Book: In the World War

C >> Count Ottokar Czernin >> In the World War




Very shortly after taking up office I had some discussions with the
German Government which left those gentlemen perfectly aware of the
serious nature of the situation. In April, 1917--eighteen months
ago--I sent the following report to the Emperor Charles, which he
forwarded to the Emperor William with the remark that he was entirely
of my opinion.

[This report is already printed in these pages. See p. 146.]

This led to a reply from the German Government, dated May 9, again
expressing the utmost confidence in the success of the submarine
campaign, declaring, it is true, their willingness in principle to
take steps towards peace, but reprehending any such steps as might be
calculated to give an impression of weakness.

As to any territorial sacrifice on the part of Germany, this was not
to be thought of.

As will be seen from this report, however, we did not confine
ourselves to words alone. In 1917 we declared in Berlin that the
Emperor Charles was prepared to permit the union of Galicia with
Poland, and to do all that could be done to attach that State to
Germany in the event of Germany making any sacrifices in the West in
order to secure peace. But we were met with a _non possumus_ and the
German answer that territorial concessions to France were out of the
question.

The whole of Galicia was here involved, but I was firmly assured that
if the plan succeeded Germany would protect the rights of the Ukraine;
and consideration for the Ukrainians would certainly not have
restrained me had it been a question of the highest value--of peace
itself.

When I perceived that the likelihood of converting Berlin to our views
steadily diminished I had recourse to other means. The journey of the
Socialist leaders to Stockholm will be remembered. It is true that the
Socialists were not "sent" by me; they went to Stockholm of their own
initiative and on their own responsibility, but it is none the less
true that I could have refused them their passes if I had shared the
views of the Entente Governments and of numerous gentlemen in our own
country. Certainly, I was at the time very sceptical as to the
outcome, as I already saw that the Entente would refuse passes to
their Socialists, and consequently there could be nothing but a "rump"
parliament in the end. But despite all the reproaches which I had to
bear, and the argument that the peace-bringing Socialists would have
an enormous power in the State to the detriment of the monarchical
principle itself, I never for a moment hesitated to take that step,
and I have never regretted it in itself, only that it did not succeed.
It is encouraging to me now to read again many of the letters then
received criticising most brutally my so-called "Socialistic
proceedings" and to find that the same gentlemen who were then so
incensed at my policy are now adherents of a line of criticism which
maintains that I am too "narrow-minded" in my choice of new means
towards peace.

It will be remembered how, in the early autumn of 1917, the majority
of the German Reichstag had a hard fight against the numerically
weaker but, from their relation to the German Army Command, extremely
powerful minority on the question of the reply to the Papal Note. Here
again I was no idle spectator. One of my friends, at my instigation,
had several conversations with Suedekum and Erzberger, and encouraged
them, by my description of our own position, to pass the well known
peace resolution. It was owing to this description of the state of
affairs here that the two gentlemen mentioned were enabled to carry
the Reichstag's resolution in favour of a peace by mutual
understanding--the resolution which met with such disdain and scorn
from the Pan-Germans and other elements. I hoped then, for a moment,
to have gained a lasting and powerful alliance in the German Reichstag
against the German military plans of conquest.

