Book: In the World War

C >> Count Ottokar Czernin >> In the World War




Au revoir, in true friendship, your

TISZA.

Tisza was strongly opposed to the U-boat warfare, and only tolerated
it from reasons of _vis major_, because we could not prevent the
German military leaders from adopting the measure, and because he, and
I too, were convinced that "not joining in" would have been of no
advantage to us.

Not until very much later--in fact, not until after the war--did I
learn from a reliable source that Germany, with an incomprehensible
misunderstanding of the situation, had restricted the building of more
U-boats during the war. The Secretary of State, Capelle, was
approached by competent naval technical experts, who told him that, by
stopping the building of all other vessels, a fivefold number of
U-boats could be built. Capelle rejected the proposal on the pretext
"that nobody would know what to do with so many U-boats when the war
was at an end." Germany had, as mentioned, 100 submarines; had she
possessed 500, she might have achieved her aims.

I only heard this in the winter of 1918, but it was from a source from
which I invariably gleaned correct information.

Seldom has any military action called forth such indignation as the
sinking, without warning, of enemy ships. And yet the observer who
judges from an objective point of view must admit that the waging war
on women and children was not begun by us, but by our enemies when
they enforced the blockade. Millions have perished in the domains of
the Central Powers through the blockade, and chiefly the poorest and
weakest people--the greater part women and children--were the victims.
If, to meet the argument, it be asserted that the Central Powers were
as a besieged fortress, and that in 1870 the Germans starved Paris in
similar fashion, there is certainly some truth in the argument. But it
is just as true--as stated in the Note of March 5--that in a war on
land no regard is ever paid to civilians who venture into the war
zone, and that no reason is apparent why a war at sea should be
subject to different moral conditions. When a town or village is
within the range of battle, the fact has never prevented the artillery
from acting in spite of the danger to the women and children. But in
the present instance, the non-combatants of the enemy States who are
in danger can easily escape it by not undertaking a sea voyage.

Since the debacle in the winter of 1918, I have thoroughly discussed
the matter with English friends of long standing, and found that their
standpoint was--that it was not the U-boat warfare in itself that had
roused the greatest indignation, but the cruel nature of the
proceedings so opposed to international law. Also, the torpedoing of
hospital ships by the Germans, and the firing on passengers seeking to
escape, and so on. These accounts are flatly contradicted by the
Germans, who, on their part, have terrible tales to tell of English
brutality, as instanced by the _Baralong_ episode.

There have, of course, been individual cases of shameful brutality in
all the armies; but that such deeds were sanctioned or ordered by the
German or English Supreme Commands I do not believe.

An inquiry by an international, but neutral, court would be the only
means of bringing light to bear on the matter.

Atrocities such as mentioned are highly to be condemned, no matter who
the perpetrators are; but in itself, the U-boat warfare was an
allowable means of defence.

The blockade is now admitted to be a permissible and necessary
proceeding; the unrestricted U-boat warfare is stigmatised as a crime
against international law. That is the sentence passed by might but
not by right. In days to come history will judge otherwise.

FOOTNOTES:

[5] The Ambassador, Gottfried, Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst.

[6] See p. 279.

[7] Mr. Penfield, American Ambassador to Vienna.




CHAPTER VI

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE


1

The constitutional procedure which prevails in every parliamentary
state is ordered so that the minister is responsible to a body of
representatives. He is obliged to account for what he has done. His
action is subject to the judgment and criticism of the body of
representatives. If the majority of that body are against the
minister, he must go.

The control of foreign policy in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was in
the hands of the delegations.

Besides which, however, there existed in the Hungarian Constitution a
regulation to the effect that the Hungarian Prime Minister was
responsible to the country for the foreign policy, and, consequently,
the "foreign policy of the Monarchy had to be carried out, in
conjunction, by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs in office and
the Prime Minister."

