Book: In the World War

C >> Count Ottokar Czernin >> In the World War




"Details as to the destination of exported coal have since the
beginning of this year been withheld. England is presumably desirous
of saving the French and Italians the further distress of reading for
the future in black and white the calamitous decline in their coal
supply. The serious nature of this decline, even up to the end of
1916, may be seen from the following figures:

"England's coal export to France amounted in December, 1916, to only
1,128,000 tons, as against 1,269,000 tons in January of the same year;
the exports to Italy in December, 1916, amounted only to 278,000 tons,
as against 431,000 tons in January, and roughly 800,000 tons monthly
average for the peace year 1913.

"As to the further development since the end of February, I am able to
give some interesting details. Scotland's coal export in the first
week of April was 103,000 tons, as against 194,000 tons the previous
year; from the beginning of the year 1,783,000 tons, as against
2,486,000 tons the previous year. From this it is easy to see how the
operations of the U-boats are striking at the root of railway and war
industries in the countries allied with England.

"Lloyd George, in a great speech made on January 22 of this year,
showed the English how they could protect themselves against the
effects of submarine warfare by increased production in their own
country. The practicability and effectiveness of his counsels are more
than doubtful. He makes no attempt, however, to instruct his Allies
how they are to protect themselves against the throttling of the coal
supply.

"I come now to the most important point: _the position of England with
regard to its food supply_.

"First of all I would give a few brief figures by way of calling to
mind the degree to which England is dependent upon supplies of
foodstuffs from overseas.

"The proportion of imports in total British consumption averaged
during the last years of peace as follows:

"Bread-corn, close on 80 per cent.

"Fodder-grain (barley, oats, maize), which can be utilised as
substitutes for, and to supplement, the bread-corn, 50 per cent.;
meat, over 40 per cent.; butter, 60-65 per cent. The sugar
consumption, failing any home production at all, must be entirely
covered by imports from abroad.

"I would further point out that our U-boats, inasmuch as concerns the
food situation in England, are operating under quite exceptionally
favourable conditions; the world's record harvest of 1915 has been
followed by the world's worst harvest of 1916, representing a loss of
45-50 million tons of bread and fodder-grain. The countries hardest
hit are those most favourably situated, from the English point of
view, in North America. The effects are now--the rich stocks from the
former harvest having been consumed--becoming more evident every day
and everywhere. The Argentine has put an embargo on exports of grain.
As to the condition of affairs in the United States, this may be seen
from the following figures:

"The Department of Agriculture estimates the stocks of wheat still in
the hands of the farmer on March 1, 1917, at 101 million bushels, or
little over 21/2 million tons. The stocks for the previous year on that
date amounted to 241 million bushels. Never during the whole of the
time I have followed these figures back have the stocks been so low or
even nearly so. The same applies to stocks of maize. Against a supply
of 1,138,000 bushels on March 1, 1916, we have for this year only
789,000 bushels.

"The extraordinary scarcity of supplies is nearing the panic limit.
The movement of prices during the last few weeks is simply fantastic.
Maize, which was noted in Chicago at the beginning of January, 1917,
at 95 cents, rose by the end of April to 127 cents, and by April 25
had risen further to 148 cents. Wheat in New York, which stood at 871/4
cents in July, 1914, and by the beginning of 1917 had already risen to
1911/2 cents, rose at the beginning of April to 229 cents, and was noted
at no less than 281 on April 2. This is three and a half times the
peace figure! In German currency at normal peace time exchange, these
281 cents represent about 440 marks per ton, or, at present rate of
exchange for dollars, about 580 marks per ton.

"That, then, is the state of affairs in the country which is to help
England in the war of starvation criminally begun by itself!

"In England no figures are now made public as to imports and stocks of
grain. I can, however, state as follows:

"On the last date for which stocks were noted, January 13, 1917,
England's visible stocks of wheat amounted to 5.3 million quarters, as
against 6.3 and 5.9 million quarters in the two previous years. From
January to May and June there is, as a rule, a marked decline in the
stocks, and even in normal years the imports during these months do
not cover the consumption. In June, 1914 and 1915, the visible stocks
amounted only to about 2 million quarters, representing the
requirements for scarcely three weeks.

