Book: The Fight For The Republic in China

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Your Excellency:

A telegraphic communication has been received from the Chinese
Minister at Berlin transmitting a note from the German Government
dated February 1st, 1917, which makes known that the measures of
blockade newly adopted by the Government of Germany will, from that
day, endanger neutral merchant vessels navigating in certain
prescribed zones.

The new measures of submarine warfare, inaugurated by Germany,
imperilling the lives and property of Chinese citizens to even a
greater extent than the measures previously taken which have already
cost so many human lives to China, constitute a violation of the
principles of public international law at present in force; the
tolerance of their application would have as a result the
introduction into international law of arbitrary principles
incompatible with even legitimate commercial intercourse between
neutral states and between neutral states and belligerent powers.

The Chinese Government, therefore, protests energetically to the
Imperial German Government against the measures proclaimed on
February 1st, and sincerely hopes that with a view to respecting the
rights of neutral states and to maintaining the friendly relations
between these two countries, the said measures will not be carried
out.

In case, contrary to its expectations, its protest be ineffectual
the Government of the Chinese Republic will be constrained, to its
profound regret, to sever the diplomatic relations at present
existing between the two countries. It is unnecessary to add that
the attitude of the Chinese Government has been dictated purely by
the desire to further the cause of the world's peace and by the
maintenance of the sanctity of international law.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the
assurance of my highest consideration.

At the same time the following reply was handed to the American Minister
in Peking thus definitely clinching the matter:

Your Excellency:

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's
Note of the 4th February, 1917, informing me that the Government of
the United States of America, in view of the adoption by the German
Government of its new policy of submarine warfare on the 1st of
February, has decided to take certain action which it judges
necessary as regards Germany.

The Chinese Government, like the President of the United States of
America, is reluctant to believe that the German Government will
actually carry into execution those measures which imperil the lives
and property of citizens of neutral states and jeopardize the
commerce, even legitimate, between neutrals as well as between
neutrals and belligerents and which tend, if allowed to be enforced
without opposition, to introduce a new principle into public
international law.

The Chinese Government being in accord with the principles set forth
in Your Excellency's note and firmly associating itself with the
Government of the United States, has taken similar action by
protesting energetically to the German Government against the new
measures of blockade. The Chinese Government also proposes to take
such action in the future as will be deemed necessary for the
maintenance of the principles of international law.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the
assurance of my highest consideration.

His Excellency Paul S. Reinsch,
Envoy Extraordinary & Minister Plenipotentiary of
The United States of America.

When these facts became generally known an extraordinary ferment was
noticeable. What efforts had to be made to overcome the not
inconsiderable opposition of the Military Party who were opposed to any
departure from a policy of passive neutrality need not now be set down;
but it is sufficient to state that the decision arrived at was in every
sense a victory of the younger intellectual forces over the older
mandarinate, whose traditions of _laissez faire_ and spineless diplomacy
had hitherto cost the country so dear. A definite and far-reaching
Foreign Policy had at last been inaugurated. By responding rapidly and
firmly to the invitation of the United States to associate herself with
the stand taken against Germany's piratical submarine warfare, China has
undoubtedly won for herself a new place in the world's esteem. Both in
Europe and America the news of this development awakened
well-understandable enthusiasm, and convinced men that the Republic at
last stood for something vital and real. Until the 9th February, 1917,
what China had been doing was not really to maintain her neutrality,
since she had been unable to defend her territory from being made a
common battleground in 1914: she had been engaged in guarding and
perpetuating her traditional impotency. For whilst it may be accurate to
declare--a fact which few Westerners have realized--that to the mass of
the Chinese nation the various members of the European Family are
undistinguishable from one another, there being little to choose in
China between a Russian or a German, an Englishman or an Austrian, a
Frenchman or a Greek, the trade-contact of a century had certainly
taught to a great many that there was profit in certain directions and
none in certain others. It was perfectly well-known, for instance, that
England stood for a sea-empire; that the sea was an universal road; that
British ships, both mercantile and military, were the most numerous; and
that other things being equal it must primarily be Britain more than any
other European country which would influence Chinese destinies. But the
British Alliance with Japan had greatly weakened the trust which
originally existed; and this added to the fact that Germany, although
completely isolated and imprisoned by the sea, still maintained herself
intact by reason of her marvellous war-machine, which had ploughed
forward with such horrible results in a number of directions, had made
inaction seem the best policy. And yet, although the Chinese may be
pardoned for not forming clear concepts regarding the rights and wrongs
of the present conflict, they had undoubtedly realized that it was
absolutely essential for them not to remain outside the circle of
international friendships when a direct opportunity was offered them to
step within.