And now, gentlemen, I should like to say a few words on the subject of
that unfortunate submarine campaign which was undoubtedly the beginning
of the end, and to set forth the reasons which in this case, as in many
other instances, forced us to adopt tactics not in accordance with our
own convictions. Shortly after my appointment as Minister the idea of
unrestricted submarine warfare began to take form in German minds. The
principal advocate of this plan was Admiral Tirpitz. To the credit of
the former _Reichskansler_, Bethmann-Hollweg, be it said that he was
long opposed to the idea, and used all means and every argument to
dissuade others from adopting so perilous a proceeding. In the end he
was forced to give way, as was the case with all politicians who came
in conflict with the all-powerful military party. Admiral Holtzendorff
came to us at that time, and the question was debated from every point
of view in long conferences lasting for hours. My then ministerial
colleagues, Tisza and Clam, as well as myself were entirely in
agreement with Emperor Charles in rejecting the proposal, and the only
one who then voted unreservedly in favour of it was Admiral Haus. It
should here be noted that the principal German argument at that time
was not the prospect of starving England into submission, but the
suggestion that the Western front could not be held unless the American
munition transports were sunk--that is to say, the case for the
submarine campaign was then based chiefly on a point of _technical
military importance_ and nothing else. I myself earnestly considered
the question then of separating ourselves from Germany on this point;
with the small number of U-boats at our disposal it would have made but
little difference had we on our part refrained. But another point had
here to be considered. If the submarine campaign was to succeed in the
northern waters it must be carried out at the same time in the
Mediterranean. With this latter water unaffected the transports would
have been sent via Italy, France and Dover to England, and the northern
U-boat campaign would have been paralysed. But in order to carry
on submarine war in the Adriatic we should have to give the Germans
access to our bases, such as Pola, Cattaro and Trieste, and by so doing
we were _de facto_ partaking in the submarine campaign ourselves. If we
did not do it, then we were attacking Germany in the rear by hindering
their submarine campaign--that is to say, it would bring us into direct
conflict with Germany. Therefore, albeit sorely against our will, we
agreed, not convinced by argument, but unable to act otherwise.

And now, gentlemen, I hasten to conclude. I have but a few words to
say as to the present. From time to time reports have appeared in the
papers to the effect that certain gentlemen were preparing
disturbances in Switzerland, and I myself have been mentioned as one
of them. I am doubtful whether there is any truth at all in these
reports; as for myself, I have not been outside this country for the
last nine months. As, however, my contradiction on this head itself
appears to have given rise to further misunderstandings, I will give
you my point of view here briefly and, as I hope, clearly enough. I am
most strongly opposed to any attempt at revolt. I am convinced that
any such attempt could only lead to civil war--a thing no one would
wish to see. I am therefore of opinion that the Republican Government
must be maintained untouched until the German-Austrian people as a
whole has taken its decision. But this can only be decided by the
German people. Neither the Republic nor the Monarchy is in itself a
dogma of democracy. The Kingdom of England is as democratic as
republican Switzerland. I know no country where men enjoy so great
freedom as in England. But it is a dogma of democracy that the people
itself must determine in what manner it will be governed, and I
therefore repeat that the final word can only be spoken by the
constitutional representative body. I believe that I am here entirely
at one with the present Government. There are two methods of
ascertaining the will of the people: either each candidate for the
representative body stands for election on a monarchical or a
republican platform, in which case the majority of the body itself
will express the decision; or the question of Monarchy or Republic can
be decided by a plebiscite. It is matter of common knowledge that I
myself have had so serious conflicts with the ex-Kaiser that any
co-operation between us is for all time an impossibility. No one can,
therefore, suspect me of wishing on personal grounds to revert to the
old regime. But I am not one to juggle with the idea of democracy, and
its nature demands that the people itself should decide. I believe
that the majority of German-Austria is against the old regime, and
when it has expressed itself to this effect the furtherance of
democracy is sufficiently assured.

And with this, gentlemen, I have finished what I proposed to set
before you. I vainly endeavoured to make peace together with Germany,
but I was not unsuccessful in my endeavours to save the
German-Austrians from ultimately coming to armed conflict with
Germany. I can say this, and without exaggeration, that I have
defended the German alliance as if it had been my own child, and I do
not know what would have happened had I not done so. Andrassy's "extra
turn" at the last moment showed the great mass of the public how
present a danger was that of war with Germany. Had the same
experiment been made six months before it would have been war with
Germany; would have made Austria a scene of war.

There are evil times in store for the German people, but a people of
many millions cannot perish and will not perish. The day will come
when the wounds of this war begin to close and heal, and when that day
comes a better future will dawn.

