Book: In the World War

C >> Count Ottokar Czernin >> In the World War




Report of a conference held January 20, 1917, in the Imperial and
Royal Ministry of Home and Foreign Affairs. Members: Dr.
Zimmermann, Secretary of State of the German Foreign Affairs
Department; Admiral von Holtzendorff, Chief of the German Naval
Staff; Count Czernin, Imperial and Royal Minister for Foreign
Affairs; Count Tisza, Royal Hungarian Prime Minister; Count
Clam-Martinic, Imperial and Royal Prime Minister; Admiral Haus,
the German naval attache in Vienna; Baron von Freyburg, the
Imperial and Royal naval attache in Berlin; Count B.
Colloredo-Mannsfeld.

On January 20 a discussion took place in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs on the question of establishing unrestricted U-boat
warfare.

As evidenced by Admiral v. Holtzendorff's statements, the German
naval authorities hold the standpoint that there exists an
absolute necessity for the quickest possible inauguration of an
unrestricted U-boat campaign. The arguments employed in support of
this thesis are known from the reports of the Imperial and Royal
Ambassador in Berlin (report of 12/1/17 Nr. 6/P, and telegram of
13/1 Nr. 22), and may be summarised in the following sentences:
Lack of time, decreasing human material in the Central Powers,
progressive deterioration of the harvest, impending Anglo-French
offensive on the Western front with improved and increased means
for fighting, and the necessity arising therefrom to prevent or at
least check the reinforcements required for such undertaking, the
impossibility of obtaining a decision on land, the necessity of
raising the _moral_ of the troops by ruthlessly obtained results
and the use of every available means in war, certainty of the
success of an unrestricted U-boat warfare in view of provisions
in England only being sufficient for two to three months, as well
as the stoppage of the munitions output and industrial production
owing to the lack of raw material, the impossibility of supplying
coal to France and Italy, etc., etc.

Concerning the carrying out of the plan, the German Navy owns at
present for that purpose 120 U-boats of the latest type. In view
of the great success achieved by the U-boats at the beginning of
the war, when there were only 19 of an antiquated type, the
present increased numbers of the vessels offer a safe guarantee of
success.

February 1 is suggested on the part of the Germans as the date on
which to start the unrestricted U-boat warfare and also to
announce the blockade of the English coast and the west coast of
France. Every vessel disobeying the order will be torpedoed
without warning. In this manner it is hoped to bring England to
reason within four months, and it must here be added that Admiral
von Holtzendorff _expressis verbis_ guaranteed the results.

As regards the attitude to be taken by the neutrals, leading
German circles, although aware of the danger, hold optimistic
views. It is not thought that either the Scandinavian countries or
Holland will interfere with us, although, in view of the
possibility of such happening, military precautions have been
taken. The measures taken on the Dutch and Danish frontiers will,
in the opinion of the Germans, hold those countries in check, and
the possibility of sharing the fate of Roumania will frighten
them. Indeed, it is expected that there will be a complete
stoppage of all neutral shipping, which in the matter of supplies
for England amounts to 39 per cent. of the cargo space. Meanwhile
concessions will be granted to the neutrals by fixing a time limit
for the withdrawal of such of their vessels as may be at sea on
the opening day of the U-boat warfare.

With regard to America, the Germans are determined, if at all
possible, to prevent the United States from attacking the Central
Powers by adopting a friendly attitude towards America (acting
upon the proposals made at the time of the _Lusitania_ incident),
but they are prepared for and await with calmness whatever
attitude America may adopt. The Germans are, nevertheless, of the
opinion that the United States will not go so far as making a
breach with the Central Powers. If that should occur, America
would be too late and could only come into action after England
had been beaten. America is not prepared for war, which was
clearly shown at the time of the Mexican crisis; she lives in fear
of Japan and has to fight against agricultural and social
difficulties. Besides which, Mr. Wilson is a pacifist, and the
Germans presume that after his election he will adopt a still
more decided tendency that way, for his election will not be due
to the anti-German Eastern States, but to the co-operation of the
Central and Western States that are opposed to war, and to the
Irish and Germans. These considerations, together with the
Entente's insulting answer to President Wilson's peace proposal,
do not point to the probability of America plunging readily into
war.

