Book: In the World War

C >> Count Ottokar Czernin >> In the World War




The theory of the Union Government, frequently referred to, also
admits of several interpretations; the question arises, for instance,
whether, as has frequently been maintained, only armed resistance can
be held to justify destruction of ship and persons on board, or
whether the same applies to resistance of another sort, as, for
example, when the crew purposely refrain from getting the passengers
into the boats (the case of the _Ancona_), or when the passengers
themselves decline to enter the boats. In the opinion of the Austrian
Government cases such as those last should also justify destruction of
the vessel without responsibility for the lives of those on board, as
otherwise it would be in the power of anyone on the vessel to deprive
the belligerent of his right to sink the ship. For the rest it should
also be borne in mind that there is no unanimity of opinion really as
to when the destruction of enemy merchant tonnage is justifiable at
all.

The obligation as to issuing a warning immediately before sinking a
vessel will, in the view of the Austrian Government on the one hand,
involve hardships otherwise avoidable, while, on the other, it may in
certain circumstances be calculated to prejudice the rightful
interests of the belligerent. In the first place it cannot be denied
that saving lives _at sea_ is nearly always a matter of blind
uncertainty, since the only alternatives are to leave them on board a
vessel exposed to the operations of the enemy, or to take them off in
small boats to face the dangers of the elements. It is, therefore,
far more in accordance with the dictates of humanity _to restrain
people from venturing upon vessels thus endangered by warning them
beforehand_. For the rest, however, the Austrian Government is not
convinced, despite careful consideration of all legal questions
concerned, that the subjects of neutral countries have any claim to
immunity when travelling on board enemy ships.

The principle that neutrals shall also in time of war enjoy the
freedom of the seas extends only to neutral vessels, not to neutral
persons on board enemy ships, since the belligerents are admittedly
justified in hampering enemy traffic at sea as far as lies in their
power. Granted the necessary military power, they can, if deemed
necessary to their ends, forbid enemy merchant vessels to sail the
sea, on pain of instant destruction, as long as they make their
purpose known beforehand so that all, whether enemy or neutral, _are
enabled to avoid risking their lives_. But even where there is doubt
as to the justification of such proceeding, and possible reprisals
threatened by the opposing side, the question would remain one to be
decided between the belligerents themselves alone, they being
admittedly allowed the right of making the high seas a field for their
military operations, of suppressing any interruption of such
operations and supremely determining what measures are to be taken
against enemy ships. The neutrals have in such case no legitimate
claims beyond that of demanding that due notice be given them of
measures contemplated against the enemy, in order that they may
refrain from entrusting their persons or goods to enemy vessels.

The Austrian Government may presumably take it for granted that the
Washington Cabinet agrees with the foregoing views, which the Austrian
Government is fully convinced are altogether unassailable. To deny the
correctness of these views would imply--and this the Union Government
can hardly intend--that neutrals have the right of interfering in the
military operations of the belligerents; indeed, ultimately to
constitute themselves the judges as to what methods may or may not be
employed against an enemy. It would also seem a crying injustice for a
neutral Government, in order merely to secure for its subjects the
right of passage on enemy ships when they might just as well, or
indeed with far greater safety, travel by neutral vessels, to grasp at
the arm of a belligerent Power, fighting perhaps for its very
existence. Not to mention the fact that it would open the way for all
kinds of abuses if a belligerent were forced to lay down arms at the
bidding of any neutral whom it might please to make use of enemy ships
for business or pleasure. No doubt has ever been raised as to the fact
that subjects of neutral states are themselves responsible for any
harm they may incur _by their presence in any territory on land where
military operations are in progress_. Obviously, there is no ground
for establishing another standard for naval warfare, particularly
since the second Peace Conference expressed the wish that, pending the
agreement of rules for naval warfare, the rules observed in warfare
upon land should be applied as far as possible at sea.