The Austrian armies went forth in the hour of war to save Austria.
They have not availed to save it. But if out of this ocean of blood
and suffering a better, freer and nobler world arise, then they will
not have died in vain, all those we loved who now lie buried in cold
alien earth; they died for the happiness, the peace and the future of
the generations to come.

FOOTNOTES:

[11] Translated from the German text given by Count Czernin, no English
text being available.




INDEX


Adler, Dr. Victor, a discussion with, 27
and the Socialist Congress at Stockholm, 168
and Trotski, 234, 235

Adrianople, cession of, 268

Aehrenthal, Franz Ferdinand and, 40
policy of expansion, 5

Air-raids on England, cause of, 16
their effect, 167

Albania, and the Peace of Bucharest, 6
Queen Elizabeth of Roumania and, 92

Albrecht von Wuertemberg, 39

Alsace-Lorraine, Bethmann on, 74
cession of, demanded by Entente, 165
conquest of, a curse to Germany, 15
Emperor Charles's offer to Germany, 75
France insists on restoration of, 170
Germany and, 71, 158, 159

Ambassadors and their duties, 97, 110

America and the U-boat campaign, 116, 119, 120
enters the war, 17, 148
rupture with Germany, 127
shipbuilding programme of, 291
unpreparedness for war, 122
(_Cf._ United States)

American Government, Count Czernin's Note to, 279 _et seq._

Andrassy, Count, and Roumanian peace negotiations, 260
declares a separate peace, 24, 25
German Nationalist view of his action, 25

Andrian at Nordbahnhof, 219

Anti-Roumanian party and its leader, 77

Arbitration, courts of, 171, 176, 177

Arion, Roumanian Foreign Minister, 322

Armaments, pre-war fever for, 3

Armand-Revertera negotiations, the, 164, 169

Asquith, a warlike speech by, 181

Austria-Hungary, a rejected proposal decides fate of, 2
and Albania, 6
and cession of Galicia, 145
and question of separate peace, 27, 164, 170
and the U-boat campaign, 124, 125, 149, 334
ceases to exist, 179
consequences of a separate peace, 24
death-blow to Customs dues, 168
declaration on submarine warfare, 279
democratic Parliament of, 306
enemy's secret negotiations for peace, 141, 162
food troubles and strikes in, 238, 239, 241, 314
her army merged into German army, 21
her position before and after the ultimatum, 13
heroism of her armies, 336
impossibility of a separate peace for, 19, 21 _et seq._
maritime trade obstructed by blockade, 280
mobilisation and its difficulties, 8, 9
obstinate attitude after Sarajevo tragedy, 8
parlous position of, in 1917, 188
peace negotiations with Roumania, 259, 318
peace terms to, 179
policy during war, Count Czernin on, 325
racial problems in, 190
separatist tactics in, 164
Social Democracy in, 21, 31
terms on which she could make peace, 29
the Archdukes, 22
views on a "tripartite solution" of Polish question, 201

Austrian Delegation, Count Czernin's speech to, 298 _et seq._

Austrian Government and the Ukrainian question, 242, 245

Austrian Navy, the, Franz Ferdinand and, 50

Austrian Ruthenians, leader of, 247

Austro-Hungarian demands at Bucharest negotiations, 319

Austro-Hungarian army, General Staff of, 22
inferiority of, 21

Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the, and foreign policy, 134
peace idea of, 174

Austro-Polish question, the, and the Ukrainian demands, 242
no bar to peace, 331
solution of, 200 _et seq._

Avarescu, interview with, 263
retirement of, 323


=B=

Baernreither, his views of a separate peace, 230

Balkan Wars, the, 6

Balkans, the, troubles in: attitude of German Emperor, 68

_Baralong_ episode, the, 133

Bathurst, Captain, and consumption of breadstuffs, 295
on an "un-English" system, 296

Bauer, Dr., German-Austrian Secretary of State, 18

Bauer, Herr, houses Trotski's library, 235

Bavarian troops enter into the Tyrol, 27

Belgian neutrality violated by Germany, 14

Belgian question, the, Germany ready for negotiations with England on, 180

Belgium, England's promise to, 14
German entry into, 14
Germany's views regarding, 157, 158

