Book: History of the Expedition to Russia

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The baggage of all the corps was therefore assembled in the rear of the
army: there was, from Dorogobouje, a long train of bat-horses and
kibitks, harnessed with ropes; these vehicles were laden with booty,
provisions, military effects, men appointed to take care of them;
lastly, sick soldiers, and the arms of both, which were rusting in them.
In this column were seen many of the tall dismounted cuirassiers,
bestriding horses no bigger than our asses, because they could not
follow on foot for want of practice and of boots. On this confused and
disorderly multitude, as well as on most of the marauders on our flanks,
the cossacks might have made successful _coups de main_. They would
thereby have harassed the army, and retarded its march, but Barclay
seemed fearful of discouraging us: he put out his strength only against
our advanced guard, and that but just sufficiently to slacken without
stopping our progress.

This determination of Barclay's, the declining strength of the army, the
quarrels between its chiefs, the approach of the decisive moment, gave
uneasiness to Napoleon. At Dresden, at Witepsk, and even at Smolensk, he
had hoped in vain for a communication from Alexander. At Ribky, on the
28th of August, he appeared to solicit one: a letter from Berthier to
Barclay, in no other respect worthy of notice, concluded with these
words: "The emperor directs me to request you to present his compliments
to the emperor Alexander; tell him that neither the vicissitudes of war,
nor any other circumstance, can diminish the friendship which he feels
for him."

The same day, the 28th of August, the advanced-guard drove back the
Russians as far as Wiazma; the army, thirsty from the march, the heat
and the dust, was in want of water; the troops disputed the possession
of a few muddy pools, and fought near the springs, which were soon
rendered turbid and exhausted; the emperor himself was forced to put up
with this muddy beverage.

During the night, the enemy destroyed the bridges over the Wiazma,
plundered that town, and set it on fire. Murat and Davoust precipitately
advanced to extinguish the flames. The enemy defended his conflagration,
but the Wiazma was fordable near the ruins of the bridges: one part of
the advanced-guard then attacked the incendiaries, and the other the
fire, which they speedily subdued.

On this occasion some chosen men were sent to the advanced-guard, with
orders to watch the enemy closely at Wiazma, and ascertain whether they,
or our soldiers, were the real incendiaries. Their report entirely
dissipated the doubts which the emperor might still have entertained as
to the fatal resolution of the Russians. They found in this town some
resources, which pillage would soon have wasted. In passing through the
city, the emperor observed this disorder: he was exceedingly incensed,
rode into the midst of the groups of soldiers, caused a suttler to be
seized, and ordered him to be instantly tried and shot. But the meaning
of the phrase from his lips was well known; it was known, also that the
more vehement his paroxysms of anger, the sooner they were followed by
indulgence. A moment afterwards, they, therefore, merely placed in his
way the unfortunate man on his knees, with a woman and several children
beside him, whom they passed off for his family. The emperor, who had
already cooled, inquired what they wanted, and caused the man to be set
at liberty.

He was still on horseback, when he saw Belliard, for fifteen years the
companion in war of Murat, and then the chief of his staff, coming
towards him. Surprised at seeing him, the emperor fancied some
misfortune had happened. Belliard first relieved his apprehensions, and
then added, that "Beyond the Wiazma, behind a ravine, on an advantageous
position, the enemy had shown himself in force and ready for battle;
that the cavalry on both sides immediately engaged, and as the infantry
became necessary, the king in person put himself at the head of one of
Davoust's divisions, and drew it out to lead it against the enemy; but
that the marshal hastened up, calling to his men to halt, loudly
censuring that manoeuvre, harshly reproaching the king for it, and
forbidding his generals to obey him: that Murat then appealed to his
dignity, to his military rank, to the exigency of the occasion, but in
vain; that, finally, he had sent to declare to the emperor his disgust
for a command so contested, and to tell him that he must choose between
him and Davoust."

This intelligence threw Napoleon into a passion: he exclaimed, that
"Davoust was unmindful of all subordination; that he forgot the respect
due to his brother-in-law, to him whom he had appointed his lieutenant;"
and he sent Berthier with orders that Compans's division, the same which
had been the subject of the altercation, should be thenceforward under
the command of the king. Davoust did not defend the manner, but merely
the motive of his act, either from prejudice against the habitual
temerity of the king, from spleen, or that he was a better judge of the
ground, and the manoeuvre adapted to it, which is very possible.

