Book: The Fight For The Republic in China

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A VITAL INTEREST

"As the abolition of likin concerns the vital interest of the merchants
and manufacturers, it should be carried out without delay. The
commercial and industrial enterprises of the country can only thrive
after likin is abolished and only then can new sources of revenue be
obtained. This measure will form the fundamental factor of our
industrial and economical development. But one thing to which we should
like to call the special attention of the Government is the procedure to
be adopted to negotiate with the Foreign countries respecting the
adoption of this measure. The first step in this connection should be
the increase of the present Customs tariff to the actual five per cent
_ad valorem_ rate. When this is done, proposals should be made to the
Powers having treaty relations with us concerning the abolition of likin
and revision of Customs tariff. The transit destination duties on
imported goods should at the same time be done away with. This would not
entail any disadvantage to the importers of foreign goods and any
diplomatic question would not be difficult of solution. Meantime
preparatory measures should be devised for reorganizing the method of
collecting duties set forth above so that the abolition of likin can
take place as soon as the Government obtains the consent of the foreign
Powers respecting the increase of Customs tariff."

MEMORANDUM

THE LEADING OUTSTANDING CASES BETWEEN CHINA AND THE FOREIGN POWERS

(Author's note. The following memorandum was drawn up by Dr. C.C. Wu,
Councillor at the Chinese Foreign Office and son of Dr. Wu Ting-fang,
the Foreign Minister, and is a most competent and precise statement. It
is a noteworthy fact that not only is Dr. C.C. Wu a British barrister
but he distinguished himself above all his fellows in the year he was
called to the Bar. It is also noteworthy that the Lao Hsi-kai case does
not figure in this summary, China taking the view that French action
throughout was _ultra vires_, and beyond discussion.)

BY DR. C.C. WU

Republican China inherited from imperial China the vast and rich
territory of China Proper and its Dependencies, but the inheritance was
by no means free from incumbrances as in the case of Outer Mongolia,
Tibet and Manchuria, and other impediments in the form of unfavourable
treaty obligations and a long list of outstanding foreign cases
affecting sovereign and territorial rights.

I have been asked by the Editor of the _North-China Daily News_ to
contribute an article on some of the outstanding questions between China
and foreign powers, instancing Tibet, Manchuria, Mongolia, and to give
the Chinese point of view on these questions. Although the subject is a
delicate one to handle, particularly in the press, being as it is one in
which international susceptibilities are apt to be aroused, I have yet
accepted the invitation in the belief that a calm and temperate
statement of the Chinese case will hurt no one whose case will bear
public discussion but will perhaps do some good by bringing about a
clear understanding of the points at issue between China and the foreign
Powers concerned, and thus facilitating an early settlement which is so
earnestly desired by China. I may say that I have appreciated the
British sense of justice and fairplay displayed by the "North-China
Daily News" in inviting a statement of the Chinese case in its own
columns on questions one of which concerns British interests in no small
degree, and the discussion cannot be conducted under a better spirit
than that expressed in the motto of the senior British journal in the
Far East: "Impartial not Neutral."

1st MANCHURIA

The treaty between China and Japan of 1915 respecting South Manchuria
and Eastern Inner Mongolia giving that power special rights and
privileges in those regions has given rise to many knotty problems for
the diplomatists of the two countries to solve. Two of such problems are
mentioned here.

JAPANESE POLICE BOXES IN MANCHURIA AND MONGOLIA

Since the last days of the Tsings, the Japanese have been establishing
police boxes in different parts of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner
Mongolia always under protest of the local and Peking authorities. Since
the treaty of 1915, a new reason has become available in the right of
mixed residence given to Japanese in these regions. It is said that for
the protection and control of their subjects, and indeed for the
interest of the Chinese themselves, it is best that this measure should
be taken. It is further contended that the stationing of police officers
is but a corollary to the right of exterritoriality, and that it is in
no way a derogation of Chinese sovereignty.