It was a sudden inkling of these things which now dawned on the public
mind and slowly awakened enthusiasm. For the first time since Treaty
relations with the Powers had been established Chinese diplomatic action
had swept beyond the walls of Peking and embraced world-politics within
its scope. The Confucianist conception of the State, as being simply a
regional creation, a thing complete in itself and all sufficient because
it was locked to the past and indifferent to the future, had hitherto
been supreme, foreign affairs being the result of unwilling contact at
sea-ports or in the wastes of High Asia where rival empires meet. To
find Chinese--five years after the inauguration of their Republic--ready
to accept literally and loyally in the western way all the duties and
obligations which their rights of eminent domain confer was a great and
fine discovery. It has been supposed by some that a powerful role was
played in this business by the temptation to benefit materially by an
astute move: that is that China was greatly influenced in her decision
by the knowledge that the denouncing of the German treaties would
instantly suspend the German Boxer indemnity and pour into the depleted
Central Treasury a monthly surplus of nearly two million Mexican
dollars. Paradoxical as it may sound in a country notoriously
hard-pressed for cash, monetary considerations played no part whatever
in convincing the Peking Government that the hour for action had
arrived; nor again was there any question of real hostility to a nation
which is so far removed from the East as to be meaningless to the
masses. The deep, underlying, decisive influence was simply
expediency--the most subtle of all political reasons and the hardest to
define. But just as Britain declared war because the invasion of Belgium
brought to a head all the vague grounds for opposition to German policy;
and just as America broke off relations because the scrapping of
undertaking after undertaking regarding the sea-war made it imperative
for her to act, so did China choose the right moment to enunciate the
doctrine of her independence by voicing her determination to hold to the
whole corpus of international sanctions on which her independence
finally rests. In the last analysis, then, the Chinese note of the 9th
February to the German Government was a categorical and unmistakable
reply to all the insidious attempts which had been made since the
beginning of the war to place her outside and beyond the operation of
the Public Law of Europe; and it is solely and entirely in that light
that her future actions must be judged. The leaders who direct the
destinies of China became fully prepared for a state of belligerency
from the moment they decided to speak; but they could not but be
supremely anxious concerning the expression of that belligerency, since
their international position had for years been such that a single false
move might cripple them.

Let us make this clear. Whilst China has been from the first fully
prepared to co-operate with friendly Powers in the taking of
war-measures which would ultimately improve her world-position, she has
not been prepared to surrender the initiative in these matters into
foreign hands. The argument that the mobilization of her resources could
only be effectively dealt with by specially designated foreigners, for
instance, has always been repellent to her because she knows from bitter
experience that although Japan has played little or no part in the war,
and indeed classifies herself as a semi-belligerent, the Tokio
Government would not hesitate to use any opportunity which presented
itself in China for selfish ends; and by insisting that as she is on the
spot she is the most competent to insure the effectiveness of Chinese
co-operation, attempt to tighten her hold on the country. It is a fact
which is self-evident to observers on the spot that ever since the coup
of the Twenty-one Demands, many Japanese believe that their country has
succeeded in almost completely infeodating China and has become the
sovereign arbitrator of all quarrels, as well as the pacificator of the
Eastern World. Statements which were incautiously allowed to appear in
the Japanese Press a few days prior to the Chinese Note of the 9th
February disclose what Japan really thought on the subject of China
identifying herself with the Allies. For instance, the following, which
bears the hall-mark of official inspiration, reads very curiously in the
light of after-events:

... "Dispatches from Peking say that England and France have already
started a flanking movement to induce China to join the anti-German
coalition. The intention of the Chinese Government has not yet been
learned. But it is possible that China will agree, if conditions are
favourable, thus gaining the right to voice her views at the coming
peace conference. Should the Entente Powers give China a firm
guarantee, it is feared here that China would not hesitate to act.

"The policy of the Japanese Government toward this question cannot
yet be learned. It appears, however, that the Japanese Government is
not opposed to applying the resolutions of the Paris Economic
Conference, in so far as they concern purely economic questions,
since Japan desires that German influence in the commerce and
finance of the Orient should be altogether uprooted. But should the
Entente Powers of Europe try to induce China to join them, Japan may
object on the ground that it will create more disturbances in China
and lead to a general disturbance of peace in the Orient."

Now there is not the slightest doubt in the writer's mind--and he can
claim to speak as a student of twenty years' standing--that this
definition of Japanese aims and objects is a very true one; and that the
subsequent invitation to China to join the Allies which came from Tokio
after a meeting between the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and the
Allied Ambassadors was simply made when a new orientation of policy had
been forced by stress of circumstances. Japan has certainly always
wished German influence in the Far East to be uprooted if she can take
the place of Germany; but if she cannot take that place absolutely and
entirely she would vastly prefer the influence to remain, since it is in
the nature of counterweight to that of other European Powers and of
America--foreign influence in China, as Mr. Hioki blandly told the late
President Yuan Shih-kai in his famous interview of the 18th January,
1915, being a source of constant irritation to the Japanese people, and
the greatest stumbling-block to a permanent understanding in the Far
East.

