Book: The Fight For The Republic in China
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Bertram Lenox Putnam Weale >> The Fight For The Republic in China
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FOOTNOTES:
[13] Refers to preaching Buddhism.
[14] The reader will observe, that the expression "Hanyehping
enterprises" is compounded by linking together characters denoting the
triple industry.
[15] Six articles found in Japan's Revised Demands are omitted here as
they had already been initialled by the Chinese Foreign Minister and the
Japanese Minister.
CHAPTER VII
THE ORIGIN OF THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS
The key to this remarkable business was supplied by a cover sent
anonymously to the writer during the course of these negotiations with
no indication as to its origin. The documents which this envelope
contained are so interesting that they merit attention at the hands of
all students of history, explaining as they do the psychology of the
Demands as well as throwing much light on the manner in which the
world-war has been viewed in Japan.
The first document is purely introductory, but is none the less
interesting. It is a fragment, or rather a _precis_ of the momentous
conversation which took place between Yuan Shih-kai and the Japanese
Minister when the latter personally served the Demands on the Chief
Executive and took the opportunity to use language unprecedented even in
the diplomatic history of Peking.
The _precis_ begins in a curious way. After saying that "the Japanese
Minister tried to influence President Yuan Shih-kai with the following
words," several long lines of asterisks suggest that after reflection
the unknown chronicler had decided, for political reasons of the highest
importance, to allow others to guess how the "conversation" opened. From
the context it seems absolutely clear that the excised words have to
deal with the possibility of the re-establishment of the Empire in
China--a very important conclusion in view of what followed later in the
year. Indeed there is no reason to doubt that the Japanese Envoy
actually told Yuan Shih-kai that as he was already virtually Emperor it
lay within his power to settle the whole business and to secure his
position at one blow. In any case the _precis_ begins with these
illuminating sentences:
... Furthermore, the Chinese revolutionists are in close touch and
have intimate relations with numerous irresponsible Japanese, some
of whom have great influence and whose policy is for strong
measures. Our Government has not been influenced by this policy, but
if your Government does not quickly agree to these stipulations, it
will be impossible to prevent some of our irresponsible people from
inciting the Chinese revolutionists to create trouble in China.
The majority of the Japanese people are also opposed to President
Yuan and Yuan's Government. They all declare that the President
entertains anti-Japanese feeling and adopts the policy of
"befriending the Far" (Europe and America) and "antagonizing the
Near" (Japan). Japanese public opinion is therefore exceedingly
hostile.
Our Government has all along from first to last exerted its best
efforts to help the Chinese Government, and if the Chinese
Government will speedily agree to these stipulations it will have
thus manifested its friendship for Japan.
The Japanese people will then be able to say that the President
never entertained anti-Japanese feelings, or adopted the policy of
"befriending the Far and antagonizing the Near." Will not this then
be indeed a bona fide proof of our friendly relations?
The Japanese Government also will then be inclined to render
assistance to President Yuan's Government whenever it is
necessary....
We are admittedly living in a remarkable age which is making waste paper
of our dearest principles. But in all the welter which the world war has
made it would be difficult to find anything more extraordinary than
these few paragraphs. Japan, through her official representative, boldly
tears down the veil hiding her ambitions, and using the undoubted menace
which Chinese revolutionary activities then held for the Peking
Government, declares in so many words that unless President Yuan
Shih-kai bows his head to the dictation of Tokio, the duel which began
in Seoul twenty-five years ago would be openly resumed.
Immediately following the "conversation" is the principal document in
the dossier. This is nothing less than an exhaustive Memorandum, divided
into two sections, containing the policy advocated by the Japanese
secret society, called the Black Dragon Society, which is said to have
assumed that name on account of the members (military officers) having
studied the situation in the Heilungchiang (or "Black Dragon") province
of Manchuria. The memorandum is the most remarkable document dealing
with the Far East which has come to light since the famous Cassini
Convention was published in 1896. Written presumably late in the autumn
of 1914 and immediately presented to the Japanese Government, it may
undoubtedly be called the fulminate which exploded the Japanese mine of
the 18th January, 1915. It shows such sound knowledge of
world-conditions, and is so scientific in its detachment that little
doubt can exist that distinguished Japanese took part in its drafting.
It can therefore be looked upon as a genuine expression of the highly
educated Japanese mind, and as such cannot fail to arouse serious
misgivings. The first part is a general review of the European War and
the Chinese Question: the second is concerned with the Defensive
Alliance between China and Japan, which is looked upon as the one goal
of all Japanese Diplomacy.
PART I. THE EUROPEAN WAR AND THE CHINESE QUESTION
The present gigantic struggle in Europe has no parallel in history.
