Book: In the World War

C >> Count Ottokar Czernin >> In the World War




In the matter of annexations a satisfactory manner of formulating this
was found, making it applicable only in the event of general peace.
Had the Entente then been disposed to make peace the principle of "no
annexations" would have succeeded throughout.

Even allowing for the conciliatory form given through our endeavours
to this answer by the four Powers to the Russian proposals, the German
Headquarters evinced extreme indignation. Several highly outspoken
telegrams from the German Supreme Command to the German delegates
prove this. The head of the German Delegation came near to being
recalled on this account, and if this had been done it is likely that
German foreign policy would have been placed in the hands of a firm
adherent of the sternest military views. As this, however, could only
have had an unfavourable effect on the further progress of the
negotiations, we were obliged to do all in our power to retain Herr
Kuehlmann. With this end in view he was informed and invited to advise
Berlin that if Germany persisted in its harsh policy Austria-Hungary
would be compelled to conclude a separate peace with Russia. This
declaration on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs did not
fail to create a certain impression in Berlin, and was largely
responsible for the fact that Kuehlmann was able to remain.

Kuehlmann's difficult position and his desire to strengthen it rendered
the discussion of the territorial questions, which were first
officially touched upon on December 27, but had been already taken up
in private meetings with the Russian delegates, a particularly awkward
matter. Germany insisted that the then Russian front was not to be
evacuated until six months after the general peace. Russia was
disposed to agree to this, but demanded on the other hand that the
fate of Poland was not to be decided until after evacuation. Against
this the Germans were inclined to give up its original standpoint to
the effect that the populations of occupied territories had already
availed themselves of the right of self-determination conceded, and
allow a new inquiry to be made among the population, but insisted that
this should be done during the occupation. No solution could be
arrived at on this point, though Austria-Hungary made repeated efforts
at mediation. The negotiations had arrived at this stage when they
were first interrupted on December 29.

On resuming the negotiations on January 6 the situation was little
changed. Kuehlmann's position was at any rate somewhat firmer than
before, albeit only at the cost of some concessions to the German
military party. In these circumstances the negotiations, in which
Trotski now took part as spokesman for the Russians, led only to
altogether fruitless theoretical discussions and the right of
self-determination, which could not bring about any lessening of the
distance between the two firmly maintained points of view. In order to
get the proceedings out of this deadlock further endeavours were made
on the part of Austria to arrive at a compromise between the German
and Russian standpoints, the more so as it was generally, and
especially in the case of Poland, desirable to solve the territorial
question on the basis of complete self-determination. Our proposals to
the German delegates were to the effect that the Russian standpoint
should so far be met as to allow the plebiscite demanded by the
Russians, this to be taken, as the Germans insisted should be the
case, during the German occupation, but with extensive guarantees for
free expression of the will of the people. On this point we had long
discussions with the German delegates, based on detailed drafts
prepared by us.

Our endeavours here, however, were again unsuccessful. Circumstances
arising at the time in our own country were responsible for this, as
also for the result of the negotiations which had in the meantime been
commenced with the Ukrainian delegates. These last had, at the first
discussion, declined to treat with any Polish representatives, and
demanded the concession of the entire Cholm territory, and, in a more
guarded fashion, the cession of Eastern Galicia and the Ukrainian part
of North-Eastern Hungary, and in consequence of which the negotiations
were on the point of being broken off. At this stage a food crisis
broke out in Austria to an extent of which the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs was hitherto unaware, threatening Vienna in particular with
the danger of being in a few days devoid of flour altogether. Almost
immediately after this came a strike movement of threatening
proportions. These events at home weakened the position of the Foreign
Minister both as regards his attitude towards the German Allies and
towards the opposing parties in the negotiations--with both of which
he was then in conflict--and this, at a most critical moment, to a
degree that can hardly be appreciated from a distance. He was required
to exert pressure upon Germany, and was now forced, not merely to ask,
but to entreat Germany's aid in sending supplies of food, or Vienna
would within a few days be in the throes of a catastrophe. With the
enemy, on the other hand, he was forced, owing to the situation at
home, to strive for a settlement of peace that should be favourable to
Austria, in spite of the fact that our food situation and our labour
troubles were well known to that enemy.