It is pointed out by the Chinese Government that in the treaty of 1915,
express provision is made for Japanese in South Manchuria and Eastern
Inner Mongolia to submit to the police laws and ordinances and taxation
of China (Article 5). This leaves the matter in no doubt. If the
Japanese wish to facilitate the Chinese police in their duty of
protection and control of the Japanese, they have many means at their
command for so doing. It is unnecessary to point out that the
establishment of foreign police on Chinese soil (except in foreign
settlements and concessions where it is by the permission of the Chinese
Government) is, to our thinking, at any rate, a very grave derogation to
China's sovereign rights. Furthermore, from actual experience, we know
that the activities of these foreign police will not be confined to
their countrymen; in a dispute between a Chinese and a Japanese both
will be taken to the Japanese station by the Japanese policeman. This
existence of an imperium in imperio, so far from accomplishing its
avowed object of "improving the relations of the countries and bringing
about the development of economic interests to no small degree," will,
it is feared, be the cause of continual friction between the officials
and people of the two countries.

As to the legal contention that the right of police control is a natural
corollary to the right of exterritoriality, it must be said that ever
since the grant of consular jurisdiction to foreigners by China in her
first treaties, this is the first time that such a claim has been
seriously put forward. We can only say that if this interpretation of
exterritoriality is correct the other nations enjoying exterritoriality
in China have been very neglectful in the assertion of their just
rights.

In the Chengchiatun case, the claim of establishing police boxes
wherever the Japanese think necessary was made one of the demands. The
Chinese Government in its final reply which settled the case took the
stand as above outlined.

It may be mentioned in passing that in Amoy the Japanese have also
endeavoured to establish similar police rights. The people of that city
and province, and indeed of the whole country, as evidenced by the
protests received from all over China, have been very much exercised
over the matter. It is sincerely hoped that with the undoubted
improvement of relations between the two countries within the last
several months, the matter will be smoothly and equitably settled.

LEGAL STATUS OF KOREANS IN CHIENTAO

The region which goes by the name of Chientao, a Japanese denomination,
comprises several districts in the Yenchi Circuit of Kirin Province
north of the Tumen Kiang (or the Tiumen River) which here forms the
boundary between China and Korea. For over thirty years Koreans have
been allowed here to cultivate the waste lands and acquire ownership
therein, a privilege which has not been permitted to any other
foreigners in China and which has been granted to these Koreans on
account of the peculiar local conditions. According to reliable sources,
the Korean population now amounts to over 200,000 which is more than the
Chinese population itself. In 1909 an Agreement, known as the Tumen
Kiang Boundary Agreement, was arrived at between China and Japan, who
was then the acknowledged suzerain of Korea, dealing, inter alia, with
the status of these Koreans. It was provided that while Koreans were to
continue to enjoy protection of their landed property, they were to be
subject to Chinese laws and to the jurisdiction of Chinese courts. The
subsequent annexation of Korea did not affect this agreement in point of
international law, and as a matter of practice Japan has adhered to it
until September, 1915. Then the Japanese Consul suddenly interfered in
the administration of justice by the local authorities over the Koreans
and claimed that he should have jurisdiction.

The Japanese claim is based on the Treaty Respecting South Manchuria and
Eastern Inner Mongolia signed in May, 1915, article 5 of which provides
that civil and criminal cases in which the defendants are Japanese shall
be tried and adjudicated by the Japanese consul.

The Chinese view is that this article is inapplicable to Koreans in this
region and that the Tumen Kiang Agreement continues in force. This view
is based on a saving clause in article 8 of the Treaty of 1915 which
says that "all existing treaties between China and Japan relating to
Manchuria shall, except where otherwise provided for by treaty, remain
in force."

In the first place, the origin of the Tumen Kiang Agreement supports
this view. When the Japanese assumed suzerainty over Korea they raised
certain questions as to the boundary between China and Korea. There were
also outstanding several questions regarding railways and mines between
China and Japan. Japan insisted that the boundary question and the
railway and mining questions be settled at the same time. As a result,
two agreements were concluded in 1909 one respecting the boundary
question, the Tumen Kiang Agreement, and the other respecting railways
and mines whereby Japan obtained many new and valuable privileges and
concessions, such as the extension of the Kirin-Changchun Railway to the
Korean frontier, the option on the Hsinminfu-Fakumen line, and the
working of the Fushun and Yentai mines, while in return China obtained a
bare recognition of existing rights, namely the boundary between China
and Korea and the jurisdiction over the Koreans in the Yenchi region.
The two settlements were in the nature of quid pro quo though it is
clear that the Japanese side of the scale heavily outweighed that of the
Chinese. Now Japan endeavours to repudiate, for no apparent reason so
far as we can see, the agreement which formed the consideration whereby
she obtained so many valuable concessions.