These, in brief, are the points of view on which the German demand
for the immediate start of the unrestricted U-boat warfare is
based, and which caused the Imperial Chancellor and the Foreign
Affairs Department to revise their hitherto objective views.

Both the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Hungarian
Prime Minister pointed out what disastrous consequences would
ensue from America's intervention, in a military, moral,
agricultural and financial sense, and great doubt was expressed of
the success of a blockade of England. Count Czernin held that the
Germans overlooked the possibility of lowering the consumption in
England, taking into consideration the fact that since the war
consumption in the countries of the Central Powers had been
reduced by half. Further, Count Czernin referred to the very vague
and by no means convincing data of the German naval authorities.
It was also debated whether a continuation of the U-boat war to
the present extent (the destruction on an average of 400,000 tons
per month) would not be more likely to achieve the desired end,
and if it were not more advisable not to play our last and best
card until all other means had been tried. The possibility of
being able to start a ruthless U-boat warfare hung like a
Damocles' sword over the heads of our adversaries, and would
perhaps be a more effectual means of ending the war than the
reckless use of the U-boat as a weapon of war, carrying with it
the danger of an attack by the neutrals. If the effect expected by
Germany was not realised, which was within the bounds of
possibility, we must be prepared to see the desire for war in the
enemy greatly intensified. However that may be, the vanishing of
the desire for peace must be accepted as an established fact.
Finally, it was pointed out that the arguments recently put
forward by the Germans show a complete _novum_, namely, the danger
on the Western front in view of the great Anglo-French offensive
that is expected. Whereas formerly it was always said that the
attacks of the enemy would be repulsed, it is now considered
necessary to relieve the land army by recklessly bringing the navy
into the line of action. If these fears are justified, then most
certainly should all other considerations be put on one side and
the risk ensuing from the ruthless employment of the U-boats be
accepted. Both Count Czernin and Count Tisza expressed their
grave doubts in this connection.

To meet the case, the Hungarian Prime Minister pointed out the
necessity of immediately starting propagandist activities in the
neutral countries and particularly in America, by which the
Central Powers' political methods and aims would be presented to
them in a proper light; and then later, after introducing
unrestricted U-boat warfare, it would be seen that no other choice
was left to the peaceful tendencies of the Quadruple Alliance as
the means for a speedy ending of the struggle between the nations.

The leaders of the foreign policy agreed to take the necessary
steps in that direction, and remarked that certain arrangements
had already been made.

Admiral Haus agreed _unreservedly_ with the arguments of the
German Navy, as he declared that _no great anxiety need be felt_
as to the likelihood of America's joining in with military force,
and finally pointed out that, on the part of the Entente, a
ruthless torpedoing of hospital and transport ships had been
practised for some time past in the Adriatic. The Admiral urged
that this fact be properly recognised and dealt with, to which the
Foreign Affairs leaders on both sides gave their consent.

The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in conclusion, said
that the definite decision to be taken must be left to the
conclusions arrived at by both sovereigns, whereupon the 26th
inst. was fixed for a meeting to be held for that purpose.

After the general discussion, I had a private talk with the Emperor,
and found that he still had the same aversion to that means of warfare
and the same fears as to the result. We knew, however, that Germany
had definitely made up her mind to start the campaign in any case, and
that all our arguments would be of no practical value. It remained to
be decided whether we should join them or not. Owing to the small
number of our U-boats, our holding aside would not have had any great
effect on the final issue of the experiment, and for a moment I
entertained the idea of proposing to the Emperor that we should
separate from Germany on that one point, although I was aware that it
might lead to the ending of our alliance. But the difficulty was that
the U-boat effort would also have to be carried on in the
Mediterranean in order that it should not lose its effect in the
North Sea. If the Mediterranean remained exempt, the transports would
take that route and proceed by land via Italy, France, and Dover, and
thus render the northern U-boat warfare of no effect. But in order to
carry it on in the Mediterranean, Germany would need our support in
the Adriatic from Trieste, Pola, and Cattaro. If we allowed her at
those places it involved us in the campaign, and if we refused to let
our few U-boats go out, it would be attacking Germany in the rear and
we should become embroiled with her, which would lead to the definite
severance of the Alliance.