From the foregoing it appears that the rule as to warning being given
to the vessel itself before such vessel is sunk is subject to
exceptions of various kinds under certain circumstances, as, for
instance, the cases cited by the Union Government of flight and
resistance, the vessel may be sunk without any warning; in others
warning should be given before the vessel sails. The Austrian
Government may then assert that it is essentially in agreement with
the Union Government as to the protection of neutrals against risk of
life, whatever may be the attitude of the Washington Cabinet towards
some of the separate questions here raised. The Austrian Government
has not only put into practice throughout the war the views it holds
in this respect, but has gone even farther, regulating its actions
with the strictest care according to the theory advanced by the
Washington Cabinet, although its assurance as published only stated
that was "essentially in agreement" with the Union Government's views.
The Austrian Government would be extremely satisfied if the Washington
Cabinet should be inclined to assist it in its endeavours, which are
inspired by the warmest feelings of humanity, to save American
citizens from risk at sea by instructing and warning its subjects in
this direction.

Then, as regards the circular verbal note of February 10 of this year
concerning the treatment of armed enemy merchant vessels, the Austrian
Government must in any case declare itself to be, as indicated in the
foregoing, of the opinion that the arming of trading ships, even when
only for the purpose of avoiding capture, is not justified in modern
international law. The rules provide that a warship is to approach an
enemy merchant vessel in a peaceable manner; it is required to stop
the vessel by means of certain signals, to interview the captain,
examine the ship's papers, enter the particulars in due form and,
where necessary, make an inventory, etc. But in order to comply with
these requirements it must obviously be understood that the warship
has full assurance that the merchant vessel will likewise observe a
peaceable demeanour throughout. And it is clear that no such assurance
can exist when the merchant vessel is so armed as to be capable of
offering resistance to a warship. A warship can hardly be expected to
act in such a manner under the guns of an enemy, whatever may be the
purpose for which the guns were placed on board. Not to speak of the
fact that the merchant vessels of the Entente Powers, despite all
assurances to the contrary, have been proved to be armed for offensive
purposes, and make use of their armament for such purposes. It would
also be to disregard the rights of humanity if the crew of a warship
were expected to surrender to the guns of an enemy without resistance
on their own part. No State can regard its duty to humanity as less
valid in respect of men defending their country than in respect of the
subjects of a foreign Power.

The Austrian Government is therefore of opinion that its former
assurance to the Washington Cabinet could not be held to apply to
armed merchant vessels, since these, according to the legal standards
prevailing, whereby hostilities are restricted to organised military
forces, must be regarded as privateers (freebooters) which are liable
to immediate destruction. History shows us that, according to the
_general_ law of nations, merchant vessels have never been justified
in resisting the exercise by warships of the right of taking prizes.
But even if a standard to this effect could be shown to exist, it
would not mean that the vessels had the right to provide themselves
with guns. It should also be borne in mind that the arming of merchant
ships must necessarily alter the whole conduct of warfare at sea, and
that such alteration cannot correspond to the views of those who seek
to regulate maritime warfare according to the principles of humanity.
As a matter of fact, since the practice of privateering was
discontinued, until a few years back no Power has ever thought of
arming merchant vessels. Throughout the whole proceedings of the
second Peace Conference, which was occupied with all questions of the
laws of warfare at sea, not a single word was ever said about the
arming of merchant ships. Only on one occasion was a casual
observation made with any bearing on this question, and it is
characteristic that it should have been by a British naval officer of
superior rank, who impartially declared: "Lorsqu'un navire de guerre
se propose d'arreter et de visiter un vaisseau marchand, le
commandant, avant de mettre une embarcation a la mer, fera tirer un
coup de canon. Le coup de canon est la meilleure garantie que l'on
puisse donner. _Les navires de commerce n'ont pas de canons a bord._"
(When a warship intends to stop and board a merchant vessel the
commander, before sending a boat, will fire a gun. The firing of a gun
is the best guarantee that can be given. _Merchant vessels do not
carry guns._)

Nevertheless, Austria-Hungary has in this regard also held by its
assurance; in the circular verbal note referred to neutrals were
cautioned beforehand against entrusting their persons or their goods
on board any armed ship; moreover, the measures announced were not put
into execution at once, but a delay was granted in order to enable
neutrals already on board armed ships to leave the same. And, finally,
the Austro-Hungarian warships are instructed, even in case of
encountering armed enemy merchant vessels, to give warning and to
provide for the safety of those on board, provided it seems possible
to do so in the circumstances.