Secondly, while Koreans are now Japanese subjects, it is contended by
the Chinese that the particular Koreans inhabiting the Yenchi region
are, as regards China, in a different position from Japanese subjects
elsewhere. These Koreans enjoy the rights of free residence and of
cultivating and owning land in the interior of China, rights denied to
other foreigners, including Japanese who, even by the new treaty, may
only lease land in South Manchuria. For this exceptional privilege, they
are subject to the jurisdiction of Chinese laws and Chinese courts, a
duty not imposed on other foreigners. It would be "blowing hot and cold
at the same time" in the language of English lawyers if it is sought to
enjoy the special privileges without performing the duties.

Thirdly, Japanese under the Treaty of 1915 are required to register
their passports with the local authorities. On the other hand, Koreans
in Yenchi have never been nor are they now required to procure
passports. This would seem to be conclusive proof that Koreans in that
region are not within the provisions of the treaty of 1915 but are still
governed by the Tumen Kiang Agreement.

The question is something more than one of academic or even merely
judicial importance. As has been stated, the Koreans in Yenchi outnumber
the Chinese and the only thing that has kept the region Chinese
territory in fact as well as in name is the possession by the Chinese of
jurisdiction over every inhabitant, whether Chinese or Korean. Were
China to surrender that jurisdiction over a majority of those
inhabitants, it would be tantamount to a cession of territory.

2nd MACAO

The dispute between China and Portugal over the Macao question has been
one of long standing. The first treaty of commerce signed between them
on August 13, 1862, at Tientsin, was not ratified in consequence of a
dispute respecting the Sovereignty of Macao. By a Protocol signed at
Lisbon on March 26, 1887, China formally recognized the perpetual
occupation and government of Macao and its dependencies by Portugal, as
any other Portuguese possession; and in December of the same year, when
the formal treaty was signed, provision was made for the appointment of
a Commission to delimit the boundaries of Macao; "but as long as the
delimitation of the boundaries is not concluded, everything in respect
to them shall continue as at present without addition, diminution or
alteration by either of the Parties."

In the beginning of 1908, a Japanese steamer, the _Tatsu Maru_, engaged
in gun-running was captured by a Chinese customs cruiser near the
Kauchau archipelago (Nove Ilhas). The Portuguese authorities demanded
her release on the ground that she was seized in Portuguese territorial
waters thus raising the question of the status of the waters surrounding
Macao.

In the same year the Portuguese authorities of Macao attempted the
imposition of land tax in Maliaoho, and proposed to dredge the waterways
in the vicinity of Macao. The Chinese Government thereupon instructed
its Minister in France, who was also accredited to Portugal, to make
personal representations to the Portuguese Foreign Office in regard to
the unwarrantable action of the local Portuguese authorities. The
Portuguese Government requested the withdrawal of Chinese troops on the
Island of Lappa as a quid pro quo for the appointment of a new
Demarcation Commissioner, reserving to itself the right to refer to The
Hague Tribunal any dispute that may arise between the Commissioners
appointed by the respective Governments.

After protracted negotiations it was agreed between the Chinese Minister
and the Portuguese Government by an exchange of notes that the
respective Governments should each appoint a Demarcation Commissioner to
delimit the boundaries of Macao and its dependencies in pursuance of the
Lisbon Protocol and Article 2 of the Sino-Portuguese Treaty of 1887,
subject to the decision of their respective Governments.

THE PORTUGUESE CLAIM

In February, 1909, Portugal appointed General Joaquim Machado and China
Mr. Kao Erh-chien as their respective Commissioners and they met at
Hongkong in June of the same year.

The Portuguese claim consisted of the whole of the Peninsula of Macao as
far north as Portas do Cerco, the Island of Lappa, Green Island (Ilha
Verde), Ilhas de Taipa, Ilha de Coloane, Ilha Macarira, Ilha da
Tai-Vong-Cam, other small islands, and the waters of Porto Interior.
The Portuguese Commissioner also demanded that the portion of Chinese
territory between Portas de Cerco and Peishanling be neutralized.

