Book: The Fight For The Republic in China
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Bertram Lenox Putnam Weale >> The Fight For The Republic in China
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Mr. Ko: I desire a true picture of the chaos which you have hinted
will ensue in this country. Can you tell me anything along that
line?
Mr. Hu: In a time of confusion, the soldiers play the most
important part, virtuous and experienced and learned statesmen being
unable to cope with the situation. The only qualification which a
leader at such a time needs to possess is the control of the
military, and the ability to suppress Parliament. Should such a
person be made the president, he cannot long hold his enviable post
in view of the fact that he cannot possess sufficient influence to
control the troops of the whole country. The generals of equal rank
and standing will not obey each other, while the soldiers and
politicians, seeing a chance in these differences for their
advancement, will stir up their feelings and incite one another to
fight. They will fight hard among themselves. The rebels, who are
now exiles in foreign lands, taking advantage of the chaos in China,
will return in very little time to perpetrate the worst crimes known
in human history. The royalists who are in retirement will likewise
come out to fish in muddy waters. Persons who have the
qualifications of leaders will be used as tools to fight for the
self-aggrandizement of those who use them. I do not wish to mention
names, but I can safely predict that more than ten different parties
will arise at the psychological moment. Men who will never be
satisfied until they become president, and those who know they
cannot get the presidency but who are unwilling to serve others,
will come out one after another. Confusion and disturbance will
follow with great rapidity. Then foreign countries which have
entertained wild ambitions, availing themselves of the distressful
situation in China will stir up ill-feelings among these parties and
so increase the disturbances. When the proper time comes, various
countries, unwilling to let a single country enjoy the privilege of
controlling China, will resort to armed intervention. In consequence
the eastern problem will end in a rupture of the international
peace. Whether China will be turned at that time into a battleground
for the Chinese people or for the foreign Powers I cannot tell you.
It is too dreadful to think of the future which is enshrouded in a
veil of mystery. However, I can tell you that the result of this
awful turmoil will be either the slicing of China like a melon or
the suppression of internal trouble with foreign assistance which
will lead to dismemberment. As to the second result some explanation
is necessary. After foreign countries have helped us to suppress
internal disturbances, they will select a man of the type of Li Wang
of Korea, who betrayed his country to Japan, and make him Emperor of
China. Whether this man will be the deposed emperor or a member of
the Imperial family or the leader of the rebel party, remains to be
seen. In any event he will be a figurehead in whose hand will not be
vested political, financial and military power, which will be
controlled by foreigners. All the valuable mines, various kinds of
industries and our abundant natural resources will likewise be
developed by others. China will thus disappear as a nation. In
selecting a man of the Li Wang type, the aforesaid foreign countries
will desire merely to facilitate the acquisition of China's
territory. But there can be easily found such a man who bears
remarkable resemblance to Li Wang, and who will be willing to make a
treaty with the foreigners whereby he unpatriotically sells his
country in exchange for a throne which he can never obtain or keep
without outside assistance. His procedure will be something like
this: He will make an alliance with a foreign nation by which the
latter will be given the power to carry on foreign relations on
behalf of his country. In the eyes of foreigners, China will have
been destroyed, but the people will continue deceived and made to
believe that their country is still in existence. This is the first
step. The second step will be to imitate the example of Korea and
make a treaty with a certain power, whereby China is annexed and the
throne abolished. The imperial figurehead then flees to the foreign
country where he enjoys an empty title. Should you then try to make
him devise means for regaining the lost territory it will be too
late. For China will have been entirely destroyed by that time. This
is the second procedure in the annexation of Chinese territory. The
reason why that foreign country desires to change the republic into
the monarchy is to set one man on the throne and make him witness
the whole process of annexation of his country, thereby simplifying
the matter. When that time has come, the people will not be
permitted to make any comment upon the form of government suitable
for China, or upon the destruction of their country. The rebels who
raised the standard of the republic have no principles and if they
now find that some other tactics will help to increase their power
they will adopt these tactics. China's republic is doomed, no matter
what happens. If we do not change it ourselves, others will do it
for us. Should we undertake the change ourselves we can save the
nation: otherwise there is no hope for China to remain a nation. It
is to be regretted that our people now assume an attitude of
indifference, being reluctant to look forward to the future, and
caring not what may happen to them and their country. They are
doomed to become slaves after the loss of their national
independence.
Mr. Ko: I am very much frightened by what you have said. You have
stated that the adoption of a constitutional monarchy can avert such
terrible consequences; but is there not likely to be disturbance
during the change of the republic to monarchy, since such
disturbance must always accompany the presidential election?
