Book: In the World War

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[Illustration: COUNT CZERNIN]

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IN THE WORLD WAR

BY COUNT OTTOKAR CZERNIN



_WITH FOUR PLATES_



CASSELL AND COMPANY, LTD
London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne

Copyright in Great Britain.




PREFACE


It is impossible in a small volume to write the history of the World
War in even a partially exhaustive manner. Nor is that the object of
this book.

Rather than to deal with generalities, its purpose is to describe
separate events of which I had intimate knowledge, and individuals
with whom I came into close contact and could, therefore, observe
closely; in fact, to furnish a series of snapshots of the great drama.

By this means the following pages may possibly present a conception of
the war as a whole, which may, nevertheless, differ in many respects
from the hitherto recorded, and possibly faulty, history of the war.

Everyone regards people and events from his own point of view; it is
inevitable. In my book, I speak of men with whom I was in close touch;
of others who crossed my path without leaving any personal impression
on me; and finally, of men with whom I was often in grave dispute. I
endeavour to judge of them all in objective fashion, but I have to
describe people and things as I saw them. Wherever the description
appears to be at fault, the reason will not be due to a prematurely
formed opinion, but rather, probably, to a prevailing lack of the
capacity for judging.

Not everything could be revealed. Much was not explained, although it
could have been. Too short a period still separates us from those
events to justify the lifting of the veil from all that happened.

But what remains unspoken can in no way change the whole picture,
which I describe exactly as imprinted on my mind.

OTTOKAR CZERNIN.




CONTENTS


CHAPTER PAGE

1. INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS 1

2. KONOPISCHT 34

3. WILLIAM II 52

4. ROUMANIA 77

5. THE U-BOAT WARFARE 114

6. ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 134

7. WILSON 188

8. IMPRESSIONS AND REFLECTIONS 195

9. POLAND 200

10. BREST-LITOVSK 211

11. THE PEACE OF BUCHAREST 258

12. FINAL REFLECTIONS 271

APPENDIX 275




LIST OF PLATES


COUNT CZERNIN _Frontispiece_

FACING PAGE

THE ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND 48

COUNT TISZA 128

GENERAL HOFFMANN 240




IN THE WORLD WAR


CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS


1

The bursting of a thunderstorm is preceded by certain definite
phenomena in the atmosphere. The electric currents separate, and the
storm is the result of atmospheric tension which can no longer be
repressed. Whether or no we become aware of these happenings through
outward signs, whether the clouds appear to us more or less
threatening, nothing can alter the fact that the electric tension is
bound to make itself felt before the storm bursts.

For years the political barometer of the European Ministries of
Foreign Affairs had stood at "storm." It rose periodically, to fall
again; it varied--naturally; but for years everything had pointed to
the fact that the peace of the world was in danger.

The obvious beginnings of this European tension date back several
years: to the time of Edward VII. On the one hand England's dread of
the gigantic growth of Germany; on the other hand Berlin's politics,
which had become a terror to the dwellers by the Thames; the belief
that the idea of acquiring the dominion of the world had taken root in
Berlin. These fears, partly due merely to envy and jealousy, but
partly due also to a positive anxiety concerning existence; these
fears led to the encircling policy of Edward VII., and thus was
started the great drive against Germany. It is well known that Edward
VII. made an attempt to exercise a direct influence on the Emperor
Francis Joseph to induce him to secede from the Alliance and join the
Powers encircling Germany. It is likewise known that the Emperor
Francis Joseph rejected the proposal, and that this decided the fate
of Austria-Hungary. From that day we were no longer the independent
masters of our destiny. Our fate was linked to that of Germany;
without being conscious of it, we were carried away by Germany through
the Alliance.

