Book: In the World War

C >> Count Ottokar Czernin >> In the World War




Later I had information from England relating to the official view of
the situation there, which differed very much from the optimistic
confidential reports, and proved that the desire for peace was not so
strong. It will easily be understood that for us the English policy
was always the most interesting. England's entry into the war had made
the situation so dangerous that an understanding arrived at with
her--that is, an understanding between England and Germany through our
intervention--would have put an end to the war.

This information was to the effect that England was less than ever
inclined to confer with Germany until the two cardinal points had been
guaranteed--the cession of Alsace-Lorraine and the abolition of German
militarism. The former was a French claim, and England must and would
support France in this to her very utmost; the second claim was
necessary in the interests of the future peace of the world. Germany's
military strength was always estimated very highly in England, but the
army's deeds in this war had surpassed all expectations. The military
successes had encouraged the growth of the military spirit. The peace
resolution passed in the Reichstag proved nothing, or at any rate, not
enough, for the Reichstag is not the real exponent of the Empire in
the outside world; it became paralysed through an unofficial
collateral Government, the generals, who possessed the greater power.
Certain statements made by General Ludendorff--so the Entente
said--proved that Germany did not wish for an honourable peace of
understanding. Besides this the Wilhelmstrasse did not associate
itself with the majority in the Reichstag. The war was not being waged
against the German nation, but against its militarism, and to conclude
peace with the latter would be impossible. It appeared, further, that
in no circumstances would England restore Germany's colonies. So far
as the Monarchy was concerned, England appeared to be ready to
conclude a separate peace with her, though subject to the promises
made to her own Allies. According to the latter there was much
territory to be given up to Italy, Serbia and Roumania. But in
exchange we might reckon on a sort of annexation of newly made states
like Poland.

This information left no doubt that England was not then thinking of
making advances to Germany; the fear of Prussian militarism was at the
bottom of her reasons for refusing. My impression was that, through a
more favourable continuous development, a settlement and understanding
might be feasible on the territorial but not on the military
questions. On the contrary, the stronger Germany's military power
proved itself to be, the more did the Entente fear that their enemy's
power of defence would be invincible unless it was broken then.

Not only the period preceding war and the outbreak of war, but the
actual course of the war has been full of many and disturbing
misunderstandings. For long it was not understood here what England
meant by the term militarism. It was pointed out that the English Navy
was jealously defending the dominion of the seas, that France and
Russia stood ready armed for the attack, and that Germany was only in
a similar position to any other state; that every state strengthened
and equipped its defensive forces as thoroughly as possible.

By the term "Prussian militarism" England did not only mean the
strength of the German army. She understood it to be a combination of
a warlike spirit bent on oppressing others, and supported by the best
and strongest army in the world. The first would have been innocuous
without the second; and the splendid German army was in England's
eyes the instrument of a domineering and conquest-loving autocrat.
According to England's view, Germany was exactly the counterpart of
France under Bonaparte--if for Napoleon be substituted a many-headed
being called "Emperor, Crown Prince, Hindenburg, Ludendorff"--and just
as little as England would treat with Napoleon would she have any
dealings with the individual who to her was the personification of the
lust for conquest and the policy of violence.

The notion of the existence of German militarism seems to be quite
justified, although the Emperor and the Crown Prince played the
smallest part in it. But it seems to me an altogether wrong conception
that militarism is a speciality of Germany. The negotiations at
Versailles must now have convinced the general public that it is not
only on the banks of the Spree that militarism reigns.

Germany in former days was never able to understand that on the enemy
continent, by the side of morally unjustified envy, fear and anxiety
as to Germany's plans practically reigned, and that the talk about the
"hard" and "German" peace, about "victory and triumph" was like
throwing oil on the flames of their fears; that in England and France,
too, at one time, there was a current of feeling urging for a peace of
settlement, and that such expressions as the foregoing were highly
detrimental to all pacifist tendencies.

In my opinion the air raids on England may be ranked in the same
category as these expressions. They were carried out with the greatest
heroism by the German fliers, but no other object was gained but to
irritate and anger England and rouse to the utmost resistance all who
otherwise had pacifist tendencies. I said this to Ludendorff when he
called on me at the Ballplatz in the summer of 1917, but it made not
the slightest impression on him.

