Book: In the World War

C >> Count Ottokar Czernin >> In the World War




During a war every Minister of Foreign Affairs must attach an
important and adequately estimated significance to confidential
reports. The hermetic isolation which during the world war divided
Europe into two separate worlds made this doubly urgent. But it is
inevitable in regard to confidential reports that they must be
accepted, for various reasons, with a certain amount of scepticism.
Those persons who write and talk, not from any material, but from
political interests, from political devotion and sympathy, are, from
the nature of the case, above suspicion of reporting, for their own
personal reasons, more optimistically than is justified. But they are
apt to be deceived. Nations, too, are subject to feelings, and the
feelings of the masses must not be taken as expressing the tendencies
of the leading influences. France was tired of war, but how far the
leading statesmen were influenced by that condition, not to be
compared to our own war-weariness, was not proved.

In persons who make this _metier_ their profession, the wish is often
present, alongside the comprehensible mistakes they make, to give
pleasure and satisfaction by their reports, and not run any risk of
losing a lucrative post. I think it will be always well to estimate
confidential reports, no matter from what source they proceed, as
being 50 per cent. less optimistic than they appear. The more
pessimistic opinion that prevailed in Vienna, compared with Berlin,
was due, first and foremost, to the reliance placed on news coming
from the enemy countries. Berlin, too, was quite certain that we were
losing time, although Bethmann once thought fit in the Reichstag to
assert the contrary; but the German military leaders and the
politicians looked at the situation _among our opponents_ differently
from us.

When the Emperor William was at Laxenburg in the summer of 1917 he
related to me some instances of the rapidly increasing food trouble in
England, and was genuinely surprised when I replied that, though I was
convinced that the U-boats were causing great distress, there was no
question of a famine. I told the Emperor that the great problem was
whether the U-boats would actually interfere with the transport of
American troops, as the German military authorities asserted, or not,
but counselled him not to accept as very serious facts a few passing
incidents that might have occurred.

After the beginning of the unrestricted U-boat warfare, I repeat that
many grave fears were entertained in England. It is a well-known fact.
But it was a question of fears, not actualities. A person who knew how
matters stood, and who came to me from a neutral country in the summer
of 1917, said: "If the half only of the fears entertained in England
be realised, then the war will be over in the autumn"; but a wide
difference existed between London's fears and Berlin's hopes on the
one hand, and subsequent events on the other, which had not been taken
into account by German opinion.

However that may be, I consider there is no doubt that, in spite of
the announced intervention of America, the summer of 1917 represented
a more hopeful phase for us. We were carried along by the tide, and it
was essential to make the most of the situation. Germany must be
brought to see that peace must be made, in case the peace wave became
stronger.

I resolved, therefore, to propose to the Emperor that he should make
the first sacrifice and prove to Berlin that it was not only by words
that he sought for peace. I asked him to authorise me to state in
Berlin that, in the event of Germany coming to an agreement with
France on the Alsace-Lorraine question, Austria would be ready to cede
Galicia to Poland, which was about to be reorganised, and to make
efforts to ensure that this Great-Polish State should be attached to
Germany--not _incorporated_, but, say, some form of personal union.

The Emperor and I went to Kreuznach, where I first of all made the
proposal to Bethmann and Zimmermann, and subsequently, in the presence
of the Emperor Charles and Bethmann, laid it before the Emperor
William. It was not accepted unconditionally, nor yet refused, and the
conference terminated with a request from the Germans for
consideration of the question.

In making this proposal, I was fully aware of all that it involved. If
Germany accepted the offer, and we in our consequent negotiations with
the Entente did not secure any noteworthy alterations in the Pact of
London, we could count on war only. In that case, we should have to
satisfy not only Italy, Roumania, and Serbia, but would also lose the
hoped-for compensation in the annexation of Poland. The Emperor
Charles saw the situation very clearly, but resolved at once,
nevertheless, to take the proposed step.

