Book: In the World War

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"Tell your comrades that we await definite declarations from your
Governments and peoples renouncing conquest and indemnities. We
will shed no drop of blood for Imperialists, whether they be
Russians, Germans or English. We await the speediest agreement
between the workers of all countries for the termination of the
war, which is a thing shameful in itself, and will, if continued,
prove disastrous to the Russian Revolution. We will not conclude
any separate peace, but tell your people to let us know their aims
as soon as possible."

According to the report, the French Socialists were altogether
converted to this point of view. This also appears to be the case,
from the statements with regard to the attitude of Cachin and
Moutet at the French Socialist Congress. The English, on the other
hand, were immovable, with the exception of Sanders, who inclined
somewhat toward the Russian point of view.

Private information reaching the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
this country states that shots were fired at M. Thomas, the
Minister of Munitions, in the course of one of his war speeches at
the Russian front.

The disorganisation at the front is described by an officer or
soldier at the front in the same organ, the _Rabocaja Gazeta_ for
May 26, as follows:

"The passionate desire for peace, peace of whatever kind, aye,
even a peace costing the loss of ten governments (i.e. districts),
is growing ever more plainly evident. Men dream of it
passionately, even though it is not yet spoken of at meetings and
in revolutions, even though all conscious elements of the army
fight against this party that long for peace." And to paralyse
this, there can be but one way: let the soldiers see the democracy
fighting emphatically for peace and the end of the war.

The Pan-Russian Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates'
Councils and the Army Organisation at the front in St. Petersburg
June 1-14 took for its first point in the order of the day the
following: "The War, questions of defence and the struggle for
peace." At this time the Government would doubtless have to give a
declaration with regard to the answer already received at the
beginning of June from the Allies as to their war aims. This
congress will also probably decide definitely upon the nomination
for the Stockholm Conference and appoint delegates. Point 4 deals
with the question of nationality. An open conflict had broken out
between the Petersburg Workers' and Soldiers' Deputy Councils and
the Ukrainian Soldiers' Congress, sitting at Kieff, on account of
the formation of an Ukrainian army. The appointment of an
"Ukrainian Army General Committee" further aggravated the
conflict.

With regard to the increasing internal confusion, the growing
seriousness of the nationality dispute, the further troubles in
connection with agricultural and industrial questions, a detailed
report dealing separately with these heads will be forwarded
later.

Towards the end of November I wrote to one of my friends the following
letter, which I have given _in extenso_, as it shows faithfully my
estimate of the situation at the time:

_Vienna, November 17, 1917._

MY DEAR FRIEND,--After many days, full of trouble, annoyance and
toil, I write to you once more in order to answer your very
noteworthy observations; to be in contact with you again turns my
thoughts into other channels, and enables me, for the time at
least, to forget the wretchedness of every day.

You have heard, you say, that matters are not going so well
between the Emperor and myself, and you are sorry for this. I am
sorry myself, if for no other reason than that it increases the
friction of the daily working machine to an insupportable degree.
As soon as a thing of this sort leaks out--and it does so fast
enough--all enemies, male and female, rush in with renewed
strength, making for the vulnerable point, in the hope of securing
my overthrow. These good people are like carrion vultures--I
myself am the carrion--they can scent from afar that there is
something for them to do, and come flying to the spot. And the
lies they invent and the intrigues they contrive, with a view to
increasing existing differences--really, they are worthy of
admiration. You ask, who are these inveterate enemies of mine?

Well, first of all, those whom you yourself conjecture.

And, secondly, the enemies whom every Minister has, the numbers of
those who would fain be in his place. Finally, a crowd of
political mountebanks from the Jockey Club, who are disgusted
because they had hoped for some personal advantage through my
influence, and I have ignored them. No. 3 is a comfortingly
negligible quantity, No. 2 are dangerous, but No. 1 are deadly.