The _demarche_ for peace made by the Pope and our reply have been
published in the European Press. We accepted the noble proposals made
by the Holy Father. I have therefore nothing to add on that matter.

In the early part of the summer of 1917 the Socialist Conference at
Stockholm had become a practical question. I issued passports to the
representatives of our Social Democrats, and had several difficulties
to overcome in connection therewith. My own standpoint is made clear
by the following letter to Tisza.

(_Not dated._)

DEAR FRIEND,--I hear that you do not approve of the delegation of
Socialists for Stockholm. To begin with, it is not a delegation.
The men came to me of their own accord and applied for permission
to travel, which I granted. Adler, Ellenbogen and Seitz were
there, Renner as well. The two first are capable men, and I value
them in spite of the differences that exist between us. The two
last are not well known to me. But all are genuinely desirous of
peace, and Adler in particular does not wish the downfall of the
Empire.

If they secure peace it will be a socialistic one, and the Emperor
will have to pay out of his own pocket; I am sure too, dear
friend, that if it is not possible to end the war, the Emperor
will have to pay still more; you may be sure of that.

Or, as may be expected, if they do not secure peace, then my
prediction was all the more correct, for then I shall have proved
to them that it is not the inefficiency of the Diplomatic Service
but the conditions surrounding it that must be blamed for the war
not coming to an end.

If I had refused to grant permission for them to travel, they
would have continued to the last declaring that, if they had been
allowed to proceed, they would have secured peace.

Everyone is indignant with me here, particularly in the
Herrenhaus. They even go so far that they imagine I had tried to
"buy" the Socialists by promising to lower the Customs dues if
they returned with peace. I do not want the dues, as you know, but
that has no connection with Stockholm, "Sozie" and peace.

I was at an Austrian Cabinet Council lately and gave the
death-blow to the Customs dues--but I felt rather like Daniel in
the lions' den when I did it; N. and E. in particular were very
indignant. The only one who entirely shares my standpoint beside
Trnka is the Prime Minister Clam.

Consequently, this contention that they have been deprived of the
octroi owing to my love for the "Sozies" angers them still more,
but the contention is false.

You, my dear friend, are doubly wrong. In the first place, we
shall be forced to have Socialist policy after the war whether it
is welcome or not, and I consider it extremely important to
prepare the Social Democrats for it. Socialist policy is the
valve we are bound to open in order to let off the superfluous
steam, otherwise the boiler will burst. In the second place, none
of us Ministers can take upon ourselves the false pretence of
using _sabotage_ with regard to peace. The nations may perhaps
tolerate the tortures of war for a while, but only if they
understand and have the conviction that it cannot be
otherwise--that a _vis major_ predominates; in other words, that
peace can fail owing to circumstances, but not owing to the ill
will or stupidity of the Ministers.

The German-Bohemian Deputy, K.H. Wolf, made a scene when the
speech from the throne was read in the "Burg"; he declared that we
were mad and would have to account for it to the delegation, and
made many other equally pleasant remarks, but he had also come to
a wrong conclusion about the Customs dues and Stockholm.

You are quite right in saying that it is no concern of Germany's
what we do in the interior. But they have not attempted the
slightest interference with the dues. If they are afraid of an
anti-German rate of exchange and, therefore, are in favour of the
dues, we are to a certain extent to blame. The Berlin people are
always afraid of treachery. When a vessel answers the starboard
helm it means she turns to the right, and in order to check this
movement the steersman must put the helm to larboard as the only
way to keep a straight course--he must hold out. Such is the case
of statecraft in Vienna--it is always carried out of the course of
the Alliance.

It is possible to turn and steer the Entente course if thought
feasible; but then courage would be needed to make the turn fully.
Nothing is more stupid than trifling with treachery and not
carrying it out; we lose all ground in Berlin and gain nothing
either in London or Paris. But why should I write all this--_you_
share my opinions; I do not need to convert you. We will talk
about Stockholm again.--In true friendship, your old

CZERNIN.

As a matter of fact, Tisza in this instance allowed himself to be
quite converted, and raised no objections as to the Hungarian Social
Democrats. The negative result of the Stockholm Congress is known.