Belgium, invasion of, changes England's policy, 2

Benckendorff, Count, at London Conference, 275

Benedict XV, Pope, Austria's answer to peace Note of, 175
German reply to, 333
proposals for peace by, 167, 177

Berchtold, Count, and Franz Ferdinand, 43, 44
and the Roumanian question, 77
criticised by pro-war party at Vienna, 33
ultimatum to Serbia, 7
vacillation of, 10

Berlin, Byzantine atmosphere of, 62, 66
the English Ambassador demands his passport, 14

Bessarabia, Bolshevism in, 265

Bethmann-Hollweg, and Austria's willingness to cede Galicia, 146
and the Supreme Military Command, 156
draws up a peace proposal, 139
opposes U-boat warfare, 115, 334
optimistic view of U-boat campaign, 151 _et seq._
replies to author's _expose_, 150
requests Vienna Cabinet to accept negotiations, 8
visits Western front, 73

Bilinski, Herr von, and the future of Poland, 205

Bismarck, Prince, and the invincibility of the army, 17
and William II., 52
dealings with William I., 65
heritage of, becomes Germany's curse, 15
his policy of "blood and iron," 15

Bizenko, Madame, murders General Sacharow, 220

Blockade, enemies feeling the grip of, 297
of Germany, 280
why established by Great Britain, 281

Bohemia as a possible theatre of war: author's reflections on, 24

Bolsheviks and the Kieff Committee, 245

Bolsheviks, dastardly behaviour of, 249
destruction wrought in Ukraine, 252
enter Kieff, 248, 249

Bolshevism, Czernin on, 216, 221
in Bessarabia, 265
in Russia, 211, 216, 229
terrorism of, 226
the Entente and, 273

Bosnia, as compensation to Austria, 207

Bozen, proposals for cession of, 170, 173

Bratianu, a tactless proceeding by, 112
apprises author of Sarajevo tragedy, 86
collapse of, 99
Ministry of, 88
on Russia, 263
reproaches author, 96

"Bread peace," origin of the term, 257

Brest-Litovsk, a dejected Jew at, 225
a victory for German militarism, 193
answer to Russian peace proposals, 224
arrival of Trotski at, 232
conflict with Ukrainians at, 235
episode of Roumanian peace, 260
evacuation of occupied areas: difficulties of, 312
first peace concluded at, 249
frontier question, 208
further Ukrainian representation at, 300
heated discussions at, 228
object of negotiations at, 305
peace negotiations at, 218 _et seq._, 311
Russians threaten to withdraw from, 227
territorial questions at, 235, 236, 245
Ukrainian delegation and their claims, 208, 231, 314

Briand, peace negotiations with, 182

Brinkmann, Major, transmits Petersburg information to German
delegation, 230

British losses by submarines, 290
trade, and result of submarine warfare, 291

Bronstein and Bolshevism, 211

_Brotfrieden_ ("Bread peace"), 257

Bucharest, fall of, 99
report of peace negotiations at, 318
Zeppelin attacks on, 101 et seq.

Bucharest, Peace of, 6, 82, 100, 258 _et seq._, 270

Budapest, author's address to party leaders at, 174
demonstrations against Germany in, 233

Buftea, Treaty of, 323

Bulgaria, a dispute with Turkey, 268
and the Dobrudsha question, 263, 323
her relations with America, 125
humiliation of, 6
negotiations with the Entente, 162, 163, 269
question of her neutrality, 10
secession of, 183

Bulgarian representatives at Brest, 223

Buelow, Prince, exposes William II., 54

Burian, Count, 106, 200
and the division of Galicia, 244
draws up a peace proposal, 139
his Red Book on Roumania, 98, 114
succeeded by author, 114
visits German headquarters, 210