In any case, then, my days are numbered. Heaven be thanked, relief
is not far off. If only I could now settle things with Russia
quickly, and thus perhaps secure the possibility of a peace all
round. All reports from Russia seem to point to the fact that the
Government there is determined on peace, and peace as speedily as
possible. But the Germans are now full of confidence. If they can
throw their massed forces against the West, they have no doubt of
being able to break through, take Paris and Calais, and directly
threaten England. Such a success, however, could only lead to
peace if Germany could be persuaded to renounce all plans of
conquest. I at any rate cannot believe that the Entente, after
losing Paris and Calais, would refuse to treat for peace as _inter
pares_--it would at least be necessary to make every endeavour in
that direction. Up to now Hindenburg has done all that he
promised, so much we must admit, and the whole of Germany believes
in his forthcoming success in the West--always taking for granted,
of course, the freeing of the Eastern front; that is to say, peace
with Russia. The Russian peace, then, _may_ prove the first step
on the way to the peace of the world.

I have during the last few days received reliable information
about the Bolsheviks. Their leaders are almost all of them Jews,
with altogether fantastic ideas, and I do not envy the country
that is governed by them. From our point of view, however, the
most interesting thing about them is that they are anxious to make
peace, and in this respect they do not seem likely to change, for
they cannot carry on the war.

In the Ministry here, three groups are represented: one declines
to take Lenin seriously, regarding him as an ephemeral personage,
the second does not take this view at all, but is nevertheless
unwilling to treat with a revolutionary of this sort, and the
third consists, as far as I am aware, of myself alone, and I
_will_ treat with him, despite the possibly ephemeral character of
his position and the certainty of revolution. The briefer Lenin's
period of power the more need to act speedily, for no subsequent
Russian Government will recommence the war--and I cannot take a
Russian Metternich as my partner when there is none to be had.

The Germans are hesitating--they do not altogether like the idea
of having any dealings with Lenin, possibly also from the reasons
already mentioned; they are inconsistent in this, as is often the
case. The German military party--which, as everyone knows, holds
the reins of policy in Germany entirely--have, as far as I can
see, done all they could to overthrow Kerenski and set up
"something else" in his place. Now, the something else is there,
and is ready to make peace; obviously, then, one must act, even
though the party concerned is not such as one would have chosen
for oneself.

It is impossible to get any exact information about these
Bolsheviks; that is to say, there is plenty of information
available, but it is contradictory. The way they begin is this:
everything in the least reminiscent of work, wealth, and culture
must be destroyed, and the bourgeoisie exterminated. Freedom and
equality seem no longer to have any place on their programme; only
a bestial suppression of all but the proletariat itself. The
Russian bourgeois class, too, seems almost as stupid and cowardly
as our own, and its members let themselves be slaughtered like
sheep.

True, this Russian Bolshevism is a peril to Europe, and if we had
the power, besides securing a tolerable peace for ourselves, to
force other countries into a state of law and order, then it would
be better to have nothing to do with such people as these, but to
march on Petersburg and arrange matters there. But we have not the
power; peace at the earliest possible moment is necessary for our
own salvation, and we cannot obtain peace unless the Germans get
to Paris--and they cannot get to Paris unless their Eastern front
is freed. That is the circle complete. All this the German
military leaders themselves maintain, and it is altogether
illogical of them now apparently to object to Lenin on personal
grounds.

I was unable to finish this letter yesterday, and now add this
to-day. Yesterday another attempt was made, from a quarter which
you will guess, to point out to me the advantage of a separate
peace. I spoke to the Emperor about it, and told him that this
would simply be shooting oneself for fear of death; that I could
not take such a step myself, but would be willing to resign under
some pretext or other, when he would certainly find men ready to
make the attempt. The conference of London has determined on a
division of the Monarchy, and no separate peace on our part would
avail to alter that. The Roumanians, Serbians and Italians are to
receive enormous compensation, we are to lose Trieste, and the
remainder is to be broken up into separate states--Czechish,
Polish, Hungarian and German. There will be very slight contact
between these new states; in other words, a separate peace would
mean that the Monarchy, having first been mutilated, would then be
hacked to pieces. But until we arrive at this result, we must
fight on, and that, moreover, _against_ Germany, which will, of
course, make peace with Russia at once and occupy the Monarchy.
The German generals will not be so foolish as to wait until the
Entente has invaded Germany through Austria, but will take care to
make _Austria itself the theatre of war_. So that instead of
bringing the war to an end, we should be merely changing one
opponent for another and delivering up provinces hitherto
spared--such as Bohemia and Tyrol--to the fury of battle, only to
be wrecked completely in the end.

