Book: The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero, Volume 4

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It is a sort of statement like this:--"If on the day on which that
murder was committed at Rome, I was at Athens, I could not have been
present at that murder." Because this is manifestly true, there is no
need to adduce proof of it; wherefore, it is proper at once to assume
the fact, in this way:--"But I was at Athens on that day." If this is
not notorious, it requires proof; and when the proof is furnished the
conclusion must follow:--"Therefore I could not have been present at
the murder." There is, therefore, a certain kind of proposition which
does not require proof. For why need one waste time in proving that
there is a kind which does require proof; for that is easily visible
to all men. And if this be the case, from this fact, and from that
statement which we have established, it follows that proof is
something distinct from a proposition. And if it is so, it is
evidently false that argumentation is susceptible of only three
divisions.

In the same manner it is plain that there is another sort of proof
also which is distinct from assumption. For if in some sort of
argumentation it is sufficient to use assumption, and if it is not
requisite to add proof to the assumption; and if, again, in some sort
of argumentation assumption is invalid unless proof be added to it;
then proof is something separate and distinct from assumption. But
there is a kind of argumentation in which assumption does not require
proof; and a certain other kind in which it is of no use without
proof; as we shall show. Proof, then, is a thing distinct from
assumption. And we will demonstrate that which we have promised to in
this manner.

That assumption which contains a truth evident to all men has no need
of proof. That is an assumption of this sort:--"If it be desirable
to be wise, it is proper to pay attention to philosophy." This
proposition requires proof. For it is not self-evident. Nor is it
notorious to all men, because many think that philosophy is of no
service at all, and some think that it is even a disservice. A
self-evident assumption is such as this:--"But it is desirable to be
wise." And because this is of itself evident from the simple fact, and
is at once perceived to be true, there is no need that it be proved.
Wherefore, the argumentation may be at once terminated:--"Therefore
it is proper to pay attention to philosophy." There is, therefore, a
certain kind of assumption which does not stand in need of proof; for
it is evident that is a kind which does. Therefore, it is false that
argumentation is susceptible of only a threefold division.

XXXVII. And from these considerations that also is evident, that there
is a certain kind of argumentation in which neither proposition nor
assumption stands in need of proof, of this sort, that we may adduce
something undoubted and concise, for the sake of example. "If wisdom
is above all things to be desired, then folly is above all things to
be avoided; but wisdom is to be desired above all things, therefore
folly is above all things to be avoided." Here both the assumption and
the proposition are self-evident, on which account neither of them
stands in need of proof. And from all these facts it is manifest that
proof is at times added, and at times is not added. From which it
is palpable that proof is not contained in a proposition, nor in an
assumption, but that each being placed in its proper place, has its
own peculiar force fixed and belonging to itself. And if that is the
case, then those men have made a convenient arrangement who have
divided argumentation into five parts.

Are there five parts of that argumentation which is carried on by
ratiocination? First of all, proposition, by which that topic is
briefly explained from which all the force of the ratiocination ought
to proceed. Then the proof of the proposition, by which that which has
been briefly set forth being corroborated by reasons, is made more
probable and evident. Then assumption, by which that is assumed which,
proceeding from the proposition, has its effect on proving the case.
Then the proof of the assumption, by which that which has been assumed
is confirmed by reasons. Lastly, the summing up, in which that which
results from the entire argumentation is briefly explained. So the
argumentation which has the greatest number of divisions consists of
these five parts.

The second sort of argumentation has four divisions; the third has
three. Then there is one which has two; which, however, is a disputed
point. And about each separate division it is possible that some
people may think that there is room for a discussion.

XXXVIII. Let us then bring forward some examples of those matters
which are agreed upon. And in favour of those which are doubtful, let
us bring forward some reasons. Now the argumentation which is divided
into five divisions is of this sort:--It is desirable, O judges, to
refer all laws to the advantage of the republic, and to interpret them
with reference to the general advantage, and according to the strict
wording according to which they are drawn up. For our ancestors were
men of such virtue and such wisdom, that when they were drawing up
laws, they proposed to themselves no other object than the safety and
advantage of the republic; for they were neither willing themselves to
draw up any law which could be injurious; and if they had drawn up one
of such a character, they were sure that it would be rejected when its
tendency was perceived. For no one wishes to preserve the laws for the
sake of the laws, but for the sake of the republic; because all men
believe that the republic is best managed by means of laws. It is
desirable, therefore, to interpret all written laws with reference to
that cause for the sake of which it is desirable that the laws should
be preserved. That is to say, since we are servants of the republic,
let us interpret the laws with reference to the advantage and benefit
of the republic. For as it is not right to think that anything results
from medicine except what has reference to the advantage of the body,
since it is for the sake of the body that the science of medicine has
been established; so it is desirable to think that nothing proceeds
from the laws except what is for the advantage of the republic, since
it is for the sake of the republic that laws were instituted.

