Book: In the World War

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The German demands as to extension of the period of occupation for
five to six years after the general peace likewise played a great part
at several stages of the negotiations, and were from the first stoutly
opposed by Austria-Hungary. We endeavoured to bring about an
arrangement by which, on the conclusion of peace, Roumania should have
all legislative and executive power restored, being subject only to a
certain right of control in respect of a limited number of points, but
not beyond the general peace. In support of this proposal the Foreign
Minister pointed out in particular that the establishment of a
Roumanian Ministry amicably disposed towards ourselves would be an
impossibility (the Averescu Ministry was then still in power) if we
were to hold Roumania permanently under our yoke. We should far rather
use every endeavour to obtain what could be obtained from Roumania
through the medium of such politicians in that country as were
disposed to follow a policy of friendly relations with the Central
Powers. The main object of our policy to get such men into power in
Roumania, and enable them to remain in the Government, would be
rendered unattainable if too severe measures were adopted. We might
gain something thereby for a few years, but it would mean losing
everything in the future. And we succeeded also in convincing the
German Secretary of State, Kuehlmann, of the inadvisability of the
demands in respect of occupation, which were particularly voiced by
the German Army Council. As a matter of fact, after the retirement of
Averescu, Marghiloman declared that these demands would make it
impossible for him to form a Cabinet at all. And when he had been
informed, from German sources, that the German Supreme Army Command
insisted on these terms, he only agreed to form a Cabinet on the
assurance of the Austrian Foreign Minister that a solution of the
occupation problem would be found. In this question also we did
ultimately succeed in coming to agreement with Roumania.

One of the decisive points in the conclusion of peace with Roumania
was, finally, the cession of the Dobrudsha, on which Bulgaria insisted
with such violence that it was impossible to avoid it. The ultimatum
which preceded the preliminary Treaty of Buftea had also to be altered
chiefly on the Dobrudsha question, as Bulgaria was already talking of
the ingratitude of the Central Powers, of how Bulgaria had been
disillusioned, and of the evil effects this disillusionment would have
on the subsequent conduct of the war. All that Count Czernin could do
was to obtain a guarantee that Roumania, in case of cession of the
Dobrudsha, should at least be granted a sure way to the harbour of
Kustendje. In the main the Dobrudsha question was decided at Buftea.
When, later, Bulgaria expressed a desire to interpret the wording of
the preliminary treaty by which the Dobrudsha "as far as the Danube"
was to be given up in such a sense as to embrace the whole of the
territory up to the northernmost branch (the Kilia branch) of the
Danube, this demand was most emphatically opposed both by Germany and
Austria-Hungary, and it was distinctly laid down in the peace treaty
that only the Dobrudsha as far as the St. George's branch was to be
ceded. This decision again led to bad feeling in Bulgaria, but was
unavoidable, as further demands here would probably have upset the
preliminary peace again.

The proceedings had reached this stage when Count Czernin resigned his
office.


7

=Wilson's Fourteen Points=

I. Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall
be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy
shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial
waters alike in peace and in war except as the seas may be closed in
whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of
international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the
establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations
consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its
maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will
be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all
colonial claims based upon a strict observance of the principle that
in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the
populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims
of the Government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory, and such a settlement of
all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest
co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an
unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent
determination of her own political development and national policy,
and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations
under institutions of her own choosing; and more than a welcome
assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself
desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the
months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their
comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests,
and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and
restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys
in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve
as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws
which they have themselves set and determined for the government of
their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole
structure and validity of international law is for ever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed, and the invaded portions
restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the
matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world
for nearly 50 years, should be righted in order that peace may once
more be made secure in the interests of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along
clearly recognisable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we
wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the first
opportunity of autonomous development.

XI. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated, occupied
territories restored, Serbia accorded free and secure access to the
sea, and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another
determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of
allegiance and nationality, and international guarantees of the
political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the
several Balkan States should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be
assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are
now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life
and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development,
and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to
the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish State should be erected which should
include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations,
which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose
political and economic independence and territorial integrity should
be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific
covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political
independence and territorial integrity to great and small States
alike.


