless: to which we
may add, that it does away with all the certainty which the masses acquire
by candid reading, or which is gained by any other persons in any other way.
(186) In conclusion, then, we dismiss Maimonides' theory as harmful,
useless, and absurd.

(187) As to the tradition of the Pharisees, we have already shown that it is
not consistent, while the authority of the popes of Rome stands in need of
more credible evidence; the latter, indeed, I reject simply on this ground,
for if the popes could point out to us the meaning of Scripture as surely as
did the high priests of the Jews, I should not be deterred by the fact that
there have been heretic and impious Roman pontiffs; for among the Hebrew
high-priests of old there were also heretics and impious men who gained the
high- priesthood by improper means, but who, nevertheless, had Scriptural
sanction for their supreme power of interpreting the law. (See
Deut. xvii:11, 12, and xxxiii:10, also Malachi ii:8.)

(188) However, as the popes can show no such sanction, their authority
remains open to very grave doubt, nor should anyone be deceived by the
example of the Jewish high-priests and think that the Catholic religion also
stands in need of a pontiff; he should bear in mind that the laws of Moses
being also the ordinary laws of the country, necessarily required some
public authority to insure their observance; for, if everyone were free to
interpret the laws of his country as he pleased, no state could stand, but
would for that very reason be dissolved at once, and public rights would
become private rights.

(189) With religion the case is widely different. Inasmuch as it consists
not so much in outward actions as in simplicity and truth of character, it
stands outside the sphere of law and public authority. (190) Simplicity and
truth of character are not produced by the constraint of laws, nor by
the authority of the state, no one the whole world over can be forced or
legislated into a state of blessedness; the means required for such a
consummation are faithful and brotherly admonition, sound education, and,
above all, free use of the individual judgment.

(191) Therefore, as the supreme right of free thinking, even on religion, is
in every man's power, and as it is inconceivable that such power could be
alienated, it is also in every man's power to wield the supreme right and
authority of free judgment in this behalf, and to explain and interpret
religion for himself. (192) The only reason for vesting the supreme
authority in the interpretation of law, and judgment on public affairs in
the hands of the magistrates, is that it concerns questions of public right.
(193) Similarly the supreme authority in explaining religion, and in passing
judgment thereon, is lodged with the individual because it concerns
questions of individual right. (194) So far, then, from the authority of the
Hebrew high-priests telling in confirmation of the authority of the Roman
pontiffs to interpret religion, it would rather tend to establish individual
freedom of judgment. (195) Thus in this way also, we have shown that our
method of interpreting Scripture is the best. (196) For as the highest power
of Scriptural interpretation belongs to every man, the rule for such
interpretation should be nothing but the natural light of reason which is
common to all - not any supernatural light nor any external authority;
moreover, such a rule ought not to be so difficult that it can only be
applied by very skilful philosophers, but should be adapted to the natural
and ordinary faculties and capacity of mankind. (197) And such I have shown
our method to be, for such difficulties as it has arise from men's
carelessness, and are no part of its nature.





CHAPTER VIII. - OF THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE PENTATEUCH AND THE OTHER
HISTORICAL BOOKS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

(1) In the former chapter we treated of the foundations and principles of
Scriptural knowledge, and showed that it consists solely in a trustworthy
history of the sacred writings; such a history, in spite of its
indispensability, the ancients neglected, or at any rate, whatever they may
have written or handed down has perished in the lapse of time, consequently
the groundwork for such an investigation is to a great extent, cut from
under us. (2) This might be put up with if succeeding generations had
confined themselves within the limits of truth, and had handed down
conscientiously what few particulars they had received or discovered without
any additions from their own brains: as it is, the history of the Bible is
not so much imperfect as untrustworthy: the foundations are not only too
scanty for building upon, but are also unsound. (3) It is part of my purpose
to remedy these defects, and to remove common theological prejudices. (4)
But I fear that I am attempting my task too late, for men have arrived at
the pitch of not suffering contradiction, but defending obstinately whatever
they have adopted under the name of religion. (5) So widely have these
prejudices taken possession of men's minds, that very few, comparatively
speaking, will listen to reason. (6) However, I will make the attempt, and
spare no efforts, for there is no positive reason for despairing of success.