Therefore, while deciding on this point, cease to inquire about the
strict letter of the law, and consider the law (as it is reasonable to
do) with reference to the advantage of the republic. For what was more
advantageous for the Thebans than for the Lacedaemonians to be put
down? What object was Epaminondas, the Theban general, more bound
to aim at than the victory of the Thebans? What had he any right to
consider more precious or more dear to him, than the great glory then
acquired by the Thebans, than such an illustrious and magnificent
trophy? Surely, disregarding the letter of the law, it became him to
consider the intention of the framer of the law. And this now has been
sufficiently insisted on, namely, that no law has ever been drawn
up by any one, that had not for its object the benefit of the
commonwealth. He then thought that it was the very extremity of
madness, not to interpret with reference to the advantage of the
republic, that which had been framed for the sake of the safety of the
republic. And it is right to interpret all laws with reference to the
safety of the republic; and if he was a great instrument of the safety
of the republic, certainly it is quite impossible that he by one and
the same action should have consulted the general welfare, and yet
should have violated the laws.

XXXIX. But argumentation consists of four parts, when we either
advance a proposition, or claim an assumption without proof. That it
is proper to do when either the proposition is understood by its own
merits, or when the assumption is self-evident and is in need of no
proof. If we pass over the proof of the proposition, the argumentation
then consists of four parts, and is conducted in this manner:--"O
judges, you who are deciding on your oaths, in accordance with the
law, ought to obey the laws; but you cannot obey the laws unless
you follow that which is written in the law. For what more certain
evidence of his intention could the framer of a law leave behind him,
than that which he himself wrote with great care and diligence? But if
there were no written documents, then we should be very anxious for
them, in order that the intention of the framer of the law might be
ascertained; nor should we permit Epaminondas, not even if he were
beyond the power of this tribunal, to interpret to us the meaning of
the law; much less will we now permit him, when, the law is at hand,
to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, not from that which is
most clearly written, but from that which is convenient for his own
cause. But if you, O judges, are bound to obey the laws, and if you
are unable to do so unless you follow what is written in the law; what
can hinder your deciding that he has acted contrary to the laws?"

But if we pass over the proof of the assumption, again the
argumentation will be arranged under four heads, in this
manner:--"When men have repeatedly deceived us, having pledged their
faith to us, we ought not to give credit to anything that they say for
if we receive any injury; in consequence of their perfidy, there will
be no one except ourselves whom we shall have any right to accuse. And
in the first place, it is inconvenient to be deceived, in the
next place, it is foolish, thirdly, it is disgraceful. But the
Carthaginians have before this deceived us over and over again. It is
therefore the greatest insanity to rest any hopes on their good faith,
when you have been so often deceived by their treachery."

When the proof both of the proposition and of the assumption is passed
over, the argumentation becomes threefold only, in this way--"We must
either live in fear of the Carthaginians if we leave them with their
power undiminished, or we must destroy their city. And certainly it is
not desirable to live in fear of them. The only remaining alternative
then is to destroy their city."

XL But some people think that it is both possible and advisable at
times to pass over the summing up altogether, when it is quite evident
what is effected by ratiocination. And then if that be done they
consider that the argumentation is limited to two divisions, in this
way--"If she has had a child she is not a virgin. But she has had a
child." In this case they say it is quite sufficient to state the
proposition and assumption, since it is quite plain that the matter
which is here stated is such as does not stand in need of summing up.
But to us it seems that all ratiocination ought to be terminated in
proper form and that that defect which offends them is above all
things to be avoided namely, that of introducing what is self evident
into the summing up.

But this will be possible to be effected if we come to a right
understanding of the different kinds of summing up. For we shall
either sum up in such a way as to unite together the proposition and
the assumption, in this way--"But if it is right for all laws to be
referred to the general advantage of the republic, and if this man
ensured the safety of the republic, undoubtedly he cannot by one
and the same action have consulted the general safety and yet have
violated the laws,"--or thus, in order that the opinion we advocate
may be established by arguments drawn from contraries, in this
manner--"It is then the very greatest madness to build hopes on the
good faith of those men by whose treachery you have been so repeatedly
deceived,"--or so that that inference alone be drawn which is already
announced, in this manner--"Let us then destroy their city,"--or so
that the conclusion which is desired must necessarily follow from the
assertion which has been established, in this way--"If she has had a
child, she has laid with a man. But she has had a child." This then is
established. "Therefore she has lain with a man." If you are unwilling
to draw this inference, and prefer inferring what follows, "Therefore
she has committed incest," you will have terminated your argumentation
but you will have missed an evident and natural summing up.

