Book: History of the Expedition to Russia

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At this intelligence, observing Bagration and 40,000 Russians cut off
from the army of Alexander, and enveloped by two rivers and two armies,
Napoleon exclaimed, "I have them!" In fact, it only required three
marches more to have hemmed in Bagration completely. But Napoleon, who
since accused Davoust of suffering the escape of the left wing of the
Russians by remaining four days in Minsk, and afterwards, with more
justice, the king of Westphalia, had just then placed that monarch under
the orders of the marshal. It was this change, which was made too late,
and in the midst of an operation, which destroyed the unity of it.

This order arrived at the very moment when Bagration, repulsed from
Minsk, had no other retreat open to him than a long and narrow causeway.
It occurs on the marshes of Nieswig, Shlutz, Glusck, and Bobruisk.
Davoust wrote to the king to push the Russians briskly into this defile,
the outlet of which at Glusck he was about to occupy. Bagration would
never have been able to get out of it. But the king, already irritated
by the reproaches which the uncertainty and dilatoriness of his first
operations had brought upon him, could not suffer a subject to be his
commander; he quitted his army, without leaving any one to replace him,
or without even communicating, if we are to credit Davoust, to any of
his generals, the order which he had just received. He was permitted to
retire into Westphalia without his guard; which he accordingly did.

Meanwhile Davoust vainly waited for Bagration at Glusck. That general,
not being sufficiently pressed by the Westphalian army, had the option
of making a new _detour_ towards the south, to get to Bobruisk, and
there cross the Berezina, and reach the Boristhenes near Bickof. There
again, if the Westphalian army had had a commander, if that commander
had pressed the Russian leader more closely, if he had replaced him at
Bickof, when he came in collision with Davoust at Mohilef, it is certain
that in that case Bagration, enclosed between the Westphalians, Davoust,
the Boristhenes, and the Berezina, would have been compelled to conquer
or to surrender We have seen that the Russian prince could not pass the
Berezina but at Bobruisk, nor reach the Boristhenes, except in the
direction of Novoi-Bikof, forty leagues to the south of Orcha, and sixty
leagues from Witepsk, which it was his object to reach.

Finding himself driven so far out of his track, he hastened to regain it
by reascending the Boristhenes, to Mohilef. But there again he found
Davoust, who had anticipated him at Lida by passing the Berezina at the
very point at which Charles XII. had formerly done so.

This marshal, however, had not expected to find the Russian prince on
the road to Mohilef. He believed him to be already on the left bank of
the Boristhenes. Their mutual surprise turned in the first instance to
the advantage of Bagration, who cut off a whole regiment of his light
cavalry. At that time Bagration had with him 35,000 men, Davoust 12,000.
On the 23d of July, the latter chose an elevated ground, defended by a
ravine, and flanked by two woods. The Russians had no means of extending
themselves on this field of battle; they, nevertheless, accepted the
challenge. Their numbers were there useless; they attacked like men sure
of victory; they did not even think of profiting by the woods, in order
to turn Davoust's right.

The Muscovites say that, in the middle of the contest they were seized
with a panic at the idea of finding themselves in the presence of
Napoleon; for each of the enemy's generals imagined him to be opposed
to them, Bagration at Mohilef; and Barclay at Drissa. He was believed to
be in all places at once: so greatly does renown magnify the man of
genius! so strangely does it fill the world with its fame! and convert
him into an omnipresent and supernatural being!

The attack was violent and obstinate on the part of the Russians, but
without scientific combination. Bagration was roughly repulsed, and
again compelled to retrace his steps. He finally crossed the Boristhenes
at Novoi-Bikof, where he re-entered the Russian interior, in order
finally to unite with Barclay, beyond Smolensk.

Napoleon disdained to attribute this disappointment to the ability of
the enemy's general; he referred it to the incapacity of his own. He
already discovered that his presence was necessary every where, which
rendered it every where impossible. The circle of his operations was so
much enlarged, that, being compelled to remain in the centre, his
presence was wanting on the whole of the circumference. His generals,
exhausted like himself, too independent of each other, too much
separated, and at the same time too dependent upon him, ventured to do
less of themselves, and frequently waited for his orders. His influence
was weakened over so great an extent. It required too great a soul for
so great a body; his, vast as it was, was not sufficient for the
purpose.