In the absence of evidence, documentary or otherwise, China could not
admit Portugal's title to half the territory claimed, but was prepared
to concede all that part of the Peninsula of Macao south of Portas do
Cerco which was already beyond the limits of the original Portuguese
Possession of Macao, and also to grant the developed parts of Ilhas de
Coloane as Portuguese settlements. The ownership of territorial waters
was to remain vested in China.

The negotiations having proved fruitless were transferred to Lisbon but
on the outbreak of the Revolution in Portugal they were suspended. No
material progress has been made since.

3rd TIBET

In November, 1911, the Chinese garrison in Lhassa, in sympathy with the
revolutionary cause in China, mutinied against Amban Lien-yu, a Chinese
Bannerman, and a few months later the Tibetans, by order of the Dalai
Lama, revolted and besieged the Chinese forces in Lhassa till they were
starved out and eventually evacuated Tibet. Chinese troops in Kham were
also ejected. An expedition was sent from Szechuan and Yunnan to Tibet,
but Great Britain protested and caused its withdrawal.

In August, 1912, the British Minister in Peking presented a Memorandum
to the Chinese Government outlining the attitude of Great Britain
towards the Tibetan question. China was asked to refrain from
dispatching a military expedition into Tibet, as the re-establishment of
Chinese authority would, it is stated, constitute a violation of the
Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1906. Chinese suzerainty in regard to Tibet was
recognized. But Great Britain could not consent to the assertion of
Chinese sovereignty over a State enjoying independent treaty relations
with her. In conclusion, China was invited to come to an agreement
regarding Tibet on the lines indicated in the Memorandum, such agreement
to be antecedent to Great Britain's recognition of the Republic. Great
Britain also imposed an embargo on the communications between China and
Tibet via India.

In deference to the wishes of the British Government, China at once
issued orders that the expeditionary force should not proceed beyond
Giamda. In her reply she declared that the Chinese Government had no
intention of converting Tibet into another province of China and that
the preservation of the traditional system of Tibetan government was as
much the desire of China as of Great Britain. The dispatch of troops
into Tibet was, however, necessary for the fulfilment of the
responsibilities attaching to China's treaty obligations with Great
Britain, which required her to preserve peace and order throughout that
vast territory, but she did not contemplate the idea of stationing an
unlimited number of soldiers in Tibet. China considered that the
existing treaties defined the status of Tibet with sufficient clearness,
and therefore there was no need to negotiate a new treaty. She
expressed the regret that the Indian Government had placed an embargo on
the communications between China and Tibet via India, as China was at
peace with Great Britain and regretted that Great Britain should
threaten to withhold recognition of the Republic, such recognition being
of mutual advantage to both countries. Finally, the Chinese Government
hoped that the British Government would reconsider its attitude.

THE SIMLA CONFERENCE

In May, 1913, the British Minister renewed his suggestion of the
previous year that China should come to an agreement on the Tibetan
question, and ultimately a Tripartite Conference was opened on October
13, at Simla with Mr. Ivan Chen, Sir Henry McMahon, and Lonchen Shatra
as plenipotentiaries representing China, Great Britain, and Tibet,
respectively.

The following is the substance of the Tibetan proposals:--

1. Tibet shall be an independent State, repudiating the Anglo-Chinese
Convention of 1906.

2. The boundary of Tibet in regard to China includes that portion of
Sinkiang south of Kuenlun Range and Altyn Tagh, the whole territory of
Chinghai, the western portion of Kansuh and Szechuan, including
Tachienlu and the northwestern portion of Yunnan, including Atuntzu.

3. Great Britain and Tibet to negotiate, independent of China, new trade
regulations.

4. No Chinese officials and troops to be stationed in Tibet.

5. China to recognize Dalai Lama as the head of the Buddhist Religion
and institutions in Mongolia and China.

6. China to compensate Tibet for forcible exactions of money or property
taken from the Tibetan Government.

The Chinese Plenipotentiary made the following counter-proposals:--

1. Tibet forms an integral part of Chinese territory and Chinese rights
of every description which have existed in consequence of this integrity
shall be respected by Tibet and recognized by Great Britain. China
engages not to convert Tibet into a province and Great Britain not to
annex Tibet or any portion of it.

2. China to appoint a Resident at Lhassa with an escort of 2,600
soldiers.

3. Tibet undertakes to be guided by China in her foreign and military
affairs and not to enter into negotiations with any foreign Power except
through the intermediary of China but this engagement does not exclude
direct relations between British Trade Agents and Tibetan authorities as
provided in the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906.