Mr. Hu: No comparison can be formed between these two things. There
may be tumult during the change of the form of government, but it
will be better in comparison with the chaos that will some day ensue
in the republic. There is no executive head in the country when a
republic endeavours to select a presidential successor. At such a
time, the ambitious try to improve their future, while the patriotic
are at a loss now to do anything which will assist in the
maintenance of order. Those who are rebellious rise in revolt while
those who are peace-loving are compelled by circumstances to join
their rank and file. Should the form of government be transformed
into a monarchical one, and should the time for change of the head
of the state come, the successor having already been provided for,
that will be well-known to the people. Those who are patriotic will
exert their utmost to preserve peace, and as result the
heir-apparent can peacefully step on the throne. There are persons
who will contend for the office of the President, but not for the
throne. Those who contend for the office of President do not commit
any crime, but those who try to seize the throne are rebels. Who
dares to contend for the Throne?
At the time of the change of the president in a republic, ambitious
persons arise with the intention of capturing this most honourable
office, but not so when the emperor is changed. Should there be a
body of persons hostile to the heir-apparent, that body must be very
small. Therefore I say that the enemies of a succeeding Emperor are
a few, whilst there are many in the case of a presidential
successor. This is the first difference.
Those who oppose the monarchy are republican enthusiasts or persons
who desire to make use of the name of the republic for their own
benefit. These persons will raise trouble even without the change of
the government. They do not mind disturbing the peace of the country
at the present time when the republic exists. It is almost certain
that at the first unfurling of the imperial flags they will at once
grasp such an opportune moment and try to satisfy their ambition.
Should they rise in revolt at the time when the Emperor is changed
the Government, supported by the loyal statesmen and officials,
whose interests are bound up with the welfare of the imperial family
and whose influence has spread far and wide, will be able to deal
easily with any situation which may develop. Therefore I declare
that the successor to the throne has more supporters while the
presidential successor has few. This is the second difference
between the republic and the constitutional monarchy.
Why certain persons will contend for the office of the President can
be explained by the fact that there is not a single man in the
country whose qualifications are above all the others. Succession to
the throne is a question of blood-relation with the reigning
Emperor, and not a question of qualifications. The high officials
whose qualifications are unusually good are not subservient to
others but they are obedient to the succeeding Emperor, because of
their gratitude for what the imperial family has done for them, and
because their well-being is closely associated with that of the
imperial household. I can cite an historical incident to support my
contention. Under the Manchu Dynasty, at one time General Chu
Chung-tang was entrusted with the task of suppressing the Mohammedan
rebellion. He appointed General Liu Sung San generalissimo. Upon the
death of General Liu, Chu Chung-tang appointed his subordinate
officers to lead the army but the subordinate officers competed for
power. Chu Chung-tang finally made the step-son of General Liu the
Commander-in-Chief and the officers and soldiers all obeyed his
order as they did his father's. But it may be mentioned that this
young man was not more able than any of his father's subordinate
commanders. Nevertheless prestige counted. He owed his success to
his natural qualification, being a step-son to General Liu. So is
the case with the emperor whose successor nobody dares openly to
defy--to say nothing of actually disputing his right to the throne.
This is the third difference between the republic and the monarchy.
I will not discuss the question: as to whether there being no
righteous and able heir-apparent to succeed his Emperor-father,
great danger may not confront the nation. However, in order to
provide against any such case, I advocate that the formation of a
constitutional government should go hand in hand with the
establishment of the monarchy. At first it is difficult to establish
and carry out a constitutional government, but once it is formed it
will be comparatively easy. When the constitutional government has
been established, the Emperor will have to seek his fame in such
useful things as the defence of his country and the conquest of his
enemy. Everything has to progress, and men possessing European
education will be made use of by the reigning family. The first
Emperor will certainly do all he can to capture the hearts of the
people by means of adopting and carrying out in letter as well as in
spirit constitutional government. The heir-apparent will pay
attention to all new reforms and new things. Should he do so, the
people will be able to console themselves by saying that they will
aways be the people of a constitutional monarchy even after the
succession to the throne of the heir-apparent. When the time comes
for the heir-apparent to mount the throne the people will extend to
him their cordial welcome, and there will be no need to worry about
internal disturbances.
Therefore, I conclude that the successor to the presidential chair
has to prevent chaos by wielding the monarchical power, while the
new emperor can avert internal disquietude forever by means of his
constitutional government. This is the fourth difference between the
republic and the monarchy. These four differences are accountable
for the fact that there will not be as much disturbance at the time
of the change of emperors as at the time when the president is
changed.
Mr. Ko: I can understand what you have said with regard to the
advantages and disadvantages of the republic and the monarchy, but
there are many problems connected with the formation of a
constitutional monarchy which we have to solve. Why is it that the
attempt to introduce constitutional government during the last years
of the Manchu Dynasty proved a failure?
