Book: In the World War

C >> Count Ottokar Czernin >> In the World War




"'Herewith: The mandate issued by the People's Secretariat of the
Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Republic, 30th December, 1917.

"'Note: People's Secretary for Enlightenment of the People, Wladimir
Petrowitch Satonski, was taken ill on the way, and did not therefore
arrive with us.

"'January, 1918.

"'The President of the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian
Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, E. Medwjedew.

"'The People's Commissary for Military Affairs, Schachrai.

"'A true copy of the original.

"'The Secretary of the Peace Delegation, Leo Karachou.'

"Appendix 2.

"'On the resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Council
of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies of Ukraina, the People's
Secretariat of the Ukrainian Republic hereby appoints, in the name of
the Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraina, the President of the
Central Executive Committee of the Council of Workers', Soldiers' and
Peasants' Deputies of Ukraina, Jesim Gregoriewitch Medwjedew, the
People's Secretary for Military Affairs, Wasili Matwjejewitch
Schachrai, and the People's Secretary for Enlightenment of the People,
Wladimir Petrowitch Satonski, in the name of the Ukrainian People's
Republic, to take part in the negotiations with the Governments of
Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria as to the terms of peace
between the mentioned states and the Russian Federative Republic. With
this end in view the mentioned deputies, Jesim Gregoriewitch
Medwjedew, Wasili Matwjejewitch Schachrai and Wladimir Petrowitch
Satonski are empowered, in all cases where they deem it necessary, to
issue declarations and to sign documents in the name of the Workers'
and Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic. The accredited
representatives of the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government are
bound to act throughout in accordance with the actions of the
accredited representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of
the Russian Federative Republic, whereby is understood the Council of
People's Commissaries.

"'In the name of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the
Ukrainian People's Republic, the People's Secretary for International
Affairs, for Internal Affairs, Military Affairs, Justice, Works,
Commissariat.

"'The Manager of the Secretariat.

"'Kharkov, 30th December, 1917/12th January, 1918.

"'In accordance with the copy.

"'The President of the Russian Peace Delegation, A. Joffe.'

"This is at any rate a new difficulty, since we cannot and will not
interfere in the internal affairs of Russia.

"This once disposed of, however, there will be no further difficulties
to encounter here; we shall, in agreement with the Ukrainian Republic
determine that _the old boundaries between Austria-Hungary and the
former Russia will also be maintained as between ourselves and the
Ukraine._


=Poland=

"As regards Poland, the frontiers of which, by the way, have not yet
been exactly determined, _we want nothing at all from this new state_.
Free and uninfluenced, the population of Poland shall choose its own
fate. For my part I attach no great weight to the _form_ of the
people's vote in this respect; _the more surely it expresses the
general wish of the people, the better I shall be pleased_. For I
desire only the _voluntary_ attachment of Poland; only in the express
_wish_ of Poland itself toward that end can I see any guarantee for
lasting harmony. It is my unalterable conviction that _the Polish
question must not be allowed to delay the signing of peace by a single
day_. If, after peace is arrived at, Poland should wish to approach
us, we will not reject its advances--_the Polish question must not and
shall not endanger the peace itself_.

"I should have been glad if _the Polish Government had been able to
take part in the negotiations_, since in my opinion Poland is _an
independent state_. The Petersburg Government, however, takes the
attitude that the present Polish Government is not entitled to speak
in the name of the country, and does not acknowledge it as competent
to represent the country, and we therefore gave way on this point in
order to avoid possible conflict. The question is certainly one of
importance, but it is more important still in my opinion _to set aside
all difficulties likely to delay the negotiations_.


=German-Russian Differences as to the Occupied Areas=

"The second difficulty to be reckoned with, and one which has been
most widely echoed in the Press, is the _difference of opinion between
our German allies and the Petersburg Government_ anent the
interpretation of _the right of self-determination among the Russian
peoples_; that is to say, in the areas occupied by German troops.
Germany maintains that it _does not aim at any annexation of territory
by force_ from Russia, but, briefly stated, the difference of opinion
is a double one.

