Book: In the World War

C >> Count Ottokar Czernin >> In the World War




All who will not admit the argument, I would refer to a fact which it
would be difficult to evade. Six months afterwards, when there was
already clear evidence of the German collapse, when Andrassy declared
a separate peace, the _Germans, as a matter of fact, threw troops into
the Tyrol_. If they, when utterly exhausted, defeated, and ruined,
with revolution at their back, still held firmly to this decision and
endeavoured to make a battlefield on Austrian territory, how much more
would they have done that six months earlier, when they still stood
full of proud defiance and their generals dreamed of victory and
triumph? What I, secondly, also would maintain is that the immediate
consequence of a separate peace would have been the conversion of
Austria-Hungary into a theatre of war. The Tyrol, as well as Bohemia,
would have become fields of battle.

If it be maintained now that the great exhaustion from the war that
prevailed throughout the Monarchy before April, 1917, had caused the
entire population of the former Monarchy to rally round the Minister
who had concluded the separate peace, it is a conscious or unconscious
untruth. Certainly the Czechs were decidedly against Germany, and it
would not have been reasons of political alliance that would have
prevented them from agreeing. But I would like to know what the Czech
people would have said if Bohemia had been turned into a theatre of
war and exposed to all the sufferings endured by this and all other
peoples, and when to it had been added the devastation of the
fatherland, for, let there be no doubt about it, the troops advancing
with flying colours from Saxony would have made their way to Prague
and penetrated even farther. We had no military forces in Bohemia; we
should not have been able to check the advance, and quicker than
either we or the Entente could have sent troops worth mentioning to
Bohemia, the Germans, drawing troops from their wellnigh
inexhaustible reserves, would have marched either against us or
against the Entente on our territory. The German-Austrian public would
not have been in agreement with such a Minister; the German
Nationalists and the German _bourgeoisie_ have no say in the matter.

On October 28 the German Nationalists published their own particular
point of view in the following manner:

"The members of the German Nationalist parties were highly
indignant at the way in which Count Andrassy answered Wilson's
Note. Count Andrassy came from Hungary, and neither came to any
agreement with the Imperial German Government nor with the
representatives of the Executive Committee before drawing up the
Note. Although the peace negotiations were most warmly welcomed
and considered most necessary, still the one-sided action of Count
Andrassy in dispatching the Note to Wilson without previous
arrangement with the German Empire has roused the greatest
indignation in the German parties. A few days ago a delegation
from the German Executive Committee was in Berlin and was
favourably received by the German Imperial Government in the
matter of providing for German-Austria. Although German soldiers
fought by the side of ours in the Alps and the Carpathians, the
alliance has now been violated by this effort to approach Wilson
without the consent of the German Empire, as is expressly stated
in the Note. Besides which, no previous agreement with the
representatives of the German Executive Committee was sought for.
They were ignored and the answer was sent to Wilson. The German
Nationalist parties strongly protest against such an
_unqualifiable act_ and will insist in the German Executive
Committee that German-Austria's right of self-determination be
unconditionally upheld and peace be secured in concert with the
German Empire."

Neither would the German-Austrian Social Democrats have been a party
to such a movement.

A conscious and intended misrepresentation of fact lies before us if
it be maintained to-day that either the National Assembly or the
Austrian Social Democrats would have approved of and supported such
policy. I again have in mind the Andrassy days.

On October 30 the National Assembly took up its position for action.
Dr. Sylvester drew up the report and pointed out the following:

"It was, however, neither necessary nor desirable to make the
attempt in such a way as to create an incurable rupture between
German-Austria and the German Empire that would endanger the
future of our people. The German-Austrian National Assembly
asserts that the Note of October 27 from the Royal and Imperial
Minister for Foreign Affairs was drawn up and dispatched to
President Wilson without in any way coming to an agreement with
the representatives of the German-Austrian people. The National
Assembly protests all the more insistently against this proceeding
as the nation to which the present Minister for Foreign Affairs
belongs has expressly refused any joint dealings. The National
Assembly states that it and its organs alone have the right to
represent the German-Austrian people in all matters relating to
foreign affairs and particularly in all peace negotiations."

The protest met with no opposition in the National Assembly.

