Book: In the World War

C >> Count Ottokar Czernin >> In the World War




Wilson's great miscalculation was his mistaken estimate of the actual
distribution of power in the Entente on the one hand, and his
surprising ignorance of national relationships in Europe, and
especially in Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, which would greatly
weaken his position and his influence on his Allies. There would be
no difficulty in the Entente's cleverly introducing Wilson into the
international labyrinth and there bewildering him with wrong
directions, so that he could not find his way out again. To begin
with, therefore, Wilson's theory brought us not a step further.

The '67 settlement was proposed by a leading German-Magyar magnate in
Austria-Hungary. Fifty years ago nationalism was much less developed
than it is now. Nations were still sleeping--the Czechs, Slovaks and
Southern Slavs, the Roumanians and Ruthenians had barely awakened to
national life. Fifty years ago it was possible to distinguish between
what was deceptive and what gave promise of lasting. The union between
Italians and Germans only took effect with the coming of--or was
perhaps the first sign of--the world-movement. At all events it was in
the second half of the last century that we came within the radius of
international politics.

The world's racial problems found a centre in Austria-Hungary, whose
affairs, therefore, became very prominent. A chemist can enclose in
his retorts different substances and observe how, following the
eternal laws of nature, the processes of nature take place. In a
similar way during past decades the effect of unsolved racial
antagonisms might have been studied within the Habsburg Monarchy and
the inevitable explosion anticipated, instead of its being allowed to
culminate in the world war.

In putting forward his Fourteen Points Mr. Wilson obviously felt the
necessity of settling the world problem of nationality and recognised
that the Habsburg Monarchy, once arranged and settled, could serve as
a model to the world, as hitherto it had afforded a terrifying
example. But to begin with, he overlooked the fact that in the
settling of national questions there must be neither adversary nor
ally, as those reflect passing differences, whereas the problem of
nationality is a permanent one. He also ignored the fact that what
applies to the Czechs applies also to Ireland, that the Armenians as
well as the Ukrainians desire to live their own national life, and
that the coloured peoples of Africa and India are human beings with
the same rights as white people. He also failed to see that good will
and the desire for justice are far from being sufficient in themselves
to solve the problem of nationality. Thus it was that under his
patronage, and presumably on the basis of the Fourteen Points, the
question of nationality was not solved but simply turned round where
not actually left untouched. If Germans and Magyars had hitherto been
the dominating races they would now become the oppressed. By the terms
settled at Versailles they were to be handed over to states of other
nationality. Ten years hence, perhaps sooner, both groups of Powers as
they exist at present will have fallen. Other constellations will have
appeared and become dominant. The explosive power of unsolved
questions will continue to take effect and within a measurable space
of time again blow up the world.

Mr. Wilson, who evidently was acquainted with the programme of the
Pact of London, though not attaching sufficient importance to the
national difficulties, probably hoped to be able to effect a
compromise between the Italian policy of conquest and his own ideal
policy. In this connection, however, no bridge existed between Rome
and Washington. Conquests are made by right of the conqueror--such was
Clemenceau's and Orlando's policy--or else the world is ruled on the
principles of national justice, as Wilson wished it to be. This ideal,
however, will not be attained--no ideal is attainable; but it will be
brought very much nearer. Might or Right, the one alone can conquer.
But Czechs, Poles and others cannot be freed while at the same time
Tyrolese-Germans, Alsatian-Germans and Transylvanian-Hungarians are
handed over to foreign states. It cannot be done from the point of
view of justice or with any hope of its being permanent. Versailles
and St. Germain have proved that it can be done by might, and as a
temporary measure.

The solution of the question of nationality was the point round which
all Franz Ferdinand's political interests were centred during his
lifetime. Whether he would have succeeded is another question, but he
certainly did try. The Emperor Charles, too, was not averse to the
movement. The Emperor Francis Joseph was too old and too conservative
to make the experiment. His idea was _quieta non movere_. Without
powerful help from outside any attempt during the war against the
German-Magyar opposition would not have been feasible. Therefore, when
Wilson came forward with his Fourteen Points, and in spite of the
scepticism with which the message from Washington was received by the
German public and here too, I at once resolved to take up the thread.