8

=Ottokar Czernin on Austria's Policy During the War=

_Speech delivered December 11, 1918_

GENTLEMEN,--In rising now to speak of our policy during the war it is
my hope that I may thereby help to bring the truth to light. We are
living in a time of excitement. After four years of war, the bloodiest
and most determined war the world has ever seen, and in the midst of
the greatest revolution ever known, this excitement is only too easily
understood. But the result of this excitement is that all those rumours
which go flying about, mingling truth and falsehood together, end by
misleading the public. It is unquestionably necessary to arrive at a
clear understanding. The public has a right to know what has really
happened, it has the right to know why we did not succeed in attaining
the peace we had so longed for, it has a right to know whether, and if
so where, any neglect can be pointed out, or whether it was the
overwhelming power of circumstances which has led our policy to take
the course it did. The new arrangement of relations between ourselves
and Germany will make an end of all secret proceedings. The day will
come then when, fortunately, all that has hitherto been hidden will be
made clear. As, however, I do not know when all this will be made
public, I am grateful for the opportunity of lifting the veil to-day
from certain hitherto unknown events. In treating of this theme I will
refrain from touching upon those constitutional factors which once
counted for so much, but which do so no longer. I do so because it
seems to me unfair to import into the discussion persons who are now
paying heavily for what they may have done and who are unable to defend
themselves. And I must pay this honourable tribute to the
Austro-Hungarian Press, that it has on the whole sought to spare the
former Emperor as far as possible. There are, of course,
exceptions--_exceptiones firmant regulam_. There are in Vienna, as
everywhere else, men who find it more agreeable to attack, the less if
those whom they are attacking are able to defend themselves. But,
believe me, gentlemen, those who think thus are not the bravest, not
the best, nor the most reliable; and we may be glad that they form so
insignificant a minority.

But, to come to the point. Before passing on to a consideration of the
various phases of the work for peace, I should like to point out two
things: firstly, that since the entry of Italy and Roumania into the
war, and especially since the entry of America, a "victorious peace"
on our part has been a Utopian idea, a Utopia which, unfortunately,
was throughout cherished by the German military party; and, secondly,
that we have never received any offer of peace from the Entente. On
several occasions peace feelers were put forward between
representatives of the Entente and our own; unfortunately, however,
these never led to any concrete conditions. We often had the
impression that we might conclude a separate peace without Germany,
but we were never told the concrete conditions upon which Germany, on
its part, could make peace; and, in particular, we were never informed
that Germany would be allowed to retain its possessions as before the
war, in consequence of which we were left in the position of having to
fight a war of defence for Germany. We were compelled by our treaty to
a common defence of the pre-war possessions, and since the Entente
never declared its willingness to treat with a Germany which wished
for no annexations, since the Entente constantly declared its
intention of annihilating Germany, we were forced to defend Germany,
and our position in Berlin was rendered unspeakably more difficult.
We ourselves, also, were never given any assurance that we should be
allowed to retain our former possessions; but in our case the desire
for peace was so strong that we would have made territorial
concessions if we had been able thereby to secure general peace. This,
however, was not the case. Take Italy, for instance, which was
primarily at war with ourselves and not with Germany. If we had
offered Italy concessions however great, if we had offered all that
Italy has now taken possession of, even then it could not have made
peace, being bound by duty to its Allies and by circumstances not to
make peace until England and France made peace with Germany.

When, then, peace by sacrifice was the only peace attainable,
obviously, as a matter of principle, there were two ways of reaching
that end. One, a general peace, i.e. including Germany, and the other,
a separate peace. Of the overwhelming difficulties attending the
former course I will speak later; at present a few words on the
question of separate peace.

