Book: In the World War

C >> Count Ottokar Czernin >> In the World War




As in July, 1914, we entered regardlessly into a loyal alliance
with Austria-Hungary, in like manner when the world war is at an
end will a basis be found for terms which will guarantee a
prosperous peace to the two closely united Monarchies.

This optimistic reply of Bethmann's was obviously not only based on
the idea of infusing more confidence in the future in us, but was also
the true expression of a more favourable atmosphere prevailing, as
Berlin naturally received the same reports from the enemy countries as
we did.

I received about that time a letter from Tisza which contained the
following passage:--

The varied information received from the enemy countries leaves no
doubt that the war is drawing to a close. It is now above all
essential to keep a steady nerve and play the game to the end with
_sangfroid_. Let there be no signs of weakness. It is not from a
love of humanity in general that our enemies have become more
peacefully inclined, but because they realise that we cannot be
crushed.

I beg of you no longer to give vent to the sentiments in your
report of April 12. A pessimistic tendency evinced now by the
leader of our foreign affairs would ruin everything. I know that
you are prudent, but I beg you to use your influence so that both
His Majesty and his entourage may show a confident front to the
world. And again, no one will have anything to say to us if they
cease to believe in our powers of resistance--and are not
persuaded that our Alliance rests on a solid foundation.

It was evident that the only right tactics were to make the supremest
efforts at the front and throughout the country, on the one hand, in
order to hold the situation a little longer, and, on the other, to
persuade the enemy that, in spite of the favourable situation, we were
prepared for peace without conquest. To appoint Hebel to the German
military Commission to carry out this last procedure seemed devoid of
sense. Neither did I expect to gain much from recent intervention in
the Wilhelmstrasse, and endeavoured therefore to put myself in direct
touch with the German Reichstag.

One of my political friends who had numerous and excellent connections
with the German Reichstag put himself into communication with
different leaders in Berlin and explained to them the situation in the
Monarchy. It was understood that this gentleman was not acting for the
Ministry, but presenting his own impressions and views. He was
enjoined to be very cautious, as any indiscretion might have
incalculable consequences. If the Entente were to imagine that we were
thinking of ending the war, not for love of peace but because we
simply could not hold out any longer, all efforts would have been
vain. In that respect, Tisza was perfectly right. It was, therefore,
absolutely necessary that the person to whom this delicate mission had
been entrusted should act in such a manner as would keep it a secret
from the Entente, a manner devoid of weakness and uniting confidence
with reasonable war aims, but also in a manner which would enable the
Ministry eventually to disavow the advances.

My friend undertook the task with just as great zeal as efficiency
and, in brief, this is what he told the Berlin leaders, Erzberger[9]
and Suedekum in particular. As far as he could judge, we had now
reached a turning point. The next few weeks would decide whether it
was to be peace or war _a l'outrance_. France was tired and not
anxious for America's entry into the war if it was not to be the
latter. If Germany forced the Entente to continue the war the
situation would be very grave. Neither Austria-Hungary nor Turkey
could do more. Germany, by herself, could not bring the war to a
successful end. Austria-Hungary's position was obvious to the whole
world. She was ready to make peace without annexations and without war
compensation, and to devote all her energies to preventing the
recurrence of a war. (Austria-Hungary's standpoint was that a
universal, equal, but extensive disarmament on sea and on land offered
the only means to restore the financial situation in Europe after the
war.)

Germany must publicly notify her position just as clearly as
Austria-Hungary had done and must declare the following:

(1) No annexations, no indemnities.

(2) Particularly the unconditional and total release of Belgium
(politically and economically).

(3) All territories occupied by Germany and Austria-Hungary to be
evacuated as soon as both those States had had their
territories restored to them (including the German
colonies).

(4) Germany, as well as Austria-Hungary, to work for a general
disarmament and guarantee that no further war be possible.

Such declaration to be a joint one from the German Government and the
Reichstag, and to be made public.