I, however, thoroughly believed then--though wrongly--that in the
circumstances London and Paris would have been able to effect an
amendment in the Pact of London. It was not until much later that a
definite refusal of our offer was sent by Germany.

In April, before a decision had been arrived at, I sent a report to
the Emperor Charles explaining the situation to him, and requesting
that he would submit it to the Emperor William.

The report was as follows:--

Will Your Majesty permit me, with the frankness granted me from
the first day of my appointment, to submit to Your Majesty my
responsible opinion of the situation?

It is quite obvious that our military strength is coming to an
end. To enter into lengthy details in this connection would be to
take up Your Majesty's time needlessly.

I allude only to the decrease in raw materials for the production
of munitions, to the thoroughly exhausted human material, and,
above all, to the dull despair that pervades all classes owing to
under-nourishment and renders impossible any further endurance of
the sufferings from the war.

Though I trust we shall succeed in holding out during the next few
months and carry out a successful defence, I am nevertheless
quite convinced that another winter campaign would be absolutely
out of the question; in other words, that in the late summer or in
the autumn an end must be put to the war at all costs.

Without a doubt, it will be most important to begin peace
negotiations at a moment when the enemy has not yet grasped the
fact of our waning strength. If we approach the Entente at a
moment when disturbances in the interior of the Empire reveal the
coming breakdown every step will have been in vain, and the
Entente will agree to no terms except such as would mean the
absolute destruction of the Central Powers. To begin at the right
time is, therefore, of extreme importance.

I cannot here ignore the subject on which lies the crux of the
whole argument. That is, the danger of revolution which is rising
on the horizon of all Europe and which, supported by England, is
demonstrating a new mode of fighting. Five monarchs have been
dethroned in this war, and the amazing facility with which the
strongest Monarchy in the world was overthrown may help to make us
feel anxious and call to our memory the saying: _exempla trahunt_.
Let it not be said that in Germany or Austria-Hungary the
conditions are different; let it not be contested that the firmly
rooted monarchist tendencies in Berlin and Vienna exclude the
possibility of such an event. This war has opened a new era in the
history of the world; it is without example and without precedent.
The world is no longer what it was three years ago, and it will be
vain to seek in the history of the world a parallel to the
happenings that have now become daily occurrences.

The statesman who is neither blind nor deaf must be aware how the
dull despair of the population increases day by day; he is bound
to hear the sullen grumbling of the great masses, and if he be
conscious of his own responsibility he must pay due regard to that
factor.

Your Majesty has seen the secret reports from the governor of the
town. Two things are obvious. The Russian Revolution affects our
Slavs more than it does the Germans, and the responsibility for
the continuation of the war is a far greater one for the Monarch
whose country is only united through the dynasty than for the one
where the people themselves are fighting for their national
independence. Your Majesty knows that the burden laid upon the
population has assumed proportions that are unbearable; Your
Majesty knows that the bow is strained to such a point that any
day it may be expected to snap. But should serious disturbances
occur, either here or in Germany, it will be impossible to conceal
the fact from the Entente, and from that moment all further
efforts to secure peace will be defeated.

I do not think that the internal situation in Germany is widely
different from what it is here. I am only afraid that the military
circles in Berlin are deceiving themselves in certain matters. I
am firmly convinced that Germany, too, like ourselves, has reached
the limit of her strength, and the responsible political leaders
in Berlin do not seek to deny it.

I am firmly persuaded that, if Germany were to attempt to embark
on another winter campaign, there would be an upheaval in the
interior of the country which, to my mind, would be far worse than
a peace concluded by the Monarchs. If the Monarchs of the Central
Powers are not able to conclude peace within the next few months,
it will be done for them by their people, and then will the tide
of revolution sweep away all that for which our sons and brothers
fought and died.

I do not wish to make any _oratio pro domo_, but I beg Your
Majesty graciously to remember that I, the only one to predict the
Roumanian war two years before, spoke to deaf ears, and that when
I, two months before the war broke out, prophesied almost the very
day when it would begin, nobody would believe me. I am just as
convinced of my present diagnosis as I was of the former one, and
I cannot too insistently urge you not to estimate too lightly the
dangers that I see ahead.