On the other hand, we might perhaps, in a few months' time, secure
peace all round, with Germany as well--a tolerable peace of mutual
understanding--always provided the German offensive turns out
successful. The Emperor was more silent then. Among his entourage,
one pulls this way, another that--and we gain nothing in that
manner among the Entente, while we are constantly losing the
confidence of Berlin. If a man wishes to go over to the enemy,
then let him do it--_le remede sera pire que le mal_--but to be
for ever dallying with the idea of treachery and adopting the
pose without carrying it out in reality--this I cannot regard as
prudent policy.

I believe we could arrive at a tolerable peace of understanding;
we should lose something to Italy, and should, of course, gain
nothing in exchange. Furthermore, we should have to alter the
entire structure of the Monarchy--after the fashion of the
_federation Danubienne_ proposed in France--and I am certainly
rather at a loss to see how this can be done in face of the
Germans and Hungarians. But I hope we may survive the war, and I
hope also that they will ultimately revise the conditions of the
London conference. Let but old Hindenburg once make his entry into
Paris, and then the Entente _must_ utter the decisive word that
they are willing to treat. But when that moment comes, I am firmly
determined to do the utmost possible, to appeal publicly to the
_peoples_ of the Central Powers and ask them if they prefer to
fight on for conquest or if they will have peace.

To settle with Russia as speedily as possible, then break through
the determination of the Entente to exterminate us, and then to
make peace--even at a loss--that is my plan and the hope for which
I live. Naturally, after the capture of Paris, all "leading"
men--with the exception of the Emperor Karl--will demand a "good"
peace, and that we shall never get in any case. The odium of
having "spoiled the peace" I will take upon myself.

So, I hope, we may come out of it at last, albeit rather mauled.
But the old days will never return. A new order will be born in
throes and convulsions. I said so publicly some time back, in my
Budapest speech, and it was received with disapproval practically
on all sides.

This has made a long letter after all, and it is late. _Lebe
wohl_, and let me hear from you again soon.--In friendship as of
old, yours

(Signed) CZERNIN.

With regard to the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, I will leave
my diary to speak for itself. Despite many erroneous views that may
appear in the following notes, and various unimportant details, I have
not abbreviated it at all, since it gives, in its present form, what I
believe will be a clear picture of the development.

"_December 19, 1917._--Departure from Vienna, Wednesday, 19th.

"Four o'clock, Nordbahnhof. Found the party already assembled there:
Gratz and Wiesner, Colloredo, Gautsch and Andrian, also Lieut.
Field-Marshal Csicserics, and Major Fleck, Baden.

"I took the opportunity on the journey to give Csicserics an idea of
my intentions and the tactics to be pursued. I told him that in my
opinion Russia would propose a _general_ peace, and that we must of
course accept this proposal. I hoped that the first steps for a
general peace would be taken at Brest, and not given up for a long
time. Should the Entente not accept, then at least the way would be
open for a separate peace. After that I had long discussions with
Gratz and Wiesner, which took up more or less the whole day.

"_December 20, 1917._--Arrived at Brest a few minutes past five. At
the station were the Chief of Staff, General Hoffmann, with some ten
of his suite, also the emissary Rosenberg and Merey with my party. I
greeted them on the platform, and after a few words Merey went into
the train with me to tell me what had happened during the past few
days. On the whole, Merey takes a not unfavourable view of the
situation, and believes that, unless something unforeseen crops up, we
should succeed within a reasonable time in arranging matters
satisfactorily.

"At six o'clock I went to pay my visit to General Hoffmann; he gave me
some interesting details as to the mentality of the Russian delegates,
and the nature of the armistice he had so fortunately concluded. I had
the impression that the General combined expert knowledge and energy
with a good deal of calm and ability, but also not a little Prussian
brutality, whereby he had succeeded in persuading the Russians,
despite opposition at first, to agree to very favourable terms of
truce. A little later, as arranged, Prince Leopold of Bavaria came in,
and I had some talk with him on matters of no importance.