Busche, von dem, and territorial concessions, 107


=C=

Cachin, his attitude at French Socialist Congress, 214

Cambon, M., attends the London Conference, 275

Capelle and U-boats, 132

Carmen Sylva (_see_ Elizabeth, Queen of Roumania)

Carol, King, a fulfilled prophecy of, 88
and Serbia, 12
last days of, 90
peculiar policy of Government of, 81
tactfulness of, 79
Tsar's visit to, 88
urges acceptance of ultimatum, 90
visited by Franz Ferdinand, 79

Carp, 82, 87, 94

Catarau, and the crime at Debruzin, 89

Central-European question, the, 209
the terror of the Entente, 172

Central Powers and the Bratianu Ministry, 97
enemy blockade of, 132
favourable news in 1917, 143
why they adopted submarine warfare, 281 _et seq._

Charles VIII., Emperor, and Franz Ferdinand, 41
and problem of nationality, 192
and the principle of ministerial responsibility, 56
and the Ukrainian question, 244
apprised by author of critical condition of food supply, 237, 239
cautions the Kaiser, 321
communicates with King Ferdinand on Roumanian peace, 260
confers a title on eldest son of Franz Ferdinand, 45
correspondence with Prince Sixtus, 164
frequent absences from Vienna, 61
his ever friendly demeanour, 57, 58
invites Crown Prince to Vienna, 75
opposes U-boat warfare, 334
reinstates Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, 61
rejoices at peace with Ukraine, 249
submits author's _expose_ to William II., 146, 332
suggests sacrifices for ending World War, 75
visits South Slav provinces, 59

Clam-Martinic, Count, and the customs question, 168
and U-boat campaign, 121
attends conference on Polish question, 206
opposes submarine warfare, 334

Clemenceau, M., and Germany, 182
and the Peace of Versailles, 272
dominant war aim of, 184, 186

Colloredo-Mannsfield, Count, at Brest-Litovsk, 236
attends conference on U-boat question, 121
meets author, 219

Compulsory international arbitration, 171, 176, 177

Conrad, Chief of the General Staff, 44

Constantinople, an Entente group in, 163

Corday, Charlotte, cited, 227

Cossacks, the, 212

Courland demanded by Germany, 249

Crecianu, Ambassador Jresnea, house damaged in Zeppelin attack
on Bucharest, 103

Csatth, Alexander, mortally wounded, 89

Csicserics, Lieut. Field-Marshal, 219
at Brest-Litovsk, 236

Czechs, the, attitude of, regarding a separate peace, 24

Czernin, Count Ottokar, a candid chat with Franz Ferdinand, 43
a hostile Power's desire for peace, 141
a scene at Konopischt, 39
abused by a braggart and brawler, 83
acquaints Emperor of food shortage, 237, 239
activities for peace with Roumania, 258 _et seq._
ambassador to Roumania, 7
an appeal for confidence, 310
and American intervention, 123
and the reinstatement of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, 61
and the Ukrainian question (_see_ Ukrainian)
answers explanation of an American request, 128
appeals to Germany for food, 238, 239, 329
appointed Ambassador to Bucharest, 77
apprises Berchtold of decision of Cabinet Council, 12
attends conference on U-boat warfare, 121
avoided by Pan-Germans, 160
becomes Minister for Foreign Affairs, 114
breakfasts with Kuehlmann, 230
confers with Tisza, 27, 28
conflicts with the Kaiser, 335
conversation with Trotski, 248
converses with Crown Prince, 74
criticises Michaelis, 160
decorated by King Carol, 88
disapproves of U-boat warfare, 115
dismissal of, 183, 194, 266
extracts bearing on a trip to Western front, 72
friction with the Emperor, 210, 215
his hopes of a peace of understanding, 20 _et seq._, 174,
209, 217, 331, 333
imparts peace terms to Marghiloman, 266
informs Emperor of proceedings at Brest, 229
interviews King Ferdinand, 264
issues passports for Stockholm Conference, 168, 333
journeys to Brest-Litovsk, 218
learns of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, 86
loss of a dispatch-case, 98
loyalty to Germany, 327
lunches with Prince of Bavaria, 222
meets the Emperor William II., 54
misunderstandings resulting from a speech by, 19, 23
nominated to the Herrenhaus, 46
note to American Government, 279
obtains a direct statement from William II., 57
on a separate peace, 327
on Austria's policy during war, 325
on Bolshevism, 216, 221
on President Wilson's programme, 192
on U-boat warfare, 148, 179, 334
passages of arms with Ludendorff, 247
peace programme of, 299
persecution of, 208
Polish leaders and, 205
President Wilson on, 193
private talk with the Emperor, 124
sends in his resignation, 23
sets interned prisoners at liberty, 95, 96
speech to Austrian Delegation, 298 _et seq._
threatens a separate peace with Russia, 228
unfounded charges against, 162
urges sacrifice of Alsace-Lorraine, 71
William II.'s gift to, 64
with Emperor Charles visits Eastern front, 57