"We have no reason to believe that matters have developed more
favourably during the present year. This is borne out by the import
figures for January--as published. The imports of bread-corn and
fodder-grain--I take them altogether, as in the English regulations
for eking out supplies--amounted only to 12.6 million quarters, as
against 19.8 and 19.2 in the two previous years.

"For February the English statistics show an increase in the import
value of unstated import quantity of all grain of 50 per cent., as
against February, 1916. This gives, taking the distribution among the
various sorts of grain as similar to that of January, and reckoning
with the rise in prices since, about the same import quantity as in
the previous year. But in view of the great decrease in American grain
shipments and the small quantity which can have come from India and
Australia the statement is hardly credible. We may take it that March
has brought a further decline, and that to-day, when we are nearing
the time of the three-week stocks, the English supplies are lower than
in the previous years.

"The English themselves acknowledge this. Lloyd George stated in
February that the English grain supplies were lower than ever within
the memory of man. A high official in the English Ministry of
Agriculture, Sir Ailwyn Fellowes, speaking in April at an agricultural
congress, added that owing to the submarine warfare, which was an
extremely serious peril to England, the state of affairs had grown far
worse even than then.

"Captain Bathurst, of the British Food Controller's Department
(_Kriegsernaehrungsamt_), stated briefly on April 19 that the then
consumption of breadstuffs was 50 per cent. in excess of the present
_and prospective_ supplies. It would be necessary to reduce the
consumption of bread by fully a third in order to make ends meet.

"Shortly before, Mr. Wallhead, a delegate from Manchester, at a
conference of the Independent Labour Party in Leeds had stated that,
according to his information, England would in six to eight weeks be
in a complete state of famine.

"The crisis in which England is placed--and we can fairly call it a
crisis now--is further aggravated by the fact that the supplies of
other important foodstuffs have likewise taken an unfavourable turn.

"The import of meat in February, 1917, shows the lowest figures for
many years, with the single exception of September, 1914.

"The marked falling off in the butter imports--February, 1917, showing
only half as much as in the previous year--is not nearly
counterbalanced by the margarine which England is making every effort
to introduce.

"The import of lard also, most of which comes from the United States,
shows a decline, owing to the poor American crops of fodder-stuffs.
The price of lard in Chicago has risen from 151/2 cents at the beginning
of January, 1917, to 211/2 cents on April 25, and the price of pigs in
the same time from 9.80 to 16.50 dollars.

"Most serious of all, however, is the shortage of potatoes, which at
present is simply catastrophic. The English crop was the worst for a
generation past. The imports are altogether insignificant. Captain
Bathurst stated on April 19 that in about four weeks the supplies of
potatoes in the country would be entirely exhausted.

"The full seriousness of the case now stares English statesmen in the
face. Up to now they have believed it possible to exorcise the danger
by voluntary economies. Now they find themselves compelled to have
recourse to compulsory measures. I believe it is too late."

The Secretary of State then gives a detailed account of the measures
taken up to date in England for dealing with the food question, and
thereafter continues:

"On March 22 again the English food dictator, Lord Devonport, stated
in the House of Lords that a great reduction in the consumption of
bread would be necessary, but that it would be _a national disaster_
if England should have to resort to compulsion.

"His representative, Bathurst, stated at the same time: 'We do not
wish to introduce _so un-English a system_. In the first place,
because we believe that the patriotism of the people can be trusted to
assist us in our endeavours towards economy, and, further, because, as
we can see from the example of Germany, the compulsory system promises
no success; finally, because such a system would necessitate a too
complicated administrative machinery and too numerous staffs of men
and women whose services could be better employed elsewhere.'

"Meantime the English Government has, on receipt of the latest
reports, decided to adopt this un-English system which has proved a
failure in Germany, declaring now that the entire organisation for the
purpose is in readiness.

"I have still something further to say about the vigorous steps now
being taken in England to further the progress of agriculture in the
country itself. I refrain from going into this, however, as the
measures in question cannot come to anything by next harvest time, nor
can they affect that harvest at all. The winter deficiency can hardly
be balanced, even with the greatest exertions, by the spring. Not
until the 1918 crop, if then, can any success be attained. And between
then and now lies a long road, a road of suffering for England, and
for all countries dependent upon imports for their food supply.