Afterwards the chairman, Dr. Ellenbogen, the Social Democrat, spoke as
follows:

"Instead of now telling the German Emperor that his remaining in
office is the greatest obstacle to peace" (loud applause from the
Social Democrats), "and if there ever were an object in Curtius's
famous leap, it would be comprehensible now were the German
Emperor to copy it to save his people, this coalition now seizes
the present moment to break away from Germany and in doing so
attacks German democracy in the rear. Those gentlemen arrived too
late to gain any profit from the peace. What now remains is the
_bare and shameful breach of faith_, the thanks of the House of
Austria, so styled by a celebrated German poet." (Applause from
the Social Democrats and the German Radicals.)

It was the attack on the separate peace that furnished the exceptional
opportunity for Social Democrats and German Radicals to unite in
common applause, probably the first instance of such a thing in all
these years of war.

If that could happen at a moment when it already was obvious that
there was no longer a possibility of making a peace of understanding
together with Germany--what would have happened, I ask, at a time
when this was by no means so clear to the great majority of the
population; at a time when it was still far from certain, or, at
least, not to be proved mathematically, that we in time and together
with Germany might still be able to conclude a peace of understanding?
Disbandment at the front, where all would be fighting against all,
civil war in the interior--such would have been the result of a
separate peace. And all that in order finally to impose on us the
resolutions passed in London! For never--as I shall presently
show--had the Entente given up their decision, as they were bound to
Italy, and Italy would allow of no change. Such a policy would have
been as suicide from the sheer fear of death.

In 1917 I once discussed the whole question with the late Dr. Victor
Adler, and pointed out to him the probabilities ensuing from a
separate peace.

Dr. Adler replied: "For God's sake, do not plunge us into a war with
Germany!" After the entry of Bavarian troops into the Tyrol (Adler was
then a secretary in the Foreign Affairs department) he reminded me of
our conversation, and added: "The catastrophe we spoke of then has
arrived. The Tyrol will become a theatre of war."

Everyone in Austria wished for peace. No one wanted a new war--and a
separate peace would have brought about not peace, but a new war with
Germany.

In Hungary, Stephen Tisza ruled with practically unlimited powers; he
was far more powerful than the entire Wekerle Ministry put together.
As applied to Hungary, a separate peace would also have meant the
carrying out of the Entente aims; that is, the loss of the largest and
richest territories in the north and south of Czecho-Slovakia,
Roumania and Serbia. Is there anyone who can honestly maintain that
the Hungarians in 1917 would have agreed to these sacrifices without
putting up the bitterest resistance? Everyone who knows the
circumstances must admit that in this case Tisza would have had the
whole of Hungary behind him in a fierce attack on Vienna. Soon after I
took office I had a long and very serious conversation with him on
the German and the peace questions. Tisza pointed out that the Germans
were difficult to deal with; they were arrogant and despotic; yet
without them we could not bring the war to an end. The proposal to
cede Hungarian territory (Transylvania) and also the plan to enforce
an internal Hungarian reform in favour of the subject nationalities
were matters that were not capable of discussion. The congress in
London in 1915 had adopted resolutions that were quite mad and never
could be realised, and the desire for destruction prevailing in the
Entente could only be suppressed by force. In all circumstances, we
must keep our place by the side of Germany. In Hungary are many
different currents of feeling--but the moment that Vienna prepared to
sacrifice any part of Hungary, the whole country would rise as one man
against such action. In that respect there was no difference between
him--Tisza--and Karolyi. Tisza alluded to Karolyi's attitude before
the Roumanian declaration of war, referred to the attitude of
Parliament, and said that if peace were to be made behind Hungary's
back she would separate from Austria and act independently.

I replied that there was no question either of separating from Germany
or of ceding any Hungarian territory, but that we must be quite clear
as to what we had to guard should we be carried further through the
German lust of conquest.

Thereupon Tisza pointed out that the situation was different. It was
not known for certain what had been determined at the conference in
London (the protocol had not then been published), but that Hungarian
territory was promised to Roumania was just as certain as that the
Entente was planning to intervene in Hungarian internal affairs, and
both contingencies were equally unacceptable. Were the Entente to give
Hungary a guarantee for the _status quo ante_ and to desist from any
internal interference it would alter the situation. Until then he must
declare against any attempt at peace.

