Book: In the World War

C >> Count Ottokar Czernin >> In the World War




This, I repeat, is the impression produced on me by lengthy
conversations with Count Tisza--an impression which has been confirmed
from other sources. I am persuaded, however, that Tschirsky, in
behaving as he did, widely overstretched his prescribed sphere of
activity. Iswolsky was not the only one of his kind. I conclude this
to be so, since Tschirsky, as intimated in a former dispatch, was
never in a position to make an official declaration urging for war,
but appears only to have spoken after the manner of diplomatic
representatives when anxious to adapt the policy of their Government
to their own point of view. Undoubtedly Tschirsky transmitted his
instructions correctly and loyally, nor did he keep back or secrete
anything. An ambassador attains more or less according to the energy
expended by him in carrying out the instructions of his Government;
and the private opinion of the ambassador is, under certain
circumstances, not easy to distinguish from his official one. At all
events, the latter will be influenced by the former, and Tschirsky's
private opinion aimed at a more vigorous policy.

In complete ignorance of impending events, I had arrived at Steiermark
a few days before the ultimatum in order to establish my family there
for the summer. While there I received a message from Berchtold to
return to my post as quickly as possible. I obeyed at once, but before
leaving had one more audience with the Emperor Francis Joseph at
Ischl. I found the Emperor extremely depressed. He alluded quite
briefly to the coming events, and merely asked me if, in case of a
war, I could guarantee Roumania's neutrality. I answered in the
affirmative, so long as King Carol was alive; beyond that any
guarantee was impossible.


3

Certain extremely important details relating to the period immediately
preceding the outbreak of war can only be attributed to the influence
of the group represented by Tschirsky. It is incomprehensible why we
granted to our then allies, Italy and Roumania, facilities for playing
the part of seceders by presenting them with an ultimatum before
action was completed, instead of winning them over and involving them
also.

I am no accurate judge of the events in Rome, but King Carol in
Roumania had certainly tried everything to induce Serbia to yield. In
all probability he would not have succeeded, as Serbia had no idea of
renouncing her plans for a Greater Serbia; but presumably an anxious
feeling would have arisen between Bucharest and Belgrade, which would
strongly have influenced further Roumanian policy in our favour.

Bucharest has made enormous capital out of the diplomatic proceedings.

Before the first decisive Cabinet Council Baron Fasciotti, the Italian
Ambassador, harangued all the members in this spirit, and declared
that the situation in Roumania and Italy was similar, and in each case
there was no reason for co-operation, as neither Rome nor Bucharest
had previously come to an understanding regarding the ultimatum. His
efforts were crowned with success.

On August 1, 1914, I sent the following telegram to Berchtold:

"The Prime Minister has just notified me the result of the Cabinet
Council. After a warm appeal from the King to bring the treaty
into force, the Cabinet Council, with one exception, declared that
no party could undertake the responsibility of such action.

"The Cabinet Council has resolved that _as Roumania was neither
notified nor consulted concerning the Austro-Hungarian action in
Belgrade no casus foederis exists_. The Cabinet Council further
resolved that military preparations for the safety of the frontier
be undertaken, which would be an advantage for the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as several hundred miles of its
frontiers would thereby be covered.

"The Prime Minister added that he had already given orders to
strengthen all military posts, after which by degrees general
mobilisation would follow.

"The Government intends only to publish a short communique
relating to the military measures taken for the safety of the
country."

Secondly, it appears incomprehensible why the ultimatum was drawn up
as it was. It was not so much a manifestation of Berchtold's wish for
war, as of other influences, above all that of Tschirsky. In 1870
Bismarck also desired war, but the Ems telegram was of quite a
different character.

In the present case it appears incomprehensible why a Note should have
been selected which by its wording gave umbrage to many who hitherto
were favourably disposed towards us.

Had we, before the ultimatum and after the assassination, secretly and
confidentially furnished proofs to the Great Powers who were not
inimical to us, and especially to England, that trouble was impending
over a political murder staged at Belgrade, we should have evoked a
very different frame of mind in those Governments. Instead, we flung
the ultimatum at them and at the whole of Europe.