Meanwhile the combat had finished, and Murat, whose attention was no
longer diverted by the enemy, was wholly occupied with the thoughts of
his quarrel. Shut up with Belliard, and hiding himself in a manner in
his tent, as his memory recalled the expressions of the marshal, his
blood became more and more inflamed with shame and rage. "He had been
set at defiance, and publicly insulted, and Davoust still lived! What
did he care for the anger of the emperor, and for his decision? it was
for him to revenge his own wrong! What signified his rank? it was his
sword alone that had made him a king, and it was to that alone he should
appeal!" He was already snatching up his arms to go and attack Davoust,
when Belliard stopped him, by urging existing circumstances, the example
he ought to set to the army, the enemy to be pursued, and that it would
be wrong to distress his friends and delight the foe by so desperate a
proceeding.

The general says, that he then saw the king curse his crown, and strive
to swallow the affront; but that tears of spite rolled down his cheeks
and fell upon his clothes. Whilst he was thus tormenting himself,
Davoust, obstinately persisting in his opinion, said that the emperor
was misinformed, and remained quietly in his head-quarters.

Napoleon returned to Wiazma, where he was obliged to stop to ascertain
the advantages that he might derive from his new conquest. The accounts
which he received from the interior of Russia, represented the hostile
government as appropriating to itself our successes, and inculcating the
belief that the loss of so many provinces was the effect of a general
plan of retreat, adopted beforehand. Papers seized at Wiazma stated that
_Te Deum_ had been sung at Petersburgh for pretended victories at
Witepsk or Smolensk. "What!" he exclaimed in astonishment, "_Te Deum!_
Dare they then lie to God as well as to men?"

For the rest, most of the intercepted Russian letters expressed the same
astonishment. "While our villages are blazing," said they, "we hear
nothing here but the ringing of bells, hymns of thanksgiving, and
triumphant reports. It seems as if they would make us thank God for the
victories of the French. Thus there is lying in the air, lying on earth,
lying in words and in writing, lying to Heaven and earth, lying in every
thing. Our great men treat Russia like a child, but there is no small
degree of credulity in believing us to be so credulous."

Very just reflections, if means so gross had been employed to deceive
those who were capable of writing such letters. At any rate, though
these political falsehoods are generally resorted to, it was plain that
when carried to such excess, they were a satire either on the governors
or the governed, and, perhaps, on both.

During this time the advanced-guard pushed the Russians as far as Gjatz,
exchanging a few balls with them,--an exchange which was almost always
to the disadvantage of the French, the Russians taking care to employ
only their long pieces, which would carry much farther than ours.
Another remark which we made was, that from Smolensk the Russians had
neglected to burn the villages and the mansions. As they are of a
character which aims at effect, this obscure evil probably appeared to
them to be a useless one. They were satisfied with the more signal
conflagrations of their cities.

This defect, if that negligence proceeded from it, turned, as is
frequently the case with all other defects, to the advantage of their
enemies. In these villages, the French army found forage, corn, ovens
for baking, and shelter. Others observed on this point, that all these
devastations were allotted to cossacks, to barbarians; and that these
hordes, either from hatred or contempt of civilization, seemed to take a
savage and particular pleasure in the destruction of the towns.




CHAP. IV.


On the 1st of September, about noon, there was only a copse of fir-trees
between Murat and Gjatz. The appearance of cossacks obliged him to
deploy his first regiments, but in his impatience he soon sent for some
horse, and having himself driven the Russians from the wood which they
occupied, he crossed it and found himself at the gates of Gjatz. This
sight animated the French, and they instantly made themselves masters of
the town as far as the river which parts it into two, and the bridges of
which had been already set on fire.

There, as at Smolensk and Wiazma, whether by chance, or from the relic
of a Tartar custom, the bazaar was on the Asiatic side, on the bank
opposite to us. The Russian rear-guard, secured by the river, had time,
therefore, to burn that whole quarter. Nothing but the promptitude of
Murat saved the rest.

