Book: The Fight For The Republic in China
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Bertram Lenox Putnam Weale >> The Fight For The Republic in China
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What attitude then should those who have the good of the nation at
heart, take under the present circumstances? Should they advocate
the continuance of the Republic or suggest a change for a monarchy?
It is difficult to answer these questions. But I have no doubt in
saying that the monarchical system is better suited to China than
the republican system. For, if China's independence is to be
maintained, the government should be constitutional, and in
consideration of China's conditions as well as her relations with
other Powers, it will be easier to form a constitutional government
by adopting a monarchy than a Republic.
However, it must be remembered that in order to secure the best
results from changing the Republic into a Monarchy not a single one
of the following points can be dispensed with:
1. Such a change must not arouse the opposition of the Chinese
people or the Foreign Powers, which will cause the disturbances so
energetically suppressed by the Republican Government to appear
again in China. For the peace now prevailing in the country should
be maintained at any price so that no danger may come therefrom.
2. If the law of succession be not definitely defined in such a way
that it will leave no doubts as to the proper successor, no good can
come from the change from Republic to Monarchy. I have said enough
about the necessity of not allowing the monarch to choose his own
successor. Although the power of an Emperor is greater than that of
a President, when the majority of the people know nothing, it is
more respected by the people. But the reason for such a change will
not be valid if the change is brought about merely to add to the
power of the chief executive without the question of succession
being definitely settled. For the definiteness about succession is
the most prominent point of superiority of the monarchical system
over the republican system.
3 If the Government should fail to make provisions for the
development of the constitutional government, no permanent benefit
will result from the change of a republic into a monarchy. For if
China wishes to occupy a suitable place among the world powers, the
patriotism of her people must be made to grow so that the government
will be more than strong enough to cope with outside aggression. The
patriotism of the people will not grow if they are not allowed to
participate in political affairs, and without the hearty assistance
of the people no government can become strong. For the reason why
the people will assist the government is because they feel they are
a part of the government. Therefore the government should make the
people realize that the government is the organ which aims at
bringing blessing to the people, and make the people understand that
they have the right to superintend the government before the
government can achieve great things.
Every one of the points mentioned above are indispensable for the
change of the Republic into a monarchy. Whether the necessary
conditions are present must be left to those who know China well and
are responsible for her future progress. If these conditions are all
present then I have no doubt that the change of the form of the
government will be for the benefit of China.
The first illuminating point, as we have already said, to leap up and
lock attention to the exclusion of everything else in this memorandum,
is that the chief difficulty which perplexes Dr. Goodnow is not the
consolidation of a new government which had been recognized by all the
Treaty Powers only two years previously but the question of _succession_
to the supreme office in the land, a point which had already been fully
provided for in the one chapter of the Permanent Constitution which had
been legally passed prior to the _Coup d'etat_ of the 4th November,
1913. But Yuan Shih-kai's first care after that _coup d'etat_ had been
to promulgate with the assistance of Dr. Goodnow and others, a bogus
Law, resting on no other sanction than his personal volition, with an
elaborate flummery about three candidates whose names were to be
deposited in the gold box in the Stone House in the gardens of the
Palace. Therefore since the provisional nature of this prestidigitation
had always been clear, the learned doctor's only solution is to
recommend the overthrow of the government; the restoration of the Empire
under the name of Constitutional Monarchy; and, by means of a fresh plot
to do in China what all Europe has long been on the point of abandoning,
namely, to substitute Family rule for National rule.
Now had these suggestions been gravely made in any country but China by
a person officially employed it is difficult to know what would have
happened. Even in China had an Englishman published or caused to be
published--especially after the repeated statements Yuan Shih-kai had
given out that any attempt to force the sceptre on him would cause him
to leave the country and end his days abroad[17]--that Englishman, we
say, would have been liable under the Orders in Council to summary
imprisonment, the possibility of tumult and widespread internal
disturbances being sufficient to force a British Court to take action.
What are the forces which brought an American to say things which an
Englishman would not dare to say--that in 1915 there was a sanction for
a fresh revolutionary movement in China? First, an interpretation of
history so superficial, combined with such an amazing suppression of
contemporary political thought, that it is difficult to believe that the
requirements of the country were taken in the least bit seriously;
secondly, in the comparisons made between China and the Latin republics,
a deliberate scouting of the all-important racial factor; and, lastly, a
total ignorance of the intellectual qualities which are by far the most
outstanding feature of Chinese civilization.