It was feared probably at the Ballplatz that any communication to the
Powers would result in their intervention in the form of a new
conference of ambassadors, and that stagnation would ensue. But in the
year 1914 the case was very different from former days--before the
ultimatum right was so undoubtedly on our side.

At all events, the Tschirsky group dreaded such an insipid solution,
and had insisted, therefore, on drastic action. In 1870 Bismarck was
the attacking party, and he succeeded in interchanging the parts. We
also succeeded, but in an opposite sense.


4

Then came our greatest disaster: the German entry into Belgium.

Had England remained neutral we should not have lost the war. In his
book, "Ursachen und Ausbruck des Krieges," page 172, Jagow tells how
on August 4, towards the close of the Reichstag session, the English
Ambassador appeared there and again asked whether Germany would
respect Belgium's neutrality. At that time German troops were already
on Belgian soil. On hearing that, the Ambassador retired, but,
returning in a few hours, demanded a declaration, to be handed in
before midnight, that the further advance of the German troops into
Belgium would cease, otherwise he was instructed to ask for his
passport and England would then protect Belgium. Germany refused, and
the consequence was a declaration of war by England.

That England on the same day sent word to Belgium that she would
resist with her utmost strength any violation of her neutrality is
fully in accordance with the steps taken at Berlin by the English
Ambassador.

Two days before, on August 2, the English Cabinet certainly gave
France the assurance that, in addition to the protection of Belgian
neutrality, she had demanded that there should be no naval action
against France. The contradiction between both points of view is
clearly visible. It appears to me, however, that the only explanation
is that on August 4 England no longer adhered to her standpoint of
August 2, for the German acceptance of the English ultimatum on the
evening of August 4 had wrested from England the moral possibility of
making further claims. If England, on August 4, had sought a pretext
for war, she would have put forward, besides the Belgian demand, also
that referring to the abstention from naval action. But she did not do
so, and confined her ultimatum to the Belgian question, thereby tying
her own hands in the event of Germany accepting the ultimatum. _On
the night of August 4, between the hours of nine and midnight, the
decision as to whether England would remain neutral or no lay with
Germany._

Germany kept to her resolve to violate Belgian neutrality in spite of
the certainty of the English declaration of war resulting therefrom.
That was the first fateful victory of the militarists over the
diplomats in this war. The former were naturally the motive power.

The German military plan was to overrun France and then make a furious
onslaught on Russia. This plan was shattered on the Marne.

In more respects than one, German policy foundered on the heritage
left by Bismarck. Not only was the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine a
lasting obstacle to friendly relations with France, perpetually
forcing the latter into the arms of every anti-German coalition, but
Bismarck's heritage became Germany's curse, because the Germans,
though desirous of following in his footsteps, had no one sufficiently
competent to lead them therein.

Bismarck created the German Empire out of Dueppel, Koeniggraetz and
Sedan. His policy was one of "blood and iron"--and for fifty years
that policy of violence and violent means had been engrained in the
mind of every German schoolboy as the gospel of diplomatic art--but
Bismarck was not able to bequeath to the German people his genial
efficiency, wisdom and prudence in the use of his violent means.
Bismarck carefully prepared the wars of 1866 and 1870, and struck when
he held good cards in his hand. The Germany of William II. had no
desire for war, but one day plunged headlong into it, and during the
first week had already created political situations which were beyond
her power to cope with. Belgium and Luxembourg were treated on the
Bismarckian principle of "Might before Right," and the world rose
against Germany. I say world, because England's power extended over
the world.

At the beginning of the war England stood at "order arms." It would
have been entirely true to her traditional policy to allow Germany to
fight against France and Russia and mutually weaken each other, then
at a given moment to intervene and enjoin peace. England was forced to
join in by Germany threatening to establish herself in Belgium. How
far the German invasion of Belgium can morally be extenuated owing to
a French purpose to do likewise has still not been made clear--but
this argument does not apply to Luxembourg, and the breach of right
remains the same whether the country where it occurs be large or
small.

The invasion of Belgium and Luxembourg was a stroke of the Bismarckian
policy of violence, not carried out by politicians but by generals who
were devoid of Bismarck's power of calculating the devastating
consequences.