The troops crossed the Gjatz as they could, on planks, in a few boats,
and by fording. The Russians disappeared behind the flames, whither our
foremost riflemen followed them,--when they saw an inhabitant come
forth, approach them, and cry out that he was a Frenchman. His joy and
his accent confirmed his assertion. They conducted him to Davoust, who
interrogated him.

According to the account of this man, there had been a great change in
the Russian army. A violent clamour had been raised from its ranks
against Barclay. It had been re-echoed by the nobility, by the
merchants, by all Moscow. "That general, that minister, was a traitor;
he caused all their divisions to be destroyed piece-meal; he was
dishonouring the army by an interminable flight; yet, at the same time,
they were labouring under the disgrace of an invasion, and their towns
were in flames. If it was necessary to determine upon this ruin, they
might as well sacrifice themselves at once; then, there would be at
least some honour, whereas, to suffer themselves to be sacrificed by a
stranger, was losing every thing, the honour of the sacrifice not
excepted.

"But why employ this stranger? Was not the contemporary, the comrade,
the rival of Suwarrow yet living? A Russian was wanted to save Russia!"
And they all called for, all were anxious for Kutusof and a battle. The
Frenchman added, that Alexander had yielded; that the insubordination of
Bagration, and the universal outcry, had obtained from him that general
and a battle; and that, moreover, after drawing the invading army so
far, the Russian emperor had himself judged a general engagement
unavoidable.

Finally, he related, that the arrival of Kutusof on the 29th of August
at Tzarewo-zaimizcze, between Wiazma and Gjatz, and the announcement of
a speedy battle, had intoxicated the enemy with two-fold joy; that all
had immediately marched towards Borodino,--not to continue their flight,
but to fix themselves on this frontier of the government of Moscow, to
root themselves to the soil, and defend it; in short, to conquer there
or die.

An incident, otherwise not worthy of notice, seemed to confirm this
intelligence; this was the arrival of a Russian officer with a flag of
truce. He had so little to say, that it was evident from the first that
he came only to observe. His manner was particularly displeasing to
Davoust, who read in it something more than assurance. A French general
having inconsiderately asked this stranger what we should find between
Wiazma and Moscow, the Russian proudly replied, "Pultowa." This answer
bespoke a battle; it pleased the French, who are fond of a smart
repartee, and delight to meet with enemies worthy of themselves.

This officer was conducted back without precaution, as he had been
brought. He saw that there was no obstacle to prevent access to our very
head-quarters; he traversed our advanced posts without meeting with a
single vidette; every where the same negligence was perceptible, and the
temerity so natural to Frenchmen and to conquerors. Every one was
asleep; there was no watchword, no patroles; our soldiers seemed to
despise these details, as too trivial. Wherefore so many precautions?
They attacked--they were victorious: it was for the Russians to defend
themselves! This officer has since said, that he was tempted to take
advantage that very night of our imprudence, but that he did not find
any Russian corps within his reach.

The enemy, in his haste to burn the bridges over the Gjatz, left behind
some of his cossacks; they were taken and conducted to the emperor, who
was approaching on horseback. Napoleon wished to question them himself.
He sent for his interpreter, and caused two of these Scythians, whose
strange dress and wild look were remarkable, to be placed by his side.
In this manner he entered Gjatz, and passed through that town. The
answers of these barbarians corresponded with the account of the
Frenchman; and during the night of the 1st of September, all the reports
from the advanced posts confirmed their accuracy.

Thus Barclay had, singly against all, supported till the very last
moment that plan of retreat, which in 1807 he had vaunted to one of our
generals as the only expedient for saving Russia. Among us, he was
commended for having persisted in this prudent defensive system, in
spite of the clamours of a proud nation irritated by misfortune, and
before so aggressive an enemy.

He had, no doubt, failed in suffering himself to be surprised at Wilna,
and for not considering the marshy course of the Berezina as the proper
frontier of Lithuania; but it was remarked that, subsequently, at Witepsk
and Smolensk, he had forestalled Napoleon; that on the Loutcheza, on the
Dnieper, and at Valoutina, his resistance had been proportionate to time
and place; that this petty warfare, and the losses occasioned by it, had
been but too much in his favour; every retrograde step of his drawing us
to a greater distance from our reinforcements, and carrying him nearer to
his: in short, all that he had done, he had done judiciously, whether he
had hazarded, defended, or abandoned.