The peace resolution of July 19, 1917, was the result of this step.
The Imperial Chancellor Bethmann was the first victim. The Supreme
Military Command, by whom he always had been persecuted, now trying to
secure his dismissal, declared such resolution to be unacceptable.
When Bethmann had gone and Michaelis had been appointed, they were
satisfied.

Although the resolution in itself was satisfactory, it had one fault
at the start. It was no secret that everyone connected with
Pan-Germanism, especially the German generals, disagreed with the
decision, and would not accept the resolution as coming from the
entire country. Certainly the great majority in Germany, counting them
per head, supported the resolution but the leading men, together with
a considerable following, were opposed to it. The "Starvation Peace,"
the "Peace of Renunciation," and the "Scheidemann Peace" were the
subjects of articles in the papers expressing the greatest disapproval
of the resolution. Neither did the German Government take up any
decided attitude. On July 19 the Imperial Chancellor Michaelis made a
speech approving the resolution, but adding "as I understand it."

The Imperial Chancellor wrote a letter to me in August confirming his
very optimistic views of the situation, and defining Germany's views
regarding Belgium. The phrase, "as I understand it," above alluded to
in his approval of the resolution, was explained in his letter, at any
rate, as to the Belgium question: "As Germany wishes to reserve to
herself the right to exercise a far-reaching military and economic
influence on Belgium." He wrote as follows:--

_Berlin, August 17, 1917._

DEAR COUNT CZERNIN,--According to our agreement, I take the
liberty briefly to lay before you my views of our discussions of
the 14th and 15th inst., and would be extremely grateful if Your
Excellency would be so kind as to advise me of your views on my
activities.

The internal economic and political situation in Germany justifies
me in the firm belief that Germany herself would be able to stand
a fourth year of war. The bread-corn harvest promises better than
we thought five or six weeks ago, and will be better than that of
the previous year. The potato harvest promises a considerably
higher yield than in 1916-17. Fodder is estimated to be much less
than last year; by observing a unified and well-thought-out
economic plan for Germany herself and the occupied territories,
including Roumania, we shall be in a position to hold out with
regard to fodder, as was also possible in the very dry year 1915.

There is no doubt that the political situation is grave. The
people are suffering from the war, and the longing for peace is
very great; however, there is no trace of any general and really
morbid exhaustion, and when food is controlled any work done will
be no worse than it was last year.

This economic and political prospect can only be altered if the
condition of the Allies, or of the neutrals, under pressure from
the Entente, should become very much worse. It would be a change
for the worse for us if our Allies or the neutral states, contrary
to our expectations and hopes, were to experience such shortage as
would cause them to turn to us. To a certain extent, this is
already the case; a further increase of their claims would greatly
prejudice our economic position and in certain cases endanger it.
It must be admitted that the situation in the fourth year of war
in general is more difficult than in the third year. The most
earnest endeavours, therefore, will be made to bring about a peace
as soon as possible.

Nevertheless, our genuine desire for peace must not lead us to
come forward with a fresh peace proposal. That, in my opinion,
would be a great tactical error. Our _demarche_ for peace last
December found sympathy in the neutral states, but it was answered
by our adversaries raising their demands. A fresh step of the kind
would be put down to our weakness and would prolong the war; any
peace advances must come now from the enemy.

The leading motive in my foreign policy will always be the
watchful care of our Alliance with Austria-Hungary that the storm
of war has made still stronger, and a trusting, friendly and loyal
co-operation with the leading men of the Allied Monarchy. If the
spirit of the Alliance--and in this I know Your Excellency
agrees--remains on the same high level as heretofore, even our
enemies would see that it was impossible for one of the Allies to
agree to any separate negotiations offered to him, unless he
states beforehand that the discussion would only be entered into
if the object were a general peace. If this were clearly laid down
there could be no reason why one of the Allies should not listen
to such proposal from the enemy and with him discuss preparations
for peace.