"Everything points to the likelihood that the universal failure of the
harvest in 1916 will be followed by a like universal failure in 1917.
In the United States the official reports of acreage under crops are
worse than ever, showing 63.4, against 78.3 the previous year. The
winter wheat is estimated at only 430 million bushels, as against 492
million bushels for the previous year and 650 million bushels for
1915.

"The prospects, then, for the next year's harvest are poor indeed, and
offer no hope of salvation to our enemies.

"As to our own outlook, this is well known to those present: short,
but safe--for we can manage by ourselves. And to-day we can say that
the war of starvation, that crime against humanity, has turned against
those who commenced it. We hold the enemy in an iron grip. No one can
save them from their fate. Not even the apostles of humanity across
the great ocean, who are now commencing to protect the smaller nations
by a blockade of our neutral neighbours through prohibition of
exports, and seeking thus to drive them, under the lash of starvation,
into entering into the war against us.

"Our enemies are feeling the grip of the fist that holds them by the
neck. They are trying to force a decision. England, mistress of the
seas, is seeking to attain its end by land, and driving her sons by
hundreds of thousands to death and mutilation. Is this the England
that was to have sat at ease upon its island till we were starved into
submission, that could wait till their big brother across the Atlantic
arrived on the scene with ships and million armies, standing fast in
crushing superiority until the last annihilating battle?

"No, gentlemen, our enemies have no longer time to wait. Time is on
our side now. True, the test imposed upon us by the turn of the
world's history is enormous. What our troops are doing to help, what
our young men in blue are doing, stands far above all comparison. But
they will attain their end. For us at home, too, it is hard; not so
hard by far as for them out there, yet hard enough. Those at home must
do their part as well. If we remain true to ourselves, keeping our own
house in order, maintaining internal unity, then we have won existence
and the future for our Fatherland. Everything is at stake. The German
people is called upon now, in these weeks heavy with impending
decision, to show that it is worthy of continued existence."


4

=Speech by Count Czernin to the Austrian Delegation, January 24,
1918.=

"Gentlemen, it is my duty to give you a true picture of the peace
negotiations, to set forth the various phases of the results obtained
up to now, and to draw therefrom such conclusions as are true, logical
and justifiable.

"First of all it seems to me that those who consider the progress of
the negotiations too slow cannot have even an approximate idea of the
difficulties which we naturally had to encounter at every step. I will
in my remarks take the liberty of setting forth these difficulties,
but would like first to point out a cardinal difference existing
between the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk and all others which
have ever taken place in the history of the world. Never, so far as I
am aware, have peace negotiations been conducted with open windows. It
would be impossible that negotiations of the depth and extent of the
present could from the start proceed smoothly and without opposition.
We are faced with nothing less than the task of building up a new
world, of restoring all that the most merciless of all wars has
destroyed and cast down. In all the peace negotiations we know of the
various phases have been conducted more or less behind closed doors,
the results being first declared to the world when the whole was
completed. All history books tell us, and indeed it is obvious enough,
that the toilsome path of such peace negotiations leads constantly
over hill and dale, the prospects appearing often more or less
favourable day by day. But when the separate phases themselves, the
details of each day's proceedings, are telegraphed all over the world
at the time, it is again obvious that nervousness prevailing
throughout the world must act like an electric current and excite
public opinion accordingly. We were fully aware of the disadvantage of
this method of proceeding. Nevertheless we at once agreed to the wish
of the Russian Government in respect of this publicity, desiring to
meet them as far as possible, and also because we had nothing to
conceal on our part, and because it would have made an unfavourable
impression if we had stood firmly by the methods hitherto pursued, of
secrecy until completion. _But the complete publicity in the
negotiations makes it insistent that the great public, the country
behind, and above all the leaders, must keep cool._ The match must be
played out in cold blood, and the end will be satisfactory if the
peoples of the Monarchy support their representatives at the
conference.