Dr. Goodnow's method is simplicity itself. In order to prove the
superiority of Monarchism over Republicanism--and thus deliberately
ignoring the moral of the present cataclysmic war--he ransacks the
dust-laden centuries. The English Commonwealth, which disappeared nearly
three hundred years ago, is brought forward as an example of the dangers
which beset a republic, though it is difficult to see what relation an
experiment made before the idea of representative government had been
even understood bears to our times. But there is worse. The statement is
deliberately made that the reason for the disappearance of that
Commonwealth was "that the problem of succession after the death of
Cromwell was difficult to solve." English historians would no doubt have
numerous remarks to offer on this strange untruth which dismisses a
remarkably interesting chapter of history in the most misleading way,
and which tells Chinese political students nothing about the complete
failure which military government--not republicanism--must always have
among the Anglo-Saxon peoples and which is the sole reason why
Cromwellism disappeared. Even when treating the history of his own
country Dr. Goodnow seems to take pleasure in being absurd. For he says:
"The mind of the American people was so imbued with the idea of
republicanism that a republican form of government was the ideal of the
whole race"; then adding as if to refute his own statements, "Had
General Washington--the leader of the revolutionary army--had the desire
to become a monarch he would probably have been successful." We do not
know how Americans will like this kind of interpretation of their
history; but at least they will not fail to note what dismal results it
hastened on in China. With the experimental Eighteenth Century French
Republic; with the old Spanish Colonies of Central and South America;
and above all with Mexico, Dr. Goodnow deals in the same vein. Vast
movements, which can be handled only tentatively even in exhaustive
essays are dismissed in misleading sentences framed so as to serve as
mere introduction to the inevitable climax--the Chinese Constitutional
Monarchy of 1915 with Yuan Shih-kai as Emperor.
Yet this is not all. As if in alarm at the very conclusions he so
purposely reaches, at the end of his Memorandum he reduces these
conclusions to naught by stating that three impossible conditions are
necessary to consummate the Restoration of the Monarchy in China, (1) no
opposition should be aroused, (2) the law of succession must be properly
settled, (3) Full provision must be made for the development of
Constitutional Government. That these conditions were known to be
impossible, everyone in the Far East had long admitted. Had Dr. Goodnow
paid the slightest attention to the course of history in China he would
have known (a) that any usurpation of the Throne would infallibly lead
to rebellion in China and intervention on the part of Japan, (b) that
Yuan Shih-kai's power was purely personal and as such could not be
transmitted to any son by any means known to the human intellect, (c)
that all Yuan Shih-kai's sons were worthless, the eldest son being
semi-paralyzed, (d) that constitutional government and the Eastern
conception of kingship, which is purely theocratic, are so antithetical
that they cannot possibly co-exist, any re-establishment of the throne
being _ipso facto_ the re-establishment of a theocracy, (e) that
although he so constantly speaks of the low political knowledge of the
people, the Chinese have had a most complete form of local
self-government from the earliest times, the political problem of the
day being simply to gather up and express these local forms in some
centralized system: (f) the so-called non-patriotism of the Chinese is
non-existent and is an idea which has been spread abroad owing to the
complete foreign misunderstanding of certain basic facts--for instance
that under the Empire foreign affairs were the sole concern of the
Emperors, provincial China prior to 1911 being a socio-economic
confederation resembling mediaeval contrivances such as the Hanseatic
League--a provincial confederation not concerning itself with any matter
which lay outside its everyday economic life, such as territorial
overlordship or frontier questions or the regulation of sea-port
intercourse etc., because such matters were meaningless. It was only
when foreign encroachment in the _post_-Japanese war period (_i.e._
after 1895) carried problems from the fringes of the Empire into the
economic life of the people that their pride was touched and that in
spite of "their lack of experience and knowledge in political affairs"
they suddenly displayed a remarkable patriotic feeling, the history of
China during the past two decades being only comprehensible when this
capital contention, namely the reality of Chinese patriotism, is given
the central place.
It is useless, however, to pursue the subject: we have said enough to
disclose the utter levity of those who should have realized from the
first that the New China is a matter of life and death to the people,
and that the first business of the foreigner is to uphold the new
beliefs. The Goodnow Memorandum, immediately it was published, was put
to precisely those base uses which any one with an elementary knowledge
of China might have foreseen: it was simply exploited in an unscrupulous
way, its recommendations being carried out in such a manner as to
increase one's contempt for the men who were pushing the monarchist plot
with any means that they could seize hold of, and who were not averse
from making responsible foreigners their tools.
FOOTNOTES:
[16] It is perhaps of importance to note that Dr. Goodnow carried out
all his studies in Germany.
[17] The most widely-quoted statement on this subject is the remarkable
interview, published in the first week of July, 1915, throughout the
metropolitan press, between President Yuan Shih-kai and General Feng
Kuo-chang, commanding the forces on the lower Yangtsze. This statement
was telegraphed by foreign correspondents all over the world. Referring
to the many rumours afloat that titles of nobility would be revived as a
precursor to the monarchy the President declared that even if he seized
the Throne that would not increase his powers, whilst as for
transmitting the Imperial Yellow to his sons none were fitted for that
honour which would mean the collapse of any new dynasty. Here General
Feng Kuo-chang interrupted with the remark that the people of South
China would not oppose such a change ultimately, though they thought it
was too early to talk about it just now. Thereupon the President's
features became stern and he declared in a heightened voice: "You and
others seem still to believe that I harbour secret ambitions. I affirm
positively that when I sent my sons to study in England, I privately
ordered the purchase of a small estate there as a possible home. If the
people of China insist upon my accepting the sceptre I shall leave this
country and spend the remaining days of my life abroad." This interview,
so far from being denied, has been affirmed to the present writer as
being substantially correct.