Not only will the equilibrium of Europe be affected and its effect
felt all over the globe, but its results will create a New Era in
the political and social world. Therefore, whether or not the
Imperial Japanese Government can settle the Far Eastern Question and
bring to realization our great Imperial policy depends on our being
able to skilfully avail ourselves of the world's general trend of
affairs so as to extend our influence and to decide upon a course of
action towards China which shall be practical in execution. If our
authorities and people view the present European War with
indifference and without deep concern, merely devoting their
attention to the attack on Kiaochow, neglecting the larger issues of
the war, they will have brought to nought our great Imperial policy,
and committed a blunder greater than which it can not be conceived.
We are constrained to submit this statement of policy for the
consideration of our authorities, not because we are fond of
argument but because we are deeply anxious for our national welfare.
No one at present can foretell the outcome of the European War. If
the Allies meet with reverses and victory shall crown the arms of
the Germans and Austrians, German militarism will undoubtedly
dominate the European Continent and extend southward and eastward to
other parts of the world. Should such a state of affairs happen to
take place the consequences resulting therefrom will be indeed great
and extensive. On this account we must devote our most serious
attention to the subject. If, on the other hand, the Germans and
Austrians should be crushed by the Allies, Germany will be deprived
of her present status as a Federated State under a Kaiser. The
Federation will be disintegrated into separate states, and Prussia
will have to be content with the status of a second-rate Power.
Austria and Hungary, on account of this defeat, will consequently be
divided. What their final fate shall be, no one would now venture
to predict. In the meantime Russia will annex Galicia and the
Austrian Poland: France will repossess Alsace and Lorraine: Great
Britain will occupy the German Colonies in Africa and the South
Pacific; Servia and Montenegro will take Bosnia, Herzegovina and a
certain portion of Austrian Territory; thus making such great
changes in the map of Europe that even the Napoleonic War in 1815
could not find a parallel.
When these events take place, not only will Europe experience great
changes, but we should not ignore the fact that they will occur also
in China and in the South Pacific. After Russia has replaced Germany
in the territories lost by Germany and Austria, she will hold a
controlling influence in Europe, and, for a long time to come, will
have nothing to fear from her western frontier. Immediately after
the war she will make an effort to carry out her policy of expansion
in the East and will not relax that effort until she has acquired a
controlling influence in China. At the same time Great Britain will
strengthen her position in the Yangtsze Valley and prohibit any
other country from getting a footing there. France will do likewise
in Yunnan province using it as her base of operations for further
encroachments upon China and never hesitate to extend her
advantages. We must therefore seriously study the situation
remembering always that the combined action of Great Britain,
Russia, and France will not only affect Europe but that we can even
foresee that it will also affect China.
Whether this combined action on the part of England, France and
Russia is to terminate at the end of the war or to continue to
operate, we can not now predict. But after peace in Europe is
restored, these Powers will certainly turn their attention to the
expansion of their several spheres of interest in China, and, in the
adjustment, their interests will most likely conflict with one
another. If their interests do not conflict, they will work jointly
to solve the Chinese Question. On this point we have not the least
doubt. If England, France and Russia are actually to combine for the
coercion of China, what course is to be adopted by the Imperial
Japanese Government to meet the situation? What proper means shall
we employ to maintain our influence and extend our interests within
this ring of rivalry and competition? It is necessary that we bear
in mind the final results of the European War and forestall the
trend of events succeeding it so as to be able to decide upon a
policy towards China and determine the action to be ultimately
taken. If we remain passive, the Imperial Japanese Government's
policy towards China will lose that subjective influence and our
diplomacy will be checked for ever by the combined force of the
other Powers. The peace of the Far East will be thus endangered and
even the existence of the Japanese Empire as a nation will no doubt
be imperilled. It is therefore our first important duty at this
moment to enquire of our Government what course is to be adopted to
face that general situation after the war? What preparations are
being made to meet the combined pressure of the Allies upon China?
What policy has been followed to solve the Chinese Question? When
the European War is terminated and peace restored we are not
concerned so much with the question whether it be the Dual
Monarchies or the Triple Entente which emerge victorious but
whether, in anticipation of the future expansion of European
influence in the Continents of Europe and Asia, the Imperial
Japanese Government should or should not hesitate to employ force to
check the movement before this occurrence. Now is the most opportune
moment for Japan to quickly solve the Chinese Question. Such an
opportunity will not occur for hundreds of years to come. Not only
is it Japan's divine duty to act now, but present conditions in
China favour the execution of such a plan. We should by all means
decide and act at once. If our authorities do not avail themselves
of this rare opportunity, great difficulty will surely be
encountered in future in the settlement of this Chinese Question.
Japan will be isolated from the European Powers after the war, and
will be regarded by them with envy and jealousy just as Germany is
now regarded. Is it not then a vital necessity for Japan to solve at
this very moment the Chinese Question?