"We then went to dinner, all together, including the whole staff of
nearly 100 persons. The dinner presented one of the most remarkable
pictures ever seen. The Prince of Bavaria presided. Next to the Prince
sat the leader of the Russian delegation, a Jew called Joffe,
recently liberated from Siberia; then came the generals and the other
delegates. Apart from this Joffe, the most striking personality in the
delegation is the brother-in-law of the Russian Foreign Minister,
Trotski, a man named Kameneff, who, likewise liberated from prison
during the Revolution, now plays a prominent part. The third delegate
is Madame Bizenko, a woman with a comprehensive past. Her husband is a
minor official; she herself took an early part in the revolutionary
movement. Twelve years ago she murdered General Sacharow, the governor
of some Russian city, who had been condemned to death by the
Socialists for his energy. She appeared before the general with a
petition, holding a revolver under her petticoat. When the general
began to read she fired four bullets into his body, killing him on the
spot. She was sent to Siberia, where she lived for twelve years, at
first in solitary confinement, afterwards under somewhat easier
conditions; she also owes her freedom to the Revolution. This
remarkable woman learned French and German in Siberia well enough to
read them, though she cannot speak them, not knowing how the words
should be pronounced. She is the type of the educated Russian
proletariat. Extremely quiet and reserved, with a curious determined
set of the mouth, and eyes that flare up passionately at times. All
that is taking place around her here she seems to regard with
indifference. Only when mention is made of the great principles of the
International Revolution does she suddenly awake, her whole expression
alters; she reminds one of a beast of prey seeing its victim at hand
and preparing to fall upon it and rend it.

"After dinner I had my first long conversation with Hr. Joffe. His
whole theory is based on the idea of establishing the right of
self-determination of peoples on the broadest basis throughout the
world, and trusting to the peoples thus freed to continue in mutual
love. Joffe does not deny that the process would involve civil war
throughout the world to begin with, but he believes that such a war,
as realising the ideals of humanity, would be justified, and its end
worth all it would cost. I contented myself with telling him that he
must let Russia give proof that Bolshevism was the way to a happier
age; when he had shown this to be so, the rest of the world would be
won over to his ideals. But until his theory had been proved by
example he would hardly succeed in convincing people generally to
adopt his views. We were ready to conclude a general peace without
indemnities or annexations, and were thoroughly agreed to leave the
development of affairs in Russia thereafter to the judgment of the
Russian Government itself. We should also be willing to learn
something from Russia, and if his revolution succeeded he would force
Europe to follow him, whether we would or not. But meanwhile there was
a great deal of scepticism about, and I pointed out to him that we
should not ourselves undertake any imitation of the Russian methods,
and did not wish for any interference with our own internal affairs:
this we must strictly forbid. If he persisted in endeavouring to carry
out this Utopian plan of grafting his ideas on ourselves, he had
better go back home by the next train, for there could be no question
of making peace. Hr. Joffe looked at me in astonishment with his soft
eyes, was silent for a while, and then, in a kindly, almost imploring
tone that I shall never forget, he said: 'Still, I hope we may yet be
able to raise the revolution in your country too.'

"We shall hardly need any assistance from the good Joffe, I fancy, in
bringing about a revolution among ourselves; the people will manage
that, if the Entente persist in refusing to come to terms.

"They are strange creatures, these Bolsheviks. They talk of freedom
and the reconciliation of the peoples of the world, of peace and
unity, and withal they are said to be the most cruel tyrants history
has ever known. They are simply exterminating the bourgeoisie, and
their arguments are machine guns and the gallows. My talk to-day with
Joffe has shown me that these people are not honest, and in falsity
surpass all that cunning diplomacy has been accused of, for to oppress
decent citizens in this fashion and then talk at the same time of the
universal blessing of freedom--it is sheer lying.