This complete alteration of the position changed the whole basis and
tactics of the Foreign Minister's proceedings. He had to obtain the
supplies of grain asked for from Germany and thus to diminish
political pressure on that country; but at the same time he had to
persuade the Soviet delegates to continue negotiations, and finally to
arrive at a settlement of peace under the most acceptable conditions
possible with the Ukraine, which would put an end to the still serious
difficulties of the food situation.

In these circumstances it was impossible now to work on the German
delegates by talking of Austria-Hungary's concluding a separate peace
with Russia, as this would have imperilled the chance of food supplies
from Germany--the more so as the representative of the German Army
Command had declared that it was immaterial whether Austria-Hungary
made peace or not. Germany would in any case march on Petersburg if
the Russian Government did not give way. On the other hand, however,
the Foreign Minister prevailed on the leader of the Russian delegation
to postpone the carrying out of the intentions of his Government--to
the effect that the Russian delegation, owing to lack of good faith on
the part of German-Austro-Hungarian negotiators, should be recalled.

At the same time the negotiations with the Ukrainian delegation were
continued. By means of lengthy and wearisome conferences we succeeded
in bringing their demands to a footing which might just possibly be
acceptable, and gaining their agreement to a clause whereby Ukraine
undertook to deliver at least 1,000,000 tons of grain by August, 1918.
As to the demand for the Cholm territory, which we had wished to have
relegated to the negotiations with Poland, the Ukrainian delegates
refused to give way on this point, and were evidently supported by
General Hoffmann. Altogether the German military party seemed much
inclined to support Ukrainian demands and extremely indisposed to
accede to Polish claims, so that we were unable to obtain the
admission of Polish representatives to the proceedings, though we had
frequently asked for this. A further difficulty in the way of this was
the fact that Trotski himself was unwilling to recognise the Polish
party as having equal rights here. The only result obtainable was that
the Ukrainians should restrict their claims on the Cholm territory to
those parts inhabited by Ukrainian majority and accept a revision of
the frontier line, as yet only roughly laid down, according to the
finding of a mixed commission and the wishes of the population, i.e.
the principle of national boundaries under international protection.
The Ukrainian delegates renounced all territorial claims against the
Monarchy, but demanded from us on the other hand a guarantee as to the
autonomous development of their co-nationals in Galicia. With regard
to these two weighty concessions, the Foreign Minister declared that
they could only be granted on the condition that the Ukraine fulfilled
the obligation it had undertaken as to delivery of grain, the
deliveries being made at the appointed times; he further demanded that
the obligations on both sides should be reciprocal, i.e. that the
failure of one party to comply therewith should release the other.
The formulation of these points, which met with the greatest
difficulties on the part of Ukraine, was postponed to a later date.

At this stage of the proceedings a new pause occurred to give the
separate delegates time to advise their Governments as to the results
hitherto attained and receive their final instructions. The Foreign
Minister returned to Vienna and reported the state of the negotiations
to the proper quarters. In the course of these deliberations his
policy of concluding peace with Russia and Ukraine on the basis of the
concessions proposed was agreed to. Another question dealt with at the
same time was whether the Monarchy should, in case of extreme
necessity, conclude a separate peace with Russia if the negotiations
with that state should threaten to come to nothing on account of
Germany's demands. This question was, after full consideration of all
grounds to the contrary, answered _in thesi_ in the affirmative, as
the state of affairs at home apparently left no alternative.

On resuming the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk further endeavours were
made to persuade Germany to give way somewhat by pointing out what
would be the consequence of its obstinate attitude. In the course of
the deliberations on this point with Herr Kuehlmann we succeeded after
great difficulty in obtaining the agreement of the German delegates to
a final attempt at compromise, to be undertaken by the Foreign
Minister. The proposals for this compromise were based on the
following considerations:

For months past conflicting views had been expressed as to:

1. Whether in the territories where constitutional alterations were to
be made owing to the war the right of self-determination should be
taken as already exercised, or whether a plebiscite should be taken
first;

2. Whether such plebiscite, if taken, should be addressed to a
constituent body or in the form of a referendum to the people direct;

