Book: The Ethics [Part II]
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Benedict de Spinoza >> The Ethics [Part II]
Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS
(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
Translated by R. H. M. Elwes
Part II: ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND
PREFACE I now pass on to explaining the results, which must
necessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal
and infinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in
Part i., Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in an
infinite number of ways), but only those which are able to lead
us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind
and its highest blessedness.
DEFINITIONS I. By 'body' I mean a mode which expresses in a
certain determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he
is considered as an extended thing. (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv.
Cor.)
II. I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that,
which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and,
which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; in
other words, that without which the thing, and which itself
without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.
III. By 'idea,' I mean the mental conception which is formed by
the mind as a thinking thing.
>>>>>Explanation--I say 'conception' rather than perception,
because the word perception seems to imply that the mind is
passive in respect to the object; whereas conception seems to
express an activity of the mind.
IV. By 'an adequate idea,' I mean an idea which, in so far as
it is considered in itself, without relation to the object, has
all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.
>>>>>Explanation--I say 'intrinsic,' in order to exclude that
mark which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea
and its object (ideatum).
V. 'Duration' is the indefinite continuance of existing.
>>>>>Explanation--I say 'indefinite,' because it cannot be
determined through the existence itself of the existing thing,
or by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence
of the thing, but does not take it away.
VI. 'Reality' and 'perfection' I use as synonymous terms.
VII. By 'particular things,' I mean things which are finite and
have a conditioned existence; but if several individual things
concur in one action, so as to be all simultaneously the effect
of one cause, I consider them all, so far, as one particular
thing.
AXIOMS I. The essence of man does not involve necessary
existence, that is, it may, in the order of nature, come to pass
that this or that man does or does not exist.
II. Man thinks.
III. Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of
the passions, do not take place, unless there be in the same
individual an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c. But the idea
can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.
IV. We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.
V. We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and
modes of thought.
N.B. The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop.
xiii.
PROPOSITIONS I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a
thinking thing.
>>>>>Proof--Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are
modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature
of God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Cor.). God therefore possesses the
attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved in
all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby.
Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God,
which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def.
vi.). In other words, God is a thinking thing. Q.E.D.
*****Note--This proposition is also evident from the fact, that
we are able to conceive an infinite thinking being. For, in
proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more
thoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or
perfection. Therefore a being, which can think an infinite
number of things in an infinite number of ways, is,
necessarily, in respect of thinking, infinite. As, therefore,
from the consideration of thought alone, we conceive an infinite
being, thought is necessarily (Pt. i., Deff. iv. and vi.) one of
the infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.
II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended
thing.
>>>>>Proof--The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
the last.
III. In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his
essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from
his essence.
>>>>>Proof--God (by the first Prop. of this Part) can think an
infinite number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the same
thing, by Prop. xvi., Part i.) can form the idea of his essence,
and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom. Now all
that is in the power of God necessarily is (Pt. i., Prop.
xxxv.). Therefore, such an idea as we are considering
necessarily is, and in God alone. Q.E.D. (Part i., Prop. xv.)
*****Note--The multitude understand by the power of God the free
will of God, and the right over all things that exist, which
latter are accordingly generally considered as contingent. For
it is said that God has the power to destroy all things, and to
reduce them to nothing. Further, the power of God is very often
likened to the power of kings. But this doctrine we have
refuted (Pt. i., Prop. xxxii., Cors. i. and ii.), and we have
shown (Part i., Prop. xvi.) that God acts by the same necessity,
as that by which he understands himself; in other words, as it
follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit),
that God understands himself, so also does it follow by the same
necessity, that God performs infinite acts in infinite ways. We
further showed (Part i., Prop. xxxiv.), that God's power is
identical with God's essence in action; therefore it is as
impossible for us to conceive God as not acting, as to conceive
him as non-existent. If we might pursue the subject further, I
could point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to
God is not only human (as showing that God is conceived by the
multitude as a man, or in the likeness of a man), but involves a
negation of power. However, I am unwilling to go over the same
ground so often. I would only beg the reader again and again, to
turn over frequently in his mind what I have said in Part i.
from Prop. xvi. to the end. No one will be able to follow my
meaning, unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the
power of God with the human power and right of kings.
IV. The idea of God, from which an infinite number of things
follow in infinite ways, can only be one.
>>>>>Proof--Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the
attributes of God and his modifications (Part i., Prop. xxx.).
Now God is one (Part i., Prop. xiv., Cor.). Therefore the idea
of God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in infinite
ways, can only be one. Q.E.D.
V. The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only in so
far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far as he
is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas both of
the attributes of God and of particular things do not own as
their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things
perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.
>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this
Part. We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea
of his essence, and of all things which follow necessarily
therefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because
he is the object of his own idea. Wherefore the actual being of
ideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing.