"It should be stated beforehand that the basis on which
Austria-Hungary treats with the various newly-constituted Russian
states is that of 'no indemnities and no annexations.' That is the
programme which a year ago, shortly after my appointment as Minister,
I put before those who wished to talk of peace, and which I repeated
to the Russian leaders on the occasion of their first offers of peace.
And I have not deviated from that programme. Those who believe that I
am to be turned from the way which I have set myself to follow are
poor psychologists. I have never left the public in the slightest
doubt as to which way I intended to go, and I have never allowed
myself to be turned aside so much as a hair's breadth from that way,
either to right or left. And I have since become far from a favourite
of the Pan-Germans and of those in the Monarchy who follow the
Pan-German ideas. I have at the same time been hooted as an inveterate
partisan of war by those whose programme is peace at any price, as
innumerable letters have informed me. Neither has ever disturbed me;
on the contrary, the double insults have been my only comfort in this
serious time. I declare now once again that I ask not a single
kreuzer, not a single square metre of land from Russia, and that if
Russia, as appears to be the case, takes the same point of view, then
peace must result. Those who wish for peace at any price might
entertain some doubt as to my 'no-annexation' intentions towards
Russia if I did not tell them to their faces with the same complete
frankness that I shall never assent to the conclusion of a peace going
beyond the lines just laid down. If the Russian delegates demand any
surrender of territory on our part, or any war indemnity, then I shall
continue the war, despite the fact that I am as anxious for peace as
they, or I would resign if I could not attain the end I seek.

"This once said, and emphatically asserted, that there is no ground
for the pessimistic anticipation of the peace falling through, since
the negotiating committees are agreed on the basis of no annexations
or indemnities--and nothing but new instructions from the various
Russian Governments, or their disappearance, could shift that basis--I
then pass to the two great difficulties in which are contained the
reasons why the negotiations have not proceeded as quickly as we all
wished.

"The first difficulty is this: that we are not dealing with _a single_
Russian peace delegation, but with various newly-formed Russian
states, whose spheres of action are as yet by no means definitely
fixed or explained among themselves. We have to reckon with the
following: firstly, the Russia which is administered from St.
Petersburg; secondly, our new neighbour proper, the great State of
Ukraine; thirdly, Finland; and, fourthly, the Caucasus.

"With the first two of these states we are treating directly; that is
to say, face to face; with the two others it was at first in a more or
less indirect fashion, as they had not sent any representative to
Brest-Litovsk. We have then four Russian parties, and four separate
Powers on our own side to meet them. The case of the Caucasus, with
which we ourselves have, of course, no direct questions to settle, but
which, on the other hand, is in conflict with Turkey, will serve to
show the extent of the matter to be debated.

"The point in which we ourselves are most directly interested is that
of the great newly-established state upon our frontiers, Ukraine. In
the course of the proceedings we have already got well ahead with this
delegation. We are agreed upon the aforementioned basis of no
indemnities and no annexations, and have in the main arrived at a
settlement on the point that trade relations are to be re-established
with the new republic, as also on the manner of so doing. But this
very case of the Ukraine illustrates one of the prevailing
difficulties. While the Ukraine Republic takes up the position of
being entirely autonomous and justified in treating independently with
ourselves, the Russian delegation insists that the boundaries between
their territory and that of the Ukraine are not yet definitely fixed,
and that Petersburg is therefore able to claim the right of taking
part in our deliberations with the Ukraine, which claim is not
admitted by the members of the Ukraine delegation themselves. This
unsettled state of affairs in the internal conditions of Russia,
however, gave rise to very serious delays. We have got over these
difficulties, and I hope that in a few days' time we shall be able
once more to resume negotiations.