I myself would never have made a separate peace. I have never, not
even in the hour of disillusionment--I may say of despair at my
inability to lead the policy of Berlin into wiser channels--even in
such hours, I say, I have never forgotten that our alliance with the
German Empire was no ordinary alliance, no such alliance as may be
contracted by two Emperors or two Governments, and can easily be
broken, but an alliance of blood, a blood-brotherhood between the ten
million Austro-Germans and the seventy million of the Empire, which
could not be broken. And I have never forgotten that the military
party in power at that time in Germany were not the German people, and
that we had allied ourselves with the German people, and not with a
few leading men. But I will not deny that in the moments when I saw my
policy could not be realised I did ventilate the idea of suggesting to
the Emperor the appointment, in my stead, of one of those men who saw
salvation in a separation from Germany. But again and again I
relinquished this idea, being firmly convinced that separate peace was
a sheer impossibility. The Monarchy lay like a great block between
Germany and the Balkans. Germany had great masses of troops there from
which it could not be cut off, it was procuring oil and grain from the
Balkans; if we were to interpose between it and the Balkans we should
be striking at its most sensitive vital nerve. Moreover, the Entente
would naturally have demanded first of all that we joined in the
blockade, and finally our secession would automatically have involved
also that of Bulgaria and Turkey. Had we withdrawn, Germany would have
been unable to carry on the war. In such a situation there can be no
possibility of doubt but that the German Army Command would have flung
several divisions against Bohemia and the Tyrol, meting out to us the
same fate which had previously befallen Roumania. The Monarchy,
Bohemia in particular, would at once have become a scene of war. But
even this is not all. Internally, such a step would at once have led
to civil war. The Germans of Austria would never have turned against
their brothers, and the Hungarians--Tisza's Hungarians--would never
have lent their aid to such a policy. _We had begun the war in common,
and we could not end it save in common._ For us there was no way out
of the war; we could only choose between fighting with Germany against
the Entente, or fighting with the Entente against Germany until
Germany herself gave way. A slight foretaste of what would have
happened was given us through the separatist steps taken by Andrassy
at the last moment. This utterly defeated, already annihilated and
prostrate Germany had yet the power to fling troops toward the Tyrol,
and had not the revolution overwhelmed all Germany like a
conflagration, smothering the war itself, I am not sure but that the
Tyrol might at the last moment have been harried by war. And,
gentlemen, I have more to say. The experiment of separate peace would
not only have involved us in a civil war, not only brought the war
into our own country, but even then the final outcome would have been
much the same. The dissolution of the Monarchy into its component
national parts was postulated throughout by the Entente. I need only
refer to the Conference of London. But whether the State be dissolved
by way of reward to the people or by way of punishment to the State
makes little difference; the effect is the same. In this case also a
"German Austria" would have arisen, and in such a development it would
have been hard for the German-Austrian people to take up an attitude
which rendered them allies of the Entente. In my own case, as Minister
of the Imperial and Royal Government, it was my duty also to consider
dynastic interests, and I never lost sight of that obligation. But I
believe that in this respect also the end would have been the same. In
particular the dissolution of the Monarchy into its national elements
by legal means, against the opposition of the Germans and Hungarians,
would have been a complete impossibility. And the Germans in Austria
would never have forgiven the Crown if it had entered upon a war with
Germany; the Emperor would have been constantly encountering the
powerful Republican tendencies of the Czechs, and he would have been
in constant conflict with the King of Serbia over the South-Slav
question, an ally being naturally nearer to the Entente than the
Habsburgers. And, finally, the Hungarians would never have forgiven
the Emperor if he had freely conceded extensive territories to Bohemia
and to the South-Slav state; I believe, then, that in this confusion
the Crown would have fallen, as it has done in fact. _A separate peace
was a sheer impossibility._ There remained the second way: to make
peace jointly with Germany. Before going into the difficulties which
rendered this way impossible I must briefly point out wherein lay our
great dependence upon Germany. First of all, in military respects.
Again and again we were forced to rely on aid from Germany. In
Roumania, in Italy, in Serbia, and in Russia we were victorious with
the Germans beside us. We were in the position of a poor relation
living by the grace of a rich kinsman. But it is impossible to play
the mendicant and the political adviser at the same time, particularly
when the other party is a Prussian officer. In the second place, we
were dependent upon Germany owing to the state of our food supply.
Again and again we were here also forced to beg for help from Germany,
because the complete disorganisation of our own administration had
brought us to the most desperate straits. We were forced to this by
the hunger blockade established, on the one hand, by Hungary, and on
the other by the official authorities and their central depots. I
remember how, when I myself was in the midst of a violent conflict
with the German delegates at Brest-Litovsk, I received orders from
Vienna to bow the knee to Berlin and beg for food. You can imagine,
gentlemen, for yourselves how such a state of things must weaken a
Minister's hands. And, thirdly, our dependence was due to the state of
our finances. In order to keep up our credit we were drawing a hundred
million marks a month from Germany, a sum which during the course of
the war has grown to over four milliards; and this money was as
urgently needed as were the German divisions and the German bread.
And, despite this position of dependence, the only way to arrive at
peace was by leading Germany into our own political course; that is to
say, persuading Germany to conclude a peace involving sacrifice. _The
situation all through was simply this: that any momentary military
success might enable us to propose terms of peace which, while
entailing considerable loss to ourselves, had just a chance of being
accepted by the enemy._ The German military party, on the other hand,
increased their demands with every victory, and it was more hopeless
than ever, after their great successes, to persuade them to adopt a
policy of renunciation. I think, by the way, that there was a single
moment in the history of this war when such an action would have had
some prospect of success. I refer to the famous battle of Goerlitz.
Then, with the Russian army in flight, the Russian forts falling like
houses of cards, many among our enemies changed their point of view.
I was at that time still our representative in Roumania. Majorescu was
then not disinclined to side with us actively, and the Roumanian army
moved forward toward Bessarabia, could have been hot on the heels of
the flying Russians, and might, according to all human calculations,
have brought about a complete debacle. It is not unlikely that the
collapse which later took place in Russia might have come about then,
and after a success of that nature, with no "America" as yet on the
horizon, we might perhaps have brought the war to an end. Two things,
however, were required: in the first place, the Roumanians demanded,
as the price of their co-operation, a rectification of the Hungarian
frontier, and this first condition was flatly refused by Hungary; the
second condition, which naturally then did not come into question at
all, would have been that we should even then, after such a success,
have proved strong enough to bear a peace with sacrifice. We were not
called upon to agree to this, but the second requirement would
undoubtedly have been refused by Germany, just as the first had been
by Hungary. I do not positively assert that peace would have been
possible in this or any other case, but I do positively maintain that
during my period of office _such a peace by sacrifice was the utmost
we and Germany could have attained_. The future will show what
superhuman efforts we have made to induce Germany to give way. That
all proved fruitless was not the fault of the German people, nor was
it, in my opinion, the fault of the German Emperor, but that of the
leaders of the German military party, which had attained such enormous
power in the country. Everyone in Wilhelmstrasse, from Bethmann to
Kuehlmann, wanted peace; but they could not get it simply because the
military party got rid of everyone who ventured to act otherwise than
as they wished. This also applies to Bethmann and Kuehlmann. The
Pan-Germanists, under the leadership of the military party, could not
understand that it was possible to die through being victorious, that
victories are worthless when they do not lead to peace, that
territories held in an iron grasp as "security" are valueless
securities as long as the opposing party cannot be forced to redeem
them. There were various shades of this Pan-Germanism. One section
demanded the annexation of parts of Belgium and France, with an
indemnity of milliards; others were less exorbitant, but all were
agreed that peace could only be concluded with an extension of German
possessions. It was the easiest thing in the world to get on well with
the German military party so long as one believed in their fantastic
ideas and took a victorious peace for granted, dividing up the world
thereafter at will. But if anyone attempted to look at things from
the point of view of the real situation, and ventured to reckon with
the possibility of a less satisfactory termination of the war, the
obstacles then encountered were not easily surmounted. We all of us
remember those speeches in which constant reference was always made to
a "stern peace," a "German peace," a "victorious peace." For us, then,
the possibility of a more favourable peace--I mean a peace based on
mutual understanding--I have never believed in the possibility of a
victorious peace--would only have been acute in the case of Poland and
the Austro-Polish question. But I cannot sufficiently emphasise the
fact that the Austro-Polish solution never was an obstacle in the way
of peace and could never have been so. There was only the idea that
Austrian Poland and the former Russian Poland might be united and
attached to the Monarchy. It was never suggested that such a step
should be enforced against the will of Poland itself or against the
will of the Entente. There was a time when it looked as if not only
Poland but also certain sections among the Entente were not
disinclined to agree to such a solution.