Mr. Hu: The constitutional government of the Manchu Dynasty was one
in name only, and as such the forerunner of the revolution of 1911.
Towards the end of the Manchu Dynasty, the talk of starting a
revolution to overthrow the imperial regime was in everybody's
mouth, although the constitutional party endeavoured to accomplish
something really useful. At that time His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai
was the grand chancellor, and realizing the fact that nothing except
the adoption of a constitutional government could save the throne of
the Manchus, he assumed the leadership of the constitutional party,
which surpassed in strength the revolutionary party as a result of
his active support. The people's hearts completely turned to the
constitutional party for salvation, while the revolutionary party
lost that popular support which it had formerly enjoyed. Then it
seemed that the imperial household would soon adopt the
constitutional monarchy and the threatening revolution could be
averted. Unfortunately, the elaborate plans of His Excellency Yuan
Shih-kai regarding the adoption of the constitutional government
were not carried out by the imperial household. A great change took
place: His Excellency retired to his native province; and after
losing this powerful leader the constitutional party was pitilessly
shattered. A monarchist party suddenly made its appearance on the
political arena to assist the imperial family, which pretended to do
its very best for the development of a constitutional government,
but secretly exerted itself to the utmost for the possession and
retention of the real power. This double-dealing resulted in
bringing about the revolution of 1911. For instance, when the people
cried for the convening of a parliament, the imperial family said
"No." The people also failed to secure the abolition of certain
official organs for the imperialists. They lost confidence in the
Reigning House, and simultaneously the revolutionary party raised
its banner and gathered its supporters from every part of the
country. As soon as the revolt started at Wuchang the troops all
over the country joined in the movement to overthrow the Manchu
Dynasty. The members of the Imperial Senate, most of whom were
members of the constitutional party, could not help showing their
sympathy with the revolutionists. At last the imperial household
issued a proclamation containing Nineteen Articles--a veritable
_magna charta_--but it was too late. The constitutional government
which was about to be formed was thus laid aside. What the imperial
family did was the mere organization of an advisory council. A
famous foreign scholar aptly remarked: "A false constitutional
government will eventually result in a true revolution." In trying
to deceive the people by means of a false constitutional government
the imperial house encompassed its own destruction. Once His
Excellency Yuan Shih-kai stated in a memorial to the throne that
there were only two alternatives: to give the people a
constitutional government or to have them revolt. What happened
afterwards is a matter of common knowledge. Therefore I say that the
government which the imperial family attempted to form was not a
constitutional government.
Mr. Ko: Thank you for your discussion of the attempt of the imperial
household to establish a constitutional government; but how about
the Provisional Constitution, the parliament and the cabinet in the
first and second years of the Republic? The parliament was then so
powerful that the government was absolutely at its mercy, thereby
disturbing the peaceful condition of the country. The people have
tasted much of the bitterness of constitutional government. Should
you mention the name of constitutional government again they would
be thoroughly frightened. Is that true?
Mr. Hu: During the first and second years of the Republic, in my
many conversations with the members of the Kuo Ming Tang, I said
that the republic could not form an efficient method of control, and
that there would be an over centration of power through the adoption
of monarchical methods of ruling, knowing as well as I did the
standards of our people. When the members of the Kuo Ming Tang came
to draw up the Provisional Constitution they purposely took
precisely the opposite course of action and ignored my suggestion.
It may, however, be mentioned that the Provisional Constitution made
in Nanking was not so bad, but after the government was removed to
Peking, the Kuo Ming Tang people tied the hand and foot of the
government by means of the Cabinet System and other restrictions
with the intention of weakening the power of the central
administration in order that they might be able to start another
revolution. From the dissolution of the Nanking government to the
time of the second revolution they had this one object in view,
namely to weaken the power of the central administration so that
they could contend for the office of the president by raising
further internal troubles in China. Those members of the Kuo Ming
Tang who made the constitution know as well as I that China's
republic must be governed through a monarchical administration; and
therefore the unreasonable restrictions in the Provisional
Constitution were purposely inserted.
Mr. Ko: What is the difference between the constitutional government
which you have proposed and the constitutional government which the
Manchu Dynasty intended to adopt?
Mr. Hu: The difference lies in the proper method of procedure and in
honesty of purpose, which are imperative if constitutional
government expects to be successful.
Mr. Ko: What do you mean by the proper method of procedure?