Without a doubt, the American declaration of war has greatly
aggravated the situation. It may be many months before America can
throw any noteworthy forces into the field, but the moral fact,
the fact that the Entente has the hope of fresh forces, brings the
situation to an unfavourable stage for us, because our enemies
have more time before them than we have and can afford to wait
longer than we, unfortunately, are able to do. It cannot yet be
said what course events will take in Russia. I hope--and this is
the vital point of my whole argument--that Russia has lost her
motive power for a long time to come, perhaps for ever, and that
this important factor will be made use of. I expect, nevertheless,
that a Franco-English, probably also an Italian, offensive will be
launched at the first opportunity, though I hope and trust that we
shall be able to repulse both attacks. If this succeeds--and I
reckon it can be done in two or three months--we must then, before
America takes any further military action to our disadvantage,
make a more comprehensive and detailed peace proposal and not
shrink from the probably great and heavy sacrifices we may have to
make.

Germany places great hopes on the U-boat warfare. I consider such
hopes are deceptive. I do not for a moment disparage the fabulous
deeds of the German sea heroes; I admit admiringly that the
tonnage sunk per month is phenomenal, but I assert that the
success anticipated and predicted by the Germans has not been
achieved.

Your Majesty will remember that Admiral Holtzendorff, when last in
Vienna, told us positively that the unrestricted U-boat warfare
would bring England to her knees within six months. Your Majesty
will also remember how we combated the prediction and declared
that, though we did not doubt the U-boat campaign would seriously
affect England, yet the looked-for success would be discounted by
the anticipated entry of America into the war. It is now two and a
half months (almost half the time stated) since the U-boat warfare
started, and all the information that we get from England is to
the effect that the downfall of this, our most powerful and most
dangerous adversary, is not to be thought of. If, in, spite of
many scruples, Your Majesty yielded to Germany's wish and
consented to allow the Austro-Hungarian Navy to take part in the
U-boat warfare, it was not because we were converted by the German
arguments, but because Your Majesty deemed it to be absolutely
necessary to act with Germany in loyal concert in all quarters and
because we were firmly persuaded that Germany, unfortunately,
would never desist from her resolve to begin the unrestricted
U-boat warfare.

To-day, however, in Germany the most enthusiastic advocates of the
U-boat warfare are beginning to see that this means to victory
will not be decisive, and I trust that the mistaken idea that
England within a few months will be forced to sue for peace will
lose ground in Berlin too. Nothing is more dangerous in politics
than to believe the things one wishes to believe; nothing is more
fatal than the principle not to wish to see the truth and to fall
a prey to Utopian illusions from which sooner or later a terrible
awakening will follow.

England, the motive power in the war, will not be compelled to lay
down her arms in a few months' time, but perhaps--and here I
concede a limited success to the U-boat scheme--perhaps England in
a few months will ask herself whether it is wise and sensible to
continue this war _a l'outrance_, or whether it would not be more
statesmanlike to set foot upon the golden bridges the Central
Powers must build for her, and then the moment will have come for
great and painful sacrifices on the part of the Central Powers.

Your Majesty has rejected the repeated attempts of our enemies to
separate us from our Allies, in which step I took the
responsibility because Your Majesty is incapable of any
dishonourable action. But at the same time, Your Majesty
instructed me to notify the statesmen of the German Empire that
our strength is at an end, and that after the close of the summer
Germany must not reckon on us any longer. I carried out these
commands and the German statesmen left me in no doubt that for
Germany, too, another winter campaign would be impossible. In this
one sentence may be summed up all that I have to say:

We can still wait some weeks and try if there is any possibility
of dealing with Paris or Petersburg. If that does not succeed,
then we must--and at the right time--play our last card and make
the extreme proposals I have already hinted at. Your Majesty has
proved that you have no selfish plans and that you do not expect
from your German Ally sacrifices that Your Majesty would not be
ready to make yourself. More than that cannot be expected.