Later on, during the course of the war, the German Supreme Command
made repeated use of violent means, which were more detrimental than
useful to us, though subsequently these means were morally justifiable
and comprehensible; in fact, were directly forced on us, seeing that
Germany was fighting for her existence, and her adversaries, who would
not come to an understanding, left her no choice of means. The use of
noxious gas, aerial attacks on open towns and the U-boat warfare were
means used in desperation against a merciless enemy, who left women
and children to die of starvation and declared day by day that Germany
must be annihilated.

When war was declared, that murderous element was lacking, and it was
only the entry into neutral territory that fostered an atmosphere of
such terrible hatred and vengeance and stamped the struggle as a war
of annihilation.

England's policy concerning Napoleon III. was more of a diplomatic
than a military nature, and everything tends to show that in the
present case England originally had no intention of joining in the
conflagration, but was content to see Germany weakened by her own
confederates.

So far as I am in a position to review the situation no blame for the
wrongly estimated English attitude can be attached to our ambassadors
in London. Their predictions and warnings were correct, and the final
decision respecting the previously mentioned English ultimatum was
taken in Berlin and not in London. Moreover, the German Foreign
Office would never voluntarily have consented to the acts of violence,
but the military party, who cared neither for diplomatic reports nor
political complications, carried everything before them.

It will always be particularly difficult in a war to define the limits
of military and political spheres of action. The activities of both
encroach to so great an extent on each other as to form one whole, and
very naturally in a war precedence is given to military needs.
Nevertheless, the complete displacement of politicians into
subordinate positions which was effected in Germany and thereby made
manifest the fact that the German Supreme Military Command had
possessed itself of all State power of command, was a misfortune. Had
the politicians at Berlin obtained a hearing there would never have
been any invasion of Belgium, nor yet the ruthless U-boat warfare, the
abstention from which would in both cases have saved the life of the
Central Powers.

From the very first day the Emperor William was as a prisoner in the
hands of his generals.

The blind faith in the invincibility of the army was, like so much
else, an heirloom from Bismarck, and the "Prussian lieutenant,
inimitable save in Germany," became her doom. The entire German people
believed in victory and in an Emperor who flung himself into the arms
of his generals and took upon himself a responsibility far surpassing
the normal limit of what was bearable. Thus the Emperor William
allowed his generals full liberty of action, and, to begin with, their
tactics seemed to be successful. The first battle of the Marne was a
godsend for the Entente in their direst need. But, later, when the war
long since had assumed a totally different character, when the troops
were made stationary by the war of position and fresh enemies were
constantly rising up against us, when Italy, Roumania, and finally
America appeared on the scene, then did the German generals achieve
miracles of strategy. Hindenburg and Ludendorff became gods in the
eyes of the German people; the whole of Germany looked up to them and
hoped for victory through them alone. They were more powerful than
the Emperor, and he, therefore, less than ever in a position to oppose
them.

Both the generals drew the wellnigh unlimited measure of their power
direct from the Entente, for the latter left the Germans in no doubt
that they must either conquer or die. The terrified and suffering
people clung, therefore, to those who, as they believed, alone could
give them victory.


5

Anglo-German competition, the increasing decadence of the Monarchy,
and the consequent growing lust of conquest evinced by our neighbours
had prepared the soil for war. Serbia, by the assassination, brought
about an acute state of tension, and Russia profited thereby to fling
herself on the Central Powers.

That appears to me to be briefly an objective history of the beginning
of the war. Faults, errors and omissions from the most varied sources
may occur in it, but can neither alter nor affect the real nature of
the case.

The victorious Entente gives a different interpretation of it. They
maintain that Germany let loose the war, and the terrible peace of
Versailles is the product of that conception, for it serves as
punishment.

A neutral court of justice, as proposed by Germany, was refused. Their
own witnesses and their own judges suffice for them. They are judge
and prosecutor in one. In Dr. Bauer, the German-Austrian Secretary of
State, they have certainly secured an important witness for their view
of the case. In the winter of 1918 the latter openly declared that
"three Austro-Hungarian counts and one general had started the
war."[1]

Were that true, then Germany would also have to bear a vast amount of
blame. For the four "guilty ones" could not have incited to war
without being sure of having Germany at their back, and were it true,
there could only have been a question of some plot laid by the
Austro-Hungarian and the German Governments, in which case Germany,
being the vastly superior military element, would undoubtedly have
assumed the role of leader.