Wherefore in long argumentations it is often desirable to draw
influences from combinations of circumstances, or from contraries. And
briefly to explain that point alone which is established, and in
those in which the result is evident, to employ arguments drawn from
consequences. But if there are any people who think that argumentation
ever consists of one part alone they will be able to say that it is
often sufficient to carry-on an argumentation in this way.--"Since
she has had a child, she has lain with a man." For they say that
this assertion requires no proof, nor assumption, nor proof of an
assumption, nor summing up. But it seems to us that they are misled
by the ambiguity of the name. For argumentation signifies two things
under one name, because any discussion respecting anything which is
either probable or necessary is called argumentation, and so also is
the systematic polishing of such a discussion.

When then they bring forward any statement of this kind,--"Since she
has had a child, she has lain, with a man," they bring forward a plain
assertion, not a highly worked up argument, but we are speaking of the
parts of a highly worked up argument.

XLI. That principle then has nothing to do with this matter. And with
the help of this distinction we will remove other obstacles which seem
to be in the way of this classification, if any people think that it
is possible that at times the assumption may be omitted, and at other
times the proposition, and if this idea has in it anything probable
or necessary, it is quite inevitable that it must affect the hearer in
some great degree. And if it were the only object in view, and if
it made no difference in what manner that argument which had been
projected was handled, it would be a great mistake to suppose that
there is such a vast difference between the greatest orators and
ordinary ones.

But it will be exceedingly desirable to infuse variety into our
speech, for in all cases sameness is the mother of satiety. That will
be able to be managed if we not always enter upon our argumentation
in a similar manner. For in the first place it is desirable to
distinguish our orations as to their kinds, that is to say, at one
time to employ induction, and at another ratiocination. In the next
place, in the argumentation itself, it is best not always to begin
with the proposition, nor in every case to employ all the five
divisions, nor always to work up the different parts in the same
manner, but it is permissible sometimes to begin with the assumption,
sometimes with one or other of the proofs, sometimes with both,
sometimes to employ one kind of summing up, and sometimes another. And
in order that this variety may be seen, let us either write, or in any
example whatever let us exercise this same principle with respect to
those things which we endeavour to prove, that our task may be as easy
as possible.

And concerning the parts of the argumentation it seems to us that
enough has been said. But we wish to have it understood that we hold
the doctrine that argumentations are handled in philosophy in many
other manners, and those too at times obscure ones, concerning which,
however, there is still some definite system laid down. But still
those methods appear to us to be inconsistent with the practice of an
orator. But as to those things which we think belong to orators, we
do not indeed undertake to say that we have attended to them more
carefully than others have, but we do assert that we have written on
them with more accuracy and diligence. At present let us go on in
regular order to the other points, as we originally proposed.

XLII. Reprehension is that by means of which the proof adduced by the
opposite party is invalidated by arguing, or is disparaged, or is
reduced to nothing. And this sort of argument proceeds from the same
source of invention which confirmation employs, because whatever the
topics may be by means of which any statement can be confirmed, the
very same may be used in order to invalidate it. For nothing is to
be considered in all these inventions, except that which has been
attributed to persons or to things. Wherefore it will be necessary
that the invention and the high polish which ought to be given to
argumentation must be transferred to this part of our oration also
from those rules which have been already laid down. But in order that
we may give some precepts with reference to this part also, we will
explain the different methods of reprehension, and those who observe
them will more easily be able to do away with or invalidate those
statements which are made on the opposite side.

All argumentation is reprehended when anything, whether it be one
thing only, or more than one of those positions which are assumed, is
not granted, or if, though they are granted, it is denied that the
conclusion legitimately follows from them, or if it is shown that the
very kind of argumentation is faulty, or if in opposition to one
form and reliable sort of argumentation another is employed which is
equally firm and convincing. Something of those positions which have
been assumed is not granted when either that thing which the opposite
party says is credible is denied to be such, or when what they think
admits of a comparison with the present case is shown to be unlike
it, or when what has been already decided is either turned aside
as referring to something else, or is impeached as having been
erroneously decided, or when that which the opposite party have called
a proof is denied to be such, or if the summing up is denied in
some one point or in every particular, or if it is shown that the
enumeration of matters stated and proved is incorrect, or if the
simple conclusion is proved to contain something false. For everything
which is assumed for the purpose of arguing on, whether as necessary
or as only probable, must inevitably be assumed from these topics, as
we have already pointed out.

XLIII. What is assumed as something credible is invalidated, if it is
either manifestly false, in this way:--"There is the one who would not
prefer riches to wisdom." Or on the opposite side something credible
may be brought against it, in this manner--"Who is there who is not
more desirous of doing his duty than of acquiring money?" Or it may be
utterly and absolutely incredible, as if some one, who it is notorious
is a miser, were to say that he had neglected the acquisition of some
large sum of money for the sake of performing some inconsiderable
duty. Or if that which happens in some circumstances, and to some
persons, were asserted to happen habitually in all cases and to
everybody, in this way.--'Those men who are poor have a greater regard
for money than for duty.' 'It is very natural that a murder should
have been committed in that which is a desert place.' How could a man
be murdered in a much frequented place? Or if a thing which is done
seldom is asserted never to be done at all, as Curius asserts in his
speech in behalf of Fulvius, where he says, "No one can fall in love
at a single glance, or as he is passing by."