This was again one of those instances that prove that when a strong
and a weak nation concert in war, the weak one cannot desist unless it
changes sides entirely and enters into war with its former ally. None
who were in the Government would hear of that, and with a heavy heart
we gave our consent. Bulgaria, who was not affected by this phase of
the war, and had kept up diplomatic relations with America, was
differently situated, being able to stand aside without paralysing the
German plans. Apart from this, I was already persuaded then that
Bulgaria's not joining in would make a bad impression on the outside
world, and would not help her in any way. Although her relations with
America were maintained up to the last, they did not, as a matter of
fact, make her fate easier.

Had we been able to make Germany desist from the unrestricted U-boat
warfare, the advantage would have been very great; whether we joined
in or not was a matter of indifference viewed from the standpoint of
our treatment by the Entente, as is proved by the instance of
Bulgaria. As soon as America had declared war on Germany, a conflict
with us was inevitable in any case, as Austro-Hungarian troops and
artillery were then on the Western front facing Americans. We were
compelled to go to war with America, seeing that Germany was already
at war with her.

It was not possible, therefore, for us to remain in a state of even
nominally peaceful relations with America, such as existed between her
and Bulgaria to the very end of the war.

It is not quite clear when Germany really recognised the fact that
the unrestricted U-boat warfare had no effect, and was thus a terrible
mistake. To the public, as well as to the Allied Cabinets, the German
military authorities continued to profess the greatest optimism, and
when I left my post in April, 1918, the standpoint held in Berlin was
still that England would be defeated by the naval war. Writing on
December 14, 1917, Hohenlohe reported that in competent German circles
the feeling was thoroughly optimistic. I, however, certainly perceived
definite signs of doubt beginning in some German minds, and Ludendorff
in replying to the reproaches I made to him said: "Everything is risky
in war; it is impossible before an operation to be sure of the
results. I admit that the time limit was a mistake, but the final
result will show that I was right." In order to exculpate themselves
all the leaders in Germany declared that America would, in any case,
have gone to war, and that the U-boat had merely given the last
impetus. Whether this is quite true appears doubtful; it cannot either
be asserted or denied positively.

The world has become used to looking upon Hindenburg and Ludendorff as
one; they belonged together. Together they rose to highest power, to
be forcibly separated in their fall. In all business transactions
Ludendorff was in the foreground. He was a great speaker, but always
in a sharp tone, suggestive of the Prussian military system. It
usually aroused a scene, but he seemed to take nothing amiss, and his
anger vanished as rapidly as it broke out. Hindenburg's retiring
modesty made him attractive. Once when we were speaking of the
photographers who besieged every conference in Berlin, the old
gentleman remarked: "I have lived to be seventy, and nobody ever
thought there was anything wonderful about me; now they seem all at
once to have discovered that I have such an interesting head." He was
much more staid and quiet than Ludendorff, nor was he so sensitive to
public opinion as the latter. I remember once how Ludendorff, when I
exhorted him to yield on the peace question, rejoined with vigour:
"The German people wishes for no peace of renunciation, and I do not
intend to end by being pelted with stones. The dynasty would never
survive such a peace." The dynasty has departed, the stones have been
thrown, and the peace of renunciation has become a reality, and is
certainly more terrible than the gloomiest pessimist could ever have
believed!


2

The rupture between America and Germany occurred on February 3, 1917.

The Ambassador, Count Tarnowski, remained in Washington, but was not
received by Wilson, and had intercourse with Lansing only. I still
hoped to maintain these semi-official relations with America, in case
America, in breaking off relations with Germany, might be content with
that and not declare war on her. The German Government would have
preferred our breaking off diplomatic relations simultaneously with
them.