But at length, on the 16th of July, the whole army was in motion. While
all were hurrying and exerting themselves in this manner, he was still
at Wilna, which he caused to be fortified. He there ordered a levy of
eleven Lithuanian regiments. He established the duke of Bassano as
governor of Lithuania, and as the centre of administrative, political,
and even military communication between him, Europe, and the generals
commanding the _corps de armee_ which were not to follow him to Moscow.

This ostensible inactivity of Napoleon at Wilna lasted twenty days. Some
thought that, finding himself in the centre of his operations with a
strong reserve, he awaited the event, in readiness to direct his motions
either towards Davoust, Murat, or Macdonald; others thought that the
organization of Lithuania, and the politics of Europe, to which he was
more proximate at Wilna, retained him in that city; or that he did not
anticipate any obstacles worthy of him till he reached the Duena; a
circumstance in which he was not deceived, but by which he was too much
flattered. The precipitate evacuation of Lithuania by the Russians
seemed to dazzle his judgment; of this Europe will be the best judge;
his bulletins repeated his words.

"Here then is that Russian empire, so formidable at a distance! It is a
desert, for which its scattered population is wholly insufficient. They
will be vanquished by its very extent, which ought to defend them. They
are barbarians. They are scarcely possessed of arms. They have no
recruits in readiness. Alexander will require more time to collect them
than he will take to reach Moscow. It is true that, from the moment of
the passage of the Niemen, the atmosphere has been incessantly deluging
or drying up the unsheltered soil; but this calamity is less an obstacle
to the rapidity of our advance, than an impediment to the flight of the
Russians. They are conquered without a combat by their weakness alone;
by the memory of our victories; by the remorse which dictates the
restitution of that Lithuania, which they have acquired neither by peace
nor war, but solely by treachery."

To these motives of the stay, perhaps too protracted, which Napoleon
made at Wilna, those who were nearest to his person have added another.
They remarked to each other, "that a genius so vast as his, and always
increasing in activity and audacity, was not now seconded as it had been
formerly by a vigorous constitution. They were alarmed at finding their
chief no longer insensible to the heat of a burning atmosphere; and they
remarked to each other with melancholy forebodings, the tendency to
corpulence by which his frame was now distinguished; the sure sign of a
premature debility of system."

Some of them attributed this to his frequent use of the bath. They were
ignorant, that, far from being a habit of luxury, this had become to him
an indispensable relief from a bodily ailment of a serious and alarming
character[17], which his policy carefully concealed, in order not to
excite cruel expectations in his adversaries.

[Footnote 17: The _dysuria_, or retention of urine.]

Such is the inevitable and unhappy influence of the most trivial causes
over the destiny of nations. It will be shortly seen, when the
profoundest combinations, which ought to have secured the success of the
boldest, and perhaps the most useful enterprise in a European point of
view, come to be developed;--how, at the decisive moment, on the plains
of the Moskwa, nature paralysed the genius, and the man was wanting to
the hero. The numerous battalions of Russia could not have defended her;
a stormy day, a sudden attack of fever, were her salvation.

It will be only just and proper to revert to this observation, when, in
examining the picture which I shall be forced to trace of the battle of
the Moskwa, I shall be found repeating all the complaints, and even the
reproaches, which an unusual inactivity and languor extorted from the
most devoted friends and constant admirers of this great man. Most of
them, as well as those who have subsequently given an account of the
battle, were unaware of the bodily sufferings of a chief, who, in the
midst of his depression, exerted himself to conceal their cause. That
which was eminently a misfortune, these narrators have designated as a
fault.

Besides, at 800 leagues' distance from one's home, after so many
fatigues and sacrifices, at the instant when they saw the victory escape
from their grasp, and a frightful prospect revealed itself, it was
natural for them to be severe; and they had suffered too much, to be
quite impartial.

As for myself, I shall not conceal what I witnessed, in the persuasion
that truth is of all tributes that which is alone worthy of a great
man; of that illustrious captain, who had so often contrived to extract
prodigious advantages from every occurrence, not excepting his reverses;
of that man who raised himself to so great an eminence, that posterity
will scarcely be enabled to distinguish the clouds scattered over a
glory so brilliant.