I repeat that I never doubted the honourable and sincere intentions
entertained by Wilson--nor do I doubt them now--but my doubts as to
his powers of carrying them out were from the first very pronounced.
It was obvious that Wilson, when conducting the war, was much stronger
than when he took part in the Peace Conference. As long as fighting
proceeded Wilson was master of the world. He had only to call back his
troops from the European theatre of war and the Entente would be
placed in a most difficult position. It has always been
incomprehensible to me why the President of the United States did not
have recourse to this strong pressure during this time in order to
preserve his own war aims.

The secret information that I received soon after the publication of
the Fourteen Points led me to fear that Wilson, not understanding the
situation, would fail to take any practical measures to secure respect
for the regulations he had laid down, and that he underestimated
France's, and particularly Italy's, opposition. The logical and
practical consequences of the Wilson programme would have been the
public annulment of the Pact of London; it must have been so for us to
understand the principles on which we could enter upon peace
negotiations. Nothing of that nature occurred, and the gap between
Wilson's and Orlando's ideas of peace remained open.

On January 24, 1918, in the Committee of the Austrian Delegation, I
spoke publicly on the subject of the Fourteen Points and declared them
to be--in so far as they applied to us and not to our Allies--a
suitable basis for negotiations. Almost simultaneously we took steps
to enlighten ourselves on the problem of how in a practical way the
fourteen theoretical ideas of Wilson could be carried out. The
negotiations were then by no means hopeless.

Meanwhile the Brest negotiations were proceeding. Although that
episode, which represented a victory for German militarism, cannot
have been very encouraging for Wilson, he was wise enough to recognise
that we were in an awkward position and that the charge brought
against Germany that she was making hidden annexations did not apply
to Vienna. On February 12--thus, _after_ the conclusion of the Brest
peace--the President, in his speech to Congress, said:

Count Czernin appears to have a clear understanding of the peace
foundations and does not obscure their sense. He sees that an
independent Poland composed of all the undeniably Polish
inhabitants, the one bordering on the other, is a matter for
European settlement and must be granted; further, that Belgium
must be evacuated and restored, no matter what sacrifices and
concessions it may involve; also that national desires must be
satisfied, even in his own Empire, in the common interests of
Europe and humanity.

Though he is silent on certain matters more closely connected with
the interests of his Allies than with Austria-Hungary, that is
only natural, because he feels compelled under the circumstances
to defer to Germany and Turkey. Recognising and agreeing with the
important principles in question and the necessity of converting
them into action, he naturally feels that Austria-Hungary, more
easily than Germany, can concur with the war aims as expressed by
the United States. He would probably have gone even further had he
not been constrained to consider the Austro-Hungarian Alliance and
the country's dependence on Germany.

In the same speech the President goes on to say:

Count Czernin's answer referring mainly to my speech of January 8
is couched in very friendly terms. He sees in my statements a
sufficiently encouraging approach to the views of his own
Government to justify his belief that they afford a basis for a
thorough discussion by both Governments of the aims.

And again:

I must say Count Hertling's answer is very undecided and most
confusing, full of equivocal sentences, and it is difficult to say
what it aims at. It certainly is written in a very different tone
from that of Count Czernin's speech and obviously with a very
different object in view.

There can be no doubt that when the head of a State at war with us
speaks in such friendly terms of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, he
has the best intentions of coming to an understanding. My efforts in
this connection were interrupted by my dismissal.

In these last weeks during which I remained in office the Emperor had
definitely lost faith in me. This was not due to the Wilson question,
nor yet was it the direct consequence of my general policy. A
difference of opinion between certain persons in the Emperor's
entourage and myself was the real reason. The situation became so
strained as to make it unbearable. The forces that conspired against
me convinced me that it would be impossible for me to gain my
objective which, being of a very difficult nature, could not be
obtained unless the Emperor gave me his full confidence.