It may be differently proved as follows: the actual being of
ideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i., Prop.
xxv., Cor.) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the
nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore
(Part i., Prop. x.) involves the conception of no other attribute
of God, and consequently (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effect
of any attribute save thought. Therefore the actual being of
ideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a
thinking thing, &c. Q.E.D.
VI. The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in so
far as he is considered through the attribute of which they are
modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any other
attribute.
>>>>>Proof--Each attribute is conceived through itself, without
any other part (Part i., Prop. x.); wherefore the modes of each
attribute involve the conception of that attribute, but not of
any other. Thus (Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, only
in so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modes
they are, and not in so far as he is considered through any
other. Q.E.D.
<<<<
modes of thought, does not follow from the divine nature,
because that nature has prior knowledge of the things. Things
represented in ideas follow, and are derived from their
particular attribute, in the same manner, and with the same
necessity as ideas follow (according to what we have shown) from
the attribute of thought.
VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order
and connection of things.
>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv.
For the idea of everything that is caused depends on a
knowledge of the cause, whereof it is an effect.
<<<<realized power of action-- that is, whatsoever follows from the
infinite nature of God in the world of extension (formaliter),
follows without exception in the same order and connection from
the idea of God in the world of thought (objective).
*****Note--Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind
what has been pointed out above--namely, that whatsoever can be
perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence
of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance:
consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one
and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute,
now through the other. So, also, a mode of extension and the
idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed
in two ways. This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by
those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the
things understood by God are identical. For instance, a circle
existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is
also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through
different attributes. Thus, whether we conceive nature under the
attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or
under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one
and the same chain of causes--that is, the same things following
in either case.
I said that God is the cause of an idea--for instance, of the
idea of a circle,--in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a
circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the
actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a
proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again
through another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as we
consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order
of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through
the attribute of thought only. And, in so far as we consider
things as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the
whole of nature through the attributes of extension only; and so
on, in the case of the other attributes. Wherefore of things as
they are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he
consists of infinite attributes. I cannot for the present
explain my meaning more clearly.
VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not
exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in the
same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes
are contained in the attributes of God.
>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from the last; it is
understood more clearly from the preceding note.
<<<<exist, except in so far as they are comprehended in the
attributes of God, their representations in thought or ideas do
not exist, except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists;
and when the particular things are said to exist, not only in so
far as they are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so
far as they are said to continue, their ideas will also involve
existence, through which they are said to continue.
*****Note--If anyone desires an example to throw more light on
this question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any,
which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak,
inasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavour to
illustrate it as far as possible. The nature of a circle is
such that if any number of straight lines intersect within it,
the rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one
another; thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a
circle. Yet none of these rectangles can be said to exist,
except in so far as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of
these rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as they are
comprehended in the idea of the circle. Let us grant that,
from this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist. The
ideas of these two not only exist, in so far as they are
contained in the idea of the circle, but also as they involve the
existence of those rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished
from the remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.
IX. The idea of an individual thing actually existing is caused
by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is
considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually
existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected
by a third idea, and so on to infinity.
>>>>>Proof--The idea of an individual thing actually existing is
an individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes
(by the Cor. and Note to Prop. viii. of this part); thus (by
Prop. vi. of this part) it is caused by God, in so far only as he
is a thinking thing. But not (by Prop. xxviii. of Part i.) in
so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely, only in so far as
he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking; and he
is the cause of this latter, as being affected by a third, and
so on to infinity. Now, the order and connection of ideas is
(by Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the order and connection
of causes. Therefore of a given individual idea another
individual idea, or God, in so far as he is considered as
modified by that idea, is the cause; and of this second idea God
is the cause, in so far as he is affected by another idea, and
so on to infinity. Q.E.D.
<<<<of any idea, the knowledge thereof is in God, in so far only as
he has the idea of the object.
>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its
idea is in God (by Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far as he
is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by
another idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop.); but (by
Prop. vii. of this part) the order and connection of ideas is
the same as the order and connection of things. The knowledge,
therefore, of that which takes place in any individual object
will be in God, in so far only as he has the idea of that
object. Q.E.D.
X. The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of
man--in other words, substance does not constitute the actual
being (forma) of man.
>>>>>Proof--The being of substance involves necessary existence
(Part i., Prop. vii.). If, therefore, the being of substance
appertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, man
would necessarily be granted also (II. Def. ii.), and,
consequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd (II.
Ax. i.). Therefore &c. Q.E.D.
*****Note--This proposition may also be proved from I.v., in
which it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the
same nature; for as there may be many men, the being of
substance is not that which constitutes the actual being of man.
Again, the proposition is evident from the other properties of
substance--namely, that substance is in its nature infinite,
immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone may see for himself.
<<<<constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God.