As already mentioned, it is at present still impossible to discuss in
detail the various negotiations and attempts at peace. Besides the
negotiations between Revertera and Armand, other tentative efforts
were made. For instance, the interviews already alluded to between the
Ambassador Mennsdorff and General Smuts, which were referred to in
the English Parliament. I do not consider it right to say more about
the matter here. But I can and will repeat the point of view which was
at the bottom of all our peace efforts since the summer of 1917, and
which finally wrecked them all.

The last report cited reflected the views of the Entente quite
correctly. With Germany there was at present no possibility of
intercourse. France insisted on the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine,
and the entire Entente demanded the abolition of German militarism.
Neither would Germany be allowed to retain her colonies. But Germany
was not yet "ripe" for this demand to be made. In the opinion of the
Entente, therefore, any debate on the subject would be useless. For us
the case was different. The impression prevailed that we could
conclude a separate peace providing we were ready to make sacrifices.
The London terms had created a situation which must be accepted.
Concessions to Roumania, the cession of Trieste and the Trentino, as
well as the German South Tyrol, to Italy, and concessions to the
Southern Slav state would be unavoidable, besides reforms in the
Monarchy on a federal basis. Our answer was that a one-sided
concession of Austro-Hungarian and German territory in that form was,
naturally, not possible. But still we thought that, under certain
premises in the territorial questions, an agreement might perhaps not
meet with insurmountable difficulties. As a matter of course, however,
the Entente were not in a position to make terms such as could only be
laid down by the victor to the vanquished, as we were anything but
beaten, but, in spite of that, we did not cling so firmly to the
frontier posts in the Monarchy.

It might be thought, therefore, that, the Entente being willing, a
settlement of the various interests would be possible; but proposals
such as the giving up of Trieste, Bozen, and Meran were impossible, as
was also the suggestion to make peace behind Germany's back. I
referred to the military situation and the impossibility of anyone
accepting these views of the Entente. I was full of confidence in the
future, and even if that were not the case I could not conclude a
peace in the present situation which the Entente could not dictate in
other terms, even if we were beaten. To lose Trieste and access to the
Adriatic was a totally unacceptable condition, just as much as the
unconditional surrender of Alsace-Lorraine.

Neutral statesmen agreed with my views that the Entente demands were
not couched in the terms of a peace of understanding, but of victory.
Opinion in neutral countries was quite clear on the subject. But in
England especially there were various currents of thought; not
everyone shared Lloyd George's views. The main point was, however, to
lead up to a debate which would tend to clear up many matters, and I
seized the idea eagerly. The greatest difficulty, I was assured by
some, lay in the Entente's assertion that Germany had shown remarkable
military strength, but yet had not been adequately prepared for war;
she had not had sufficient stores either of raw materials or
provisions, and had not built sufficient U-boats. The Entente's idea
was that if peace were made now, Germany might perhaps accept even
unfavourable conditions, but it would only be to gain time and make
use of the peace to draw breath before beginning a fresh war. She
would make up for loss of time and "hit out again." The Entente,
therefore, considered the preliminary condition of any peace, or even
of a discussion of terms, to be the certainty of the abolition of
German militarism. I replied that nobody wished for more war, and that
I agreed with the Entente that a guarantee in that connection must be
secured, but that a one-sided disarmament and disbanding of men by
Austria-Hungary and Germany was an impossibility. It might be imagined
what it would be like if one fine day an army, far advanced in the
enemy country, full of confidence and hope and certain of victory, had
to lay down arms and disappear. No one could accept such a proposal.
Meanwhile, a general disarmament of all the Powers was both possible
and necessary. Disarmament, the establishment of courts of arbitration
under international control: that, according to my idea, would present
an acceptable basis. I mentioned my fears that the Entente rulers in
this, as in the territorial question, would not mete out the same
measure to themselves as they intended for us, and unless I had some
guarantee in the matter I should not be in a position to carry the
plan through here and with our Allies; anyhow, it would be worth a
trial.

Long and frequent were the debates on the Central European question,
which was the Entente's terror, as it implied an unlimited increase in
Germany's power. In Paris and London it would presumably be preferred
that the Monarchy should be made independent of Germany, and any
further advances to Berlin on the part of Vienna checked. We rejoined
that to us this was not a new Entente standpoint, but that the
mutilation caused by the resolutions of the Pact of London forced us
to investigate the matter. Apart from the question of honour and duty
to the Alliance, as matters now stood, Germany was fighting almost
more for us than for herself. If Germany to-day, and we knew it,
concluded peace, she would lose Alsace-Lorraine and her military
superiority on land; but we, with our territory, would have to pay the
Italians, Serbians, and Roumanians for their part in the war.