In spite of all the rumours and stories spread about me I do not
intend to go into details unless I should be compelled to do so by
accounts derived from reliable sources. I am still convinced to this
day that morally I was perfectly right. I was wrong as to form,
because I was neither clever nor patient enough to _bend_ the
opposition, but would have _broken_ it, by reducing the situation to a
case of "either--or".




CHAPTER VIII

IMPRESSIONS AND REFLECTIONS


1

In the autumn of 1917 I had a visit from a subject of a neutral state,
who is a pronounced upholder of general disarmament and world
pacifism. We began, of course, to discuss the theme of free
competition in armaments, of militarism, which in England prevails on
the sea and in Germany on land, and my visitor entered upon the
various possibilities likely to occur when the war was at an end. He
had no faith in the destruction of England, nor had I; but he thought
it possible that France and Italy might collapse. The French and
Italians could not possibly bear any heavier burdens than already were
laid on them; in Paris and Rome, he thought, revolution was not far
distant, and a fresh phase of the war would then ensue. England and
America would continue to fight on alone, for ten, perhaps even
twenty, years. England was not to be considered just a little island,
but comprised Australia, India, Canada, and the sea. "_L'Angleterre
est imbattable_," he repeated, and America likewise. On the other
hand, the German army was also invincible. The secession of France and
Italy would greatly hinder the cruel blockade, for the resources of
those two countries--once they were conquered by the Central
Powers--were very vast, and in that case he could not see any end to
the war. Finally, the world would collapse from the general state of
exhaustion. My visitor cited the fable in which two goats met on a
narrow bridge; neither would give way to the other, and they fought
until they both fell into the water and were drowned. The victory of
one group as in previous wars, he continued, where the conqueror
gleaned a rich harvest of gains and the vanquished had to bear all
the losses, was out of the question in this present war. _Tout le
monde perdra, et a la fin il n'y aura que des vaincus._

I often recalled that interview later. Much that was false and yet, as
it seemed to me, much that was true lay in my friend's words. France
and Italy did not break down; the end of the war came quicker than he
thought; and the invincible Germany was defeated. And still I think
that the conclusions he arrived at came very near the truth.

The conquerors' finances are in a very precarious state, particularly
in Italy and France; unrest prevails; wages are exorbitant; discontent
is general; the phantom of Bolshevism leers at them; and they live in
the hope that the defeated Central Powers will have to pay, and they
will thus be saved. It was set forth in the peace terms, but _ultra
posse nemo tenetur_, and the future will show to what extent the
Central Powers can fulfil the conditions dictated to them.

Since the opening of the Peace Congress at Versailles continuous war
in Europe has been seen: Russians against the whole world, Czechs
against Hungarians, Roumanians against Hungarians, Poles against
Ukrainians, Southern Slavs against Germans, Communists against
Socialists. Three-fourths of Europe is turned into a witch's cauldron
where everything is concocted except work and production, and it is
futile to ask how this self-lacerated Europe will be able to find the
war expenses laid upon her. According to human reckoning, the
conquerors cannot extract even approximate compensation for their
losses from the defeated states, and their victory will terminate with
a considerable deficit. If that be the case, then my visitor will be
right--there will only be the vanquished.

If our plan in 1917, namely, Germany to cede Alsace-Lorraine to France
in exchange for the annexation of all Poland, together with Galicia,
and all states to disarm; if that plan had been accepted in Berlin and
sanctioned by the Entente--unless the _non possumus_ in Berlin and
opposition in Rome to a change in the Pact of London had hindered any
action--it seems to me the advantage would not only have been on the
side of the Central Powers.

Pyrrhus also conquered at Asculum.

* * * * *

My visitor was astonished at Vienna. The psychology of no city that he
had seen during the war could compare with that of Vienna. An amazing
apathy prevailed. In Paris there was a passionate demand for
Alsace-Lorraine; in Berlin the contrary was demanded just as eagerly;
in England the destruction of Germany was the objective; in Sofia the
conquest of the Dobrudsha; in Rome they clamoured for all possible and
impossible things; in Vienna nothing at all was demanded. In Cracow
they called for a Great Poland; in Budapest for an unmolested Hungary;
in Prague for a united Czech State; and in Innsbruck the descendants
of Andreas Hofer were fighting as they did in his day for their sacred
land, Tyrol. In Vienna they asked only for peace and quiet.