4. Tibet to grant amnesty to those Tibetans known for their pro-Chinese
inclinations and to restore to them their property.

5. Clause 5 of Tibetan claims can be discussed.

6. Revision of Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908, if found necessary,
must be made by all the parties concerned.

7. In regard to the limits of Tibet China claims Giamda and all the
places east of it.

THE BOUNDARY DEADLOCK

The British plenipotentiary sustained in the main the Tibetan view
concerning the limits of Tibet. He suggested the creation of Inner and
Outer Tibet by a line drawn along the Kuenlun Range to the 96th
longitude, turning south reaching a point south of the 34th latitude,
then in south-easterly direction to Niarong, passing Hokow, Litang,
Batang in a western and then southern and southwestern direction to
Rima, thus involving the inclusion of Chiamdo in Outer Tibet and the
withdrawal of the Chinese garrison stationed there. He proposed that
recognition should be accorded to the autonomy of Outer Tibet whilst
admitting the right of the Chinese to re-establish such a measure of
control in Inner Tibet as would restore and safeguard their historic
position there, without in any way infringing the integrity of Tibet as
a geographical and political entity. Sir Henry McMahon also submitted to
the Conference a draft proposal of the Convention to the
plenipotentiaries. After some modification this draft was initialled by
the British and Tibetan delegates but the Chinese delegate did not
consider himself authorized to do so. Thereupon the British member after
making slight concessions in regard to representation in the Chinese
Parliament and the boundary in the neighbourhood of Lake Kokonor
threatened, in the event of his persisting in his refusal, to eliminate
the clause recognizing the suzerainty of China, and ipso facto the
privileges appertaining thereto from the draft Convention already
initialled by the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries. In order to
save the situation, the Chinese delegate initialled the documents, but
on the clear understanding that to initial and to sign were two
different things and that to sign he must obtain instructions from his
Government.

China, dissatisfied with the suggested division into an Inner and Outer
Tibet the boundaries of which would involve the evacuation of those
districts actually in Chinese effective occupation and under its
administration, though otherwise in accord with the general principles
of the draft Convention, declared that the initialled draft was in no
way binding upon her and took up the matter with the British Government
in London and with its representative in Peking. Protracted negotiations
took place thereafter, but, in spite of repeated concessions from the
Chinese side in regard to the boundary question, the British Government
would not negotiate on any basis other than the initialled convention.
On July 3 an Agreement based on the terms of the draft Convention but
providing special safe-guards for the interests of Great Britain and
Tibet in the event of China continuing to withhold her adherence, was
signed between Great Britain and Tibet, not, however, before Mr. Ivan
Chen had declared that the Chinese Government would recognize any treaty
or similar document that might then or thereafter be signed between
Great Britain and Tibet.

CHINA'S STANDPOINT

With the same spirit of compromise and a readiness to meet the wishes of
the British Government and even to the extent of making considerable
sacrifices in so far as they were compatible with her dignity, China has
more than once offered to renew negotiations with the British Government
but the latter has up to the present declined to do so. China wants
nothing more than the re-establishment of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet,
with recognition of the autonomy of the territory immediately under the
control of the Lhassa Government; she is agreeable to the British idea
of forming an effective buffer territory in so far as it is consistent
with equity and justice; she is anxious that her trade interest should
be looked after by her trade agents as do the British, a point which is
agreeable even to the Tibetans, though apparently not to the British; in
other words, she expects that Great Britain would at least make with her
an arrangement regarding Tibet which should not be any less
disadvantageous to her than that made with Russia respecting Outer
Mongolia.

Considering that China has claimed and exercised sovereign rights over
Tibet, commanded the Tibetan army, supervised Tibetan internal
administration, and confirmed the appointments of Tibetan officials,
high and low, secular and even ecclesiastical, such expectations are
modest enough, surely. At the present moment, with communication via
India closed, with no official representative or agent present, with
relations unsettled and unregulated, the position of China _vis-a-vis_
Tibet is far from satisfactory and altogether anomalous, while as
between China and Great Britain there is always this important question
outstanding. An early settlement in a reciprocal spirit of give and take
and giving reasonable satisfaction to the legitimate aspirations and
claims of all parties is extremely desirable.

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