3. Whether this should be done before or after evacuation; and

4. In what manner it was to be organised (by general franchise, by a
vote of the nobles, etc.). It would be advisable, and would also be in
accordance with the principles adopted by Russia, to leave the
decision on all these points to the people themselves, and deliver
them over to the "temporary self-administrative body," which should,
also according to the Russian proposal (Kameneff), be introduced at
once. The whole of the peace negotiations could then be concentrated
upon a single point: the question as to the composition of this
temporary body. Here, however, a compromise could be arrived at, as
Russia could agree that the already existent bodies set in the
foreground by Germany should be allowed to express a part of the will
of the people, Germany agreeing that these bodies should, during the
occupation, be supplemented by elements appointed, according to the
Russian principles, by free election.

On February 7, immediately after Herr Kuehlmann had agreed to mediation
on this basis, the Foreign Minister saw the leader of the Russian
delegation, Trotski, and had a series of conversations with him. The
idea of compromise on the lines just set forth was little to Trotski's
taste, and he declared that he would in any case protest against the
handling of the self-determination question by the Four Powers. On the
other hand, the discussion did lead to some result, in that a new
basis for disposing of the difficulties which had arisen was now
found. There was to be no further continuance of the conflict as to
whether the territorial alterations involved by the peace should be
termed "annexations," as the Russian delegates wished, or "exercise of
the right of self-determination," as Germany wished; the territorial
alterations were to be simply noted in the peace treaty ("Russia notes
that ..."). Trotski, however, made his acquiescence to the conclusion
of such a compact subject to two conditions: one being that the Moon
Sound Islands and the Baltic ports should remain with Russia; the
other that Germany and Austria-Hungary should not conclude any
separate peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic, whose Government
was then seriously threatened by the Bolsheviks and, according to some
reports, already overthrown by them. The Foreign Minister was now
anxious to arrive at a compromise on this question also, in which he
had to a certain degree the support of Herr von Kuehlmann, while
General Hoffmann most vehemently opposed any further concession.

All these negotiations for a compromise failed to achieve their end
owing to the fact that Herr Kuehlmann was forced by the German Supreme
Army Command to act promptly. Ludendorff declared that the
negotiations with Russia must be concluded within three days, and when
a telegram from Petersburg was picked up in Berlin calling on the
German Army to rise in revolt Herr von Kuehlmann was strictly ordered
not to be content with the cessions already agreed to, but to demand
the further cession of the unoccupied territories of Livonia and
Esthonia. Under such pressure the leader of the German delegation had
not the power to compromise. We then arrived at the signing of the
treaty with Ukraine, which had, after much trouble, been brought to an
end meanwhile. It thus appeared as if the efforts of the Foreign
Minister had proved fruitless. Nevertheless he continued his
discussions with Trotski, but these still led to no result, owing to
the fact that Trotski, despite repeated questioning, persisted in
leaving everything vague till the last moment as to whether he would,
in the present circumstances, conclude any peace with the Four Powers
at all or not. Not until the plenary session of February 10 was this
cleared up; Russia declared for a cessation of hostilities, but signed
no treaty of peace.

The situation created by this declaration offered no occasion for
further taking up the idea of a separate peace with Russia, since
peace seemed to have come _via facta_ already. At a meeting on
February 10 of the diplomatic and military delegates of Germany and
Austria-Hungary to discuss the question of what was now to be done it
was agreed unanimously, save for a single dissentient, that the
situation arising out of Trotski's declarations must be accepted. The
one dissentient vote--that of General Hoffmann--was to the effect that
Trotski's statement should be answered by declaring the Armistice at
an end, marching on Petersburg, and supporting the Ukraine openly
against Russia. In the ceremonial final sitting, on February 11, Herr
von Kuehlmann adopted the attitude expressed by the majority of the
peace delegations, and set forth the same in a most impressive speech.
Nevertheless, a few days later, as General Hoffmann had said, Germany
declared the Armistice at an end, ordered the German troops to march
on Petersburg, and brought about the situation which led to the
signing of the peace treaty. Austria-Hungary declared that we took no
part in this action.