No one--not even those who care nothing for politics--can deny that
there is in this document an astounding disclosure of the mental
attitude of the Japanese not only towards their enemies but towards
their friends as well. They trust nobody, befriend nobody, envy nobody;
they content themselves with believing that the whole world may in the
not distant future turn against them. The burden of their argument
swings just as much against their British ally as against Germany and
Austria; and the one and only matter which preoccupies Japanese who make
it their business to think about such things is to secure that Japan
shall forestall Europe in seizing control of China. It is admitted in so
many words that it is too early to know who is to triumph in the
gigantic European struggle; it is also admitted that Germany will
forever be the enemy. At the same time it is expected, should the issue
of the struggle be clear-cut and decisive in favour of the Allies, that
a new three-Power combination formed by England, France and Russia may
be made to operate against Japan. Although the alliance with England,
twice renewed since 1902, should occupy as important a place in the Far
East as the _Entente_ between England and France occupies in Europe, not
one Japanese in a hundred knows or cares anything about such an
arrangement; and even if he has knowledge of it, he coolly assigns to
his country's major international commitment a minimum and constantly
diminishing importance. In his view the British Alliance is nothing but
a piece of paper which may be consumed in the great bonfire now shedding
such a lurid light over the world. What is germane to the matter is his
own plan, his own method of taking up arms in a sea of troubles. The
second part of the Black Dragon Society's Memorandum, pursuing the
argument logically and inexorably and disclosing traces of real
political genius, makes this unalterably clear.
Having established clearly the attitude of Japan towards the world--and
more particularly towards the rival political combinations now locked
together in a terrible death-struggle, this second part of the
Memorandum is concerned solely with China and can be broken into two
convenient sections. The first section is constructive--the plan for the
reconstruction of China is outlined in terms suited to the Japanese
genius. This part begins with an illuminating piece of rhetoric.
PART II. THE CHINESE QUESTION AND THE DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE
It is a very important matter of policy whether the Japanese
Government, in obedience to its divine mission, shall solve the
Chinese Question in a heroic manner by making China voluntarily rely
upon Japan. To force China to such a position there is nothing else
for the Imperial Japanese Government to do but to take advantage of
the present opportunity to seize the reins of political and
financial power and to enter by all means into a defensive alliance
with her under secret terms as enumerated below:
_The Secret Terms of the Defensive Alliance_
The Imperial Japanese Government, with due respect for the
Sovereignty and Integrity of China and with the object and hope of
maintaining the peace of the Far East, undertakes to share the
responsibility of co-operating with China to guard her against
internal trouble and foreign invasion and China shall accord to
Japan special facilities in the matter of China's National Defence,
or the protection of Japan's special rights and privileges and for
these objects the following treaty of Alliance is to be entered into
between the two contracting parties:
1. When there is internal trouble in China or when she is at war
with another nation or nations, Japan shall send her army to render
assistance, to assume the responsibility of guarding Chinese
territory and to maintain peace and order in China.
2. China agrees to recognize Japan's privileged position in South
Manchuria and Inner Mongolia and to cede the sovereign rights of
these regions to Japan to enable her to carry out a scheme of local
defence on a permanent basis.
3. After the Japanese occupation of Kiaochow, Japan shall acquire
all the rights and privileges hitherto enjoyed by the Germans in
regard to railways, mines and all other interests, and after peace
and order is restored in Tsingtao, the place shall be handed back to
China to be opened as an International Treaty port.
4. For the maritime defence of China and Japan, China shall lease
strategic harbours along the coast of the Fukien province to Japan
to be converted into naval bases and grant to Japan in the said
province all railway and mining rights.
5. For the reorganization of the Chinese army China shall entrust
the training and drilling of the army to Japan.
6. For the unification of China's firearms and munitions of war,
China shall adopt firearms of Japanese pattern, and at the same time
establish arsenals (with the help of Japan) in different strategic
points.
7. With the object of creating and maintaining a Chinese Navy, China
shall entrust the training of her navy to Japan.
8. With the object of reorganizing her finances and improving the
methods of taxation, China shall entrust the work to Japan, and the
latter shall elect competent financial experts who shall act as
first-class advisers to the Chinese Government.
9. China shall engage Japanese educational experts as educational
advisers and extensively establish schools in different parts of the
country to teach Japanese so as to raise the educational standard of
the country.
10. China shall first consult with and obtain the consent of Japan
before she can enter into an agreement with another Power for making
loans, the leasing of territory, or the cession of the same.
From the date of the signing of this Defensive Alliance, Japan and
China shall work together hand-in-hand. Japan will assume the
responsibility of safeguarding Chinese territory and maintaining the
peace and order in China. This will relieve China of all future
anxieties and enable her to proceed energetically with her reforms,
and, with a sense of territorial security, she may wait for her
national development and regeneration. Even after the present
European War is over and peace is restored China will absolutely
have nothing to fear in the future of having pressure brought
against her by the foreign powers. It is only thus that permanent
peace can be secured in the Far East.