I do not mean absolutely to deny that, during the years preceding war,
it would still have been possible for Germany to avert it if she had
eradicated from European public opinion all suspicion respecting her
dream of world dominion, for far be it from me to assert that the
Western Powers were eager for war. On the contrary, it is my firm
conviction that the leading statesmen of the Western Powers viewed the
situation as such, that if they did not succeed in defeating Germany,
the unavoidable result would be a German world domination. I mention
the Western Powers, for I believe that a strong military party in
Russia, which had as chief the Grand Duke Nicholas, thought otherwise,
and began this war with satisfaction. The terrible tragedy of this,
the greatest misfortune of all time--and such is this war--lies in the
fact that nobody responsible willed it; it arose out of a situation
created first by a Serbian assassin and then by some Russian generals
keen on war, while the events that ensued took the monarchs and
statesmen completely by surprise. The Entente group of Powers is as
much to blame as we are. As regards this, however, a very considerable
difference must be made between the enemy states. In 1914 neither
France nor England desired war. France had always cherished the
thought of revenge, but, judging from all indications, she had no
intention of fighting in 1914; but, on the contrary--as she did fifty
years ago--left the decisive moment for entering into war to the
future. The war came quite as a surprise to France. England, in spite
of her anti-German policy, wished to remain neutral and only changed
her mind owing to the invasion of Belgium. In Russia the Tsar did not
know what he wanted, and the military party urged unceasingly for
war. As a matter of fact, Russia began military operations without a
declaration of war.

The states that followed after--Italy and Roumania--entered into the
war for purposes of conquest, Roumania in particular. Italy also, of
course, but owing to her geographical position, and being exposed to
pressure from England, she was less able to remain neutral than
Roumania.

But the war would never have broken out had it not been that the
growing suspicion of the Entente as to Germany's plans had already
brought the situation to boiling point. The spirit and demeanour of
Germany, the speeches of the Emperor William, the behaviour of the
Prussians throughout the world--whether in the case of a general at
Potsdam or a _commis voyageur_ out in East Africa--these Prussian
manners inflicting themselves upon the world, the ceaseless boasting
of their own power and the clattering of swords, roused throughout the
whole world a feeling of antipathy and alarm and effected that moral
coalition against Germany which in this war has found such terribly
practical expression. On the other hand, I am fairly convinced that
German, or rather Prussian tendencies have been misunderstood by the
world, and that the leading German statesmen never had any intention
of acquiring world dominion. They wished to retain Germany's place in
the sun, her rank among the first Powers of the world; it was
undoubtedly her right, but the real and alleged continuous German
provocation and the ever-growing fears of the Entente in consequence
created just that fatal competition in armaments and that coalition
policy which burst like a terrible thunderstorm into war.

It was only on the basis of these European fears that the French plans
of revenge developed into action. England would never have drawn the
sword merely for the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine; but the French plan
of revenge was admirably adapted to suit the policy inaugurated by
King Edward, which was derived not from French but from English
motives.

Out of this dread of attack and defence arose that mad fever for
armaments which was characteristic of pre-war times. The race to
possess more soldiers and more guns than one's neighbour was carried
to an absurd extreme. The armaments which the nations had to bear had
become so cumbersome as to be unbearable, and for long it had been
obvious to everyone that the course entered upon could no longer be
pursued, and that two possibilities alone remained--either a voluntary
and general disarmament, or war.

A slight attempt at the first alternative was made in 1912 through
negotiations between Germany and England respecting naval disarmament,
but never got beyond the first stage. England was no readier for
peace, and no more disposed to make advances than was Germany, but she
was cleverer and succeeded in conveying to the world that she was the
Power endangered by Germany's plans for expansion.