CHAPTER X
THE MONARCHY MOVEMENT IS OPPOSED
THE APPEAL OF THE SCHOLAR LIANG CH'I-CHAO
We have already referred in several places to the extraordinary role
scholarship and the literary appeal play in the governance of China. It
is necessary to go back to the times of the birth of the Roman Empire,
and to invoke the great figure of Cicero, to understand how greatly the
voice of men of recognized intellectual qualities influences the nation.
Liang Ch'i-chao, a man of some forty-five years, had long been
distinguished for his literary attainments and for the skill with which,
though unversed in any Western language, he had expounded the European
theory and practice of government to his fellow-countrymen. To his brain
is due the coining of many exact expressions necessary for parliamentary
government, his mentality having grown with the modern growth of China
and adapted itself rather marvellously to the requirements of the
Twentieth Century. A reformer of 1898--that is one of the small devoted
band of men who under Kang Yu Wei almost succeeded in winning over the
ill-fated Emperor Kwang Hsu to carrying out a policy of modernizing the
country in the teeth of fierce mandarin opposition, he possessed in his
armoury every possible argument against the usurpation Yuan Shih-kai
proposed to practise. He knew precisely where to strike--and with what
strength; and he delivered himself over to his task with whole-hearted
fervour. It having become known that he was engaged in preparing this
brief for the people of China, every influence was brought to bear to
prevent such a disastrous publication. Influential deputations were sent
to him to implore him to remember the parlous international situation
China found herself in,--a situation which would result in open
disaster if subjected to the strain of further discords. For a time he
hesitated launching his counter-stroke. But at length the Republican
Party persuaded him to deal the tyrant the needed blow; and his now
famous accusation of the Chief Executive was published.
Its effect was immediate and very far-reaching. Men understood that
armed revolt was in the air. The almost Biblical fervour which pervades
this extraordinary document shows an unusual sense of moral outrage. The
masterly analysis of the Diaz regime in Mexico coupled with the manner
in which--always pretending to be examining the conduct of the
Mexican--he stabs at Yuan Shih-kai, won the applause of a race that
delights in oblique attacks and was ample proof that great trouble was
brewing. The document was read in every part of China and everywhere
approved. Although it suffers from translation, the text remains
singularly interesting as a disclosure of the Chinese mentality; whilst
the exhaustive examination of political terms it contains shows that
some day Chinese will carry their inventive genius into fields they have
hitherto never openly invaded. Especially interesting is it to contrast
the arguments of such a man with those of a decadent such as Yang Tu.
FROM REPUBLIC TO MONARCHY
Before I proceed with my argument I wish to make plain two points.
One is that I am not one of those reformers whose ears are their
brains, and who are intoxicated with the doctrine of republicanism.
I have, therefore, no partiality for the republican form of
government nor any bias for or against other forms of government.
This can be proved by my literary work during the last ten years.
The second point is that I am not one of the veteran conservatives
who lay so much stress on the importance of having a dynasty. For
such are the thoughts of men who only seek to adjust themselves to
existing conditions. If one wishes to consider the present situation
of the country without bias or prejudice he must disregard the rise
or fall of any particular family. Only those who bear in mind these
two points can read my argument with real understanding.
I. THE QUESTION OF KUO-TI
Some time ago I said that, as political students, we should only
care for _Cheng-ti_, _i.e._, the form of government and not for
_Kuo-ti_, _i.e._, the form of state. Do not call this trifling with
words, for it is a principle which all critics of politics should
follow and never depart from. The reason is that critics of politics
should not, because they cannot, influence the question of _Kuo-ti_.
They should not influence the question of _Kuo-ti_ because so long
as the question of _Kuo-ti_ remains unsettled the major portion of
the administration remains at a stand-still. Thus there will be no
political situation properly so called and there will be no
political questions to discuss (here the term political means really
administrative). If a critic of politics, therefore, interfere with
the question of _Kuo-ti_, he will be leading the nation into a
condition of political instability, thus undermining the ground on
which the people stand. Such critics can be likened unto a man
trying to enter a house without ascending the steps or crossing a
river without a boat.