6

=Report of the Peace Negotiations at Bucharest=

The possibility of entering upon peace negotiations with Roumania was
considered as soon as negotiations with the Russian delegations at
Brest-Litovsk had commenced. In order to prevent Roumania itself from
taking part in these negotiations Germany gave the Roumanian
Government to understand that it would not treat with the present King
and the present Government at all. This step, however, was only
intended to enable separate negotiations to be entered upon with
Roumania, as Germany feared that the participation of Roumania in the
Brest negotiations would imperil the chances of peace. Roumania's idea
seemed then to be to carry on the war and gain the upper hand. At the
end of January, therefore, Austria-Hungary took the initiative in
order to bring about negotiations with Roumania. The Emperor sent
Colonel Randa, the former Military Attache to the Roumanian
Government, to the King of Roumania, assuring him of his willingness
to grant Roumania honourable terms of peace.

In connection with the peace negotiations a demand was raised in
Hungarian quarters for a rectification of the frontier line, so as to
prevent, or at any rate render difficult, any repetition of the
invasion by Roumania in 1916 over the Siebenbuergen, despite opposition
on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The strategical
frontier drawn up by the Army Command, which, by the way, was
influenced by considerations not conducive to peace, followed a line
involving the cession to Hungary of Turnu-Severin, Sinaia and several
valuable petroleum districts in Moldavia. Public opinion in Hungary
voiced even further demands. The Hungarian Government was of opinion
that the Parliament would offer the greatest hindrances to any peace
not complying with the general desire in this respect, and leading
Hungarian statesmen, even some among the Opposition parties, declared
the rectification of the frontier to be a condition of peace _sine qua
non_. Wekerle and Tisza in particular took this view. Despite this
serious difference of opinion, the Foreign Minister, in entire
agreement with the Emperor, even before the commencement of the
negotiations in the middle of February, took up the position that
demands connected with the frontier line should not offer any obstacle
to the conclusion of peace. The rectification of the frontier should
only seriously be insisted on as far as could be done on the basis of
a loyal and, for the future, amicable relations with Roumania. Hungary
regarded this lenient attitude on the part of the Foreign Minister
with increasing disapproval. We pointed out that a frontier line
conceding cities and petroleum districts to Hungary would be
unfortunate in every respect. From the point of view of internal
politics, because the number of non-Hungarian inhabitants would be
thereby increased; from the military point of view, because it would
give rise to frontier conflicts with unreliable Roumanian factions;
and, finally, from the point of view of foreign policy, because it
would mean annexations and the transference of population this way and
that, rendering friendly relations with Roumania an impossibility.
Nevertheless, it would be necessary for a time to hold fast by the
frontier line as originally conceived, so that the point could be used
to bring about the establishment in Roumania of a regime amicably
disposed toward the Central Powers. The Foreign Minister was
particularly anxious to see a Marghiloman Cabinet formed, inaugurating
a policy friendly to ourselves. He believed that with such a Cabinet
it would be easier to arrive at a peace of mutual understanding, and
was also resolved to render possible such a peace by extensive
concessions, especially by giving his diplomatic support in the
Bessarabian question. He informed Marghiloman also in writing that he
would be prepared to grant important concessions to a Cabinet of which
he, Marghiloman, was the head, in particular as regards the cession of
inhabited places such as Turnu-Severin and Ocna, on which points he
was willing to give way. When the Marghiloman Cabinet was formed the
Austro-Hungarian demands in respect of the frontier line would,
despite active opposition on the part of the Hungarian Government, be
reduced almost by half. The negotiations with Roumania were
particularly difficult in regard to the question of two places, Azuga
and Busteni. On March 24 Count Czernin prepared to terminate these
negotiations, declaring that he was ready to renounce all claim to
Azuga and Busteni and halve his demands as to the much-debated Lotru
district, provided Marghiloman were willing to arrange the frontier
question on this basis. Marghiloman declared himself satisfied with
this compromise. On the next day, however, it was nevertheless
rejected by the Hungarian Government, and not until after further
telegraphic communication with the Emperor and Wekerle was the assent
of all competent authorities obtained. This had, indeed, been widely
considered in Hungarian circles as an impossibility.