I recollect a very telling illustration of the German and British
points of view, given to me by a prominent politician from a neutral
state. This gentleman was crossing the Atlantic on an American
steamer, and among the other travellers were a well-known German
industrial magnate and an Englishman. The German was a great talker
and preferred addressing as large an audience as possible, expatiating
on the "uprising" of Germany, on the irrepressible desire for
expansion to be found in the German people, on the necessity of
impregnating the world with German culture, and on the progress made
in all these endeavours. He discoursed on the rising prosperity of
German trade in different parts of the world; he enumerated the towns
where the German flag was flying; he pointed out with emphasis how
"Made in Germany" was the term that must and would conquer the world,
and did not fail to assert that all these grand projects were built on
solid foundations upheld by military support. Such was the German.
When my informant turned to the silent, quietly smiling Englishman and
asked what he had to say to it, he simply answered: "There is no need
for me to say anything, for I know that the world belongs to us." Such
was the Englishman. This merely illustrates a certain frame of mind.
It is a snapshot, showing how the German and the English mentality was
reflected in the brain of a neutral statesman; but it is symptomatic,
because thousands have felt the same, and because this impression of
the German spirit contributed so largely to the catastrophe.

The Aehrenthal policy, contrary to what we were accustomed to on the
Ballplatz, pursued ambitious plans for expansion with the greatest
strength and energy, thereby adding to the suspicions of the world
regarding us. For the belief gained credence that the Vienna policy
was an offshoot of that of Berlin, and that the same line of action
would be adopted in Vienna as in Berlin, and the general feeling of
anxiety rose higher. Blacker and blacker grew the clouds; closer and
closer the meshes of the net; misfortune was on the way.


2

I was in Constantinople shortly before the outbreak of war, and while
there had a lengthy discussion of the political situation with the
Markgraf Pallavicini, our most efficient and far-seeing ambassador
there. He looked upon the situation as being extremely grave. Aided by
his experience of a decade of political observations, he was able to
put his finger on the pulse of Europe, and his diagnosis was as
follows: that if a rapid change in the entire course of events did not
intervene, we were making straight for war. He explained to me that he
considered the only possibility of evading a war with Russia lay in
our definitely renouncing all claims to influence in the Balkans and
leaving the field to Russia. Pallavicini was quite clear in his own
mind that such a course would mean our resigning the status of a Great
Power; but apparently to him even so bitter a proceeding as that was
preferable to the war which he saw was impending. Shortly afterwards I
repeated this conversation to the Archduke and heir, Franz Ferdinand,
and saw that he was deeply impressed by the pessimistic views of
Pallavicini, of whom, like everyone else, he had a very high opinion.
The Archduke promised to discuss the question as soon as possible with
the Emperor. I never saw him again. That was the last conversation I
had with him, and I do not know whether he ever carried out his
intention of discussing the matter with the monarch.

The two Balkan wars were as summer lightning before the coming
European thunderstorm. It was obvious to anyone acquainted with Balkan
conditions that the peace there had produced no definite result, and
the Peace of Bucharest in 1913, so enthusiastically acclaimed by
Roumania, carried the germ of death at its birth. Bulgaria was
humiliated and reduced; Roumania and, above all, Serbia, enlarged out
of all proportion, were arrogant to a degree that baffles description.
Albania, as the apple of discord between Austria-Hungary and Italy,
was a factor that gave no promise of relief, but only of fresh wars.
In order to understand the excessive hatred prevailing between the
separate nations, one must have lived in the Balkans. When this hatred
came to an outburst in the world war the most terrible scenes were
enacted, and as an example it was notorious that the Roumanians tore
their Bulgarian prisoners to pieces with their teeth, and that the
Bulgarians, on their part, tortured the Roumanian prisoners to death
in the most shocking manner. The brutality of the Serbians in the war
can best be described by our own troops. The Emperor Francis Joseph
clearly foresaw that the peace after the second Balkan war was merely
a respite to draw breath before a new war. Prior to my departure for
Bucharest in 1913 I was received in audience by the aged emperor, who
said to me: "The Peace of Bucharest is untenable, and we are faced by
a new war. God grant that it may be confined to the Balkans." Serbia,
which had been enlarged to double its size, was far from being
satisfied; but, on the contrary, was more than ever ambitious of
becoming a Great Power.