(7) In order to treat the subject methodically, I will begin with the
received opinions concerning the true authors of the sacred books, and in
the first place, speak of the author of the Pentateuch, who is almost
universally supposed to have been Moses. (8) The Pharisees are so firmly
convinced of his identity, that they account as a heretic anyone who differs
from them on the subject. (9) Wherefore, Aben Ezra, a man of enlightened
intelligence, and no small learning, who was the first, so far as I know,
to treat of this opinion, dared not express his meaning openly, but confined
himself to dark hints which I shall not scruple to elucidate, thus throwing,
full light on the subject.

(10) The words of Aben Ezra which occur in his commentary on Deuteronomy are
as follows: "Beyond Jordan, &c . . . If so be that thou understandest the
mystery of the twelve . . . moreover Moses wrote the law . . . The
Canaanite was then in the land . . . . it shall be revealed on the mount of
God . . . . then also behold his bed, his iron bed, then shalt thou know
the truth." (11) In these few words he hints, and also shows that it was not
Moses who wrote the Pentateuch, but someone who lived long after him, and
further, that the book which Moses wrote was something different from any
now extant.

(12) To prove this, I say, he draws attention to the facts:

(13) 1. That the preface to Deuteronomy could not have been written by
Moses, inasmuch as he ad never crossed the Jordan.

(14) II. That the whole book of Moses was written at full length on the
circumference of a single altar (Deut. xxvii, and Josh. viii:37), which
altar, according to the Rabbis, consisted of only twelve stones: therefore
the book of Moses must have been of far less extent than the Pentateuch.
(15) This is what our author means, I think, by the mystery of the twelve,
unless he is referring to the twelve curses contained in the chapter of
Deuteronomy above cited, which he thought could not have been contained in
the law, because Moses bade the Levites read them after the recital of the
law, and so bind the people to its observance. (16) Or again, he may have
had in his mind the last chapter of Deuteronomy which treats of the death of
Moses, and which contains twelve verses. (17) But there is no need to dwell
further on these and similar conjectures.

(18) III. That in Deut. xxxi:9, the expression occurs, "and Moses wrote the
law:" words that cannot be ascribed to Moses, but must be those of some
other writer narrating the deeds and writings of Moses.

(19) IV. That in Genesis xii:6, the historian, after narrating that Abraham
journeyed through the and of Canaan, adds, "and the Canaanite was then in
the land," thus clearly excluding the time at which he wrote. (20) So that
this passage must have been written after the death of Moses, when the
Canaanites had been driven out, and no longer possessed the land.

(21) Aben Ezra, in his commentary on the passage, alludes to the difficulty
as follows:- "And the Canaanite was then in the land: it appears that
Canaan, the grandson of Noah, took from another the land which bears his
name; if this be not the true meaning, there lurks some mystery in the
passage, and let him who understands it keep silence." (22) That is, if
Canaan invaded those regions, the sense will be, the Canaanite was then in
the land, in contradistinction to the time when it had been held by another:
but if, as follows from Gen. chap. x. Canaan was the first to inhabit the
land, the text must mean to exclude the time present, that is the time at
which it was written; therefore it cannot be the work of Moses, in
whose time the Canaanites still possessed those territories: this is the
mystery concerning which silence is recommended.

(23) V. That in Genesis xxii:14 Mount Moriah is called the mount of God,
[Endnote 9], a name which it did not acquire till after the building of the
Temple; the choice of the mountain was not made in the time of Moses, for
Moses does not point out any spot as chosen by God; on the contrary, he
foretells that God will at some future time choose a spot to which this name
will be given.