"In the first place, Germany rightly maintains that _the numerous
expressions of desire for independence_ on the part of _legislative
corporations, communal representations_, etc., in the occupied areas
should be taken as the _provisional_ basis for the will of the people,
to be _later_ tested by _plebiscite on a broader foundation_, a point
of view which the Russian Government at first was indisposed to agree
to, as it did not consider the existing administrations in Courland
and Lithuania entitled to speak for those provinces any more than in
the case of Poland.

"In the second place, Russia demands that this plebiscite shall take
place _after all German troops and officials have been withdrawn from
the occupied provinces_, while Germany, in reply to this, points out
that if this principle were carried to its utmost limits it would
create a vacuum, which could not fail to bring about at once a state
of complete anarchy and the utmost misery. It should here be noted
that everything in these provinces which to-day renders possible the
life of a state at all is _German property_. Railways, posts and
telegraphs, the entire industry, and moreover the entire
administrative machinery, police, law courts, all are in German hands.
The sudden withdrawal of all this apparatus would, in fact, create a
condition of things which seems _practically impossible to maintain_.

"In both cases it is a question of finding a _middle way_, which
moreover _must be found_.

"_The differences between these two points of view are in my opinion
not great enough to justify failure of the negotiations_.

"But such negotiations cannot be settled from one day to another; they
take time.

"_If once we have attained peace with Russia, then in my opinion the
general peace cannot be long delayed_, despite all efforts on the part
of the Western Entente statesmen. I have learned that some are unable
to understand why I stated in my first speech after the resumption of
negotiations that it was not now a question at Brest of a general
peace, but of a _separate peace with Russia_. This was the necessary
recognition of a plain fact, which Herr Trotski also has admitted
without reserve, and it was necessary, since the negotiations would
have been on a different footing--that is to say, _in a more limited
sphere_--if treating with Russia alone than if it were a case of
treating for a general peace.

"Though I have no illusions in the direction of expecting the fruit of
general peace to ripen in a single night, I am nevertheless convinced
that the fruit _has begun to ripen_, and that it is now only a
question of holding out whether we are to obtain a general honourable
peace or not.


=Wilson's Message=

"I have recently been confirmed in this view by the offer of peace put
forward by the President of the United States of America to the whole
world. This is _an offer of peace_, for in fourteen points Mr. Wilson
sets forth the principles upon which he seeks to establish a general
peace. Obviously, an offer of this nature cannot be expected to
furnish a scheme acceptable in every detail. If that were the case,
then negotiations would be superfluous altogether, and peace could be
arrived at by a simple acceptance, a single assent. This, of course,
is not so.

"_But I have no hesitation in declaring that these last proposals on
the part of President Wilson seem to me considerably nearer the
Austro-Hungarian point of view_, and that there are among his
proposals some which we can even agree to _with great pleasure_.

"If I may now be allowed to go further into these proposals, I must,
to begin with, point out two things:

"So far as the proposals are concerned with _our Allies_--mention is
made of the German possession of _Belgium_ and of the _Turkish
Empire_--I declare that, in fulfilment of our duty to our Allies, I am
firmly determined _to hold out in defence of our Allies to the very
last. The pre-war possessions of our Allies we will defend equally
with our own_. This standpoint is that of all four Allies in complete
reciprocity with ourselves.

"In the second place, I have to point out that I must _politely but
definitely decline_ to consider the Point dealing with our internal
Government. We have in Austria _a parliament elected by general,
equal, direct and secret ballot_. There is not a more democratic
parliament in the world, and this parliament, together with the other
constitutionally admissible factors, has the sole right to decide upon
matters of _Austrian internal affairs_. I speak of _Austria_ only,
because I do not refer to _Hungarian_ internal affairs in the
_Austrian Delegation_. I should not consider it constitutional to do
so. _And we do not interfere in American affairs; but, on the other
hand, we do not wish for any foreign guidance from any state
whatever._ Having said this, I may be permitted, with regard to the
remaining Points, to state as follows:

"As to the Point dealing with the abolition of 'secret diplomacy' and
the introduction of full openness in the negotiations, I have nothing
to say. From my point of view I have _no objection to such public
negotiations so long as full reciprocity_ is the basis of the same,
though I do entertain _considerable doubt_ as to whether, all things
considered, _it is the quickest and most practical method_ of arriving
at a result. Diplomatic negotiations are simply a matter of business.
But it might easily be imagined that in the case, for instance, of
commercial treaties between one country and another it would not be
advisable _to publish incomplete results beforehand_ to the world. In
such negotiations both parties naturally commence by setting their
demands as high as possible in order to climb down gradually, using
this or that expressed demand as matter for _compensation in_ other
ways until finally an _equilibrium of the opposing interests is
arrived at_, a point which must necessarily be reached if agreement is
to be come to at all. If such negotiations were to be carried on with
full publicity, nothing could prevent the general public from
passionately defending every separate clause involved, regarding any
concession as a defeat, even when such clauses had only been advanced
_for tactical reasons_. And when the public takes up any such point
with particular fervour, ultimate agreement may be thereby rendered
impossible or the final agreement may, if arrived at, be regarded as
in itself _a defeat_, possibly by both sides. And this would not
conduce to peaceable relations thereafter; it would, on the contrary,
_increase the friction_ between the states concerned. And as in the
case of commercial treaties, so also with _political_ negotiations,
which deal with political matters.

"If the abolition of secret diplomacy is to mean that _no secret
compacts are to be made_, that no agreements are to be entered upon
without the public knowledge, then I have no objection to the
introduction of this principle. As to how it is to be realised and
adherence thereto ensured, I confess I have no idea at all. Granted
that the governments of two countries are agreed, they will always be
able to make a secret compact without the public being aware of the
fact. These, however, are minor points. I am not one to stick by
formalities, and _a question of more or less formal nature will never
prevent me from coming to a sensible arrangement_.

"Point 1, then, is one that can be discussed.

"Point 2 is concerned with the _freedom of the seas_. In this
postulate the President speaks from the hearts of all, and I can here
_fully and completely share America's desire_, the more so as the
President adds the words, 'outside territorial waters'--that is to
say, we are to understand the freedom of _the open sea_, and there is
thus, of course, no question of any interference by force in the
sovereign rights of our faithful _Turkish_ Allies. Their standpoint in
this respect will be ours.

"Point 3, which is definitely directed against any _future economic
war_, is so right, so sensible, and has so often been craved by
ourselves that I have here again nothing to remark.

"Point 4, which demands _general disarmament_, sets forth in
particularly clear and lucid form the necessity of reducing after this
present war the free competition in armaments to a footing sufficient
for the _internal security_ of states. Mr. Wilson states this frankly
and openly. In my speech at Budapest some months back I ventured to
express the same idea; it forms _part of my political creed_, and I
am most happy to find any other voice uttering the same thought.

"As regards the _Russian clause_, we are already showing in deeds that
we are endeavouring to bring about friendly relations with our
neighbours there.

"With regard to _Italy, Serbia, Roumania and Montenegro_, I can only
repeat my statement already made in the Hungarian Delegation.

"I am not disposed to effect any insurance on the war ventures of our
enemies.

"I am not disposed to make any one-sided concessions to our enemies,
who still obstinately adhere to the standpoint of fighting on until
the final victory; to prejudice permanently the Monarchy by such
concessions, which would give the enemy the invaluable advantage of
being able to carry on the war indefinitely without risk.
(_Applause._)

"Let Mr. Wilson use the great influence he undoubtedly possesses among
his Allies to persuade them on their part to declare _on what
conditions they are willing to treat_; he will then have rendered the
enormous service of having set on foot the _general peace
negotiations_. I am here replying openly and freely to Mr. Wilson, and
I will speak as openly and freely to any who wish to speak for
themselves, but it must necessarily be understood that _time, and the
continuation of the war, cannot but affect the situations here
concerned_.

"I have already said this once before; Italy is a striking example.
Italy had the opportunity before the war of making great territorial
acquisitions without firing a shot. It declined this and entered into
the war; it has lost hundreds of thousands of lives, milliards in war
expenses and values destroyed; it has brought want and misery upon its
own population, and all this _only to lose for ever an advantage which
it might have won_.