Apparently the situation was still quiet. In fact, a few weeks before
the catastrophe at Sarajevo the prevailing state of affairs showed
almost an improvement in the relations between Vienna and Belgrade.
But it was the calm before the storm. On June 28 the veil was rent
asunder, and from one moment to the next a catastrophe threatened the
world. The stone had started rolling.

At that time I was ambassador to Roumania. I was therefore only able
from a distance to watch developments in Vienna and Berlin.
Subsequently, however, I discussed events in those critical days with
numerous leading personalities, and from all that I heard have been
able to form a definite and clear view of the proceedings. I have no
doubt whatever that Berchtold, even in his dreams, had never thought
of a world war of such dimensions as it assumed; that he, above all,
was persuaded that England would remain neutral; and the German
Ambassador, Tschirsky, confirmed him in the conviction that a war
against France and Russia would inevitably end in victory. I believe
that the state of mind in which Count Berchtold addressed the
ultimatum to Serbia was such that he said to himself, either--and this
is the most favourable view--Serbia will accept the ultimatum, which
would mean a great diplomatic success; or she will refuse it, and
then, thanks to Germany's help, the victorious war against Russia and
France will effect the birth of a new and vastly stronger Monarchy. It
cannot for a moment be denied that this argument contained a series of
errors; but it must be stated that, according to my convictions, Count
Berchtold did not intend to incite war by the ultimatum, but hoped to
the very last to gain the victory by the pen, and that in the German
promises he saw a guarantee against a war in which the participators
and the chances of victory were equally erroneously estimated.

Berchtold could not have entertained any doubt that a Serbian war
would bring a Russian one in its train. At any rate, the reports sent
by my brother, who was a business man in Petersburg, left him in no
doubt on the matter.

Serbia's acceptance of the ultimatum was only partial, and the Serbian
war broke out. Russia armed and joined in. But at this moment
extremely important events took place.

On July 30, at midday, Tschirsky spoke in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and communicated to Berchtold the contents of a telegram
received from Lichnowsky. This important telegram contained the
following: He (Lichnowsky) had just returned from seeing Grey, who was
very grave, but perfectly collected, though pointing out that the
situation was becoming more and more complicated. Sassonoff had
intimated that after the declaration of war he was no longer in a
position to negotiate direct with Austria-Hungary, and requested
England to resume proceedings, the temporary cessation of hostilities
to be taken for granted. Grey proposed a negotiation between four, as
it appeared possible to him (Grey) that Austria-Hungary, after
occupying Belgrade, would state her terms.

To this Grey added a private comment, calling Lichnowsky's attention
to the fact that a war between Russia and Austria-Hungary would
facilitate England's neutrality, but that the conditions would
inevitably change in the event of Germany and France being involved.
Public opinion in England, which after the assassination was very
favourable to Austria, was now beginning to fluctuate, as it was
difficult to understand Austria's obstinacy.

Lichnowsky also added that Grey had told the Italian Ambassador that
he thought Austria would receive every satisfaction on accepting
negotiation. In any case the Serbians would be punished. Even without
a war Austria would receive a guarantee for the future.

Such were the contents of the communication from London sent by
Tschirsky, to which Bethmann added that he urgently requested the
Vienna Cabinet to accept the negotiation. On receiving this
information, Berchtold conveyed the news to the Emperor. His position
was this: that Russia was already at war with the Monarchy on the
evening of the same day on which the order for general mobilisation
was to be submitted to the Emperor, and it appeared doubtful to him
whether a postponement of their own mobilisation would be possible in
view of the Russian attack. He had also to take into consideration the
different parties prevailing in Russia, and no guarantee was
obtainable that those who were in favour of negotiation would gain the
day. Any postponement of mobilisation might in this case lead to
incalculable military consequences. Obviously hostilities had begun
without the knowledge and against the wishes of the Tsar; if they
were also to be carried on against his wish, then Austria-Hungary
would be too late.