It depended entirely on the personality of the Hungarian Prime
Minister how he observed the regulation. Under Burian's regime it had
become the custom for all telegrams and news, even of the most secret
nature, to be communicated at once to Count Tisza, who then brought
his influence to bear on all decisions and tactical events. Tisza
possessed a most extraordinary capacity for work. He always found time
to occupy himself very thoroughly with foreign policy, notwithstanding
his own numerous departmental duties, and it was necessary, therefore,
to gain his consent to every step taken. The control of our foreign
policy was, therefore, twofold--both by the delegation and the Prime
Minister.

Great as was my esteem and respect for Count Tisza and close the
friendship between us, still his constant supervision and
intervention put boundless difficulties in the way of the discharge of
business. It was not easy, even in normal times, to contend with, on
top of all the existing difficulties that confront a Minister for
Foreign Affairs; in war, it became an impossibility. The unqualified
presumption behind such twofold government would have been that the
Hungarian Prime Minister should consider all questions from the
standpoint of the entire Monarchy, and not from that of the Magyar
centre, a presumption which Tisza ignored like all other Hungarians.
He did not deny it. He has often told me that he knew no patriotism
save the Hungarian, but that it was in the interests of Hungary to
keep together with Austria; therefore, he saw most things with a
crooked vision. Never would he have ceded one single square metre of
Hungarian territory; but he raised no objection to the projected
cession of Galicia. He would rather have let the whole world be ruined
than give up Transylvania; but he took no interest whatever in the
Tyrol.

Apart from that, he applied different rules for Austria than for
Hungary. He would not allow of the slightest alteration in Hungary's
internal conditions, as they must not be effected through external
pressure. When I, forced thereto by the distress due to lack of
provisions, yielded to Ukrainian wishes and notified the Austrian
Ministry of the Ukrainian desire to divide Galicia in two, Tisza was
fully in accordance therewith. He went even further. He opposed any
expansion of the Monarchy as it might weaken Hungary's influence. All
his life he was an opponent of the Austro-Polish solution, and a
mortal enemy of the tripartist project; he intended that Poland at
most should rank as an Austrian province, but would prefer to make her
over to Germany. He did not even wish Roumania to be joined with
Hungary, as that would weaken the Magyar influence in Hungary. He
looked upon it as out of the question to grant the Serbians access to
the sea, because he wanted the Serbian agricultural products when he
was in need of them; nor would he leave an open door for the Serbian
pigs, as he did not wish the price of the Hungarian to be lowered.
Tisza went still further. He was a great stickler for equality in
making appointments to foreign diplomatic posts, but I could not pay
much heed to that. If I considered the Austrian X better fitted for
the post of ambassador than the Hungarian Y, I selected him in spite
of eventual disagreement.

This trait in the Hungarian, though legally well founded, was
unbearable and not to be maintained in war, and led to various
disputes between Tisza and myself; and now that he is dead, these
scenes leave me only a feeling of the deepest regret for many a hasty
word that escaped me. We afterwards made a compromise. Tisza promised
never to interfere except in cases of the greatest urgency, and I
promised to take no important step without his approval. Soon after
this arrangement he was dismissed by the Emperor for very different
reasons.

I greatly regretted his dismissal, in spite of the difficulties he had
caused me. To begin with, the Magyar-central standpoint was not a
speciality of Tisza's; all Magyar politicians upheld it. Secondly,
Tisza had one great point in his favour: he had no wish to prolong the
war for the purpose of conquest; he wished for a rectification of the
Roumanian frontier and nothing beyond that. If it had come to peace
negotiations, he would have supported me in taking as a basis the
_status quo ante_. His support--and that was the third reason--was of
great value, for he was a man who knew how to fight. He had become
hard and old on the battlefield of parliamentary controversy. He stood
in awe of nothing and nobody--and he was true as gold. Fourthly, this
upright man was one of the few who openly told the Emperor the truth,
and the Emperor made use of this, as we all did.

I was, therefore, convinced beforehand that a change would not improve
the situation for me. Esterhazy, who succeeded Tisza, certainly never
put obstacles in the way of my policy. At the same time, I missed the
strong hand that had kept order in Hungary, and the stern voice that
warned the Emperor, and I did not place the same reliance on Wekerle
as on Tisza, perhaps because I was not on the same terms of friendship
with him as with Tisza.

