Book: The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero, Volume 4

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But we think that these and such as these are the common topics
suitable to an argument of this description. In the first place, a
panegyric upon, and a confirmation of that writing which you are
producing. Then a comparison of the matter which is the subject of
discussion, with that which is a settled case, in such a manner that
the case which is under investigation may appear to resemble that
about which there are settled and notorious rules. After that, one
will express admiration, (by way of comparison), how it can happen
that a man who admits that this is fair, can deny that other thing,
which is either more equitable still, or which rests on exactly
similar principles; then, too, one will contend that the reason why
there is no precise law drawn up for such a case, is because, as there
was one in existence applicable to the other case, the framer of that
law thought that no one could possibly entertain a doubt in this case;
and afterwards it will be well to urge that there are many cases not
provided for in many laws, which beyond all question were passed over
merely because the rule as to them could be so easily collected out
of the other cases which were provided for; and last of all, it is
necessary to point out what the equity of the case requires, as is
done in a plain judicial case.

But the speaker who is arguing on the other side is bound to try and
invalidate the comparison instituted, which he will do if he can show
that that which is compared is different from that with which it is
compared in kind, in nature, in effect, in importance, in time, in
situation, in character, in the opinion entertained of it; if it is
shown also in what class that which is adduced by way of comparison
ought to stand, and in what rank that also ought to be considered, for
the sake of which the other thing is mentioned. After that, it will be
well to point out how one case differs from the other, so that it does
not seem that any one ought to have the same opinion of both of them.
And if he himself also is able to have recourse to ratiocination, he
must use the same ratiocination which has been already spoken of. If
he cannot, then he will declare that it is not proper to consider
anything except what is written; that all laws are put in danger if
comparisons are once allowed to be instituted; that there is hardly
anything which does not seem somewhat like something else; that when
there are many circumstances wholly dissimilar, still there are
separate laws for each individual case; and that all things can be
proved to be like or unlike to each other. The common topics derived
from ratiocination ought to arrive by conjecture from that which is
written to that which is not written; and one may urge that no one can
embrace every imaginable case in a written law, but that he frames a
law best who takes care to make one thing understood from another. One
may urge, too, that in opposition to a ratiocination of this sort,
conjecture is no better than a divination, and that it would be a
sign of a very stupid framer of laws not to be able to provide for
everything which he wished to.

LI. Definition is when a word is set down in a written document, whose
exact meaning is inquired into, in this manner:--There is a law,
"Whoever in a severe tempest desert their ship shall be deprived of
all their property; the ship and the cargo shall belong to those men
who remain by the ship." Two men, when they were sailing on the open
sea, and when the ship belonged to one of them and the cargo to
another, noticed a shipwrecked man swimming and holding out his hands
to them. Being moved with pity they directed the ship towards him, and
took the man into their vessel. A little afterwards the storm began to
toss them also about very violently, to such a degree that the owner
of the ship, who was also the pilot, got into a little boat, and from
that he guided the ship as well as he could by the rope by which the
boat was fastened to the ship, and so towed along; but the man to whom
the cargo belonged threw himself on his sword in despair. On this
the shipwrecked man took the helm and assisted the ship as far as he
could. But after the waves went down and the tempest abated, the ship
arrived in harbour. But the man who had fallen on his sword turned out
to be but slightly wounded, and easily recovered of his wound. And
then every one of these three men claimed the ship and cargo for his
own. Every one of them relies on the letter of the law to support
their claim, and a dispute arises as to the meaning of the words.
For they seek to ascertain by definitions what is the meaning of the
expressions "to abandon the ship," "to stand by the ship," and even
what "the ship" itself is. And the question must be dealt with with
reference to all the same topics as are employed in a statement of the
case which turns upon a definition.

Now, having explained all those argumentations which are adapted to
the judicial class of causes, we will proceed in regular order to
give topics and rules for the deliberative and demonstrative class
of arguments; not that there is any cause which is not at all times
conversant with some statement of the case or other; but because there
are nevertheless some topics peculiar to these causes, not separated
from the statement of the case, but adapted to the objects which are
more especially kept in view by these kinds of argumentation.

For it seems desirable that in the judicial kind the proper end
is equity; that is to say, some division of honesty. But in the
deliberative kind Aristotle thinks that the proper object is
expediency; we ourselves, that it is expediency and honesty combined.
In the demonstrative kind it is honesty only. Wherefore, in this kind
of cause also, some kinds of argumentation will be handled in a common
manner, and in similar ways to one another. Some will be discussed
more separately with reference to their object, which is what we must
always keep in view in every kind of speech. And we should have no
objection to give an example of each kind of statement of the case, if
we did not see that, as obscure things are made more plain by speaking
of them, so also things which are plain are sometimes made more
obscure by a speech. At present let us go on to precepts of
deliberation.