At present no decided line of action can be specified for such a
proceeding. Your Excellency was good enough to ask me whether the
reinstatement of the _status quo_ would be a suitable basis on
which to start negotiations. My standpoint in this matter is as
follows: I have already stated in the Reichstag that Germany is
not striving for any great changes in power after the war, and is
ready to negotiate provided the enemy does not demand the cession
of any German territory; with such a conception of the term
"reinstatement of the _status quo_," that form would be a very
suitable basis for negotiations. This would not exclude the
desired possibility of retaining the present frontiers, and by
negotiating bring former enemy economic territory into close
economic and military conjunction with Germany--this would refer
to Courland, Lithuania and Poland--and thus secure Germany's
frontiers and give a guarantee for her vital needs on the
continent and overseas.

Germany is ready to evacuate the occupied French territory, but
must reserve to herself the right, _by means of the peace
negotiations, to the economic exploitation of the territory of
Longwy and Briey_, if not through direct incorporation, by a legal
grant to exploit. We are not in a position to cede to France any
noteworthy districts in Alsace-Lorraine.

I should wish to have a free hand in the negotiations in the
matter of _connecting Belgium with Germany in a military and
economic sense_. The terms that I read out, taken from notes at
the Kreuznach negotiations--the military control of Belgium until
the conclusion of a defensive and offensive Alliance with Germany,
the acquisition of Liege (or a long-term rental thereof)--were
the maximum claims of the Supreme Military and Naval Command. The
Supreme Military Command agrees with me that these terms or
similar ones can only be secured if peace can be enforced on
England. But we are of opinion that a vast amount of economic and
military influence must be brought to bear in Belgium in the
matter of the negotiations and would perhaps not meet with much
resistance, because Belgium, from economic distress, will come to
see that her being joined to Germany is the best guarantee for a
prosperous future.

As regards Poland, I note that the confidential hint from Your
Excellency to give up Galicia and enrol it in the new Polish State
is subject to the ceding of portions of Alsace-Lorraine to France,
which was to be as a counter-sacrifice, but must be considered as
out of the question. The development of Poland as an independent
State must be carried out in the sense of the proclamation of
November 5, 1916. Whether this development will prove to be an
actual advantage for Germany or will become a great danger for the
future will be tested later. There are already many signs of
danger, and what is particularly to be feared is that the
Austro-Hungarian Government cannot notify us now during the war of
her complete indifference to Poland and leave us a free hand in
the administration of the whole state.

It will also remain to be seen whether, in view of the danger
caused to Germany and also to her relations with Austria-Hungary
through Poland's unwillingness to accept the situation, it would
not be more desirable politically for Germany, while retaining the
frontier territory as being necessary for military protection, to
grant to Poland full right of self-determination, also with the
possibility of being joined to Russia.

The question of the annexation of Roumania, according to the
Kreuznach debate of May 1, must be treated further and solved in
connection with the questions that are of interest to Germany
respecting Courland, Lithuania and Poland.

It was a special pleasure to me to meet you, dear Count Czernin,
here in Berlin and to discuss openly and frankly with you the
questions that occupy us at present. I hope in days to come there
may be an opportunity for a further exchange of thoughts enabling
us to solve problems that may arise, and carry them out in full
agreement.

With the expression of my highest esteem, I remain your very
devoted

MICHAELIS.

I replied to the Chancellor that I welcomed, as a matter of course,
the agreement to maintain complete frankness, but remarked that I
could not share his optimism. I explained that the increasing
war-weariness, both in Germany and in Austria-Hungary, rendered it
imperative to secure peace in good time, that is, before any
revolutionary signs appeared, for any beginning of disturbances would
spoil the chance of peace. The German point of view in the case of
Belgium seemed to me quite mistaken, as neither the Entente nor
Belgium would ever consent to the terms. I could not, therefore,
conceal from him that his point of view was a serious obstacle to
peace; that it was also in direct opposition to the Reichstag view,
and I failed to understand it.

I then spoke of the necessity of coming to an understanding as to the
minimum of the war aims in which an important part is played by the
question whether and how we can achieve a voluntary and peaceable
annexation of Poland and Roumania by the Central Powers.