CHAP. VII.


Meantime, he was apprised that his orders were fulfilled, his army
united, and that a battle claimed his presence. He at length departed
from Wilna on the 16th of July, at half-past eleven at night; he stopped
at Swentziani, while the heat of the 17th was most oppressive; on the
18th he was at Klubokoe: taking up his residence at a monastery, whence
he observed that the village which it commanded bore more resemblance to
an assemblage of savage huts than to European habitations.

An address of the Russians to the French soldiers had just been
dispersed throughout his army. He found in it some idle abuse, coupled
with a nugatory and unskilful invitation to desert. His anger was
excited at its perusal; in his first agitation, he dictated a reply,
which he tore; then a second, which experienced the same fate; at length
a third, with which he expressed himself satisfied. It was that which
was, at the time, read in the journals, under the signature of a French
grenadier. In this manner he dictated even the most trivial letters,
which issued from his cabinet or from his staff; he perpetually reduced
his ministers and Berthier to the condition of being mere secretaries;
his mind still retained its activity, notwithstanding his sinking frame;
their union, however, began to fail; and this was one cause of our
misfortunes.

In the midst of this occupation, he learned that Barclay had, on the
18th, abandoned his camp at Drissa, and that he was marching towards
Witepsk. This movement opened his eyes. Detained by the check which
Sebastiani had received near Druia, and more especially by the rains and
bad state of the roads, he found (though perhaps too late) that the
occupation of Witepsk was urgent and decisive; that that city alone was
eminently aggressive, inasmuch as it separated the two hostile rivers
and armies. From that position, he would be enabled to turn the broken
army of his rival, cut him off from his southern provinces, and crush
his weakness with superior force. He concluded that, if Barclay had
anticipated him in reaching that capital, he would doubtless defend it:
and there, perhaps, he was to expect that so-much-coveted victory which
had escaped him on the Vilia. He, therefore, instantly directed all his
corps on Beszenkowiczi; thither he summoned Murat and Ney, who were then
near Polotsk, where he left Oudinot. For himself, he proceeded from
Klubokoe (where he was surrounded by his guard, the Italian army, and
three divisions detached from Davoust), to Kamen, always in a carriage,
except during the night, either from necessity, or, perhaps, with a view
to keep his soldiers in ignorance of the inability of their chief to
share their fatigues.

Till that time, the greater part of the army had proceeded with
astonishment, at finding no enemy; they had now become habituated to the
circumstance. By day the novelty of the places, and impatience to get to
their journey's end, occupied their attention; at night the necessity of
choosing or making for themselves a place of shelter; of finding food,
and dressing it. The soldiers were so much engaged by so many cares,
that they considered themselves less employed in making war than a
troublesome journey; but if the war and the enemy were to fall back
always thus, how much farther should they have to go in search of them?
At length, on the 25th, the report of cannon was heard, and the army, as
well as the emperor, indulged their hopes of a victory and peace.

This was in the direction of Beszenkowiczi, Prince Eugene had there
encountered Doctorof, who commanded Barclay's rear-guard. In following
his leader from Polotsk to Witepsk, he cleared his way on the left bank
of the Duena to Beszenkowiczi, the bridge of which he burnt as he
retired. The viceroy, on capturing this town, came in sight of the Duena,
and re-established the passage; the few Russian troops left in
observation on the other side feebly opposed the operation. When
Napoleon contemplated, for the first time, this river, his new
conquest, he censured sharply, and not unjustly, the defective
construction of the bridge which made him master of the two banks.

It was no puerile vanity which induced him then to cross that river, but
anxiety to see with his own eyes how far the Russian army had proceeded
on its march from Drissa to Witepsk, and whether he might not attack it
on its passage, or anticipate its arrival at the latter city. But the
direction taken by the enemy's rear-guard, and the information obtained
from some prisoners, convinced him that Barclay had been beforehand with
him; that he had left Wittgenstein in front of Oudinot, and that the
Russian general-in-chief was in Witepsk. He was, indeed, already
prepared to dispute the possession of the defiles which cover that
capital with Napoleon.