Chinese suspicion of any invitation coming by way of Tokio has been,
therefore, in every way justified, if it is a reasonable and legitimate
thing for a nation of four hundred millions of people to be acutely
concerned about their independence; for events have already proved up to
the hilt that so far from the expulsion of Germany from Shantung having
resulted in the handing-back of interests which were forcibly acquired
from China in 1898, that expulsion has merely resulted in Japan
succeeding to such interests and thereby obliterating all trace of her
original promise to the world in 1914 that she would restore to China
what was originally taken from her. Here it is necessary to remark that
not only did Japan in her negotiations over the Twenty-one Demands force
China to hand over the twelve million pounds of German improvements in
Shantung province, but that Baron Hayashi, the present Japanese Minister
to China, has recently declared that Japan would demand from China a
vast settlement or concession at Tsingtao, thus making even the alleged
handing-back of the leased territory--which Japan is pledged to force
from Germany at the Peace Conference--wholly illusory, the formula of a
Settlement being adopted because twelve years' experience of Port Arthur
has shown that territorial "leases," with their military garrisons and
administrative offices, are expensive and antiquated things, and that it
is easier to push infiltration by means of a multitude of Settlements in
which police-boxes and policemen form an important element, than to cut
off slices of territory under a nomenclature which is a clamant
advertisement of disruptive aims.

Now although these matters appear to be taking us far from the
particular theme we are discussing, it is not really so. Like a dark
thunder-cloud on the horizon the menace of Japanese action has rendered
frank Chinese co-operation, even in such a simple matter as war-measures
against Germany, a thing of supreme difficulty. The mere rumour that
China might dispatch an Expeditionary Force to Mesopotamia was
sufficient to send the host of unofficial Japanese agents in Peking
scurrying in every direction and insisting that if the Chinese did
anything at all they should limit themselves to sending troops to
Russia, where they would be "lost"--a suggestion made because that was
what Japan herself offered to do when she declined in 1915 the Allies'
proposal to dispatch troops to Europe. Nor must the fact be lost sight
of that as in other countries so in China, foreign affairs provide an
excellent opportunity for influencing the march of internal events.
Thus, as we have clearly shown, the Military Party, although originally
averse to any action at all, saw that a strong foreign policy would
greatly enhance its reputation and allow it to influence the important
elections for the Parliament of 1918 which, sitting as a National
Convention, will elect the next President. Thus, in the extraordinary
way which happens throughout the world, the whole of February was
consumed in the rival political parties manoeuvring for position, the
Vice-President, General Feng Kuo-chang, himself coming hastily to Peking
from Nanking to take part in this elaborate game in which many were now
participating merely for what they could get out of it.

On the 4th March matters were brought to a climax by an open breach
between President Li Yuan-hung and the Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, at
a Cabinet meeting regarding the procedure to be observed in breaking off
diplomatic relations with Germany. Although nearly a month had elapsed,
no reply had been received from Berlin; and of the many plans of action
proposed nothing had been formally decided. Owing to the pressure Japan
was exerting from Tokio to get China to come to a definite arrangement,
popular anxiety was growing. Over the question of certain telegrams to
be communicated to the Japanese Government, of which he had been kept in
ignorance, President Li Yuan-hung took a firm stand; with the result
that the Premier, deeply offended, abruptly left the Council Chamber,
handed in his resignation and left the capital--a course of action which
threatened to provoke a national crisis.

Fortunately in President Li Yuan-hung China had a cool and dispassionate
statesman. At the first grave crisis in his administration he wished at
all costs to secure that the assent of Parliament should be given to all
steps taken, and that nothing so speculative as a policy which had not
been publicly debated should be put into force. He held to this point
doggedly; and after some negotiations, the Premier was induced to return
to the capital and resume office, on the understanding that nothing
final was to be done until a popular endorsement had been secured.

On the 10th March the question was sent to Parliament for decision.
After a stormy debate of several hours in the Lower House the policy of
the Government was upheld by 330 votes to 87: on the following day the
Senate endorsed this decision by 158 votes to 37. By a coincidence which
was too extraordinary not to have been artificially contrived, the
long-awaited German reply arrived on the morning of this 10th March,
copies of the document being circulated wholesale by German agents among
the Members of Parliament in a last effort to influence their decision.
The actual text of the German reply was as follows, and it will be seen
how transparently worded it is:

_To the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China_:

YOUR EXCELLENCY: By the instructions of my home Government--which
reached me on the 10th inst.--I beg to forward you the following
reply to China's protest to the latest blockade policy of Germany:--

"The Imperial German Government expresses its great surprise at the
action threatened by the Government of the Republic of China in its
Note of protest. Many other countries have also protested, but
China, which has been in friendly relations with Germany, is the
only State which has added a threat to its protest. The surprise is
doubly great, because of the fact that, as China has no shipping
interests in the seas of the barred zones, she will not suffer
thereby.