Mr. Hu: The Provisional Constitution made in Nanking, which was
considered good, is not suitable for insertion in the future
constitution, should a constitutional monarchy be established. In
making a constitution for the future constitutional monarchy we have
to consult the constitutions of the monarchies of the world. They
can be divided into three classes which are represented by England,
Prussia and Japan. England is advanced in its constitutional
government, which has been in existence for thousands of years,
(_sic_) and is the best of all in the world. The English king enjoys
his empty title and the real power of the country is exercised by
the parliament, which makes all the laws for the nation. As to
Prussia, the constitutional monarchy was established when the people
started a revolution. The ruler of Prussia was compelled to convene
a parliament and submitted to that legal body a constitution.
Prussia's constitution was made by its ruler together with the
parliament. Its constitutional government is not so good as the
English. As to the Japanese constitutional monarchy, the Emperor
made a constitution and then convened a parliament. The
constitutional power of the Japanese people is still less than that
of the Prussian people. According to the standard of our people we
cannot adopt the English constitution as our model, for it is too
advanced. The best thing for us to do is to adopt part of the
Prussian and part of the Japanese in our constitution-making. As our
people are better educated now than ever before, it is decidedly
unwise entirely to adopt the Japanese method, that is, for the
Emperor to make a constitution without the approval of the
parliament and then to convoke a legislative body. In the
circumstances China should adopt the Prussian method as described
above with some modifications, which will be very suitable to our
conditions. As to the contents of the constitution we can copy such
articles as those providing the right for the issue of urgent orders
and appropriation of special funds, etc., from the Japanese
Constitution, so that the power of the ruler can be increased
without showing the slightest contempt for the legislative organ. I
consider that this is the proper method of procedure for the
formation of a constitutional monarchy for China.
Mr. Ko: Can I know something about the contents of our future
constitution in advance?
Mr. Hu: If you want to know them in detail I recommend you to read
the Constitutions of Prussia and Japan. But I can tell you this
much. Needless to say that such stipulations as articles
guaranteeing the rights of the people and the power of the
parliament will surely be worked into the future constitution. These
are found in almost every constitution in the world. But as the
former Provisional Constitution has so provided that the power of
the parliament is unlimited, while that of the president is very
small, the Chief Executive, besides conferring decorations and
giving Orders of Merit, having almost nothing to do without the
approval of the Senate, it is certain that nothing will be taken
from that instrument for the future constitution. Nor will the
makers of the future constitution take anything from the nineteen
capitulations offered by the Manchu Government, which gave too much
power to the legislative organ. According to the Nineteen Articles
the Advisory Council was to draw up the constitution, which was to
be ratified by the parliament; the Premier being elected by the
parliament; whilst the use of the army and navy required the
parliament's sanction; the making of treaties with foreign countries
have likewise to be approved by the parliament, etc., etc. Such
strict stipulations which are not even known in such an advanced
country in matters constitutional as England were extorted from the
imperial family by the advisory council. Therefore it is most
unlikely that the makers of the future constitution will take any
article from the nineteen capitulations of "confidence." They will
use the Constitutions of Japan and Prussia as joint model and will
always have in their mind the actual conditions of this country and
the standard of the people. In short, they will copy some of the
articles in the Japanese constitution, and adopt the Prussian method
of procedure for the making of the constitution.
Mr. Ko: What do you mean by honesty?
Mr. Hu: It is a bad policy to deceive the people. Individually the
people are simple, but they cannot be deceived collectively. The
Manchu Government committed an irretrievable mistake by promising
the people a constitutional government but never carrying out their
promise. This attitude on the part of the then reigning house
brought about the first revolution. As the standard of our people at
the present time is not very high, they will be satisfied with less
power if it is properly given to them. Should any one attempt to
deceive them his cause will finally be lost. I do not know how much
power the people and the parliament will get in the constitutional
monarchy, but I would like to point out here that it is better to
give them less power than to deceive them. If they are given less
power, and if they want more, they will contend for it. Should the
government deem it advisable to give them a little more, well and
good. Should they be unfit for the possession of greater power, the
government can issue a proclamation giving the reasons for not
complying with their request, and they will not raise trouble
knowing the true intention of the government. However, honesty is
the most important element in the creation of a constitutional
monarchy. It is easy and simple to practise it. The parliament must
have the power to decide the laws and fix the budgets. Should its
decision be too idealistic or contrary to the real welfare of the
country, the Government can explain its faults and request it to
reconsider its decision. Should the parliament return the same
decision, the Government can dissolve it and convoke another
parliament. In so doing the Government respects the parliament
instead of despising it. But what the parliament has decided should
be carried out strictly by the Government, and thus we will have a
real constitutional Government. It is easy to talk but difficult to
act, but China like all other countries has to go through the
experimental stage and face all kinds of difficulties before a
genuine constitutional government can be evolved. The beginning is
difficult but once the difficulty is over everything will go on
smoothly. I emphasize that it is better to give the people less
power at the beginning than to deceive them. Be honest with them is
my policy.
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