Your Majesty, nevertheless, owes it to God and to your peoples to
make every effort to avert the catastrophe of a collapse of the
Monarchy; it is your sacred duty to God and to your peoples to
defend those peoples, the dynastic principle and your throne with
all the means in your power and to your very last breath.

On May 11 there came the following official answer from the Imperial
Chancellor, which was sent by the German Emperor to the Emperor
Charles, and then to me:--

In accordance with Your Majesty's commands I beg most humbly to
submit the following in answer to the enclosed _expose_ from the
Imperial and Royal Minister for Foreign Affairs of 12th ult.

Since the _expose_ was drawn up, the French and English on the
Western front have carried out the predicted great offensive on a
wide front, ruthlessly sacrificing masses of men and an enormous
quantity of war material. The German army checked the advance of
the numerically superior enemy; further attacks, as we have every
reason to believe, will also be shattered by the heroism of the
men and the iron will of their leaders.

Judging from all our experiences hitherto in the war, we may
consider the situation of the Allied armies on the Isonzo with the
same confidence.

The Eastern front has been greatly reduced owing to the political
upheaval in Russia. There can be no question of an offensive on a
large scale on the part of Russia. A further easing of the
situation would release more men even if it were considered
necessary to have a strong barrier on the Russian frontier to
guard against local disturbances owing to the revolutionary
movement. With the additional forces, the conditions in the West
would become more favourable for us. The withdrawal of men would
also provide more troops for the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy for
the successful carrying out of the fighting on the Italian front
until the end of the war is reached.

In both Allied Monarchies there is an ample supply of raw material
for the manufacture of munitions. Our situation as regards
provisions is such that with the greatest economy we can hold out
until the new harvest. The same applies to Austria-Hungary,
especially if her share of the supplies from Roumania are taken
into consideration.

The deeds of our navy rank beside the successes of the army. When
Admiral von Holtzendorff was permitted to lay before His Apostolic
Majesty the plans for the U-boat warfare, the prospects of success
for this stringent measure had been thoroughly tested here and the
expected military advantages weighed against the political risk.
We did not conceal from ourselves that the infliction of a
blockade of the coasts of England and France would bring about the
entry into war of the United States and, consequently, a falling
off of other neutral states. We were fully aware that our enemies
would thus gain a moral and economic renewal of strength, but we
were, and still are, convinced that the disadvantages of the
U-boat warfare are far surpassed by its advantages. The largest
share in the world struggle which began in the East has now been
transferred to the West in ever increasing dimensions, where
English tenacity and endurance promote and strengthen the
resistance of our enemies by varied means. A definite and
favourable result for us could only be achieved by a determined
attack on the vital spot in the hostile forces; that is, England.

The success obtained and the effect already produced by the U-boat
warfare far exceed all calculations and expectations. The latest
statements of leading men in England concerning the increasing
difficulty in obtaining provisions and the stoppage of supplies,
as well as corresponding comments in the Press, not only include
urgent appeals to the people to put forth their utmost strength,
but bear also the stamp of grave anxiety and testify to the
distress that England is suffering.

The Secretary of State, Helfferich, at a meeting of the Head
Committee of the Reichstag on the 28th ult., gave a detailed
account of the effects of the U-boat warfare on England. The
review was published in the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_ of
the 1st inst. I beg herewith to refer to the enclosed.[8]