Bauer's statement shows that they who inflicted the punitive peace
were right.


6

While the war was going on, a separate peace on our side that would
have delivered up Germany would have been treachery. But had attempts
at peace failed owing to the claims put forward by Germany, we should
have been morally justified in breaking away from them, as we were
united together in a war of defence and not in a war of conquest.
Although the German military party both dreamed and talked incessantly
of conquest, which doubtless gave rise to a misunderstanding of the
situation, that was by no means the exclusive reason why peace could
not be attained. It simply was because on no consideration could the
Entente be induced to pardon Germany. I have already mentioned this in
my speech of December 11, 1918,[2] in which I discoursed on politics
in the world war: "Ludendorff is exactly like the statesmen of France
and England. None of them wishes to compromise, they only look for
victory: in that respect there is no difference between them." As long
as I was in office the Entente would never come to an agreement with
Germany _inter pares_, thereby directly forcing us to assume the part
of a war of defence. Had we succeeded in what we so often attempted to
do, namely to make the Entente pronounce the saving word; and had we
ever been able to make the Entente state that they were ready to
conclude a _status quo_ peace with Germany, we would have been
relieved of our moral obligations. Against this may be quoted: "_Salus
rei publicas supreme lex_"--in order to save the Monarchy Germany
would have to be given up, and therefore the other question must be
inquired into as to whether the "physical possibility" of a separate
peace really did exist. I also mentioned this matter in the aforesaid
speech, and expressly stated then, and withdraw nothing, that after
the entry of England, then of Italy, Roumania, and finally of America
into the war, I considered a victory peace on our side to be a Utopian
idea. But up to the last moment of my official activities, I cherished
the hope of a _peace of understanding_ from month to month, from week
to week, even from day to day, and believed that the possibility would
arise of obtaining such a peace of understanding, however great the
sacrifices. Just as little as anyone else could I foresee the end
which practically has arrived, nor yet the present state of affairs. A
catastrophe of such magnitude and such dimensions was never what I
feared. This is confirmed in the published report of my aforesaid
speech, where I say: "A victory peace was out of the question; we are
therefore compelled to effect a peace with sacrifice." The Imperial
offer to cede Galicia to Poland, and, indirectly, to Germany, arose
out of this train of thought, as did all the peace proposals to the
Entente, which always clearly intimated that we were ready for
_endurable_ sacrifices.

It had always been obvious that the Entente would tear the Monarchy in
shreds, both in the event of a peace of understanding and of a
separate peace. It was quite in keeping with the terms of the Pact of
London of April 26, 1915.

The resolutions passed at that congress which prepared for Italy's
entry into the war, determined the further course of the war, for they
included the division of the Monarchy, and forced us, therefore, into
a desperate war of defence. I believe that London and Paris, at times
when the fortune of war was on our side, both regretted the
resolutions that had been adopted, as they prevented the dwellers on
both the Seine and the Thames from making any temporarily desired
advances to us.

As far back as 1915 we received vague news of the contents of this
strictly secret London agreement; but only in February, 1917, did we
obtain the authentic whole, when the Russian revolutionary Government
published a protocol referring to it, which subsequently was
reproduced in our papers.

I add this protocol to the appendix of the book,[3] as, in spite of
its being so eminently important, it has not received adequate
attention on the part of the public.

According to the settlements, which were binding on the four
States--England, France, Russia, and Italy--the last-named was awarded
the Trentino, the whole of South Tyrol as far as the Brenner Pass,
Trieste, Gorizia, Gradisca, the whole of Istria with a number of
islands, also Dalmatia.

In the course of the war the Entente had further made binding promises
to the Roumanians and Serbians, hence the need for the dissolution of
the Monarchy.