"The Government of the Republic of China mentions that loss of life
of Chinese citizens has occurred as the results of the present
method of war. The Imperial German Government wishes to point out
that the Government of the Republic of China has never communicated
with the Imperial Government regarding a single case of this kind
nor has it protested in this connexion before. According to reports
received by the Imperial Government, such losses as have been
actually sustained by Chinese subjects have occurred in the firing
line while they were engaged in digging trenches and in other war
services. While thus engaged, they were exposed to the dangers
inevitable to all forces engaged in war. The fact that Germany has
on several occasions protested against the employment of Chinese
citizens for warlike purpose is evidence that the Imperial
Government has given excellent proof of its friendly feelings toward
China. In consideration of these friendly relations the Imperial
Government is willing to treat the matter as if the threat had never
been uttered. It is reasonable for the Imperial Government to expect
that the Government of the Republic of China will revise its views
respecting the question.

"Germany's enemies were the first to declare a blockade on Germany
and the same is being persistently carried out. It is therefore
difficult for Germany to cancel her blockade policy. The Imperial
Government is nevertheless willing to comply with the wishes of the
Government of the Republic of China by opening negotiations to
arrive at a plan for the protection of Chinese life and property,
with the view that the end may be achieved and thereby the utmost
regard be given to the shipping rights of China. The reason which
has prompted the Imperial Government to adopt this conciliatory
policy is the knowledge that, once diplomatic relations are severed
with Germany, China will not only lose a truly good friend but will
also be entangled in unthinkable difficulties."

In forwarding to Your Excellency the above instructions from my home
Government, I beg also to state that--if the Government of China be
willing--I am empowered to open negotiations for the protection of
the shipping rights of China.

I have the honour to be....

(Signed by the German Minister.)

March 10, 1917.

With a Parliamentary endorsement behind them there remained nothing for
the Peking Government but to take the vital step of severing diplomatic
relations. Certain details remained to be settled but these were
expeditiously handled. Consequently, without any further discussion, at
noon on the 14th March the German Minister was handed his passports,
with the following covering dispatch from the Chinese Foreign Office. It
is worthy of record that in the interval between the Chinese Note of the
9th February and the German reply of the 10th March the French
mail-steamer _Athos_ had been torpedoed in the Mediterranean and five
hundred Chinese labourers proceeding to France on board her drowned.

_Your Excellency_:--

With reference to the new submarine policy of Germany, the
Government of the Republic of China, dictated by the desire to
further the cause of world's peace and to maintain the sanctity of
International Law, addressed a protest to Your Excellency on
February 9th and declared that in case, contrary to its
expectations, its protest be ineffectual, it would be constrained to
sever the diplomatic relations at present existing between the two
countries.

During the lapse of a month no heed has been paid to the protest of
the Government of the Republic in the activities of the German
Submarines, activities which have caused the loss of many Chinese
lives. On March 10, a reply was received from Your Excellency.
Although it states that the Imperial German Government is willing to
open negotiations to arrive at a plan for the protection of Chinese
life and property, yet it declares that it is difficult for Germany
to cancel her blockade policy. It is therefore not in accord with
the object of the protest and the Government of the Chinese
Republic, to its deep regret, considers its protest to be
ineffectual. The Government of the Republic is constrained to sever
the diplomatic relations at present existing with the Imperial
German Government. I have the honour to send herewith to Your
Excellency, the passport for Your Excellency, the members of the
German Legation and their families and retinue for protection while
leaving Chinese territory. With regard to the Consular Officers of
Germany in China, this Ministry has instructed the different
Commissioners of Foreign Affairs to issue to them similarly
passports for leaving the country.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the
assurance of my highest consideration.

March 14th, 1917.

It was not until eleven days later--on the 25th March--that the German
Minister and his suite reluctantly left Peking for Germany via America.
Meanwhile the Chinese Government remained undecided regarding the taking
of the final step as a number of important matters had still to be
settled. Not only had arrangements to be made with the Allies but there
was the question of adjusting Chinese policy with American action. A
special commission on Diplomatic affairs daily debated the procedure to
be observed, but owing to the conflict of opinion in the provinces
further action was greatly delayed. As it is necessary to show the
nature of this conflict we give two typical opinions submitted to the
Government on the question of a formal declaration of war against
Germany (and Austria). The first Memorandum was written for the
Diplomatic Commission by the scholar Liang Ch'i-chao and is singularly
lucid:--

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