According to the latest news the Food Controller, Lord Rhondda,
owing to the inadequate supply of corn, has been compelled to
specify a new allotment of cargo space. This is already so
restricted that more room for corn can only be secured by
hindering the conduct of the war in other ways. Apart from
abandoning overseas traffic, vessels could only be released by
cutting down such imports as absorbed much space. England requires
not only great transport facilities for provisions but also for
the import of ore to keep up war industries, and also pit props to
enable the coal output to be kept at a high level. In the case of
the ore needed for England and the wood available in the country,
it is not possible to restrict the cargo space in these two
instances. Already, after three months of the U-boat warfare, it
is a fact that the shortage of cargo space caused by the U-boats
reduces the living conditions of the population to an unbearable
extent, and paralyses all war industries, so much so that the hope
of defeating Germany by superior stores of munitions and a greater
number of guns has had to be given up. The lack of transport
facilities will also prevent the larger output of war industries
in America making up for the lesser output in England. The speed
with which the U-boat warfare has destroyed vessels excludes the
possibility of building new vessels to furnish adequate cargo
space. More vessels have been destroyed in a month of U-boat
warfare than the English dockyards have turned out in the last
year. Even the thousand much-talked-of American wooden vessels, if
they were there, would only cover the losses of four months. But
they will not come before it is too late. English experts on the
subject have already said quite openly that there are only two
ways of counteracting the effect of the U-boats: either to build
vessels quicker than the Germans destroy them, or else to destroy
the U-boats quicker than the Germans can build them. The first has
proved to be impossible, and the U-boat losses are far less than
the new vessels building.

England will also have to reckon on a progressive rise in the loss
of tonnage.

The effects of the U-boat warfare on the people's provisions and
on all private and Government activities will be felt more and
more.

I anticipate, therefore, the final results of the U-boat warfare
with the greatest confidence.

According to secret but reliable information, the Prime Minister
Ribot recently stated to the Italian Ambassador in Paris that
France was faced with exhaustion. This opinion was expressed
before the beginning of the last Franco-English offensive. Since
then, France has sacrificed life to a terrible extent by keeping
up the intensity of the fighting until the offensive ceased.

The French nation is certainly doing marvellous things in this
war, but the Government cannot sustain the enormous burden after
it reaches a certain limit. A reaction in the temper of France,
which is kept up by artificial means, is inevitable.

As regards our own internal situation, I do not under-estimate the
difficulties presented by the inevitable results of the severe
fighting and the exclusion from the seas. But I firmly believe
that we shall succeed in overcoming these difficulties without
permanently endangering the nation's strength and general welfare,
without any further crises and without menace to Government
organisation.

Although we are justified in viewing the total situation in a
favourable light, I am nevertheless in complete agreement with
Count Czernin in pursuing the aim of bringing about as speedily as
possible an honourable and, in the interests of the Empire and of
our Allies, just peace. I also share his opinion that the
important factor of the weakening of Russia must be exploited, and
that a fresh tentative offer for peace must be put forward at a
time when both political and military initiative are still in our
hands. Count Czernin estimates a suitable time will be in two or
three months, when the enemy offensive will be at an end. As a
matter of fact, in view of the French and English expectations of
the decisive success for their offensive, and the Entente not
having lost all hopes of Russia resuming her activities, any too
pronounced preparations for peace would not only be doomed to
failure, but would put new life into the enemy by revealing the
hopeless exhaustion of the Central Powers' forces. At the present
moment a general peace could only be bought by our submission to
the will of the enemy. A peace of that nature would not be
tolerated by the people and would lead to fatal dangers for the
Monarchy. It appears to me that quiet determination and caution as
regards the outer world are more than ever an imperative
necessity. The development of affairs in Russia has hitherto been
favourable for us. Party disputes are kept more and more within
the narrow limits of peace and war questions by political,
economic and social exigencies, and the impression grows every day
that the party which makes for peace with the Central Powers will
be the one to remain in power. It is our solemn duty carefully to
follow and encourage the process of development and disruption in
Russia and to sound the country, not with too obvious haste, but
yet with sufficient expert skill to lead to practical peace
negotiations. The probability is that Russia will avoid any
appearance of treachery towards her Allies, and will endeavour to
find a method which will practically lead to a state of peace
between herself and the Central Powers, but outwardly will have
the appearance of the union of both parties as a prelude to the
general peace.

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