Although I had many disputes with Tisza, it is one of the dearest
reminiscences of my time of office that, up to the death of this
remarkable man, our friendship remained unchanged. For many years
Hungary and Stephen Tisza were as one. Tisza was a man whose brave and
manly character, stern and resolute nature, fearlessness and integrity
raised him high above the average man. He was a thorough man, with
brilliant qualities and great faults; a man whose like is rare in
Europe, in spite of those faults. Great bodies cast long shadows; and
he was great, and modelled out of the stuff from which the heroes of
old were made--heroes who understood how to fight and die. How often
did I reproach him with his unhappy "_puszta_" patriotism, that was
digging a grave for him and all of us. It was impossible to change
him; he was obstinate and unbending, and his greatest fault was that,
all his life, he was under the ban of a petty ecclesiastical policy.
Not a single square metre would he yield either to Roumania in her
day, nor to the Czechs or the Southern Slavs. The career of this
wonderful man contains a terrible tragedy. He fought and strove like
none other for his people and his country; for years he filled the
breach and protected his people and his Hungary with his powerful
personality, and yet it was his obstinate, unyielding policy that was
one of the chief reasons of Hungary's fall; the Hungary he so dearly
loved; the fall that he saw when he died, killed by the accursed hand
of some cowardly assassin.

Tisza once told me, with a laugh, that someone had said to him that
his greatest fault was that he had come into the world as a Hungarian.

I consider this a most pertinent remark. As a human being and as a
man, he was prominent; but all the prejudices and faults of the Magyar
way of thinking spoilt him.

Hungary and her Constitution--dualism--were one of our misfortunes in
the war.

Had the Archduke Franz Ferdinand had no other plan but that of doing
away with dualism, he would on that account alone have merited love
and admiration. In Aehrenthal's and Berchtold's time Hungarian policy
settled the Serbian disputes; it made an alliance with Roumania an
impossibility; it accomplished the food blockade in Austria during the
war; prevented all internal reforms; and, finally, at the last moment,
through Karolyi's petty shortsighted selfishness, the front was
beaten. This severe judgment on Hungary's influence on the war remains
true, in spite of the undoubtedly splendid deeds of the Magyar troops.
The Hungarian is of a strong, courageous, and manly disposition;
therefore, almost always an excellent soldier; but, unfortunately, in
the course of the last fifty years, Hungarian policy has done more
injury than the Hungarian soldier possibly could make good in the war.
Once, during the war, a Hungarian met my reproaches with the rejoinder
that we could be quite sure about the Hungarians, they were so firmly
linked to Austria. "Yes," said I; "Hungary is firmly linked to us, but
like a stone a drowning man has tied round his own neck."

If we had not lost the war a fight to the death with the Magyars would
have been inevitable, because it is impossible to conceive that any
sensible European _consortium_ would consent to be brought into
partnership with Magyar aspirations and plans for dominion.

But, of course, during the war an open fight with Budapest was
impossible.

Whether the nations that once composed the Habsburg Empire will ever
be reunited is an open question; should it come to pass, may a kind
fate preserve us from a return of dualism.


2

On December 26, 1916--four days after entering upon office--I received
a letter from Tisza in which he imparted to me his views on the
tactics to be observed:

All the European neutrals feel that they are more seriously
threatened by England than by us. The events in Greece, Roumania,
etc., as well as England's commercial tyranny, act in our favour,
and the difference of our attitude to the peace plans as compared
with that of the Entente--if consistently and cleverly carried
out--will secure neutral sympathy for our group of Powers.

From this point of view I see that the chief danger will be that
our necessarily cautious attitude as regards revealing our war
aims may give rise to the idea that we are merely trifling with a
plan for peace for tactical reasons and do not really earnestly
desire peace.

We must therefore furnish our representatives accredited to
neutrals (the most important being Spain and Holland) with the
necessary instructions, so that they may be able to account for
our cautious attitude and explain the reasons that keep us from
making a premature or one-sided announcement of our conditions.