The statement of the American Ambassador, to the effect that the armed
British steamers _Secondo_ and _Welsh Prince_ were sunk without
warning by Austrian submarines, is based on error. The Austrian
Government has in the meantime received information that no
Austro-Hungarian warships were at all concerned in the sinking of
these vessels.

The Austrian Government has, as in the circular verbal note already
referred to--reverting now to the question of aggravated submarine
warfare referred to in the memorandum--also in its declaration of
January 31 of this year issued a warning to neutrals with
corresponding time limit; indeed, _the whole of the declaration itself
is, from its nature, nothing more or less than a warning to the effect
that no merchant vessel may pass the area of sea expressly defined
therein_. Nevertheless, the Austrian warships have been instructed as
far as possible to warn such merchant vessels as may be encountered in
the area concerned and provide for the safety of passengers and crew.
And the Austrian Government is in the possession of numerous reports
stating that the crews and passengers of vessels destroyed in these
waters have been saved. But the Austrian Government cannot accept any
responsibility for possible loss of human life which may after all
occur in connection with the destruction of armed vessels or vessels
encountered in prohibited areas. Also it may be noted that the
Austro-Hungarian submarines operate only in the Adriatic and
Mediterranean Seas, and there is thus hardly any question as to any
action affecting American interests on the part of Austro-Hungarian
warships.

After all that has been said in the preamble to this Memorandum, it
need hardly be said that the declaration of the waters in question as
a prohibited area is in no way intended as a measure aiming at the
destruction of human life, or even to endangering the same, but that
its object--apart from the higher aims of _relieving humanity from
further suffering by shortening the war_, is only to place Great
Britain and its Allies, who have--without establishing any legally
effective blockade of the coasts of the Central Powers--hindered
traffic by sea between neutrals and these Powers in a like position of
isolation, and render them amenable to a peace with some guarantee of
permanency. That Austria-Hungary here makes use of other methods of
war than her opponents is due mainly to circumstances beyond human
control. But the Austrian Government is conscious of having done all
in its power to avoid loss of human life. _The object aimed at in the
blockading of the Western Powers would be most swiftly and certainly
attained if not a single human life were lost or endangered in those
waters._

To sum up, the Austrian Government may point out that the assurance
given to the Washington Cabinet in the case of the _Ancona_, and
renewed in the case of the _Persia_, is neither withdrawn nor
qualified by its statements of February 10, 1916, and January 31,
1917. Within the limits of this assurance the Austrian Government
will, together with its Allies, continue its endeavours to secure to
the peoples of the world a share in the blessings of peace. If in the
pursuit of this aim--which it may take for granted has the full
sympathy of the Washington Cabinet itself--it should find itself
compelled to impose restrictions on neutral traffic by sea in certain
areas, it will not need so much to point to the behaviour of its
opponents in this respect, which appears by no means an example to be
followed, but rather to the fact that Austria-Hungary, through the
persistence and hatred of its enemies, who are determined upon its
destruction, is brought to a state of self-defence in so desperate
extreme as is unsurpassed in the history of the world. The Austrian
Government is encouraged by the knowledge that the struggle now being
carried on by Austria-Hungary tends not only toward the preservation
of its own vital interests, but also towards the realisation of the
idea of equal rights for all states; and in this last and hardest
phase of the war, which unfortunately calls for sacrifices on the part
of friends as well, it regards it as of supreme importance to confirm
in word and deed the fact that it is guided equally by the laws of
humanity and by the dictates of respect for the dignity and interests
of neutral peoples.


3

=Speech by Dr. Helfferich, Secretary of State, on the Submarine
Warfare=

The _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_ of May 1, 1917, gives the
following speech by Dr. Helfferich, Secretary of State, on the
economic effects of the submarine warfare delivered in the principal
committee of the Reichstag on April 28. The speech is here given
verbatim, with the exception of portions containing confidential
statements:

"In the sitting of yesterday a member rightly pointed out that the
technical and economic results of the submarine warfare have been
estimated with caution. In technical respects the caution observed in
estimating the results is plain; the sinkings have, during the first
month, exceeded by nearly a quarter, in the second by nearly half, the
estimated 600,000 tons, and for the present month also we may fairly
cherish the best expectations. The technical success guarantees the
economic success with almost mathematical exactitude. True, the
economic results cannot be so easily expressed numerically and set
down in a few big figures as the technical result in the amount of
tonnage sunk. The economic effects of the submarine warfare are
expressed in many different spheres covering a wide area, where the
enemy seeks to render visibility still more difficult by resorting, so
to speak, to statistical smoke-screens.