Having made these statements, I wish to explain why a separate peace
was a sheer impossibility for us. In other words, what were the
reasons that prevented us from ending the war and becoming
neutral--reasons which only left one possibility open to us: to change
our adversary, and instead of fighting the Entente, together with
Germany, to join the Entente and with her fight against Germany? It
must, above all, be kept in mind that up to the last days that I held
office the Eastern front was manned by Austro-Hungarian and German
troops all mixed together, and this entire army was under the Imperial
German Command. We had no army of our own in the East--not in the true
sense of the word, as it had been merged into the German army. That
was a consequence of our military inferiority. Again and again we
resorted to German aid. We called repeatedly for help in Serbia,
Roumania, Russia, and Italy, and were compelled to purchase it by
giving up certain things. Our notorious inferiority was only in very
slight degree the fault of the individual soldier; rather did it
emanate from the general state of Austro-Hungarian affairs. We entered
the war badly equipped and sadly lacking in artillery; the various
Ministers of War and the Parliaments were to blame in that respect.
The Hungarian Parliament neglected the army for years because their
national claims were not attended to, and in Austria the Social
Democrats had always been opposed to any measures of defence, scenting
therein plans for attack and not defence.

Our General Staff was in part very bad. There were, of course,
exceptions, but they only prove the rule. What was chiefly wanting was
contact with the troops. These gentlemen sat with their backs turned
and gave their orders. Hardly ever did they see the men at the front
or where the bullets whistled. During the war the troops learned to
_hate_ the General Staff. It was very different in the German army.
The German General Staffs exacted much, but they also achieved much;
above all, they exposed themselves freely and set an example.
Ludendorff, sword in hand, took Liege, accompanied by a couple of men!
In Austria archdukes were put into leading posts for which they were
quite unsuited. Some of them were utterly incompetent; the Archdukes
Friedrich, Eugen, and Joseph formed three exceptions. The first of
these in particular very rightly looked upon his post not as that of a
leader of operations, but as a connecting link between us and Germany,
and between the army and the Emperor Francis Joseph. He always acted
correctly and with eminent tact, and overcame many difficulties. What
was left of our independence was lost after Luck.

To return, therefore, to the plan developed above: a separate peace
that would have contained an order for our troops on the Eastern front
to lay down their arms or to march back would immediately have led to
conflict at the front. Following on the violent opposition that such
an order would naturally have aroused in the German leaders, orders
from Vienna and counter-orders from Berlin would have led to a state
of complete disorganisation, even to anarchy. Humanly speaking, it was
out of the question to look for a peaceful and bloodless unravelment
at the front. I state this in order to explain my firm conviction that
the idea that such a separating of the two armies could have been
carried out in mutual agreement is based on utterly erroneous
premises, and also to prove that we have here the first factor
showing that we would not have ended the war by a separate peace, but
would, on the contrary, have been entangled in a new one.

But what would have been enacted at the front would also, and in
aggravated fashion, have been repeated throughout the entire country:
a civil war would have been inevitable.

I must here explain a second misunderstanding, resulting also from my
speech of December 11, which is due to my statement that "if we came
out Germany could not carry on the war." I admit that this statement
is not clearly expressed, and was interpreted as though I had intended
to say that if we came out the immediate collapse of Germany was a
foregone conclusion. I did not intend to say that, nor did I say or
mean it. I meant to say that our secession from Germany would render
impossible a victorious ending of the war, or even a lasting
successful continuance of the war; that Germany through this would be
faced by the alternative of either submitting to the dictates of the
Entente or of bringing up her supremest fighting powers and
suppressing the Monarchy, preparing for her the same fate as Roumania
met with. I meant to say that Austria-Hungary, if she allowed the
Entente troops to enter, would prove such a terrible danger to Germany
that she would be compelled to use every means to forestall us and
paralyse the move. Whoever imagines that the German military leaders
would not have seized the latter eventuality knows them but badly, and
has a poor opinion of their spirit. In order to be able to form an
objective judgment of this train of thought one should be able to
enter into the spirit of the situation. In April, 1916, when I sent in
my resignation for other reasons, Germany's confidence in victory was
stronger than ever. The Eastern front was free: Russia and Roumania
were out of action. The troops were bound westward, and no one who
knew the situation as it was then can repudiate my assertion that the
German military leaders believed themselves then to be nearer than
ever to a victory peace; that they were persuaded they would take both
Paris and Calais and force the Entente to its knees. It is out of the
question that at such a moment and under such conditions they could
have replied to the falling away of Austria-Hungary otherwise than by
violence.

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