"Finally, as regards Point 13, it is an open secret that we are
adherents to the idea of establishing 'an independent Polish State to
include the areas undoubtedly occupied by Polish inhabitants.' On this
point also we shall, I think, soon agree with Mr. Wilson. And if the
President crowns his proposals with the idea of a universal _League of
Nations_ he will hardly meet with any opposition thereto on the part
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

"As will be seen from this comparison of my views with those of Mr.
Wilson, we are not only _agreed in essentials as to the great
principles_ for rearrangement of the world after this war, but _our
ideas as to several concrete questions bearing on the peace are
closely allied_.

"The differences remaining do not appear to me so great but that a
discussion of these points might lead to a clearer understanding and
bring us closer still.

"The situation, then, seems to be this: Austria-Hungary on the one
hand, and the United States of America on the other, are the two Great
Powers in the hostile groups of states whose interests are least
opposed one to the other. It seems reasonable, then, to suppose that
_an exchange of opinion between these two Powers might form the
natural starting point for a conciliatory discussion_ between all
those states which have not yet entered upon peace negotiations.
(_Applause._) So much for Wilson's proposals.


=Petersburg and the Ukraine=

"And now, gentlemen, I hasten to conclude. But this conclusion is
perhaps the most important of all I have to say; I am endeavouring to
bring about peace between the Ukraine and Petersburg.

"The conclusion of peace with Petersburg alters nothing in our
definitive situation. Austro-Hungarian troops are nowhere opposed to
the Petersburg Government--we have the Ukrainian against us--and it is
impossible to export anything from Petersburg, since they have nothing
there themselves but _revolution and anarchy, goods which the
Bolshevists, no doubt, would be glad to export, but which I must
politely decline to receive_.

"In spite of this, I wish to make peace with Petersburg as well, since
this, like any other cessation of hostilities, brings us nearer to the
_general peace_.

"It is otherwise with Ukraine. For the Ukraine has supplies of
provisions which they will export if we can agree on commercial terms.
The question of food is to-day a matter of anxiety throughout the
world; among our opponents, and also in the neutral countries, it is a
burning question. I wish to profit by the conclusion of peace with
those Russian states which have food to export, in order to help our
own population. _We could and would hold out without this assistance._
But I know my duty, and my duty bids me do all that can be done to
lighten the burden of our suffering people, and I will not, therefore,
from any hysterical nervousness about getting to final peace a few
days or a few weeks earlier, throw away this possible advantage to our
people. Such a peace takes time and cannot be concluded in a day. For
such a peace must definitely state whether, what and how the Russian
party will deliver to us, for the reason that the Ukraine on its part
wishes to close the business not after, but at the signing of peace.

"I have already mentioned that the unsettled conditions in this newly
established state occasion great difficulty and naturally considerable
delay in the negotiations.


=Appeal to the Country=

"_If you fall on me from behind, if you force me to come to terms at
once in headlong fashion, we shall gain no economic advantage at all_,
and our people will then be forced to renounce the alleviation which
they should have gained from the peace.

"A surgeon conducting a difficult operation with a crowd behind him
standing watch in hand may very likely complete the operation in
record time, but in all probability the patient would not thank him
for the manner in which it had been carried out.

"If you give our present opponents the impression that we must have
_peace at once, and at any price_, we shall not get so much as a
single measure of grain, and the result will be more or less platonic.
It is no longer by any means a question principally of terminating the
war on the Ukrainian front; neither we nor the Ukrainians themselves
intend to continue the war now that we are agreed upon the
no-annexation basis. It is a question--I repeat it once again--not of
'imperialistic' annexation plans and ideas, but of securing for our
population at last the merited reward of their endurance, and
procuring them those supplies of food for which they are waiting. Our
partners in the deal are good business men and are closely watching to
see _whether you are forcing me to act or not_.

"_If you wish to ruin the peace_, if you are anxious to renounce the
supply of grain, then it would be logical enough to force my hand by
speeches and resolutions, strikes and demonstrations, but not
otherwise. And there is not an atom of truth in the idea that we are
now at such a pass that we must prefer a bad peace without economic
gain rather than a good peace with economic advantages to-morrow.