Another Austro-Hungarian demand which played some part in the
Bucharest negotiations was in connection with the plan of an
economical alliance between Austria-Hungary and Roumania. This was of
especial interest to the Austrian Government, whereas the frontier
question, albeit in some degree affecting Austria as well, was a
matter of indifference to this Government, which, as a matter of fact,
did not sympathise with the demands at all. The plan for an economical
alliance, however, met with opposition in Hungary. Immediately before
the commencement of the Bucharest negotiations an attempt was made to
overcome this opposition on the part of the Hungarian Government and
secure its adherence to the idea of an economical alliance with
Roumania--at any rate, conditionally upon the conclusion of a customs
alliance with Germany as planned. It proved impossible, however, at
the time to obtain this assent. The Hungarian Government reserved the
right of considering the question later on, and on March 8 instructed
their representatives at Bucharest that they must dissent from the
plan, as the future economical alliance with Germany was a matter
beyond present consideration. Consequently this question could play no
part at first in the peace negotiations, and all that could be done
was to sound the leading Roumanian personages in a purely private
manner as to the attitude they would adopt towards such a proposal.
The idea was, generally speaking, well received by Roumania, and the
prevalent opinion was that such an alliance would be distinctly
advisable from Roumania's point of view. A further attempt was
therefore made, during the pause in the peace negotiations in the
East, to overcome the opposition of the Hungarian Government; these
deliberations were, however, not concluded when the Minister for
Foreign Affairs resigned his office.

Germany had, even before the commencement of negotiations in
Bucharest, considered the question of imposing on Roumania, when
treating for peace, a series of obligations especially in connection
with the economical relations amounting to a kind of indirect war
indemnity. It was also contemplated that the occupation of Wallachia
should be maintained for five or six years after the conclusion of
peace. Roumania should then give up its petroleum districts, its
railways, harbours and domains to German companies as their property,
and submit itself to a permanent financial control. Austria-Hungary
opposed these demands from the first on the grounds that no friendly
relations could ever be expected to exist with a Roumania which had
been economically plundered to such a complete extent; and
Austria-Hungary was obliged to maintain amicable relations with
Roumania.

This standpoint was most emphatically set forth, and not without some
success, on February 5 at a conference with the Reichskansler. In the
middle of February the Emperor sent a personal message to the German
Emperor cautioning him against this plan, which might prove an obstacle
in the way of peace. Roumania was not advised of these demands until
comparatively late in the negotiations, after the appointment of
Marghiloman. Until then the questions involved gave rise to constant
discussion between Germany and Austria-Hungary, the latter throughout
endeavouring to reduce the German demands, not only with a view to
arriving at a peace of mutual understanding, but also because, if
Germany gained a footing in Roumania on the terms originally
contemplated, Austro-Hungarian economical interests must inevitably
suffer thereby. The demands originally formulated with regard to the
Roumanian railways and domains were then relinquished by Germany, and
the plan of a cession of the Roumanian harbours was altered so as to
amount to the establishment of a Roumanian-German-Austro-Hungarian
harbour company, which, however, eventually came to nothing. The
petroleum question, too, was reduced from a cession to a ninety years'
tenure of the state petroleum districts and the formation of a
monopoly trading company for petroleum under German management.
Finally, an economic arrangement was prepared which should secure the
agricultural products of Roumania to the Central Powers for a series of
years. The idea of a permanent German control of the Roumanian finances
was also relinquished owing to Austro-Hungarian opposition. The
negotiations with Marghiloman and his representatives on these
questions made a very lengthy business. In the economic questions
especially there was great difference of opinion on the subject of
prices, which was not disposed of until the last moment before the
drawing up of the treaty on March 28, and then only by adopting the
Roumanian standpoint. On the petroleum question, where the differences
were particularly acute, agreement was finally arrived at, in face of
the extreme views of the German economical representative on the one
hand and the Roumanian Foreign Minister, Arion, on the other, by a
compromise, according to which further negotiations were to be held in
particular with regard to the trade monopoly for petroleum, and the
original draft was only to apply when such negotiations failed to lead
to any result.

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