But before concluding this Defensive Alliance, two points must first
be ascertained and settled, (1) Its bearing on the Chinese
Government. (2) Its bearing on those Powers having intimate
relations with and great interests in China.
In considering its effect on the Chinese Government, Japan must try
to foresee whether the position of China's present ruler Yuan
Shih-kai shall be permanent or not; whether the present Government's
policy will enjoy the confidence of a large section of the Chinese
people; whether Yuan Shih-kai will readily agree to the Japanese
Government's proposal to enter into a treaty of alliance with us.
These are points to which we are bound to give a thorough
consideration. Judging by the attitude hitherto adopted by Yuan
Shih-kai we know he has always resorted to the policy of expediency
in his diplomatic dealings, and although he may now outwardly show
friendliness towards us, he will in fact rely upon the influence of
the different Powers as the easiest check against us and refuse to
accede to our demands. Take for a single instance, his conduct
towards us since the Imperial Government declared war against
Germany and his action will then be clear to all. Whether we can
rely upon the ordinary friendly methods of diplomacy to gain our
object or not it does not require much wisdom to decide. After the
gigantic struggle in Europe is over, leaving aside America which
will not press for advantage, China will not be able to obtain any
loans from the other Powers. With a depleted treasury, without means
to pay the officials and the army, with local bandits inciting the
poverty-stricken populace to trouble, with the revolutionists
waiting for opportunities to rise, should an insurrection actually
occur while no outside assistance can be rendered to quell it we are
certain it will be impossible for Yuan Shih-kai, single-handed, to
restore order and consolidate the country. The result will be that
the nation will be cut up into many parts beyond all hope of remedy.
That this state of affairs will come is not difficult to foresee.
When this occurs, shall we uphold Yuan's Government and assist him
to suppress the internal insurrection with the certain assurance
that we could influence him to agree to our demands, or shall we
help the revolutionists to achieve a success and realize our object
through them? This question must be definitely decided upon this
very moment so that we may put it into practical execution. If we do
not look into the future fate of China but go blindly to uphold
Yuan's Government, to enter into a Defensive Alliance with China,
hoping thus to secure a complete realization of our object by
assisting him to suppress the revolutionists, it is obviously a
wrong policy. Why? Because the majority of the Chinese people have
lost all faith in the tottering Yuan Shih-kai who is discredited and
attacked by the whole nation for having sold his country. If Japan
gives Yuan the support, his Government, though in a very precarious
state, may possibly avoid destruction. Yuan Shih-kai belongs to that
school of politicians who are fond of employing craftiness and
cunning. He may be friendly to us for a time, but he will certainly
abandon us and again befriend the other Powers when the European war
is at an end. Judging by his past we have no doubt as to what he
will do in the future. For Japan to ignore the general sentiment of
the Chinese people and support Yuan Shih-kai with the hope that we
can settle with him the Chinese Question is a blunder indeed.
Therefore in order to secure the permanent peace of the Far East,
instead of supporting a Chinese Government which can neither be long
continued in power nor assist in the attainment of our object, we
should rather support the 400,000,000 Chinese people to renovate
their corrupt Government, to change its present form, to maintain
peace and order in the land and to usher into China a new era of
prosperity so that China and Japan may in fact as well as in name be
brought into the most intimate and vital relations with each other.
China's era of prosperity is based on the China-Japanese Alliance
and this Alliance is the foundational power for the repelling of the
foreign aggression that is to be directed against the Far East at
the conclusion of the European war. This alliance is also the
foundation-stone of the peace of the world. Japan therefore should
take this as the last warning and immediately solve this question.
Since the Imperial Japanese Government has considered it imperative
to support the Chinese people, we should induce the Chinese
revolutionists, the Imperialists and other Chinese malcontents to
create trouble all over China. The whole country will be thrown into
disorder and Yuan's Government will consequently be overthrown. We
shall then select a man from amongst the most influential and most
noted of the 400,000,000 of Chinese and help him to organize a new
form of Government and to consolidate the whole country. In the
meantime our army must assist in the restoration of peace and order
in the country, and in the protection of the lives and properties of
the people, so that they may gladly tender their allegiance to the
new Government which will then naturally confide in and rely upon
Japan. It is after the accomplishment of only these things that we
shall without difficulty gain our object by the conclusion of a
Defensive Alliance with China.
For us to incite the Chinese revolutionists and malcontents to rise
in China we consider the present to be the most opportune moment.
The reason why these men cannot now carry on an active campaign is
because they are insufficiently provided with funds. If the Imperial
Government can take advantage of this fact to make them a loan and
instruct them to rise simultaneously, great commotion and disorder
will surely prevail all over China. We can intervene and easily
adjust matters.
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