And yet he had drawn upon himself general animadversion! But this was,
in our opinion, his highest panegyric. We thought the better of him for
despising public opinion, when it had gone astray; for having contented
himself with watching our motions in order to profit by them, and for
having proved that, most frequently, nations are saved in spite of
themselves.

Barclay showed himself still greater during the rest of the campaign.
This commander in chief, and minister at war, who had been deprived of
the command, that it might be given to Kutusof, voluntarily served under
him, and was seen to obey with as much zeal as he had commanded.




CHAP. V.


The Russian army at length halted. Miloradowitch, with sixteen thousand
recruits, and a host of peasants, bearing the cross and shouting, "_'Tis
the will of God!_" hastened to join its ranks. We were informed that the
enemy were turning up the whole plain of Borodino, and covering it with
entrenchments, apparently with the determination of rooting themselves
there, and not falling back any further.

Napoleon announced a battle to his army; he allowed it two days to rest,
to prepare its arms, and to collect subsistence. He merely warned the
detachments sent out in quest of provisions, that "if they did not
return the following day, they would deprive themselves of the honour of
fighting."

The emperor then endeavoured to obtain some information concerning his
new adversary. Kutusof was described to him as an old man, the
groundwork of whose reputation had been formerly laid by a singular
wound. He had since skilfully profited by circumstances. The very defeat
of Austerlitz, which he had foreseen, added to his renown, which was
further increased by his late campaigns against the Turks. His valour
was incontestable, but he was charged with regulating its vehemence
according to his private interest; for he calculated every thing. His
genius was slow, vindictive, and, above all, crafty--the true Tartar
character!--knowing the art of preparing an implacable war with a
fawning, supple, and patient policy.

In other respects, he was more an adroit courtier than an able general:
but formidable by his renown, by his address in augmenting it, and in
making others concur in this object. He had contrived to flatter the
whole nation, and every individual of it, from the general to the
private soldier.

It was added, that there was in his person, in his language, nay, even
in his very dress, his superstitious practices and his age, a remnant of
Suwarrow,--the stamp of an ancient Muscovite, an air of nationality,
which rendered him dear to the Russians: at Moscow the joy at his
appointment had been carried to intoxication; people embraced one
another in the streets, and considered themselves as saved.

When Napoleon had learned these particulars, and given his orders, he
awaited the event with that tranquillity of mind peculiar to
extraordinary men. He quietly employed himself in exploring the environs
of his head-quarters. He remarked the progress of agriculture; but at
the sight of the Gjatz, which pours its waters into the Wolga, he who
had conquered so many rivers, felt anew the first emotions of his glory:
he was heard to boast of being the master of those waves destined to
visit Asia,--as if they were proceeding to announce his approach, and to
open for him the way to that quarter of the globe.

[Illustration: Portrait of Murat, King of Naples]

On the 4th of September, the army, still divided into three columns, set
out from Gjatz and its environs. Murat had gone on a few leagues before.
Ever since the arrival of Kutusof, troops of cossacks had been
incessantly hovering about the heads of our columns. Murat was
exasperated at seeing his cavalry forced to deploy against so feeble an
obstacle. We are assured that on that day, from one of those first
impulses worthy of the ages of chivalry, he dashed suddenly and alone
towards their line, stopped short a few paces from them, and there,
sword in hand, made a sign for them to retire, with an air and gesture
so commanding, that these barbarians obeyed, and fell back in amazement.

This circumstance, which was related to us immediately, was received
without incredulity. The martial air of that monarch, the brilliancy of
his chivalrous dress, his reputation, and the novelty of such an action,
caused this momentary ascendancy to appear true, in spite of its
improbability; for such was Murat, a theatrical monarch by the splendor
of his dress, and truly a king by his extraordinary valour and his
inexhaustible activity; bold as the attack, and always armed with that
air of superiority, that threatening audacity, which is the most
dangerous of offensive weapons.

He had not marched long, however, before he was forced to halt. At
Griednewa, between Gjatz and Borodino, the high-road suddenly descends
into a deep ravine, whence it again rises as suddenly to a spacious
height, which Kutusof had ordered Konownitzin to defend. That general at
first made a vigorous resistance against the foremost troops of Murat;
but as the army closely followed the latter, every moment gave increased
energy to the attack, and diminished that of the defence; presently the
advanced-guard of the viceroy engaged on the right of the Russians,
where a charge by the Italian chasseurs was withstood for a moment by
the cossacks, which excited astonishment; they became intermixed.