(24) VI. Lastly, that in Deut. chap. iii., in the passage relating to Og,
king of Bashan, these words are inserted: "For only Og king of Bashan
remained of the remnant of giants: behold, his bedstead was a bedstead of
iron: is it not in Rabbath of the children of Ammon? nine cubits was the
length thereof, and four cubits the breadth of it, after the cubit of a
man." (25) This parenthesis most plainly shows that its writer lived long
after Moses; for this mode of speaking is only employed by one treating of
things long past, and pointing to relics for the sake of gaining credence:
moreover, this bed was almost certainly first discovered by David, who
conquered the city of Rabbath (2 Sam. xii:30.) (26) Again, the historian a
little further on inserts after the words of Moses, "Jair, the son of
Manasseh, took all the country of Argob unto the coasts of Geshuri and
Maachathi; and called them after his own name, Bashan-havoth-jair, unto this
day." (27) This passage, I say, is inserted to explain the words of Moses
which precede it. (28) "And the rest of Gilead, and all Bashan, being the
kingdom of Og, gave I unto the half tribe of Manasseh; all the region of
Argob, with all Bashan, which is called the land of the giants." (29) The
Hebrews in the time of the writer indisputably knew what territories
belonged to the tribe of Judah, but did not know them under the name of the
jurisdiction of Argob, or the land of the giants. (30) Therefore the writer
is compelled to explain what these places were which were anciently so
styled, and at the same time to point out why they were at the time of his
writing known by the name of Jair, who was of the tribe of Manasseh, not of
Judah. (31) We have thus made clear the meaning of Aben Ezra and also the
passages of the Pentateuch which he cites in proof of his contention. (32)
However, Aben Ezra does not call attention to every instance, or even the
chief ones; there remain many of greater importance, which may be cited.
(33) Namely (I.), that the writer of the books in question not only speaks
of Moses in the third person, but also bears witness to many details
concerning him; for instance, "Moses talked with God;" "The Lord spoke with
Moses face to face; " "Moses was the meekest of men" (Numb. xii:3); "Moses
was wrath with the captains of the host; "Moses, the man of God, "Moses, the
servant of the Lord, died;" "There was never a prophet in Israel like
unto Moses," &c. (34) On the other hand, in Deuteronomy, where the law which
Moses had expounded to the people and written is set forth, Moses speaks and
declares what he has done in the first person: "God spake with me " (Deut.
ii:1, 17, &c.), "I prayed to the Lord," &c. (35) Except at the end of the
book, when the historian, after relating the words of Moses, begins again to
speak in the third person, and to tell how Moses handed over the law which
he had expounded to the people in writing, again admonishing them, and
further, how Moses ended his life. (36) All these details, the manner of
narration, the testimony, and the context of the whole story lead to the
plain conclusion that these books were written by another, and not by Moses
in person.

(37) III. We must also remark that the history relates not only the manner
of Moses' death and burial, and the thirty days' mourning of the Hebrews,
but further compares him with all the prophets who came after him, and
states that he surpassed them all. (38) "There was never a prophet in Israel
like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face." (39) Such testimony
cannot have been given of Moses by, himself, nor by any who immediately
succeeded him, but it must come from someone who lived centuries afterwards,
especially, as the historian speaks of past times. (40) "There was never a
prophet," &c. (41) And of the place of burial, "No one knows it to this
day."

(42) III. We must note that some places are not styled by the names they
bore during Moses' lifetime, but by others which they obtained subsequently.
(43) For instance, Abraham is said to have pursued his enemies even unto
Dan, a name not bestowed on the city till long after the death of Joshua
(Gen. xiv;14, Judges xviii;29).

(44) IV. The narrative is prolonged after the death of Moses, for in
Exodus xvi:34 we read that "the children of Israel did eat manna forty
years until they came to a land inhabited, until they came unto the borders
of the land of Canaan." (45) In other words, until the time alluded to in
Joshua vi:12.

(46) So, too, in Genesis xxxvi:31 it is stated, "These are the kings that
reigned in Edom before there reigned any king over the children of Israel."
(47) The historian, doubtless, here relates the kings of Idumaea before that
territory was conquered by David [Endnote 10] and garrisoned, as we read
in 2 Sam. viii:14. (48) From what has been said, it is thus clearer than the
sun at noonday that the Pentateuch was not written by Moses, but by someone
who lived long after Moses. (49) Let us now turn our attention to the books
which Moses actually did write, and which are cited in the Pentateuch; thus,
also, shall we see that they were different from the Pentateuch. (50)
Firstly, it appears from Exodus xvii:14 that Moses, by the command of God,
wrote an account of the war against Amalek. (51) The book in which he did so
is not named in the chapter just quoted, but in Numb. xxi:12 a book is
referred to under the title of the wars of God, and doubtless this war
against Amalek and the castrametations said in Numb. xxxiii:2 to have been
written by Moses are therein described. (52) We hear also in Exod. xxiv:4 of
another book called the Book of the Covenant, which Moses read before the
Israelites when they first made a covenant with God. (53) But this book or
this writing contained very little, namely, the laws or commandments of God
which we find in Exodus xx:22 to the end of chap. xxiv., and this no one
will deny who reads the aforesaid chapter rationally and impartially. (54)
It is there stated that as soon as Moses had learnt the feeling of the
people on the subject of making a covenant with God, he immediately wrote
down God's laws and utterances, and in the morning, after some ceremonies
had been performed, read out the conditions of the covenant to an assembly
of the whole people. (55) When these had been gone through, and doubtless
understood by all, the whole people gave their assent.

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