The conversation as it proceeded became more animated, owing
particularly to my accusing him of viewing all politics from a
Hungarian point of view, which he did not deny, though he maintained
that the dispute was a mere platonic one, as the Entente peace terms
appeared to be such that Austria would be left with much less than
Hungary. I was also first to state the terms under which we could make
peace; then only would it be seen whether extreme pressure brought to
bear on Germany were advisable or not. There was no sense in Germany's
advocating peace if she intended to continue fighting. For Germany was
fighting above all for the integrity of the Monarchy, which would be
lost the moment Germany laid down her arms. Whatever German
politicians and generals said was of little consequence. As long as
England remained bent on satisfying her Allies with our territory,
Germany was the only protection against these plans.

Tisza had no desire for conquest beyond a frontier protection from
Roumania, and he was decidedly opposed to the dismemberment of new
states (Poland); that would be to weaken not to strengthen Hungary.

After a lengthy discussion we agreed to bind ourselves to the
following policy:


(1) So long, as the determination made at the conference in
London, i.e. the destruction of the Monarchy, continues to
be the Entente's objective, we must fight on in the certain
hope of crushing that spirit of destruction.

(2) But as our war is purely a defensive war, it will on no
account be carried on for purposes of conquest.

(3) Any semblance of the weakening of our allied relations must be
avoided.

(4) No concession of Hungarian territory may take place without
the knowledge of the Prime Minister.

(5) Should the Austrian Ministry agree with the Foreign Minister
respecting a cession of Austrian territory, the Hungarian
Prime Minister will naturally acquiesce.

When the conference in London and the destruction of the Monarchy came
into question, Tisza was entirely in the right, and that he otherwise
to the end adhered to his standpoint is proved on the occasion of his
last visit to the Southern Slavs, which he undertook at the request of
the Emperor immediately before the collapse, and when in the most
marked manner he showed himself to be opposed to the aspirations of
the Southern Slavs.

Whoever attempts to judge in objective fashion must not, when looking
back from to-day, relegate all that has since happened to former
discernible facts, but should consider that, in spite of all pessimism
and all fears, the hopes of a reasonable peace of understanding, even
though involving sacrifices, still existed, and that it was impossible
to plunge the Monarchy into a catastrophe at once for fear of its
coming later.

If the situation is described to-day as though the inhabitants of the
Monarchy, and especially the Social Democrats, were favourably
disposed for any eventuality, even for a separate peace, I must again
most emphatically repudiate it. I bear in mind that Social Democracy
without doubt was the party most strongly in favour of peace, and also
that Social Democracy in Germany, as with us, repeatedly stated that
there were certain limits to its desire for peace. The German Social
Democrats never agreed that Alsace-Lorraine ought to be given up, and
never have our Social Democrats voted for ceding Trieste, Bozen and
Meran. This would in any case have been the price of peace--and also
the price of a separate peace--for, as I have already pointed out, at
the conference in London, which dates back to 1915, binding
obligations had been entered into for the partition of the Monarchy,
while all that had been promised to Italy.

The fall of the Monarchy was quite inevitable, whether through the
separation from Germany or through the vacillation in the Entente
ranks--for the claims of the Italians, the Roumanians, the Serbians,
and the Czechs had all been granted. In any case the Monarchy would
have fallen and German-Austria have arisen as she has done now; and I
doubt whether the part played by that country during the proceedings
would have recommended it to the special protection of the Entente.
It is a very great mistake, whether conscious or unconscious, to
believe and to maintain that the population of German-Austria, and
especially the present leaders of Social Democracy, are devoid of any
strong national feeling. I refer to the part played by the Austrian
Social Democracy in the question of union. It was the motive power in
the union with Germany, and the papers repeated daily that no material
advantages which the Entente could offer to Austria could alter the
decision. How, therefore, can this same Social Democracy, whose entire
political views and aims are subordinate to the desire for a union
with Germany--how can this Social Democracy demand a policy which,
without doubt, must lead not only to a separation from Germany, but to
a fratricidal war with the German nation? And why condemn the
upholding of allied relations when Andrassy was abused for doing the
opposite?

But what was the situation in March, 1918, shortly before my
resignation? Germany stood at the height of her success. I do not
pretend to say that her success was real. In this connection that is
of no moment; but the Germans were persuaded that they were quite near
a victorious end, that after leaving the Eastern front they would
throw themselves on to the Western front, and that the war would end
before America had time to come in. Their reckoning was at fault, as
we all know to-day. But for the German generals the will to victory
was the leading spirit, and all decisions arrived at by Germany
against the defection of Austria-Hungary proceeded from that dominant
influence.