They cannot influence the question of _Kuo-ti_. The force which
drives and steers the change of one form of State or _vice versa_ is
generally not derived from mere politics. If the time is not ripe,
then no amount of advocacy on the part of critics can hasten it. If
the time is ripe, nothing the critics say can prevent it. He who
indulges himself in the discussion of the problem of
_Kuo-ti_--_i.e._, the form of States, as a political student, is
ignorant of his own limitations and capacity. This is as true of the
active politicians as of the critics; for the first duty of an
active politician is to seek for the improvement and progress of the
administration of the existing foundation of government. A step
beyond this line is revolution and intrigue, and such cannot be the
attitude of a right-minded active politician or statesman. This is
looking at it from the negative side.
From the positive, that is, the progressive point of view, there is
also a boundary. Such actions under one form of government are
political activities, and under the opposite form of government are
also political activities. But these are not questions of political
principle. For only when a man sacrifices the ideals which he has
advocated and cherished during the whole of his life does the
question of principle arise. Therefore the great principle of
looking to the actual state of administration of the form of
government and leaving the mere form of state in the background is a
principle that is applicable under all circumstances and should be
followed by all critics of politics.
II. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST CHANGE
No form of government is ideal. Its reason of existence can only be
judged by what it has achieved. It is the height of folly to rely on
theoretical conclusions as a basis for artificial arbitration as to
what should be accepted and what discarded. Mere folly, however, is
not to be seriously condemned. But the danger and harm to the
country will be unmeasurable if a person has prejudiced views
respecting a certain form of government and in order to prove the
correctness of his prejudiced views, creates artificially a
situation all by himself. For this reason my view has always been
not to oppose any form of government. But I am always opposed to
any one who engages in a propaganda in favour of a form of
government other than the one under which we actually live. In the
past I opposed those who tried to spread the republican form of
government while the country was under monarchical government, and
the arguments I advanced in support of my views were written in no
fewer than 200,000 words. Even so late as the ninth month after the
outbreak of the Revolution I issued a pamphlet entitled "The Problem
of the Building of the New China," which was my last attempt to
express my views respecting the maintenance of the old form of
government.
What obligations had I to the then Imperial House? Did it not heap
persecution and humiliation on me to the utmost of its power and
resources? I would have been an exile even to this day had it not
been for the Revolution. Further, I was no child and I was fully
aware of the disappointment which the then Government caused in the
minds of the people. Yet I risked the opposition of the whole
country and attempted to prolong the life of the dying dynasty. I
had no other view in mind except that there would be some
possibility of our hope being realized if the whole nation would
unite in efforts to improve the administration under the then
existing form of government. I believed that because the people were
not educated for a change. But if the status of the country should
be changed before the people are educated and accustomed to the new
order of things, the danger and hardship during the transitional
period of several years would be incalculable. In certain
circumstances this might lead to the destruction of the nation. Even
if we are spared the tragedy of national extinction, the losses
sustained by the retarding of the progress of the administration
would be unredeemable. It is painful to recall past experiences; but
if my readers will read once more my articles in the _Hsin Min Tung
Pao_ during the years 1905 and 1906 they will see that all the
sufferings which the Republic has experienced bear out the
predictions made then. The different stages of the sinister
development have been unfolding themselves one by one just as I said
they would. It was unfortunate that my words were not heeded
although I wept and pleaded. Such has been the consequence of the
change of the state of the country--a change of _Kuo-ti_.
Yet before we have hardly ceased panting, this talk of a second
change is on us. I am not in a position to say exactly how this talk
had its beginning. Ostensibly it was started by the remarks of Dr.
Goodnow. But I am unable to say whether Dr. Goodnow actually gave
out such a view or for what purpose he expressed such a view. From
what he told the representative of a Peking newspaper he never
expressed the views attributed to him. Be this as it may, I cannot
help having my doubts. All Dr. Goodnow is alleged to have said
bearing on the merits of the monarchical and republican system of
government as an abstract subject of discussion, such as the
necessity of the form of state (_Kuo-ti_) being suited to the
general conditions of the country and the lessons we should learn
from the Central and South American republics, are really points of
a very simple nature and easily deduced. How strange that among all
this large number of politicians and scholars, who are as numerous
as the trees in the forest and the perch in the stream, should have
failed for all these years to notice these simple points; and now
suddenly make a fetish of them because they have come out of the
mouth of a foreigner. Is it because no one except a foreign doctor
can discover such facts? Why even a humble learner like myself,
though not so learned even to the extent of one ten-thousandth part
of his knowledge, more than ten years ago anticipated what the good
doctor has said; and I said much more and in much more comprehensive
terms. I have no desire to talk about my work, but let my readers
glance through the copies of the _Hsin Min Tsung Pao, Yin Ping Shih
Wen Chi_, the "Fight between Constitutional Advocates" and
"Revolutionary Advocates," the "Question of the Building of the New
China," etc., etc. My regret is that my eyes are not blue and my
hair not brown, and hence my words were not acceptable to the
nation!
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