An announcement of the conditions on both sides would expose the
belligerent parties in both camps to unfavourable criticism and
might easily make the situation more strained; _a one-sided
announcement of the war aims would simply afford the leader of the
belligerent enemy group the opportunity of undoing everything_.

It is therefore in the interests of peace that a communication of
the peace terms should only be made mutually and confidentially,
but we might be able to give the individual neutral various hints
concerning it, to show that our war aims coincide with the lasting
interests of humanity and the peace of the world, that our chief
aim, _the prevention of Russian world dominion on land and of the
English at sea_, is in the interests of the entire world, and that
our peace terms would not include anything that would endanger the
future peace of the world or could be objected to on the neutral
side.

I offer these views for your consideration, and remain in truest
friendship, your devoted

TISZA.

My predecessor, Burian, shortly before he left, had drawn up a peace
proposal together with Bethmann. The Entente's scornful refusal is
still fresh in everyone's memory. Since hostilities have ceased and
there have been opportunities of talking to members of the Entente, I
have often heard the reproach made that the offer of peace could not
have been accepted by the Entente, as it was couched in the terms of a
conqueror who "grants" peace terms to the enemy. Although I will not
attempt to deny that the tone of the peace proposal was very
arrogant--an impression which must have been enhanced by Tisza's
speeches in the Hungarian Parliament--I think, nevertheless, that even
had it been differently worded it had small prospect of success.
However that may be, the stern refusal on the part of the Entente only
strengthened the situation for the war-keen military party, who, with
increased vehemence, maintained the point that all talk of peace was a
mistake, and that the fighting must go on to the end.

In the winter of 1917, Italy made a slight advance. What territorial
concessions was the Monarchy prepared to make? This did not proceed
from the Italian Government, but was a step taken by a private
individual which was communicated to me through a friendly Government.
It is extremely difficult to judge of the true value of such a step. A
Government can make use of a private individual to take the first
step--it will probably do so when intercourse is desired; but it may
also be that a private person, without instructions from, or the
knowledge of, his Government, might do the same. Instances of the
latter occurred frequently during my term of office.

I always held the standpoint that any such tentative steps for peace,
even when a ministerial source could not be proved _a priori_, should
be treated with prudence, but in a friendly spirit. In the
above-mentioned case, however, the fact was that Italy neither could
separate from her Allies, nor did she wish to do so. Had that been her
purpose, it would have involved her in a conflict with England, whose
aim in war was the conquest of Germany and not any Italian
aspirations. A separate peace with Italy--her separation from her
Allies--was entirely out of the question, but a general peace would
have been possible if the Western Powers could have come to an
understanding with Germany.

The only object gained by that appeal would have been to confirm the
extent of our exhaustion from the war. Had I answered that I was ready
to give up this or that province, it would have been interpreted as a
conclusive symptom of our increasing weakness, and would not have
brought peace any nearer, but rather kept it at a greater distance.

I answered, therefore, in friendly tone that the Monarchy did not aim
at conquests, and that I was ready to negotiate on the basis of
pre-war conditions of possession. No answer was sent.

After the downfall I was told by a person, certainly not competent to
judge, that my tactics had been mistaken, as Italy would have
separated from her Allies and concluded a separate peace. Further
accounts given in this chapter prove the injustice of the reproof. But
it is easy now to confirm the impression that there was not a single
moment while the war lasted when Italy ever thought of leaving her
Allies.

An extraordinary incident occurred at the end of February, 1917. A
person came to me on February 26 who was in a position to give
credentials showing him to be a recognised representative of a neutral
Power, and informed me on behalf of his Government that he had been
instructed to let me know that our enemies--or at least one of
them--were ready to conclude peace with us, and that the conditions
would be favourable for us. In particular, there was to be no question
of separating Hungary or Bohemia from the Empire. I was asked, if
agreeable to the proposition, to communicate my conditions through the
same agency, my attention being called, however, to the proviso that
_these proposals made by the enemy Government would become null and
void from the moment that another Government friendly to us or to the
hostile country heard of the step_.

The bearer of this message knew nothing beyond its contents. The final
sentence made it obvious that one of the enemy Powers was anxious to
negotiate unknown to the others.