I heard it said on many sides that there were men in the Entente who
readily understood this point of view, but that the Entente nations
would do what they had intended. Italy had based her entry into the
war on promises from London. Roumania also had been given very solid
assurances, and heroic Serbia must be compensated by Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Many, both in Paris and London, regretted the situation
that had arisen through the conference in London, but a treaty is a
treaty, and neither London nor Paris could forsake their Allies.
Meanwhile, it was thought likely in Entente circles that both the new
Serbian and Polish states, probably Roumania as well, would have
certain relations with the Monarchy. Further details respecting such
relations were still unknown. Our reply was: we would not give up
Galicia to Poland, Transylvania and the Bukovina to Roumania, and
Bosnia together with Herzegovina to Serbia, in return for a vague
promise of the closer relations of those states with the pitiful
remains left to us of the Monarchy. We were not impelled thereto by
dynastic interests. I myself had persuaded the Emperor to sacrifice
Galicia to Poland; but in Transylvania there lived so many Germans and
Magyars who simply could not be made a present of, and above all the
concessions, to Italy! I once asked a neutral statesman if he could
understand what was meant by making Austria voluntarily give up the
arch-German Tyrol as far as the Brenner Pass. The storm that would be
let loose by such a peace would uproot more than merely the Minister
who had made the peace. I told my visitor that there were certain
sacrifices which on no conditions could be expected of any living
being. I would not give up German Tyrol, not even though we were still
more unfavourably situated. I reminded him of a picture that
represented wolves chasing a sledge. One by one the driver threw out
fur, coat, and whatever else he had to the pack to check them and save
himself--but he could not throw his own child to them: rather would he
suffer to the last gasp. That was how I felt about Trieste and the
German Tyrol. We were not in the position of the man in the sledge,
for, thank God, we had our arms and could beat off the wolves; but
even in the extremest emergency, never would I accept a peace that
deprived us of Bozen and Meran.

My listener did not disagree with my argument, but could see no end to
the war in that way. England was ready to carry on the war for another
ten years and, in any case, would crush Germany. Not the German
people, for whom no hatred was felt--always the same repetition of
that deceptive argument--but German militarism. England was in a
condition of constraint. Repeatedly it had been said that if Germany
were not defeated in this war she would continue with still more
extensive armaments. That was the firm belief in London; she would
then, in a few years, have not 100, but 1,000, U-boats, and then
England would be lost. Then England was also fighting for her own
existence, and her will was iron. She knew the task would be a hard
one, but it would not crush her. In London they cite again the
example of the wars of Napoleon, and conclude with: "What man has done
man can do again."

This fear of Prussian militarism was noticeable on all occasions, and
the suggestion constantly was put forward that if we were to declare
ourselves satisfied with a general disarmament, that in itself would
be a great advantage and an important step towards peace.

My speech on October 2, 1917, at Budapest, on the necessity of
securing a reorganised world was prompted by the argument that
militarism was the greatest obstacle in the way of any advance in that
direction.

At Budapest on that occasion I was addressing an audience of party
leaders. I had to take into consideration that too pacifist a tone
would have an effect at home and abroad contrary to my purpose. At
home the lesser powers of resistance would be still further paralysed,
and abroad it would be taken as the end of our capacity for fighting,
and would further check all friendly intentions.

The passage in my speech relating to the securing of a new world
organisation is as follows:--

The great French statesman, Talleyrand, is supposed to have said:
words are merely to conceal thoughts. It may be that it was true
respecting the diplomacy of his century, but I cannot imagine a
maxim less suited to the present day. The millions who are
fighting, whether in the trenches or behind the lines, wish to
know why and wherefore they are fighting. They have a right to
know why peace, which all the world is longing for, has not yet
been made.