"The difficulties in the matter of food of late are not due solely to
lack of actual provisions; it is the crises in coal, transport and
organisation which are increasing. _When you at home get up strikes
you are moving in a vicious circle; the strikes increase and aggravate
the crises concerned and hinder the supplies of food and coal._ You
are cutting your own throats in so doing, and all who believe that
peace is accelerated thereby are terribly mistaken.

"It is believed that men in the country have been circulating rumours
to the effect that the Government is instigating the strikes. I leave
to these men themselves to choose whether they are to appear as
_criminal slanderers or as fools_.

"If you had a Government desirous of concluding a peace different
from that desired by the majority of the population, if you had a
Government seeking to prolong the war for purposes of conquest, one
might understand a conflict between the Government and the country.
_But since the Government desires precisely the same as the majority
of the people--that is to say, the speedy settlement of an honourable
peace without annexationist aims--then it is madness to attack that
Government from behind, to interfere with its freedom of action and
hamper its movements._ Those who do so are fighting, not against the
Government, they are fighting blindly against the people they pretend
to serve and against themselves.

"As for yourselves, gentlemen, it is not only your right, but your
duty, to choose between the following alternatives: either you trust
me to proceed with the peace negotiations, and in that case you must
help me, or you do not trust me, and in that case you must depose me.
I am confident that I have the support of the majority of the
Hungarian delegation. The Hungarian Committee has given me a vote of
confidence. If there is any doubt as to the same here, then the matter
is clear enough. The question of a vote of confidence must be brought
up and put to the vote; if I then have the majority against me I shall
at once take the consequences. No one of those who are anxious to
secure my removal will be more pleased than myself; indeed far less
so. Nothing induces me now to retain my office but the sense of duty,
which constrains me to remain as long as I have the confidence of the
Emperor and the majority of the delegations. A soldier with any sense
of decency does not desert. But no Minister for Foreign Affairs could
conduct negotiations of this importance unless he knows, and all the
world as well, that he is endowed with the confidence of the majority
among the constitutional representative bodies. There can be no half
measures here. You have this confidence or you have not. You must
assist me or depose me; there is no other way. I have no more to say."


5

=Report of the Peace Negotiations at Brest-Litovsk=

The Austro-Hungarian Government entered upon the peace negotiations at
Brest-Litovsk with the object of arriving as quickly as possible at a
peace compact which, if it did not, as we hoped, lead to a general
peace, should at least secure order in the East. The draft of a
preliminary peace was sent to Brest containing the following points:

1. Cessation of hostilities; if general peace should not be
concluded, then neither of the present contracting parties to afford
any support to the enemies of the other.

2. No surrender of territory; Poland, Lithuania and Courland retaining
the right of determining their own destiny for the future.

3. No indemnity for costs of war or damages due to military
operations.

4. Cessation of economic war and reparation of damages sustained by
private persons through the economic war.

5. Resumption of commercial intercourse and the same provisionally on
the basis of the old commercial treaty and twenty years' preference
subject to restriction in respect of any Customs union with
neighbouring countries.

6. Mutual assistance in raw materials and industrial articles.

A further point was contemplated, dealing with the evacuation of the
occupied areas, but the formulation of this had to be postponed until
after consultation with the German Supreme Military Command, whose
co-operation was here required owing to the mingling of German and
Austro-Hungarian troops on the Russian front. The Army Command has
indicated a period of at least six months as necessary for the
evacuation.

In discussing this draft with the German delegates two points in
particular were found to present great difficulty. One was that of
evacuation. The German Army Command declared categorically that no
evacuation of the occupied districts could be thought of until after
conclusion of the general peace. The second difficulty arose in
connection with the question as to treatment of the occupied
districts. Germany insisted that in the peace treaty with Russia it
should be simply stated that Russia had conceded to the peoples within
its territory the right of self-determination, and that the nations in
question had already availed themselves of that right. The plain
standpoint laid down in our draft we were unable to carry through,
although it was shared by the other Allies. However, in formulating
the answer sent on December 25, 1916, to the Russian peace proposals a
compromise was, after persistent efforts on our part, ultimately
arrived at which at least prevented the full adoption of the divergent
German point of view on these two points. In the matter of evacuation
the Germans agreed that the withdrawal of certain bodies of troops
before the general peace might be discussed.

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