As already mentioned, I stated in my speech of December 11, on foreign
policy, that neither the Entente nor Germany would conclude a peace of
renunciation. Since then I have had opportunity to speak with several
men of the Entente, and consequent on the views that I obtained, I
feel I must formulate my previous opinion in still stronger terms. I
came to the firm conclusion that the Entente--England above all--from
the summer of 1917 at any rate, had formed an unbending resolve to
shatter Germany.

From that time onwards England, with the obstinacy which is her chief
characteristic, appears to have been determined not to treat further
with Germany, nor to sheathe her sword until Germany lay crushed to
earth. It makes no difference in the matter that the German military
party--though for other reasons--from a total misconception of their
chances of victory, steadily refused a peace involving sacrifice at a
time when it might have been possible. This is an historical fact, but
as an upholder of truth I must distinctly state that I doubt whether
concessions would have changed the fate of Germany. _We_ could have
gone over to the enemy--in 1917 and also in 1918; we could have fought
against Germany with the Entente on Austro-Hungarian soil, and would
doubtless have hastened Germany's collapse; but the wounds which
Austria-Hungary would have received in the fray would not have been
less serious than those from which she is now suffering: she would
have perished in the fight against Germany, as she has as good as
perished in her fight allied with Germany.

_Austria-Hungary's watch had run down._ Among the few statesmen who in
1914 wished for war--like Tschirsky, for instance--there can have been
none who after a few months had not altered and regretted his views.
They, too, had not thought of a world war. I believe to-day,
nevertheless, that even without the war the fall of the Monarchy would
have happened, and that the assassination in Serbia was the first
step.

The Archduke Heir Apparent was the victim of Greater Serbia's
aspirations; but these aspirations, which led to the breaking away of
our Southern Slav provinces, would not have been suppressed, but, on
the contrary, would have largely increased and asserted themselves,
and would have strengthened the centrifugal tendencies of other
peoples within the Monarchy.

Lightning at night reveals the country for a second, and the same
effect was produced by the shots fired at Sarajevo. It became obvious
that the signal for the fall of the Monarchy had been given. The bells
of Sarajevo, which began to toll half an hour after the murder,
sounded the death knell of the Monarchy.

The feeling among the Austrian people, and especially at Vienna, was
very general that the outrage at Sarajevo was a matter of more
importance than the murder of an Imperial prince and his wife, and
that it was the alarm signal for the ruin of the Habsburg Empire.

I have been told that during the period between the assassination and
the war, warlike demonstrations were daily occurrences in the Viennese
restaurants and people's parks; patriotic and anti-Serbian songs were
sung, and Berchtold was scoffed at because he could not "exert himself
to take any energetic steps." This must not be taken as an excuse for
any eventual mistakes on the part of the leaders of the nation, for a
leading statesman ought not to allow himself to be influenced by the
man in the street. It is only to prove that the spirit developed in
1914 appears to have been very general. And it may perhaps be
permitted to add this comment: how many of those who then clamoured
for war and revenge and demanded "energy," would, now that the
experiment has totally failed, severely criticise and condemn
Berchtold's "criminal behaviour"?

It is, of course, impossible to say in what manner the fall of the
Monarchy would have occurred had war been averted. Certainly in a less
terrible fashion than was the case through the war. Probably much more
slowly, and doubtless without dragging the whole world into the
whirlpool. We were bound to die. We were at liberty to choose the
manner of our death, and we chose the most terrible.

Without knowing it, we lost our independence at the outbreak of war.
We were transformed from a subject into an object.

This unfortunate war once started, we were powerless to end it. At the
conference in London the death sentence had been passed on the Empire
of the Habsburgs and a separate peace would have been no easier a form
of death than that involved in holding out at the side of our Allies.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Supposed to be the Counts Berchtold, Tisza and Stuergkh and General
Conrad von Hohendorf.

[2] See Appendix, p. 325.

[3] See page 275.




CHAPTER II

KONOPISCHT


1

Konopischt has become the cradle of manifold legends. The lord of the
castle was the first victim of the terrible world conflagration, and
the part that he played before the war has been the subject of much
and partly erroneous commentary.