But to return to the German military party. This had attained a degree
of power in the State rarely equalled in history, and the rarity of
the phenomenon was only exceeded by the suddenness of its terrible
collapse. The most striking personality in this group was General
Ludendorff. Ludendorff was a great man, a man of genius, in
conception, a man of indomitable energy and great gifts. But this man
required a political brake, so to speak, a political element in the
Wilhelmstrasse capable of balancing his influence, and this was never
found. It must fairly be admitted that the German generals achieved
the gigantic, and there was a time when they were looked up to by the
people almost as gods. It may be true that all great strategists are
much alike; they look to victory always and to nothing else. Moltke
himself, perhaps, was nothing more, but he had a Bismarck to maintain
equilibrium. We had no such Bismarck, and when all is said and done it
was not the fault of Ludendorff, or it is at any rate an excuse for
him, that he was the only supremely powerful character in the whole of
Germany, and that in consequence the entire policy of the country was
directed into military channels. Ludendorff was a great patriot,
desiring nothing for himself, but seeking only the happiness of his
country; a military genius, a hard man, utterly fearless--and for all
that a misfortune in that he looked at the whole world through Potsdam
glasses, with an altogether erroneous judgment, wrecking every attempt
at peace which was not a peace by victory. Those very people who
worshipped Ludendorff when he spoke of a victorious peace stone him
now for that very thing; Ludendorff was exactly like the statesmen of
England and France, who all rejected compromise and declared for
victory alone; in this respect there was no difference between them.
The peace of mutual understanding which I wished for was rejected on
the Thames and on the Seine just as by Ludendorff himself. I have said
this already. According to the treaty it was our undoubted duty to
carry on a defensive war to the utmost and reciprocally to defend the
integrity of the State. It is therefore perfectly obvious that I could
never publicly express any other view, that I was throughout forced to
declare that we were fighting for Alsace-Lorraine just as we were for
Trentino, that I could not relinquish German territory to the Entente
so long as I lacked the power to persuade Germany herself to such a
step. But, as I will show, the most strenuous endeavours were made in
this latter direction. And I may here in parenthesis remark that our
military men throughout refrained from committing the error of the
German generals, and interfering in politics themselves. It is
undoubtedly to the credit of our Emperor that whenever any tendency to
such interference appeared he quashed it at once. But in particular I
should point out that the Archduke Frederick confined his activity
solely to the task of bringing about peace. He has rendered most
valuable service in this, as also in his endeavours to arrive at
favourable relations with Germany.

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