"The English statistics to-day are most interesting, one might almost
say, in what they wisely refrain from mentioning. The Secretary of
State for the Navy pointed out yesterday how rapidly the pride of the
British public had faded. The English are now suppressing our reports
on the successes of our submarines and our statements as to submarine
losses; they dare not make public the amount of tonnage sunk, but
mystify the public with shipping statistics which have given rise to
general annoyance in the English Press itself. The English Government
lets its people go on calmly trusting to the myth that instead of six
U-boats sunk there are a hundred at the bottom of the sea. It conceals
from the world also the true course of the entries and departures of
tonnage in British ports since the commencement of unrestricted
submarine warfare. And more than all, the English Government has since
February suppressed most strictly all figures tending to throw light
on the position of the grain market. In the case of the coal exports,
the country of destination is not published. The monthly trade report,
which is usually issued with admirable promptness by the tenth of the
next month or thereabouts, was for February delayed and incomplete;
and for March it has not yet appeared at all. It is to be regretted
that this sudden withdrawal of information makes it more difficult for
us to estimate the effect of our submarine operations, but there is a
gratifying side to the question after all. It is not to be supposed
that England should suddenly become reticent in order to avoid
revealing its strength.

"For the rest, what can be seen is still sufficient to give us an
idea.

"I will commence with the tonnage. You are aware that in the first two
months of the unrestricted submarine warfare more than 1,600,000 tons
were sunk, of which probably considerably over one million tons sailed
under the British flag.

"The estimates as to the quantity of English tonnage at present
available are somewhat divergent; in any case, whether we take the
higher or the lower figures, a loss of more than a million tons in two
months is a thing that England cannot endure for long. And to replace
it, even approximately, by new building, is out of the question. In
the year 1914 England's newly-built ships gave a tonnage increment of
1,600,000; in 1915 it was 650,000 tons, in 1916 only 580,000, despite
all efforts. And the normal loss of the British merchant fleet in
peace time amounts to between 700,000 and 800,000 tons. It is hopeless
to think of maintaining equilibrium by urging on the building of new
vessels.

"The attempts which are made to enlist the neutral tonnage in British
service by a system of rewards and punishments may here and there, to
the ultimate disadvantage of the neutrals themselves, have met with
some success, but even so, the neutrals must consider the need for
preserving a merchant fleet themselves for peace time, so that there
is a narrow limit to what can be attained in this manner. Even in
January of this year about 30 per cent. of the shipping entries into
British ports were under foreign flags. I have heard estimates brought
up to 80 per cent. in order to terrify the neutrals; if but 50 per
cent. of this be correct it means a decrease in British shipping
traffic of roughly one-sixth. Counting tonnage sunk and tonnage
frightened off, the arrivals at British ports have been reduced, at a
low estimate, by one-fourth, and probably by as much as one-third, as
against January. In January arrivals amounted to 2.2 million net tons.
I may supplement the incomplete English statistics by the information
that in March the arrivals were only 1.5 to 1.6 million tons net, and
leave it to Mr. Carson to refute this. The 1.5 to 1.6 million tons
represent, compared with the average entries in peace time, amounting
to 4.2 millions, not quite 40 per cent. This low rate will be further
progressively reduced. Lloyd George at the beginning of the war
reckoned on the last milliard. Those days are now past. Then he based
his plans on munitions. England has here, with the aid of America,
achieved extraordinary results. But the Somme and Arras showed that,
even with those enormous resources, England was not able to beat us.
Now, in his greeting to the American Allies, Lloyd George cries out:
'Ships, ships, and yet more ships.' And this time he is on the right
tack; it is on ships that the fate of the British world-empire will
depend.

"The Americans, too, have understood this. They propose to build a
thousand wooden vessels of 3,000 tons. But before these can be brought
into action they will, I confidently hope, have nothing left to save.

"I base this confidence upon the indications which are visible,
despite the English policy of suppression and concealment.