The Archduke and heir to the throne was a man of a very peculiar
nature. The main feature of his character was a great lack of balance.
He knew no middle course and was just as eager to hate as to love. He
was unbalanced in everything; he did nothing like other people, and
what he did was done in superhuman dimensions. His passion for buying
and collecting antiquities was proverbial and fabulous. A first-rate
shot, sport was for him a question of murdering _en masse_, and the
number of game shot by him reached hundreds of thousands. A few years
before his death he shot his 5,000th stag.

His ability as a good shot was phenomenal. When in India, during his
voyage round the world, and while staying with a certain Maharajah, an
Indian marksman gave an exhibition of his skill. Coins were thrown
into the air which the man hit with bullets. The Archduke tried the
same and beat the Indian. Once when I was staying with him at
Eckartsau he made a _coup double_ at a stag and a hare as they ran; he
had knocked over a fleeing stag, and when, startled by the shot, a
hare jumped up, he killed it with the second bullet. He scorned all
modern appliances for shooting, such as telescopic sights or automatic
rifles; he invariably used a short double-barrelled rifle, and his
exceptionally keen sight rendered glasses unnecessary.

The artistic work of laying out parks and gardens became in latter
years his dominating passion. He knew every tree and every bush at
Konopischt, and loved his flowers above everything. He was his own
gardener. Every bed and every group was designed according to his
exact orders. He knew the conditions essential to the life of each
individual plant, the quality of the soil required; and even the
smallest spot to be laid out or altered was done according to his
minute instructions. But here, too, everything was carried out on the
same gigantic lines, and the sums spent on that park must have been
enormous. Few people had the varied artistic knowledge possessed by
the Archduke; no dealer could palm off on him any modern article as an
antique, and he had just as good taste as understanding. On the other
hand, music to him was simply a disagreeable noise, and he had an
unspeakable contempt for poets. He could not bear Wagner, and Goethe
left him quite cold. His lack of any talent for languages was
peculiar. He spoke French tolerably, but otherwise no other language,
though he had a smattering of Italian and Czech. For years--indeed, to
the end of his life--he struggled with the greatest energy to learn
Hungarian. He had a priest living permanently in the house to give him
Hungarian lessons. This priest accompanied him on his travels, and at
St. Moritz, for instance, Franz Ferdinand had a Hungarian lesson every
day; but, in spite of this, he continued to suffer from the feeling
that he would never be able to learn the language, and he vented his
annoyance at this on the entire Hungarian people. "Their very language
makes me feel antipathy for them," was a remark I constantly heard him
make. His judgment of people was not a well-balanced one; he could
either love or hate, and unfortunately the number of those included in
the latter category was considerably the greater.

There is no doubt about it that there was a very hard strain in Franz
Ferdinand's mentality, and those who only knew him slightly felt that
this hardness of character was the most notable feature in him and his
great unpopularity can doubtless be attributed to this cause. The
public never knew the splendid qualities of the Archduke, and
misjudged him accordingly.

Apparently he was not always like that. He suffered in his youth from
severe lung trouble, and for long was given up by the doctors. He
often spoke to me of that time and all that he had gone through, and
referred with intense bitterness to the people who were only waiting
day by day to put him altogether on one side. As long as he was looked
upon as the heir to the throne, and people reckoned on him for the
future, he was the centre of all possible attention; but when he fell
ill and his case was considered hopeless, the world fluctuated from
hour to hour and paid homage to his younger brother Otto. I do not for
a moment doubt that there was a great deal of truth in what the late
Archduke told me; and no one knowing the ways of the world can deny
the wretched, servile egotism that is almost always at the bottom of
the homage paid to those in high places. More deeply than in the
hearts of others was this resentment implanted in the heart of Franz
Ferdinand, and he never forgave the world what he suffered and went
through in those distressful months. It was chiefly the ostensible
vacillation of the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count
Goluchowski, that had so deeply hurt the Archduke, who had always
imagined that Goluchowski was deeply attached to him. According to
Franz Ferdinand's account, Goluchowski is supposed to have said to the
Emperor Francis Joseph that the Archduke Otto ought now to be given
the retinue and household suitable for the heir to the throne as
he--Franz Ferdinand--"was in any case lost." It was not so much the
fact as the manner in which Goluchowski tried "to bury him while still
living" that vexed and hurt him whom a long illness had made
irritable. But besides Goluchowski, there were numberless others whose
behaviour at that time he took greatly amiss, and his unparalleled
contempt of the world which, when I knew him, was one of his most
characteristic features, appears--partly, at any rate--to date from
his experiences during that illness.

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