"As to the position to-day, I cannot say what this may be. I received
yesterday from my representative at Brest-Litovsk the following two
telegrams:

"'Herr Joffe has this evening, in his capacity as President of the
Russian Delegation, issued a circular letter to the delegations of the
four allied Powers in which he states that the Workers' and Peasants'
Government of the Ukrainian Republic has decided to send two delegates
to Brest-Litovsk with instructions to take part in the peace
negotiations on behalf of the central committee of the workers',
soldiers' and peasants' councils of Pan-Ukraine, but also to form a
supplementary part of the _Russian_ delegation itself. Herr Joffe adds
with regard to this that the Russian delegation is prepared to receive
these Ukrainian representatives among themselves. The above statement
is supplemented by a copy of a "declaration" dated from Kharkov,
addressed to the President of the Russian Peace Delegation at Brest,
and emanating from the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the
Ukrainian Republic, proclaiming that the Central Rada at Kiev only
represents the propertied classes, and is consequently incapable of
acting on behalf of the entire Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian
Workers' and Peasants' Government declares that it cannot acknowledge
any decisions arrived at by the delegates of the Central Rada at Kiev
without its participation, but has nevertheless decided to send
representatives to Brest-Litovsk, there to participate as a
supplementary fraction of the Russian Delegation, which they recognise
as the accredited representatives of the Federative Government of
Russia.'

"Furthermore: 'The German translation of the Russian original text of
the communication received yesterday evening from Herr Joffe regarding
the delegates of the Ukrainian Government at Kharkov and the two
appendices thereto runs as follows:

"'To the President of the Austro-Hungarian Peace Delegation.

"'Sir,--In forwarding you herewith a copy of a declaration received by
me from the delegates of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the
Ukrainian Republic, W.M. Schachrai and J.G. Medwjedew, and their
mandates, I have the honour to inform you that the Russian Delegation,
in full agreement with its frequently repeated acknowledgment of the
right of self-determination among all peoples--including naturally the
Ukrainian--sees nothing to hinder the participation of the
representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the
Ukrainian Republic in the peace negotiations, and receives them,
according to their wish, among the personnel of the Russian Peace
Delegation, as accredited representatives of the Workers' and
Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic. In bringing this to
your knowledge, I beg you, sir, to accept the expression of my most
sincere respect.--The President of the Russian Peace Delegation:
A. JOFFE.'

"'Appendix 1. To the President of the Peace Delegation of the Russian
Republic. Declaration.

"'We, the representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of
the Ukrainian Republic, People's Commissary for Military Affairs, W.M.
Schachrai, and the President of the Pan-Ukrainian Central Executive
Committee of the Council of the Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants'
Deputation, J.G. Medwjedew, delegated to proceed to Brest-Litovsk for
the purpose of conducting peace negotiations with the representatives
of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, in full agreement
with the representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of
the Russian Federative Republic, thereby understood the Council of
People's Commissaries, hereby declare as follows: The General
Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central Rada can in no case be
acknowledged as representing the entire Ukrainian people. In the name
of the Ukrainian workers, soldiers and peasants, we declare
categorically that all resolutions formed by the General Secretariat
without our assent will not be accepted by the Ukrainian people,
cannot be carried out, and can in no case be realised.

"'In full agreement with the Council of People's Commissaries, and
thus also with the Delegation of the Russian Workers' and Peasants'
Government, we shall for the future undertake the conduct of the peace
negotiations with the Delegation of the four Powers, together with the
Russian Peace Delegation.

"'And we now bring to the knowledge of the President the following
resolution, passed by the Central Executive Committee of the
Pan-Ukrainian Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies,
on the 30th December, 1917/12th January, 1918:

"'The Central Committee has decided: To delegate Comrade Medwjedew,
President of the Central Executive Committee, and People's Secretary
Satonski and Commissary Schachrai, to take part in the peace
negotiations, instructing them at the same time to declare
categorically that all attempts of the Ukrainian Central Rada to act
in the name of the Ukrainian people are to be regarded as _arbitrary
steps_ on the part of the bourgeois group of the Ukrainian population,
against the will and interests of the working classes of the Ukraine,
and that no resolutions formed by the Central Rada will be
acknowledged either by the Ukrainian Soviet Government or by the
Ukrainian people; that the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government
regards the Council of People's Commissaries as representatives of the
Pan-Russian Soviet Government, and as accordingly entitled to act on
behalf of the entire Russian Federation; and that the delegation of
the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government, sent out for the
purpose of exposing the arbitrary steps of the Ukrainian Central Rada,
will act together with and in full agreement with the Pan-Russian
Delegation.

Copyright (c) 2007. knowncrafts.net. All rights reserved.