Old men and children would fight the arch-enemy in Tyrol, but if the
Italians were to enter Vienna and bring bread with them they would be
received with shouts of enthusiasm. And yet Berlin and Innsbruck were
just as hungry as Vienna. _C'est une ville sans ame._

My visitor compared the Viennese to a pretty, gay, and frivolous woman,
whose aim in life is pleasure and only pleasure. She must dance, sing,
and enjoy life, and will do so under any circumstances--_sans ame_.

This pleasure-loving good nature of the Viennese has its admirable
points. For instance, all enemy aliens were better treated in Vienna
than anywhere else. Not the slightest trace of enmity was shown to
those who were the first to attack and then starve the city.

Stronger than anything else in Vienna was the desire for sensation,
pleasure, and a gay life. My friend once saw a piece acted at one of
the theatres in Vienna called, I believe, _Der Junge Medardus_. The
scene is laid during the occupation of Vienna by Napoleon. Viennese
citizens condemned to death for intriguing with the enemy are led away
by the French. In a most thrilling scene weeping women and children
bid them farewell. A vast crowd witnesses the affair. A boy suddenly
rushes in shouting: "Napoleon is coming." The crowd hurries away to
see him, and cries of "Long live Napoleon" are heard in the distance.

Such was Vienna a hundred years ago, and it is still the same. _Une
ville sans ame._

I pass on the criticism without comment.


2

In different circles which justly and unjustly intervened in politics
during my time of office, the plan was suggested of driving a wedge
between North and South Germany, and converting the latter to the
peaceful policy of Vienna in contradistinction to Prussian militarism.

The plan was a faulty one from the very first. To begin with, as
already stated, the most pronounced obstacle to peace was not only the
Prussian spirit, but the Entente programme for our disruption, which a
closer connection with Bavaria and Saxony would not have altered.
Secondly, Austria-Hungary, obviously falling more and more to pieces,
formed no point of attraction for Munich and Dresden, who, though not
Prussian, yet were German to the very backbone. The vague and
irresponsible plan of returning to the conditions of the period before
1866 was an anachronism. Thirdly and chiefly, all experiments were
dangerous which might create the impression in the Entente that the
Quadruple Alliance was about to be dissolved. In a policy of that
nature executive ability was of supreme importance, and that was
exactly what was usually lacking.

The plan was not without good features. The appointment of the
Bavarian Count Hertling to be Imperial Chancellor was not due to
Viennese influence, though a source of the greatest pleasure to us,
and the fact of making a choice that satisfied Vienna played a great
part with the Emperor William. Two Bavarians, Hertling and Kuehlmann,
had taken over the leadership of the German Empire, and they, apart
from their great personal qualities, presented a certain natural
counter-balance to Prussian hegemony through their Bavarian origin;
but only so far as it was still possible in general administration
which then was in a disturbed state. But farther they could not go
without causing injury.

Count Hertling and I were on very good terms. This wise and
clear-sighted old man, whose only fault was that he was too old and
physically incapable of offering resistance, would have saved Germany,
if she possibly could have been saved, in 1917. In the rushing torrent
that whirled her away to her fall, he found no pillar to which he
could cling.

Latterly his sight began to fail and give way. He suffered from
fatigue, and the conferences and councils lasting often for hours and
hours were beyond his strength.




CHAPTER IX

POLAND


1

By letters patent November 5, 1916, both the Emperors declared
Poland's existence as a Kingdom.

When I came into office, I found the situation to be that the Poles
were annoyed with my predecessor because, they declared, Germany had
wanted to cede the newly created kingdom of Poland to us, and Count
Burian had rejected the offer. Apparently there is some
misunderstanding in this version of the case, as Burian says it is not
correctly rendered.

There were three reasons that made the handling of the Polish question
one of the greatest difficulty. The first was the totally different
views of the case held by competent individuals of the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy. While the Austrian Ministry was in favour of the so-called
Austro-Polish solution, Count Tisza was strongly opposed to it. His
standpoint was that the political structure of the Monarchy ought not
to undergo any change through the annexation of Poland, and that Poland
eventually might be joined to the Monarchy as an Austrian province, but
never as a partner in a tripartite Monarchy.