But that which is assumed as a proof may be invalidated by a
recurrence to the same topics as those by which it is sought to be
established. For in a proof the first thing to be shown is that it is
true, and in the next place, that it is one especially affecting the
matter which is under discussion, as blood is a proof of murder in the
next place, that that has been done which ought not to have been, or
that has not been done which ought to have been and last of all, that
the person accused was acquainted with the law and usages affecting
the matter which is the subject of inquiry. For all these circumstance
are matters requiring proof, and we will explain them more carefully,
when we come to speak about conjectural statements separately.
Therefore, each of these points in a reprehension of the statement of
the adversary must be laboured, and it must be shown either that such
and such a thing is no proof, or that it is an unimportant proof, or
that it is favourable to oneself rather than to the adversary, or that
it is altogether erroneously alleged, or that it may be diverted so as
to give grounds to an entirely different suspicion.

XLIV. But when anything is alleged as a proper object of comparison,
since that is a class of argument which turns principally on
resemblance, in reprehending the adversity it will be advisable to
deny that there is any resemblance at all to the case with which it is
attempted to institute the comparison. And that may be done if it
be proved to be different in genus or in nature, or in power, or
in magnitude, or in time or place, or with reference to the person
affected, or to the opinions generally entertained of it. And if it
be shown also in what classification that which is brought forward on
account of the alleged resemblance and in what place too the whole
genus with reference to which it is brought forward, ought to be
placed. After that it will be pointed out how the one thing differs
from the other, from which we shall proceed to show that a different
opinion ought to be entertained of that which is brought forward by
way of comparison, and of that to which it is sought to be compared.
And this sort of argument we especially require when that particular
argumentation which is carried on by means of induction is to be
reprehended. If any previous decision be alleged, since these are the
topics by which it is principally established, the praise of those who
have delivered such decision, the resemblance of the matter which is
at present under discussion to that which has already been the subject
of the decision referred to, that not only the decision is not found
fault with because it is mentioned, but that it is approved of by
every one, and by showing too, that the case which has been already
decided is a more difficult and a more important one than that which
is under consideration now. It will be desirable also to invalidate
it by arguments drawn from the contrary topics, if either truth or
probability will allow us to do so. And it will be necessary to take
care and notice whether the matter which has been decided has any real
connexion with that which is the present subject of discussion, and
we must also take care that no case is adduced in which any error has
been committed, so that it should seem that we are passing judgment on
the man himself who has delivered the decision referred to.

It is desirable further to take care that they do not bring forward
some solitary or unusual decision when there have been many decisions
given the other way. For by such means as this the authority of the
decision alleged can be best invalidated. And it is desirable that
those arguments which are assumed as probable should be handled in
this way.

XLV. But those which are brought forward as necessary, if they are
only imitations of a necessary kind of argumentation and are not so in
reality, may be reprehended in this manner. In the first place, the
summing up, which ought to take away the force of the admissions you
have made if it be a correct one, will never be reprehended, if it
be an incorrect one it may be attacked by two methods, either by
conversion or by the invalidating one portion of it. By conversion, in
this way.


"For if the man be modest, why should you
Attack so good a man? And if his heart
And face be seats of shameless impudence,
Then what avails your accusation
Of one who views all fame with careless eye?"


In this case, whether you say that he is a modest man or that he is
not, he thinks that the unavoidable inference is that you should not
accuse him. But that may be reprehended by conversion thus--"But
indeed, he ought to be accused, for if he be modest, accuse him, for
he will not treat your imputations against him lightly, but if he has
a shameless disposition of mind, still accuse him, for in that case he
is not a respectable man."

And again, the argument may be reprehended by an invalidating of
the other part of it--"But if he is a modest man, when he has
been corrected by your accusation he will abandon his error." An
enumeration of particulars is understood to be faulty if we either say
that something has been passed over which we are willing to admit, or
if some weak point has been included in it which can be contradicted,
or if there is no reason why we may not honestly admit it. Something
is passed over in such an enumeration as this.--"Since you have
that horse, you must either have bought it, or have acquired it by
inheritance, or have received it as a gift, or he must have been born
on your estate, or, if none of these alternatives of the case, you
must have stolen it. But you did not buy it, nor did it come to you by
inheritance, nor was it foaled on your estate, nor was it given to you
as a present, therefore you must certainly have stolen it."

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