LII. Of matters to be aimed at there are three classes; and on the
other hand there is a corresponding number of things to be avoided.
For there is something which of its own intrinsic force draws us to
itself, not catching us by any idea of emolument, but alluring us by
its own dignity. Of this class are virtue, science, truth. And there
is something else which seems desirable, not on account of its own
excellence or nature, but on account of its advantage and of the
utility to be derived from it--such as money. There are also some
things formed of parts of these others in combination, which allure us
and draw us after them by their own intrinsic character and dignity,
and which also hold out some prospect of advantage to us, to induce
us to seek it more eagerly, as friendship, and a fair reputation;
and from these their opposites will easily be perceived, without our
saying anything about them.

But in order that the principle may be explained in the more simple
way, the rules which we have laid down shall be enumerated briefly.
For those which belong to the first kind of discussion are called
honourable things; those which belong to the second, are called useful
things; but this third thing, because it contains some portion of what
is honourable, and because the power of what is honourable is the more
important part, is perceived to be altogether a compound kind, made up
of a twofold division; still it derives its name from its better part,
and is called honourable. From this it follows, that there are these
parts in things which are desirable,--what is honourable, and what is
useful. And these parts in things which are to be avoided,--what is
dishonourable, and what is useless. Now to these two things there
are two other important circumstances to be added,--necessity and
affection: the one of which is considered with reference to force, the
other with reference to circumstances and persons. Hereafter we will
write more explicitly about each separately. At present we will
explain first the principles of what is honourable.

LIII. That which either wholly or in some considerable portion of it
is sought for its own sake, we call honourable: and as there are two
divisions of it, one of which is simple and the other twofold, let us
consider the simple one first. In that kind, then, virtue has embraced
all things under one meaning and one name; for virtue is a habit
of the mind, consistent with nature, and moderation, and reason.
Wherefore, when we have become acquainted with all its divisions, it
will be proper to consider the whole force of simple honesty.

It has then four divisions--prudence, justice, fortitude, and
temperance. Prudence is the knowledge of things which are good, or
bad, or neither good nor bad. Its parts are memory, intelligence,
and foresight. Memory is that faculty by which the mind recovers the
knowledge of things which have been. Intelligence is that by which it
perceives what exists at present. Foresight is that by which anything
is seen to be about to happen, before it does happen. Justice is a
habit of the mind which attributes its proper dignity to everything,
preserving a due regard to the general welfare. Its first principles
proceed from nature. Subsequently some practices became established by
universal custom, from a consideration of their utility; afterwards
the fear of the laws and religion sanctioned proceedings which
originated in nature, and had been approved of by custom.

Natural law is that which has not had its origin in the opinions of
men, but has been implanted by some innate instinct, like religion,
affection, gratitude, revenge, attention to one's superiors, truth.
Religion is that which causes men to pay attention to, and to respect
with fixed ceremonies, a certain superior nature which men call
divine nature. Affection is that feeling under the influence of which
kindness and careful attention is paid to those who are united to us
by ties of blood, or who are devoted to the service of their country.
Gratitude is that feeling in which the recollection of friendship,
and of the services which we have received from another, and the
inclination to requite those services, is contained. Revenge is that
disposition by which violence and injury, and altogether everything
which can be any injury to us, is repelled by defending oneself from
it, or by avenging it. Attention is that feeling by which men obey
when they think those who are eminent for worth or dignity, worthy of
some special respect and honour. Truth is that by which those things
which are, or which have been previously, or which are about to
happen, are spoken of without any alteration.

LIV. Conventional law is a principle which has either derived its
origin in a slight degree from nature, and then has been strengthened
by habit, like religion; or, if we see any one of those things which
we have already mentioned as proceeding from nature strengthened by
habit; or, if there is anything to which antiquity has given the
force of custom with the approbation of everybody: such as covenants,
equity, cases already decided. A covenant is that which is agreed upon
between two parties; equity is that which is equally just for every
one; a case previously decided is one which has been settled by the
authoritative decision of some person or persons entitled to pronounce
it.

Legal right is that which is contained in that written form which is
delivered to the people to be observed by them.

Fortitude is a deliberate encountering of danger and enduring of
labour. Its parts are magnificence, confidence, patience, and
perseverance. Magnificence is the consideration and management of
important and sublime matters with a certain wide-seeing and splendid
determination of mind. Confidence is that feeling by which the mind
embarks in great and honourable courses with a sure hope and trust in
itself. Patience is a voluntary and sustained endurance, for the
sake of what is honourable or advantageous, of difficult and painful
labours. Perseverance is a steady and lasting persistence in a
well-considered principle.