A letter that he wrote to me from Budapest on February 22, 1917, was
characteristic of his train of thought. It was as follows:

YOUR EXCELLENCY,--Far be it from me to raise a discussion on
questions which to-day are without actual value and most probably
will not assume any when peace is signed. On the other hand, I
wish to avoid the danger that might arise from mistaken
conclusions drawn from the fact that I accepted without protest
certain statements that appeared in the correspondence of our
diplomatic representatives.

Guided exclusively by this consideration, I beg to draw the
attention of Your Excellency to the fact that the so-called
Austro-Polish solution of the Polish question has repeatedly (as
in telegram Nr. 63 from Herr von Ugron) been referred to as the
"tripartite solution."

With reference to this appellation I am compelled to point out the
fact that in the first period of the war, at a time when the
Austro-Polish solution was in the foreground, all competent
circles in the Monarchy were agreed that the annexation of Poland
to the Monarchy must on no account affect its _dualistic
structure_.

This principle was distinctly recognised by the then leaders in
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as also by both Prime Ministers;
it was also recognised and sanctioned by His late Majesty the
Emperor and King Francis Joseph. I trust I may assume that this
view is shared by Your Excellency; in any case, and to avoid
misunderstanding, I must state that the Royal Hungarian Government
considers this to be the ground-pillar of its entire political
system, from which, in no circumstances, would it be in a position
to deviate.

It would, in our opinion, be fatal for the whole Monarchy. The
uncertainty of the situation lies in the Austrian State, where the
German element, after the separation of Galicia, would be in a
very unsafe position, confronted by powerful tendencies that
easily might gain the upper hand should a relatively small number
of the Germans, whether from social-democratic,
political-reactionary or doctrinary reasons, separate from the
other German parties. The establishment of the new Polish element
as a third factor with Austria-Hungary in our constitutional
organism would represent an element so unsafe, and would be
combined with such risks for the further development of the policy
of the Habsburg Great Power, that, in view of the position of the
Monarchy as such, I should feel the greatest anxiety lest the new
and unreliable Russian-Polish element, so different from us in
many respects, should play too predominant a part.

The firm retention of dualism, according to which half the
political influence on general subjects rests with Hungary, and
_the Hungarian and German element in common furnish a safe
majority_ in the delegation, alone can secure for the dynasty and
the two States under its sceptre an adequate guarantee for the
future.

There is no other factor in the Monarchy whose every vital
interest is so bound up in the dynasty and in the position of the
Monarchy as a Great Power, as Hungary. The few people whose clear
perception of that fact may have become dulled during the last
peaceful decade must have been brought to a keener realisation of
it by the present war.

The preservation of the Danube Monarchy as a vigorous and active
Great Power is in the truest sense of the word a vital condition
for the existence of the Hungarian State. It was fatal for all of
us that this willing people, endowed with so many administrative
qualities, ready to sacrifice themselves for all State and
national aims, have for centuries past not been able to devote
themselves to the common cause. The striving for a solution of the
world racial problem and the necessity of combining the
responsibilities of a Great Power with the independence of the
Hungarian State have caused heavy trials and century-long friction
and fighting.

Hungary's longing for independence did not take the form of
efforts for dissolution. The great leaders in our struggle for
liberty did not attack the continuance of the Habsburg Empire as a
Great Power. And even during the bitter trials of the struggle
they never followed any further aim than to obtain from the Crown
a guarantee for their chartered rights.

Hungary, free and independent, wished to remain under the sceptre
of the Habsburgs; she did not wish to come under any foreign rule,
but to be a free nation governed by her own king and her own laws
and not subordinate to any other ruler. This principle was
repeatedly put forward in solemn form (in the years 1723 and
1791), and finally, in the agreement of 1867, a solution was found
which endowed it with life and ensured its being carried out in a
manner favourable for the position of a great nation.

Copyright (c) 2007. knowncrafts.net. All rights reserved.