For (by the last Prop.) the being of substance does not belong
to the essence of man. That essence therefore (by I. xv.) is
something which is in God, and which without God can neither be
nor be conceived, whether it be a modification (I. xxv. Cor.),
or a mode which expresses God's nature in a certain conditioned
manner.
*****Note--Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be
conceived without God. All men agree that God is the one and
only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their
existence; that is, God is not only the cause of things in
respect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also in
respect to their being (secundum esse).
At the same time many assert, that that, without which a thing
cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that
thing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God
appertains to the essence of created things, or else that created
things can be or be conceived without God; or else, as is more
probably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines. I think
the cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to
the proper order of philosophic thinking. The nature of God,
which should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both
in the order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have
taken to be last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the
first place what they call the objects of sensation; hence,
while they are considering natural phenomena, they give no
attention at all to the divine nature, and, when afterwards they
apply their mind to the study of the divine nature, they are
quite unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses, with which
they have overlaid the knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch
as such hypotheses are no help towards understanding the divine
nature. So that it is hardly to be wondered at, that these
persons contradict themselves freely.
However, I pass over this point. My intention her was only to
give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing
cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing:
individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God
does not appertain to their essence. I said that "I considered
as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given,
the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the
thing is necessarily removed also; or that without which the
thing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be
conceived." (II. Def. ii.)
XI. The first element, which constitutes the actual being of the
human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually
existing.
>>>>>Proof--The essence of man (by the Cor. of the last Prop.) is
constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely
(by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II.
Ax. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is
given, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior
in nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom).
Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human
mind. But not the idea of a non-existent thing, for then (II.
viii. Cor.) the idea itself cannot be said to exist; it must
therefore be the idea of something actually existing. But not of
an infinite thing. For an infinite thing (I. xxi., xxii.), must
always necessarily exist; this would (by II. Ax. i.) involve an
absurdity. Therefore the first element, which constitutes the
actual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actually
existing. Q.E.D.
<<<<the infinite intellect of God; thus when we say, that the human
mind perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God has
this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far
as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in
so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; and when
we say that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he
constitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as
he, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea of
another thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a thing
in part or inadequately.
*****Note--Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and
will call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate;
I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and
not to pronounce on my statements, till they have read to the
end.
XII. Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea, which
constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the human mind,
or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of the
said occurrence. That is, if the object of the idea constituting
the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in that body
without being perceived by the mind.
>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea,
the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God (II. ix. Cor.), in
so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the said
object, that is (II. xi.), in so far as he constitutes the mind
of anything. Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the object
constituting the idea of the human mind, the knowledge thereof
is necessarily in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of
the human mind; that is (by II. xi. Cor.) the knowledge of the
said thing will necessarily be in the mind, in other words the
mind perceives it.
*****Note--This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly
to be understood from II. vii., which see.
XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the
body, in other words a certain mode of extension which actually
exists, and nothing else.
>>>>>Proof--If indeed the body were not the object of the human
mind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in
God (II. ix. Cor.) in virtue of his constituting our mind, but
in virtue of his constituting the mind of something else; that is
(II. xi. Cor.) the ideas of the modifications of the body would
not be in our mind: now (by II. Ax. iv.) we do possess the idea
of the modifications of the body. Therefore the object of the
idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body as it
actually exists (II. xi.). Further, if there were any other
object of the idea constituting the mind besides body, then, as
nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I.
xxxvi.) there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea,
which would be the effect of that other object (II. xi.); but
(I. Ax. v.) there is no such idea. Wherefore the object of our
mind is the body as it exists, and nothing else. Q.E.D.
*****Note--We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is
united to the body, but also the nature of the union between
mind and body. However, no one will be able to grasp this
adequately or distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge
of the nature of our body. The propositions we have advanced
hitherto have been entirely general, applying not more to men
than to other individual things, all of which, though in
different degrees, are animated (animata). For of everything
there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause,
in the same way as there is an idea of the human body; thus
whatever we have asserted of the idea of the human body must
necessarily also be asserted of the idea of everything else.
Still, on the other hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like
objects, differ one from the other, one being more excellent than
another and containing more reality, just as the object of one
idea is more excellent than the object of another idea, and
contains more reality.
Wherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind differs
from other things, and wherein it surpasses them, it is
necessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is, of
the human body. What this nature is, I am not able here to
explain, nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance,
that I should do so. I will only say generally, that in
proportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing
many actions or receiving many impressions at once, so also is
the mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others for
forming many simultaneous perceptions; and the more the actions
of the body depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies
concur with it in action, the more fitted is the mind of which
it is the object for distinct comprehension. We may thus
recognize the superiority of one mind over others, and may
further see the cause, why we have only a very confused
knowledge of our body, and also many kindred questions, which I
will, in the following propositions, deduce from what has been
advanced. Wherefore I have thought it worth while to explain
and prove more strictly my present statements. In order to do
so, I must premise a few propositions concerning the nature of
bodies.