On February 12 Count Wedel called on me, and his request and my
settlement of it appear in the following telegram to Hohenlohe:


_Vienna, Feb. 12, 1917._

To notify Your Excellency.

Count Wedel has been instructed to submit to me the following
three requests from his Government:

(1) Count Tarnowski is not to hand over his credentials until the
situation between Germany and America is clear.

(2) Count Tarnowski must protest to Mr. Wilson against his having
tried to make the neutrals turn against Germany.

(3) On the outbreak of war with Germany Count Tarnowski must be
recalled.

I have refused the first two items and accepted the last.

As we should not have been able to prevent Germany from beginning the
U-boat warfare, the only alternative for us was to use all means in
our power to maintain our relations with America, and thus enable us
later to play the part of mediator, although this could only be for
that period during which America, having broken off relations, had not
yet declared war. My answer of March 5, 1917, to America's request
for an explanation of our standpoint was sent with the object of
preventing America from breaking off relations with us, and also to
keep from the public the knowledge of our divergence from Germany.
This will be found noted in the appendix.[6] It met with success so
far that America continued diplomatic relations with us until April 9,
1917.

[Illustration: COUNT TISZA. _Photo: Stanley's Press Agency._]

I had a very lively correspondence with Stephen Tisza in consequence
of my answer. I received the following letter on March 3:

DEAR FRIEND,--In the interests of the cause I can only greatly
regret that I had no opportunity of appreciating the definite
sense of our _aide-memoire_ before it was dispatched. Apart from
other less important matters, I cannot conceal my painful surprise
that we repeatedly and expressly admit having given a promise in
our _Ancona_ Note. I am afraid that we have placed ourselves in a
very awkward position with Wilson, which so easily could have been
avoided, as it was not in accordance with my views that we had
given a promise.

An expression of opinion is not a promise. Without wishing to
detract from its moral value, it has nevertheless a different
legal character, and from the point of view of a third person has
no legal authority in favour of that person as a promise.

By unnecessarily having admitted that we gave the Americans a
promise we admit the existence of obligations on our side to them.
In spite of the fine and clever argument in our Note, it will be
easy for the Americans to prove that our present procedure cannot
be reconciled with the previous statement; if the statement was a
promise, then the American Government has the right to look for
the fulfilment of it, and we will then be in an awkward
predicament. I remarked in my notification that I would prefer to
omit the admission that we had made any promise; there would have
been the possibility of recurring to it. By placing this weapon in
their hands we have exposed ourselves to the danger of a
checkmate, and I very much fear that we shall greatly regret it.

Naturally this remains between us. But I was constrained to pour
out my heart to you and justify my request that the text of all
such important State documents which involve such far-reaching
consequences may be sent to me in time for me to study and
comment on them. Believe me, it is really in the interest of the
cause and in every respect can only be for the best. In sincere
friendship, your devoted

TISZA.


_Enclosure._

It may be presumed with some semblance of truth that the peace
wave in America is progressing, and that President Wilson,
influenced thereby, may perhaps be able at any rate to postpone a
decision of a warlike nature. Even though I may be wrong in my
presumption, it lies in our interests to avoid for as long as
possible the rupture of our diplomatic relations with America.

Therefore the answer to the American _aide-memoire_, to be
dispatched as late as possible, should be so composed as to give
it the appearance of a meritorious handling of the theme put
forward on the American side without falling into the trap of the
question put forward in the _aide-memoire_.

If we answer yes, then President Wilson will hardly be able to
avoid a breach with the Monarchy. If we give a negative answer we
shall abandon Germany and the standpoint we took up on January 31.

The handle wherewith to grasp evasion of a clear answer is
provided by the _aide-memoire_ itself, as it identifies our
statements in the _Ancona_ and _Persia_ question with the attitude
of the German Note of May 4, 1916. We should, therefore, be quite
consistent if we, as we did in our Note of December 14, 1915, were
to declare that we should be governed by our own ideas of justice.