Platof himself admitted that in this affair an officer was wounded near
him, at which he was by no means surprised; but that he nevertheless
caused the sorcerer who accompanied him to be flogged before all his
cossacks, loudly charging him with laziness for neglecting to turn aside
the balls by his conjurations, as he had been expressly directed to do.

Konownitzin was vanquished and retired; on the 5th his bloody track was
followed to the vast convent of Kolotskoi,--fortified as habitations
were of old in those too highly vaunted Gothic ages, when civil wars
were so frequent; when every place, not excepting even these sacred
abodes of peace, was transformed into a military post.

Konownitzin, threatened on the right and left, made no other stand
either at Kolotskoi or at Golowino; but when the advanced-guard
debouched from that village, it beheld the whole plain and the woods
infested with cossacks, the rye crops spoiled, the villages sacked; in
short, a general destruction. By these signs it recognized the field of
battle, which Kutusof was preparing for the grand army. Behind these
clouds of Scythians were perceived three villages; they presented a line
of a league. The intervals between them, intersected by ravines and
wood, were covered with the enemy's riflemen. In the first moment of
ardour, some French horse ventured into the midst of these Russians, and
were cut off.

Napoleon then appeared on a height, from which he surveyed the whole
country, with that eye of a conqueror which sees every thing at once and
without confusion; which penetrates through obstacles, sets aside
accessaries, discovers the capital point, and fixes it with the look of
an eagle, like prey on which he is about to dart with all his might and
all his impetuosity.

He knew that, a league before him, at Borodino, the Kologha, a river
running in a ravine, along the margin of which he proceeded a few
wersts, turned abruptly to the left, and discharged itself into the
Moskwa. He guessed that a chain of considerable heights alone could
have opposed its course, and so suddenly changed its direction. These
were, no doubt, occupied by the enemy's army, and on this side it could
not be easily attacked. But the Kologha, both banks of which he
followed, while it covered the right of the position, left their left
exposed.

The maps of the country were insufficient; at any rate, as the ground
necessarily sloped towards the principal stream, which was the most
considerable merely from being the lowest, it followed, that the ravines
which ran into it must rise, become shallower, and be at length lost, as
they receded from the Kologha. Besides, the old road to Smolensk, which
ran on its right, sufficiently marked their commencement; why should it
have been formerly carried to a distance from the principal stream of
water, and consequently from the most habitable places, if not to avoid
the ravines and the hills which bordered them?

The demonstrations of the enemy agreed with these inductions of his
experience,--no precautions, no resistance in front of their right and
their centre; but before their left a great number of troops, a marked
solicitude to profit by the slightest accidents of the ground, in order
to dispute it, and finally, a formidable redoubt; this was, of course,
their weak side, since they covered it with such care. Nay, more; it was
on the flank of the high-road, and on that of the grand army, that this
redoubt was situated; it was therefore of the utmost importance to
carry it, if he would advance: Napoleon gave orders to that effect.

How much the historian is at a loss for words to express the _coup
d'oeil_ of a man of genius!

The villages and the woods were immediately occupied; on the left and in
the centre were the army of Italy, Compans's division, and Murat; on the
right, Poniatowski. The attack was general; for the army of Italy and
the Polish army appeared at once on the two wings of the grand imperial
column. These three masses drove back the Russian rear-guards upon
Borodino, and the whole war was concentrated on a single point.

This curtain being withdrawn, the first Russian redoubt was discovered;
too much detached in advance of their position, which it defended
without being defended by it. The nature of the ground had compelled the
choice of this insulated situation.

Compans skilfully availed himself of the undulations of the ground; its
elevations served as platforms to his guns for battering the redoubt,
and screened his infantry while drawing up into columns of attack. The
61st marched foremost; the redoubt was taken by a single effort, and
with the bayonet; but Bagration sent reinforcements, by which it was
retaken. Three times did the 61st recover it from the Russians, and
three times was it driven out again; but at length it maintained itself
in it, covered with blood and half destroyed.

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