When I entered upon office I seized the first opportunity openly
to state that we should commit no violence, but that we should
tolerate none, and that we were ready to enter into peace
negotiations as soon as our enemies accepted the point of view of
a peace of understanding. I think I have thus clearly explained,
though on broad lines only, the peace idea of the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy. Many at home and also in friendly countries abroad have
reproached me for speaking so openly. The arguments of the said
critical gentlemen have only confirmed my belief in the justness
of my views. I take nothing back of what I said, convinced as I am
that the great majority of people here and in Austria approve my
attitude. Following on these introductory remarks, I feel called
upon to-day to tell the public how the Imperial and Royal
Government will deal with the further development of the utterly
distorted European conditions.

Our programme for the reconstruction of the world organisation,
preferably to be called the building of a new world organisation,
is given in our answer to the peace Note of the Holy Father. It,
therefore, only remains for me to-day to complete the programme
and, above all, to state what were the considerations that decided
us to accept the principles that overthrow the former system. It
will come as a surprise to many, and perhaps appear
incomprehensible, that the Central Powers, and especially
Austria-Hungary, should be willing to desist from future military
armament, as it is only their military power that has protected
them through these trying years against vastly superior forces.

Not only has the war created new factors and conditions, but it
has also led to new conceptions which have shattered the
foundations of former European policy. Among many other political
theses, the one which held that Austria-Hungary was an expiring
state has vanished. The dogma of the impending collapse of the
Monarchy was what made our position in Europe more difficult and
caused all the misunderstanding concerning our vital needs. But
having shown ourselves in this war to be thoroughly sound and, at
any rate, of equal standing, it follows that we can reckon now on
a proper understanding of our vital needs in Europe and that no
hopes are left of being able to beat us down by force of arms.
Until the moment had arrived when this could be proved, we could
not do without the protection of armaments nor expose ourselves to
unfavourable treatment in the matters vital to us produced by the
legend of our impending collapse. But from that moment, we have
been in the position simultaneously with our enemies to lay down
arms and settle our difficulties peacefully and by arbitration.
This being recognised by the world affords us the possibility of
not only accepting the plan of disarmament and a court of
arbitration, but, as you, gentlemen, are aware, of working with
all our energy for its realisation, as we have for some time past.

After this war Europe must without doubt be placed on a new
political basis, the permanency of which can be guaranteed. This
basis will, I believe, be of a fourfold nature:

In the first place, it must furnish a guarantee that there shall
be no war of revenge on any side; we must make sure that we can
bequeath to our children's children the knowledge that they will
be spared the horrors of a time similar to that which we have
undergone. No shifting of power in the belligerent states can
achieve that. The only manner by which it can be attained is
international disarmament throughout the world and acceptance of
the principle of arbitration. It is needless to say that these
measures for disarmament must not be confined to one separate
state or to a single group of Powers, and that they apply equally
to land, water and air. War as a factor in policy must be
combated. A general, uniform and progressive disarmament of all
states in the world must be established on an international basis
and under international control, and the defensive forces limited
to the utmost. I am well aware that this object will be difficult
to achieve and that the path that leads thereto is long and thorny
and full of difficulties. And yet I am firmly convinced it is a
path that must be trodden and will be trodden, no matter whether
it is approved of individuals or not. It is a great mistake to
imagine that after such a war the world can begin from where it
left off in 1914. A catastrophe such as this war does not pass by
and leave no trace, and the most terrible misfortune that could
happen to us would be if the race for armaments were to continue
after the conclusion of peace, for it would mean the economic ruin
of all states. Before the war began the military burdens to be
borne were heavy--though we specially note that Austria-Hungary
was far from being on a high level of military preparedness when
we were surprised by the outbreak of war, and it was only during
the war that she resumed her armaments--but after this war an open
competition in armaments would render state burdens all round
simply intolerable. In order to keep a high standard of armaments
in open competition all the states would have to secure a tenfold
supply of everything--ten times the artillery, munition factories,
vessels and U-boats of former days, and also many more soldiers to
work the machinery. The annual military budget of all the Great
Powers would comprise many milliards--it would be impossible with
all the other burdens which the belligerent states will have to
bear after peace is concluded. This expense, I repeat, would mean
the ruin of the nations. To return, however, to the relatively
limited armaments in existence previous to 1914 would be quite
impossible for any individual state, which would be so far behind
that its military strength would not count. The expense incurred
would be futile. But were it possible to return to the relatively
low level of armaments in 1914, that in itself would signify an
international lowering of armaments. But then there would be no
sense in not going further and practically disarming altogether.

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