Temperance is the form and well-regulated dominion of reason over lust
and other improper affections of the mind. Its parts are continence,
clemency, and modesty. Continence is that by which cupidity is kept
down under the superior influence of wisdom. Clemency is that by which
the violence of the mind, when causelessly excited to entertain hatred
against some one else, is restrained by courtesy. Modesty is that
feeling by which honourable shame acquires a valuable and lasting
authority. And all these things are to be sought for themselves, even
if no advantage is to be acquired by them. And it neither concerns our
present purpose to prove this, nor is it agreeable to our object of
being concise in laying down our rules.

But the things which are to be avoided for their own sake, are not
those only which are the opposites to these; as indolence is to
courage, and injustice to justice; but those also which appear to
be near to and related to them, but which, in reality, are very far
removed from them. As, for instance, diffidence is the opposite to
confidence, and is therefore a vice; audacity is not the opposite of
confidence, but is near it and akin to it, and, nevertheless, is also
a vice. And in this manner there will be found a vice akin to every
virtue, and either already known by some particular name--as audacity,
which is akin to confidence; pertinacity, which is bordering on
perseverance; superstition, which is very near religion,--or in
some cases it has no fixed name. And all these things, as being the
opposites of what is good, we class among things to be avoided. And
enough has now been said respecting that class of honourable things
which is sought in every part of it for itself alone.

LV. At present it appears desirable to speak of that in which
advantage is combined with honour, and which still we style simply
honourable. There are many things, then, which allure us both by their
dignity and also by the advantage which may be derived from them:
such as glory, dignity, influence, friendship. Glory is the fact of
a person's being repeatedly spoken of to his praise; dignity is the
honourable authority of a person, combined with attention and honour
and worthy respect paid to him. Influence is a great abundance of
power or majesty, or of any sort of resource. Friendship is a desire
to do service to any one for the sake of the person himself to whom
one is attached, combined with a corresponding inclination on his part
towards oneself. At present, because we are speaking of civil causes,
we add the consideration of advantage to friendship, so that it
appears a thing to be sought for the sake of the advantage also:
wishing to prevent those men from blaming us who think that we are
including every kind of friendship in our definition.

But although there are some people who think that friendship is only
to be desired on account of the advantage to be derived from it; some
think it is to be desired for itself alone; and some, that it is to be
desired both for its own sake and for the sake of the advantage to be
derived from it. And which of these statements is the most true, there
will be another time for considering. At present it may be laid down,
as far as the orator is concerned, that friendship is a thing to be
desired on both accounts. But the consideration of the different
kinds of friendship, (since they are partly formed on religious
considerations, and partly not; and because some friendships are old,
and some new; and because some originated in kindness shown by our
friends to us, and some in kindness shown by ourselves to them; and
because some are more advantageous, and others less,) must have
reference partly to the dignity of the causes in which it originates,
partly to the occasion when it arises, and also to the services done,
the religious motives entertained, and its antiquity.

LVI. But the advantages consist either in the thing itself, or in
extraneous circumstances; of which, however, by far the greater
portion is referable to personal advantage; as there are some
things in the republic which, so to say, refer to the person of the
state,--as lands, harbours, money, fleets, sailors, soldiery, allies;
by all which things states preserve their safety and their liberty.
There are other things also which make a thing more noble looking,
and which still are less necessary; as the splendid decorating and
enlarging of a city, or an extraordinary amount of wealth, or a great
number of friendships and alliances. And the effect of all these
things is not merely to make states safe and free from injury, but
also noble and powerful. So that there appears to be two divisions of
usefulness,--safety and power. Safety is the secure and unimpaired
preservation of a sound state. Power is a possession of things
suitable to preserving what is one's own, and to acquiring what
belongs to another. And in all those things which have been already
mentioned, it is proper to consider what is difficult to be done, and
what can be done with ease. We call that a thing easy to be done,
which can be done without great labour, or expense, or annoyance, or
perhaps without any labour, expense, or annoyance at all, and in the
shortest possible time. But that we call difficult to be done which,
although it requires labour, expense, trouble and time, and has every
possible characteristic of difficulty about it, or, at all events, the
most numerous and most important ones, still, when these difficulties
are encountered, can be completed and brought to an end.

Since, then, we have now discussed what is honourable and what is
useful, it remains for us to say a little of those things which we
have said are attached to these other things; namely, affection and
necessity.