I have never discussed this phase with Berchtold, but the material
placed at my disposal leaves no doubt that he felt bound to inquire
into this side of the question and then leave the decision to the
Emperor Francis Joseph.

On the following day, July 31, therefore, Tschirsky, at the Ballplatz,
communicated the contents of a telegram from King George to Prince
Henry of Prussia. It ran as follows:--

"Thanks for telegram. So pleased to hear of William's efforts to
concert with Nicky to maintain peace. Indeed, I am earnestly
desirous that such an irreparable disaster as a European war
should be averted. My Government is doing its utmost, suggesting
to Russia and France to suspend further military preparations if
Austria will consent to be satisfied with occupation of Belgrade
and the neighbouring Serbian territory as a hostage for
satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile
suspending their war preparations. Trust William will use his
great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus
proving that Germany and England are working together to prevent
what would be an international catastrophe. Pray assure William I
am doing and shall continue to do all that lies in my power to
preserve peace of Europe.

GEORGE."

Both the telegrams cited were received in Vienna on July 31, subject
to certain military precautions, a proceeding that did not satisfy
London.

In London, as in Berlin, an effort was made to confine the conflict to
Serbia. Berchtold did the same. In Russia there was a strong party
working hard to enforce war at any price. The Russian invasion was an
accomplished fact, and in Vienna it was thought unwise to stop
mobilisation at the last moment for fear of being too late with
defence. Some ambassadors did not keep to the instructions from their
Governments; they communicated messages correctly enough, but if their
personal opinion differed they made no secret of it, and it certainly
weighed in the balance.

This added to the insecurity and confusion. Berchtold vacillated, torn
hither and thither by different influences. It was a question of hours
merely; but they passed by and were not made use of, and disaster was
the result.

Russia had created strained conditions which brought on the world war.

Some months after the outbreak of war I had a long conversation on all
these questions with the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Stephen
Tisza. He was decidedly opposed to the severe ultimatum, as he foresaw
a war and did not wish for it. It is one of the most widely spread
errors to stigmatise Tisza to-day as one of the instigators of the
war. He was opposed to it, not from a general pacifist tendency, but
because, in his opinion, an efficiently pursued policy of alliance
would in a few years considerably strengthen the powers of the
Monarchy. He particularly returned to the subject of Bulgaria, which
then was still neutral and whose support he had hoped to gain before
we went to war. I also obtained from Tisza several details concerning
the activities of the German Government as displayed by the German
Ambassador immediately preceding the war. I purposely made a
distinction between the German Government and the German diplomat, as
I was under the impression that Herr von Tschirsky had taken various
steps without being instructed so to do, and when I previously have
alluded to the fact that not all the ambassadors made use of the
language enjoined by their Governments, I had Herr von Tschirsky
specially in my mind; his whole temperament and feelings led him to
interfere in our affairs with a certain vehemence and not always in
the most tactful way, thus rousing the Monarchy out of its lethargy.

There is no doubt whatever that all Herr von Tschirsky's private
speeches at this time were attuned to the tone of "Now or Never," and
it is certain that the German Ambassador declared his opinion to be
"that at the present moment Germany was prepared to support our point
of view with all her moral and military power, but whether this would
prove to be the case in future if we accepted the Serbian rebuff
appears to me doubtful." I believe that Tschirsky in particular was
firmly persuaded that in the very near future Germany would have to go
through a war against France and Russia, and he considered that the
year 1914 would be more favourable than a later date. For this reason,
because first of all he did not believe in the fighting capacity of
either Russia or France, and secondly because--and this is a very
important point--he was convinced that he could bring the Monarchy
into this war, while it appeared doubtful to him that the aged and
peace-loving Emperor Francis Joseph would draw the sword for Germany
on any other occasion where the action would centre less round him, he
wished to make use of the Serbian episode so as to be sure of
Austria-Hungary in the deciding struggle. That, however, was his
policy, and not Bethmann's.

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