"Take the total British trade. The figures for March are still not yet
available, but those for February tell us enough.

"British imports amounted in January of this year to 90 million pounds
sterling, in February to only 70 million; the exports have gone down
from 46 to 37 millions sterling--imports and exports together showing
a decline of over 20 per cent. in the first month of the submarine
warfare. And again, the rise in prices all round has, since the
commencement of the U-boat war, continued at a more rapid rate, so
that the decline in the import quantity from one month to another may
fairly be estimated at 25 per cent. The figures for imports and
exports, then, confirm my supposition as to the decrease of tonnage in
the traffic with British ports.

"The British Government has endeavoured, by the strictest measures
rigorously prohibiting import of less important articles, to ward off
the decline in the quantity of vital necessaries imported. The attempt
can only partially succeed.

"In 1916, out of a total import quantity of 42 million tons, about 31
millions fall to three important groups alone, viz., foodstuffs and
luxuries, timber, and iron ore; all other goods, including important
war materials, such as other ores and metals, petroleum, cotton and
wool, rubber, only 11 million tons, or roughly one-fourth. A decline
of one-fourth, then, as brought about by the first month of
unrestricted submarine warfare, must affect articles indispensable to
life and to the purposes of war.

"The decline in the imports in February, 1917, as against February,
1916, appears as follows:

"Wool 17 per cent., cotton 27 per cent., flax 38 per cent., hemp 48
per cent., jute 74 per cent., woollen materials 83 per cent., copper
and copper ore 49 per cent., iron and steel 59 per cent. As to the
imports of iron ore I will give more detailed figures:

"Coffee 66 per cent., tea 41 per cent., raw sugar 10 per cent.,
refined sugar 90 per cent., bacon 17 per cent., butter 21 per cent.,
lard 21 per cent., eggs 39 per cent., timber 42 per cent.

"The only increases worth noting are in the case of leather, hides,
rubber and tin.

"As regards the group in which we are most interested, the various
sorts of grain, no figures for quantities have been given from
February onwards.

"The mere juxtaposition of two comparable values naturally gives no
complete idea of the facts. It should be borne in mind that the
commencement of the unrestricted U-boat campaign came at a time when
the economical position of England was not normal, but greatly
weakened already by two and a half years of war. A correct judgment
will, then, only be possible when we take into consideration the
entire development of the imports during the course of the war.

"I will here give only the most important figures.

"In the case of iron ore, England has up to now maintained its
position better than in other respects.

"Imports amounted in 1913 to 7.4 million tons.

"In 1916 to 6.9 million tons.

"January, 1913, 689,000 tons; February, 1913, 658,000 tons.

"January, 1916, 526,000 tons; February, 1916, 404,000 tons.

"January, 1917, 512,000 tons; February, 1917, 508,000 tons.

"Here again comparison with the peace year 1913 shows for the months
of January and February a not inconsiderable decrease, though the
imports, especially in February, 1917, were in excess of those for the
same month in 1916.

"Timber imports, 1913, 10.1 million loads.
" " 1916, 5.9 " "
" February, 1913, 406,000 loads.
" " 1916, 286,000 "
" " 1917, 167,000 "

"As regards mining timber especially, the import of which fell from
3.5 million loads in 1913 to 2.0 million in 1916, we have here
December, 1916, and January, 1917, with 102,000 and 107,000 loads as
the lowest import figures given since the beginning of 1913; a
statement for the import of mining timber is missing for February.

"Before turning to the import of foodstuffs a word may be said as to
the export of coal.

"The total export of coal has decreased from 78 million tons in 1913
to 461/2 million tons in 1915; in 1916 only about 42 million tons were
exported. In December, 1916, the export quantity fell for the first
time below 3 million tons, having remained between 3.2 and 3.9 million
tons during the months from January to November, 1916. In January,
1917, a figure of 3.5 million tons was again reached; it is the more
significant, therefore, that the coal export, which from the nature of
the case exhibits only slight fluctuations from month to month, falls
again in February, 1917, to 2.9 million tons (as against 3.4 million
tons in February of the year before), thus almost reaching once more
to the lowest point hitherto recorded--that of December, 1916. And it
should be remembered that here, as in the case of all other exports,
sunk transports are included in the English statistics.

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