"_December 21, 1917._--I went with all my party to lunch at noon with
the Prince of Bavaria. He lives in a little bit of a palace half an
hour by car from Brest. He seems to be much occupied with military
matters, and is very busy.

"I spent the first night in the train, and while we were at breakfast
our people moved in with the luggage to our residence. We are in a
small house, where I live with all the Austro-Hungarian party, quite
close to the officers' casino, and there is every comfort that could
be wished for here. I spent the afternoon at work with my people, and
in the evening there was a meeting of the delegates of the three
Powers. This evening I had the first talk with Kuehlmann alone, and at
once declared positively that the Russians would propose a _general_
peace, and that we must accept it. Kuehlmann is half disposed to take
my view himself; the formula, of course, will be 'no party to demand
annexations or indemnities'; then, if the Entente agree, we shall have
an end of all this suffering. But, alas! it is hardly likely that they
will.

"_December 22, 1917._--The forenoon was devoted to the first
discussion among the Allies, the principles just referred to as
discussed with Kuehlmann being then academically laid down. In the
afternoon the first plenary sitting took place, the proceedings being
opened by the Prince of Bavaria and then led by Dr. Kuehlmann. It was
decided that the Powers should take it in turns to preside, in order
of the Latin alphabet as to their names, i.e. Allemagne, Autriche,
etc. Dr. Kuehlmann requested Hr. Joffe to tell us the principles on
which he considered a future peace should be based, and the Russian
delegate then went through the six main tenets already familiar from
the newspapers. The proposal was noted, and we undertook to give a
reply as early as possible after having discussed the matter among
ourselves. These, then, were the proceedings of the first brief
sitting of the peace congress.

"_December 23, 1917._--Kuehlmann and I prepared our answer early. It
will be generally known from the newspaper reports. It cost us much
heavy work to get it done. Kuehlmann is personally an advocate of
general peace, but fears the influence of the military party, who do
not wish to make peace until definitely victorious. But at last it is
done. Then there were further difficulties with the Turks. They
declared that they must insist on one thing, to wit, that the Russian
troops should be withdrawn from the Caucasus immediately on the
conclusion of peace, a proposal to which the Germans would not agree,
as this would obviously mean that they would have to evacuate Poland,
Courland, and Lithuania at the same time, to which Germany would never
consent. After a hard struggle and repeated efforts, we at last
succeeded in persuading the Turks to give up this demand. The second
Turkish objection was that Russia had not sufficiently clearly
declared its intention of refraining from all interference in internal
affairs. But the Turkish Foreign Minister agreed that internal affairs
in Austria-Hungary were an even more perilous sphere for Russian
intrigues than were the Turkish; if I had no hesitation in accepting,
he also could be content.

"The Bulgarians, who are represented by Popow, the Minister of
Justice, as their chief, and some of whom cannot speak German at all,
some hardly any French, did not get any proper idea of the whole
proceedings until later on, and postponed their decision until the
24th.

"_December 24, 1917._--Morning and afternoon, long conferences with
the Bulgarians, in the course of which Kuehlmann and I on the one hand
and the Bulgarian representatives on the other, were engaged with
considerable heat. The Bulgarian delegates demanded that a clause
should be inserted exempting Bulgaria from the no-annexation
principle, and providing that the taking over by Bulgaria of Roumanian
and Serbian territory should not be regarded as annexation. Such a
clause would, of course, have rendered all our efforts null and void,
and could not under any circumstances be agreed to. The discussion was
attended with considerable excitement at times, and the Bulgarian
delegates even threatened to withdraw altogether if we did not give
way. Kuehlmann and my humble self remained perfectly firm, and told
them we had no objection to their withdrawing if they pleased; they
could also, if they pleased, send their own answer separately to the
proposal, but no further alteration would be made in the draft which
we, Kuehlmann and I, had drawn up. As no settlement could be arrived
at, the plenary sitting was postponed to the 25th, and the Bulgarian
delegates wired to Sofia for fresh instructions.

"The Bulgarians received a negative reply, and presumably the snub we
had expected. They were very dejected, and made no further difficulty
about agreeing to the common action. So the matter is settled as far
as that goes.

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