Napoleon having observed on the right bank of the river nothing but the
remains of a rear-guard, returned to Beszenkowiczi. His various
divisions arrived there at the same time by the northern and western
roads. His orders of march had been executed with so much precision,
that all the corps which had left the Niemen, at different epochs, and
by different routes, notwithstanding obstacles of every description,
after a month of separation, and at a hundred leagues' distance from the
point of their departure, found themselves all reunited at
Beszenkowiczi, where they arrived on the same day, and nearly at the
same hour.

Great disorder was naturally the result; numerous columns of cavalry,
infantry, and artillery presented themselves on all sides; contests
took place for precedence; and each corps, exasperated with fatigue and
hunger, was impatient to get to its destination. Meanwhile, the streets
were blocked up with a crowd of orderlies, staff-officers, valets,
saddle-horses, and baggage. They ran through the city in tumultuous
groups; some looking for provisions, others for forage, and a few for
lodgings; there was a constant crossing and jostling; and as the influx
augmented every instant, chaos in a short time reigned throughout.

In one quarter, _aides-de-camp_, the bearers of urgent orders, vainly
sought to force a passage; the soldiers were deaf to their
remonstrances, and even to their orders: hence arose quarrels and
outcries; the noise of which, united with the beating of drums, the
oaths of the waggoners, the rumbling of the baggage-carts and cannon,
the commands of the officers, and, finally, with the tumult of the
regular contests which took place in the houses, the entrances of which,
while one party attempted to force, others, already established there,
prepared to defend.

At length, towards midnight, all these masses, which were nearly
confounded together, got disentangled; the accumulation of troops
gradually moved off in the direction of Ostrowno, or were distributed in
Beszenkowiczi; and the most profound silence succeeded the most
frightful tumult.

This great concentration, the multiplied orders which came from all
parts, the rapidity with which the various corps were pushed forward,
even during the night--all announced the expectation of a battle on the
following day. In fact, Napoleon not having been able to anticipate the
Russians in the possession of Witepsk, was determined to force them from
that position; but the latter, after having entered by the right bank of
the Duena, had passed through that city, and were now come to meet him,
in order to defend the long defiles which protect it.

On the 25th of July, Murat proceeded towards Ostrowno with his cavalry.
At the distance of two leagues from that village, Domon, Du Coetlosquet,
Carignan, and the 8th hussars, were advancing in column upon a broad
road, lined by a double row of large birch trees. These hussars were
near reaching the summit of a hill, on which they could only get a
glimpse of the weakest portion of a corps, composed of three regiments
of cavalry of the Russian guard, and six pieces of cannon. There was not
a single rifleman to cover their line.

The colonels of the 8th imagined themselves preceded by two regiments of
their division, which had marched across the fields on the right and
left of the road, and from the view of which they were precluded by the
bordering trees. But these corps had halted; and the 8th, already
considerably in advance of them, still kept marching on, persuaded that
what it perceived through the trees, at 150 paces' distance, in its
front, were these two regiments, of which, without being aware of it, it
had got the start.

The immobility of the Russians completed the error into which the
chiefs of the 8th had fallen. The order to charge seemed to them to be a
mistake; they sent an officer to reconnoitre the troop which was before
them, and still marched on without any distrust. Suddenly they beheld
their officer sabred, knocked down, made prisoner, and the enemy's
cannon bringing down their hussars. They now hesitated no longer, and
without losing time to extend their line under the enemy's fire, they
dashed through the trees, and rushed forward to extinguish it. At the
first onset they seized the cannon, dispersed the regiment that was in
the centre of the enemy's line, and destroyed it. During the disorder of
this first success, they observed the Russian regiment on the right,
which they had passed, remaining motionless with astonishment; upon this
they returned, and attacking it in the rear dispersed it. In the midst
of this second victory, they perceived the third regiment on the enemy's
left, which was giving way in confusion, and seeking to retreat; towards
this third enemy they briskly returned, with all the men they could
muster, and attacked and dispersed it in the midst of its retreat.

Animated by this success, Murat drove the enemy into the wood of
Ostrowno, where he seemed to conceal himself. That monarch endeavoured
to penetrate the wood, but a strong resistance obstructed the attempt.

The position of Ostrowno was well chosen and commanding; those posted
there could see without being seen; it intersected the main road; it had
the Duena on the right, a ravine in front, and thick woods on its
surface and on the left. It was, moreover, in communication with
magazines; it covered them, as well as Witepsk, the capital of these
regions, which Ostermann had hurried to defend.