I did not for a moment doubt that it was a question of Russia, and my
authority confirmed my conviction by stating distinctly that he could
not say so positively. I answered at once by telegram on February 27
through the agency of the intervening neutral Power that
Austria-Hungary was, of course, ready to put an end to further
bloodshed, and did not look for any gains from the peace, because, as
stated several times, we were engaged in a war of defence only. But I
drew attention to the rather obscure sense of the application, not
being able to understand whether the State applying to us wished for
peace _with us only_, or with the entire _group of Powers_, and I was
constrained to emphasise the fact that we did not intend to separate
from our Allies. I was ready, however, to offer my services as
mediator if, as presumed, the State making the advance was ready to
conclude peace with our entire group of Powers. I would guarantee
secrecy, as I, first of all, considered it superfluous to notify our
Allies. The moment for that would only be when the situation was made
clear.

This was followed on March 9 by a reply accepting, though not giving a
direct answer to the point of whether the proposal was for a peace
with us alone or together with our Allies. In order to have it made
clear as quickly as possible, and not to lose further time, I answered
at once requesting the hostile Power to send a confidential person to
a neutral country, whither I also would send a delegate, adding that I
hoped that the meeting would have a favourable result.

I never received any answer to this second telegram. A week later, on
March 16, the Tsar abdicated. Obviously, it was a last attempt on his
part to save the situation which, had it occurred a few weeks earlier,
would not only have altered the fate of Russia, but that of the whole
world.

The Russian Revolution placed us in an entirely new situation. After
all, there was no doubt that the East presented an obvious possibility
of concluding peace, and all our efforts were turned in that
direction, for we were anxious to seize the first available moment to
make peace with the Russian Revolutionary Party, a peace which the
Tsar, faced by his coming downfall, had not been able to achieve.

If the spring of 1917 was noted for the beginning of the unrestricted
U-boat warfare and all the hopes centred on its success and the
altered situation anticipated on the part of the Germans, the summer
of the same year proved that the proceeding did not fulfil all
expectations, though causing great anxiety to England. At that time
there were great fears in England as to whether, and how, the U-boat
could be paralysed. No one in London knew whether the new means to
counteract it would suffice before they had been tried, and it was
only in the course of the summer that the success of the
anti-submarine weapons and the convoy principle was confirmed.

In the early summer of 1917 very favourable news was received relative
to English and French conditions. Information was sent from Madrid,
which was always a reliable source, that some Spanish officers
returning to Madrid from England reported that the situation there
during the last few weeks had become very much worse, and that there
was no longer any confidence in victory. The authorities seized all
the provisions that arrived for the troops and the munition workers;
potatoes and flour were not to be obtained by the poorer classes; the
majority of sailors fit for service had been enrolled in the navy, so
that only inefficient crews were left in the merchant service, and
they were difficult to secure, owing to their dread of U-boats, and,
therefore, many British merchantmen were lying idle, as there was no
one to man them.

This was the tenor of the Spanish reports coming from different
sources. Similar accounts, though in slightly different form, came
from France. It was stated that in Paris great war-weariness was
noticeable. All hope of definite victory was as good as given up; an
end must certainly come before the beginning of winter, and many of
the leading authorities were convinced that, if war were carried on
into the winter, the result would be as in Russia--a revolution.

At the same time, news came from Constantinople that one of the enemy
Powers in that quarter had made advances for a separate peace. The
Turkish Government replied that they would not separate from their
Allies, but were prepared to discuss a general peace on a basis of
non-annexation. Talaat Pasha notified me at once of the request and
his answer. Thereupon nothing more was heard from the enemy Power. At
the same time news came from Roumania evincing great anxiety
concerning the increasing break-up in Russia, and acknowledging that
she considered the game was lost. The revolution and the collapse of
the army in Russia still continued.

Taken altogether, the outlook presented a more hopeful picture for us,
and justified the views of those who had always held that a little
more "endurance"--to use a word since become ominous--would lead to a
decision.

Copyright (c) 2007. knowncrafts.net. All rights reserved.