In our correspondence with the American Government respecting the
_Ancona_, _Persia_ and _Petrolite_ questions we treated the
concrete case always without going deeper into the individual
principles of legal questions. In our Note of December 29, 1915,
which contains the expression of opinion cited in the
_aide-memoire_ (it may also be noted that our expression of
opinion was no pledge, as we had promised nothing nor taken any
obligation upon ourselves), the Austrian Government distinctly
stated that they would refer later to the difficult international
questions connected with the U-boat warfare.

Present war conditions did not appear suited to such a discussion.
In consequence, however, of the dealings of our enemies, events
have occurred and a state of things been brought about which, on
our side also, renders a more intense application of the U-boat
question unavoidable. Our merchantmen in the Adriatic, whenever
attainable, were constantly torpedoed without warning by the
enemy. Our adversaries have thus adopted the standard of the most
aggravated and unrestricted U-boat warfare without the neutrals
offering any resistance.

The Entente when laying their minefields displayed the same
ruthlessness towards free shipping and the lives of neutrals.

Mines are considered as a recognised weapon for the definite
protection of the home coast and ports, also as a means of
blockading an enemy port. But the use made of them as an
aggressive factor in this war is quite a new feature, for vast
areas of open sea on the route of the world's traffic were
converted into minefields impassable for the neutrals except at
the greatest danger of their lives.

There is no question but that that is a far greater check to the
freedom of movement and a greater obstacle to neutral interests
than establishing the unrestricted U-boat warfare within a limited
and clearly marked-out zone, leaving open channels for neutral
shipping, and by other measures giving due consideration to the
interests of the neutrals.

Just at the moment when the President's appeal to the entire
belligerent world coincided with the spontaneous statement of our
group, in which we gave a solemn proof of our willingness to
conclude a just peace and one acceptable by our enemies, a fresh
and larger minefield was laid down in the North Sea on the route
of the world's traffic, and, casting ridicule on the noble
initiative of the United States, a war of destruction against our
groups of Powers was announced by the Entente.

We urge the great aims that inspired the action of the American
Government: the quickest possible cessation of the fearful
slaughter of men and the founding of an honourable, lasting and
blessed peace by combating with the greatest energy our enemies'
furious war for conquest. The course we pursue leads to the common
aims of ourselves and the American Government, and we cannot give
up the hope of finding understanding in the people and the
Government of the United States.

TISZA.


I answered as follows:


_March 5._

DEAR FRIEND,--I cannot agree with you. After the first _Ancona_
Note you veered round and declared in a second Note that "we
agreed with the German standpoint in the main"--that was an
obvious yielding and contained a hidden promise.

I do not think that any legal wiles will dupe the Americans, and
if we were to deny the promise it would not advance us any
further.

But, secondly and principally, it is altogether impossible with
words to make the Americans desist from war if they wish it;
either they will make straight for war and then no Notes will
avail, or they will seek a pretext to escape the war danger and
will find it in our Note.

So much for the merits of the matter.

What you demand is technically impossible. The Note was not easy
to compile. I had to alter it entirely as time went on; His
Majesty then wished to see it, made some alterations and
sanctioned it. Meanwhile Penfield[7] importuned me and telegraphed
even a week ago to America to reassure his people; the Germans,
too, had to be won over for that particular passage.

You know how ready I am to discuss important matters with you, but
_ultra posse nemo tenetur_--it was physically impossible to upset
everything again and to expect His Majesty to alter his views.

In true friendship, your

CZERNIN.

I thereupon, on March 14, received the following answer from Tisza:

DEAR FRIEND,--I also note with genuine pleasure the success of
your American _aide-memoire_ (meaning thereby America's resolve
not to break off relations with us). But it does not alter my
opinion that it was a pity to admit that a pledge had been given.
It may be requited at a later stage of the controversy, and it
would have been easy not to broach the subject for the moment.

Do you think me very obstinate? I have not suppressed the final
word in our retrospective controversy so that you should not think
me better than I am.

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