I finally again pointed out that I interpreted the views of the German
Reichstag as demanding a peace without annexation or indemnity, and
that it would be out of the question for the German Government to
ignore the unanimous decision of the Reichstag. It was not a question
of whether we _wished_ to go on fighting, but whether we _could_, and
it was my duty to impress upon him in time that we were bound to end
the war.

Dr. Michaelis was more given to Pan-Germanism than his predecessor.

It was astonishing to what degree the Pan-Germans misunderstood the
situation. They disliked me so intensely that they avoided me, and I
had very few dealings with them. They were not to be converted. I
remember one instance, when a representative of that Party called on
me in Vienna to explain to me the conditions under which his group was
prepared to conclude peace: the annexation of Belgium, of a part of
east France (Longwy and Briey), of Courland and Lithuania, the cession
of the English Fleet to Germany, and I forget how many milliards in
war indemnity, etc. I received this gentleman in the presence of the
Ambassador von Wiesner, and we both agreed that it was purely a case
for a doctor.

There was a wide breach between the Imperial Chancellor Michaelis's
ideas and our own. It was impossible to bridge it over. Soon after he
left office to make way for the statesmanlike Count Hertling.

About this time very far-reaching events were being enacted behind the
scenes which had a very pronounced influence on the course of affairs.

Acts of great indiscretion and interference occurred on the part of
persons who, without being in any important position, had access to
diplomatic affairs. There is no object here in mentioning names,
especially as the responsible political leaders themselves only heard
the details of what had happened much later, and then in a very
unsatisfactory way--at a time when the pacifist tendencies of the
Entente were slackening.[10]

It was impossible then to see clearly in such a labyrinth of confused
and contradictory facts. The truth is that in the spring or early
summer of 1917 leading statesmen in the countries of the Allies and of
the Entente gathered the impression that the existence of the
Quadruple Alliance was at an end. At the very moment when it was of
the utmost importance to maintain secrecy concerning the conditions of
our Alliance the impression prevailed, and, naturally, the Entente
welcomed the first signs of disruption in the Quadruple Alliance.

I do not know if the opportunity will ever occur of throwing a clear
light on all the proceedings of those days. To explain the further
development it will suffice to confirm what follows here. This is what
happened. In the spring of 1917 connecting links were established with
Paris and London. The first impressions received were that the Western
Powers were ready to make use of us as a bridge to Germany and to a
general peace. At a somewhat later stage the wind veered and the
Entente endeavoured to make a separate peace with us.

Several important details only came to my knowledge later, some at the
time of my resignation in the spring of 1918, and some not until the
collapse in the winter of 1918-19. There was no lack of voices to
blame me for a supposed double policy, which the public also
suspected, and to accuse me of having made different statements to
Berlin from those I made in Paris. These charges were brought by
personal enemies who deliberately slandered me, which tales were
repeated by others who knew nothing about the affair. The fact is that
when I heard of the episode I immediately _possessed myself of
documents proving that not only did I know nothing whatever about the
matter_, but could not possibly have known.

Astronomical causes sometimes give rise to disturbances in the
universe, the reason of which cannot be understood by the observer. I
felt in the same way, without being able to prove anything definite,
from certain signs that I noticed, that in those worlds on the other
side of the trenches events were happening that were inexplicable to
me. I felt the effect, but could not discover the cause. In the spirit
of the Entente, now more favourably disposed for peace, an undertone
was distinctly audible. There was anxiety and a greater inclination
for peace than formerly, but again probably only in view of the
alleged laxity of our Alliance conditions and the hopes of the
downfall of the Quadruple Alliance. A friend of mine, a subject of a
neutral state, wrote to me from Paris in the summer and told me he had
heard from a reliable source that apparently at the Quai d'Orsay they
expected the Monarchy to separate from Germany, which, as a matter of
course, would alter the entire military situation.

Soon afterwards very secret information was received from a neutral
country that a Bulgarian group was negotiating with the Entente behind
the back and without the knowledge of Radoslawoff. As soon as
suspicion of a breach in the Alliance had been aroused in our Allies,
the Bulgarian party hastened to forestall the event. We felt as safe
about Radoslawoff as about Talaat Pasha; but in both countries other
forces were at work.