=D=

Danube Monarchy, the, a vital condition for existence of
Hungarian State, 202
dangers of a political structure for, 202

Debruzin, sensational crime at, 88

Declaration of London, the, 280

D'Esperey, General Franchet, and Karolyi, 260

Deutsch, Leo, and the Marxian Social Democrats, 211

Devonport, Lord, on the food question, 296

Disarmament, negotiations respecting, 4
international, 171, 176, 177, 308
question of, 181

Divorces in Roumania, 85

Dobrudsha, the, acquisition of, 82
assigned to Bulgaria, 268, 269
cession of, at peace with Roumania, 323
King Ferdinand and, 265
Marghiloman's view on, 266
question discussed with Avarescu, 263
Turkish attitude concerning, 268

Dualism, the curse of, 137


=E=


East Galicia, cession of, demanded by Ukrainians, 240 _et seq._

"Echinstvo" group, the, 211

Edward VII., King, and Emperor Francis Joseph, 1, 2
and William II., 63
encircling policy of, 1, 63

Elizabeth, Queen of Roumania, a word-picture by, 91
an operation for cataract, 93
her devotion to King Carol, 92

Ellenbogen, Dr., and Socialist Conference at Stockholm, 168
plain speaking by, 26

England, an effort at _rapprochement_ with Germany and its failure, 180
and dissolution of military power in Germany, 184
and the elder Richthofen, 246
attitude of, at beginning of World War, 15, 16
blockade of, by U-boats, 142, 151
bread shortage in, 295
declares war on Germany, 14
discards Declaration of London, 280
distress in, from U-boat warfare, 145
distrust of Germany's intentions in, 185
dread of gigantic growth of Germany in, 1
Flotow's tribute to, 120
food supply of, 293
freedom in, 335
her desire to remain neutral at opening of war, 2
negotiates with Germany on naval disarmament, 4
public opinion in, after Sarajevo tragedy, 8
refusal to restore German colonies, 166, 170
shortage of potatoes in, 296
the Pacifist party in, 167
"unbending resolve" of, to shatter Germany, 31, 32, 71

English mentality, a typical instance of, 4

English Socialists, 214

Entente, the, adheres to Pact of London, 209, 217
and arming of merchant vessels, 286
and Italy, 27
and the trial of William II., 66
answers President Wilson, 118, 120
as instruments in a world revolution, 273
Austria pressed to join, 2
demands abolition of German militarism, 165, 170, 171, 173
desire of final military victory, 164
exterminates Prussian militarism, 273
impression on, of author's speech at Budapest, 178
mine-laying by, 130
peace proposals to, 19, 20
rejects first peace offer, 115
suspicious of Germany's plans, 3
their "unbending resolve" to shatter Germany, 31, 326
views as to peace, 170

Enver Pasha, his influence in Turkey, 233, 269

Erzberger, Herr, agrees with "Czernin scheme", 185, 333
and author's secret report to the Emperor, 155 (note)

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