LVII. I think, then, that necessity means that which cannot be
resisted by any power; that which cannot be softened nor altered. And
that this may be made more plain, let us examine into the meaning of
it by the light of examples, so as to see what its character and how
great its power is. "It is necessary that anything made of wood must
be capable of being burnt with fire. It is necessary that a mortal
body should at some time or other die." And it is so necessary, that
that power of necessity which we were just now describing requires it;
which cannot by any force whatever be either resisted, or weakened,
or altered. Necessities of this kind, when they occur in oratory, are
properly called necessities; but if any difficult circumstances arise,
then we shall consider in the previous examination whether it, the
thing in question, be possible to be done. And it seems to me, that
I perceive that there are some kinds of necessity which admit of
additions, and some which are simple and perfect in themselves. For
we say in very different senses:--"It is necessary for the people of
Casilinum to surrender themselves to Hannibal;" and, "It is necessary
that Casilinum should come into the power of Hannibal." In the one
case, that is, in the first case, there is this addition to the
proposition:--"Unless they prefer perishing by hunger." For if they
prefer that, then it is not necessary for them to surrender. But in
the latter proposition such an addition has no place; because whether
the people of Casilinum choose to surrender, or prefer enduring hunger
and perishing in that manner, still it is necessary that Casilinum
must come into the power of Hannibal. What then can be effected by
this division of necessity? I might almost say, a great deal, when the
topic of necessity appears such as may be easily introduced. For when
the necessity is a simple one, there will be no reason for our making
long speeches, as we shall not be able by any means to weaken it; but
when a thing is only necessary provided we wish to avoid or to obtain
something, then it will be necessary to state what advantage or what
honour is contained in that addition. For if you will take notice,
while inquiring what this contributes to the advantage of the state,
you will find that there is nothing which it is necessary to do,
except for the sake of some cause which we call the adjunct. And,
in like manner, you will find that there are many circumstances of
necessity to which a similar addition cannot be made; of such sort
are these:--"It is necessary that mortal men should die;" without
any addition:--"It is not necessary for men to take food;" with this
exception,--"Unless they have an objection to dying of hunger."

Therefore, as I said before, it will be always proper to take into
consideration the character of that exception which is added to the
original proposition. For it will at all times have this influence,
that either the necessity must be explained with reference to what is
honourable, in this manner:--"It is necessary, if we wish to live
with honour;" or with reference to safety, in this manner:--"It is
necessary, if we wish to be safe;" or with reference to convenience,
in this manner:--"It is necessary, if we are desirous to live without
annoyance."

LVIII. And the greatest necessity of all appears to be that which
arises from what is honourable; the next to it is that which arises
from considerations of safety; the third and least important is that
which has ideas of convenience involved in it. But this last can
never be put in comparison with the two former. But it is often
indispensable to compare these together; so that although honour is
more precious than safety, there is still room to deliberate which one
is to consult in the greatest degree. And as to this point, it appears
possible to give a settled rule which may be of lasting application.
For in whatever circumstances it can happen by any possibility that
while we are consulting our safety, that slight diminution of honesty
which is caused by our conduct may be hereafter repaired by virtue and
industry, then it seems proper to have a regard for our safety. But
when that does not appear possible, then we must think of nothing but
what is honourable. And so in a case of that sort when we appear to be
consulting our safety, we shall be able to say with truth that we
are also keeping our eyes fixed on what is honourable, since without
safety we can never attain to that end. And in these circumstances it
will be desirable to yield to another, or to put oneself in another's
place, or to keep quiet at present and wait for another opportunity.
But when we are considering convenience, it is necessary to consider
this point also,--whether the cause, as far as it has reference to
usefulness, appears of sufficient importance to justify us in taking
anything from splendour or honour. And while speaking on this topic,
that appears to me to be the main thing, that we should inquire what
that is which, whether we are desirous of obtaining or avoiding it,
is something necessary; that is to say, what is the character of the
addition; in order that, according as the matter is found to be, so we
may exert ourselves, and consider the most important circumstances as
being also the most necessary.

Affection is a certain way of looking at circumstances either with
reference to the time, or to the result, or management of affairs, or
to the desires of men, so that they no longer appear to be such as
they were considered previously, or as they are generally in the habit
of being considered. "It appears a base thing to go over to the enemy;
but not with the view which Ulysses had when he went over. And it is a
useless act to throw money into the sea; but not with the design
which Aristippus had when he did so." There are, therefore, some
circumstances which may be estimated with reference to the time at
which and the intention with which they are done; and not according to
their own intrinsic nature. In all which cases we must consider what
the times require, or what is worthy of the persons concerned; and we
must not think merely what is done, but with what intention, with what
companions, and at what time, it is done. And from these divisions of
the subject, we think that topics ought to be taken for delivering
one's opinion.

LIX. But praise and blame must be derived from those topics which
can be employed with respect to persons, and which we have already
discussed. But if any one wishes to consider them in a more separate
manner, he may divide them into the intention, and the person of the
doer, and extraneous circumstances. The virtue of the mind is that
concerning the parts of which we have lately spoken; the virtues
of the body are health, dignity, strength, swiftness. Extraneous
circumstances are honour, money, relationship, family, friends,
country, power, and other things which are understood to be of a
similar kind. And in all these, that which is of universal validity
ought to prevail here; and the opposites will be easily understood as
to their description and character.

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