The suspicions aroused in our friends concerning our plans were a
further disadvantage, certainly only of a technical nature, but yet
not to be underestimated. Our various agents worked splendidly, but it
lay in the nature of the case that their dealings were more protracted
than those carried out by the Foreign Minister himself. According to
the course taken by the conversations, they were obliged to seek fresh
instructions; they were more tied, and therefore forced to assume a
more halting attitude than a responsible leader would have to do. In
the summer of 1917, therefore, I suggested going to Switzerland
myself, where negotiations were proceeding. But my journey could not
have been kept secret, and if an effort had been made to do so it
would have been all the more certain to arouse suspicion, owing to the
mistrust already awakened. But not in Berlin. I believe I still held
the confidence of the leading men in Berlin sufficiently to avert
that. I should have explained the situation to the Imperial
Chancellor, and that would have sufficed. In Turkey and Bulgaria the
case was different.

One party in Bulgaria favoured the Entente. If Bulgaria was under the
impression that our group was falling asunder she would have staked
everything to try and save herself by a separate peace. In
Constantinople, too, there was an Entente group. Talaat and Enver were
as reliable as they were strong. But a journey undertaken by me to
Switzerland in the conditions described might prove to be the alarm
signal for a general _sauve qui peut_. But the very suggestion that
the two Balkan countries would act as they supposed we should do would
have sufficed to destroy any attempt at peace in Paris and London.

The willingness to prepare for peace on the part of the enemy declined
visibly during the summer. It was evident from many trifling signs,
separately of small import, collectively of much. In the summer of
1917, too, the first horror of the U-boat warfare began to grow less.
It was seen by the enemy that it could not accomplish what he had
first feared, and that again put life into the desire for a final
military victory.

These two facts together probably contributed to fan back the peace
wind blowing from the West. Among other things, the Armand-Revertera
negotiations were proceeding the whole time. It is not yet the moment
to speak of the negotiations which in the spring of 1918, together
with the letters of the Emperor to Prince Sixtus, created such a
sensation. But this much must be stated: that Revertera in the
negotiations proved himself to be an equally correct as efficient
agent who acted exactly according to the instructions he received from
the Ballplatz. Our various attempts to take up the threads of peace
when emanating from the Ballplatz were always intended for our entire
group of Powers.

Naturally, it was not in the interests of the Entente to _prevent_ us
from separating from Germany, and when the impression was produced in
London and Paris unofficially that we were giving Germany up, we
ourselves thus used _sabotage_ in the striving for a general peace;
for it would, of course, have been pleasing to the Entente to see
Germany, her chief enemy, isolated.

There was a twofold and terrible mistake in thus trifling with the
idea of a separate peace. First of all, it could not release us from
the terms of the Pact of London, and yet it spoiled the atmosphere for
negotiating a general peace. At the time when these events were being
enacted, I presumed, but only knew for certain later, that Italy, in
any case, would claim the promises made to her.

In the spring of 1917 Ribot and Lloyd George conferred with Orlando on
the subject, when at St. Jean de Maurienne, and endeavoured to modify
the terms in case of our separating from Germany. Orlando refused, and
insisted on his view that, even in the event of a separate peace, we
should still have to yield up Trieste and the Tyrol as far as the
Brenner Pass to Italy, and thus have to pay an impossible price. And
secondly, these separatist tactics would break up our forces, and had
already begun to do so.

When a person starts running away in a fight he but too easily drags
others with him. I do not doubt that the Bulgarian negotiations,
opened with the purpose of taking soundings, were connected with the
foregoing events.

The effect of this well-meant but secret and dilettante policy was
that we suggested to the Entente a willingness to separate from our
Allies, and lost our position in the struggle for a separate peace.
For we saw that in separating from Germany we could not escape being
crippled; that, therefore, a separate peace was impossible, and that
we had dealt a death-blow at the still intact Quadruple Alliance.

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