On his side, Murat, always as prodigal of his life, which was now that
of a victorious king, as he had formerly been when only an obscure
soldier, persisted in attacks upon these woods, notwithstanding the
heavy fire which proceeded from them. But he was soon made sensible that
a furious onset was fruitless here. The ground carried by the hussars of
the 8th was disputed with him, and his advance-column, composed of the
divisions Bruyeres and Saint Germain, and of the 8th corps of infantry,
was compelled to maintain itself there against an army.

They defended themselves as victors always do, by attacking. Each
hostile corps, as it presented itself to assail our flanks, was in turn
assaulted. Their cavalry were driven back into the woods, and their
infantry broken at the point of the sabre. Our troops, nevertheless,
were getting fatigued with victory, when the division Delzons arrived;
the king promptly pushed it forward on the right, toward the line of the
enemy's retreat, who now became uneasy, and no longer disputed the
victory.

These defiles are several leagues in length. The same evening the
viceroy rejoined Murat, and the next day they found the Russians in a
new position. Pahlen and Konownitzin had united with Ostermann. After
having repulsed the Russian left, the two French princes were pointing
out to the troops of their right wing the position which was to serve
them as a _point d'appui_, from which they were to make the attack, when
suddenly a great clamour arose on their left: their eyes were instantly
turned that way; the cavalry and infantry of that wing had twice
attacked the enemy, and been twice repulsed; the Russians, emboldened by
this success, were issuing in multitudes, and with frightful cries, from
their woods. The audacity and fervour of attack had passed over to them,
while the French exhibited the uncertainty and timidity of defence.

A battalion of Croats, and the 84th regiment, vainly attempted to make a
stand; their line gradually decreased; the ground in front of them was
strewed with their dead; behind them, the plain was covered with their
wounded, who had retired from the battle, with those who carried them,
and with many others, who, under the plea of supporting the wounded, or
being wounded themselves, successively abandoned their ranks. A rout
accordingly began. Already the artillery corps, who are always picked
men, perceiving themselves no longer supported, began retiring with
their pieces; a few minutes longer, and the troops of all arms, in their
flight towards the same defile, would have there met each other; thence
would have resulted a confusion, in which the voices and the efforts of
their officers would have been lost, where all the elements of
resistance would have been confounded and rendered useless.

It is said that Murat, on seeing this, darted forward in front of a
regiment of Polish lancers; and that the latter, excited by the presence
of the king, animated by his words, and, moreover, transported with rage
at the sight of the Russians, followed him precipitately. Murat had only
wished to stimulate them and impel them against the enemy; he had no
intention of throwing himself with them into the midst of a conflict, in
which he would neither be able to see nor to command; but the Polish
lances were ready couched and condensed behind him; they covered the
whole width of the ground; and they pushed him before them with all the
rapidity of their steeds; he could neither detach himself from them nor
stop; he had no resource but to charge in front of the regiment, just
where he had stationed himself in order to harangue it; a resource to
which, like a true soldier, he submitted with the best possible grace.

At the same time, general Anthouard ran to his artillerymen, and general
Girardin to the 106th regiment, which he halted, rallied, and led back
against the Russian right wing, whose position he carried, as well as
two pieces of cannon and the victory; on his side, general Pire
encountered and turned the left of the enemy. Fortune having again
changed sides, the Russians withdrew into their forests.

Meanwhile, they persevered on the left in defending a thick wood, the
advanced position of which broke our line. The 92d regiment,
intimidated by the heavy fire which issued from it, and bewildered by a
shower of balls, remained immoveable, neither daring to advance nor
retreat, restrained by two opposite fears--the dread of danger and the
dread of shame--and escaping neither; but general Belliard hastened to
reanimate them by his words, and general Roussel by his example; and the
wood was carried.

By this success, a strong column which had advanced on our right, in
order to turn it, was itself turned; Murat perceived this, and instantly
drawing his sword, exclaimed, "Let the bravest follow me!" But this
territory is intersected with ravines which protected the retreat of the
Russians, who all plunged into a forest of two leagues in depth, which
was the last natural curtain which concealed Witepsk from our view.

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