Book: History of the Expedition to Russia

C >> Count Philip de Segur >> History of the Expedition to Russia




The success of the war, therefore, in no degree depended on the cession
of Gallicia, or the difficulties arising from the Austrian jealousy of
that possession. Napoleon, consequently, might on his entrance into
Wilna, have publicly proclaimed the liberation of the whole of Poland,
instead of betraying the expectations of her people, astonishing and
rendering them indifferent by expressions of wavering import.

This, however, was one of those prominent points, which in politics as
well as in war are decisive, with which every thing is connected, and
from which nothing ought to have made him swerve. But whether it was
that Napoleon reckoned too much on the ascendancy of his genius, or the
strength of his army, and the weakness of Alexander; or that,
considering what he left behind him, he felt it too dangerous to carry
on so distant a war slowly and methodically; or whether, as we shall
presently be told by himself, he had doubts of the success of his
undertaking; certain it is, that he either neglected, or could not yet
determine to proclaim the liberation of that country whose freedom he
had come to restore.

And yet he had sent an ambassador to her Diet. When this inconsistency
was remarked to him, he replied, that "that nomination was an act of
war, which only bound him during the war, while by his words he would be
bound both in war and peace." Thus it was, that he made no other reply
to the enthusiasm of the Lithuanians than evasive expressions, at the
very time he was following up his attack on Alexander to the very
capital of his empire.

He even neglected to clear the southern Polish provinces of the feeble
hostile armies which kept the patriotism of their inhabitants in check,
and to secure, by strongly organizing their insurrection, a solid basis
of operation. Accustomed to short methods, and to rapid attacks, he
wished to imitate himself, in spite of the difference of places and
circumstances; for such is the weakness of man, that he is always led
by imitation, either of others, or of himself, which in the latter case,
that of great men, is habit; for habit is nothing more than the
imitation of one's self. So true it is, that by their strongest side
these extraordinary men are undone!

The one in question committed himself to the fortune of battles. Having
prepared an army of six hundred and fifty thousand men, he fancied that
that was doing sufficient to secure victory, from which he expected
every thing. Instead of sacrificing every thing to obtain victory, it
was by that he looked to obtain every thing; he made use of it as a
_means_, when it ought to have been his _end_. In this manner he made it
too necessary; it was already rather too much so. But he confided so
much of futurity to it, he overloaded it with so much responsibility,
that it became urgent and indispensable to him. Hence his precipitation
to get within reach of it, in order to extricate himself from so
critical a position.

But we must not be too hasty in condemning a genius so great and
universal; we shall shortly hear from himself by what urgent necessity
he was hurried on; and even admitting that the rapidity of his
expedition was only equalled by its rashness, success would have
probably crowned it, if the premature decline of his health had left the
physical constitution of this great man all the vigour which his mind
still retained.




CHAP. II.


As to Prussia, of which Napoleon was completely master, it is not known
whether it was from his uncertainty as to the fate which he reserved for
her, or as to the period at which he should commence the war, that he
refused, in 1811, to contract the alliance which she herself proposed to
him, and of which he dictated the conditions, in 1812.

His aversion to Frederick William was remarkable. Napoleon had been
frequently heard to speak reproachfully of the cabinet of Prussia for
its treaties with the French republic. He said, "It was a desertion of
the cause of kings; that the negotiations of the court of Berlin with
the Directory displayed a timid, selfish, and ignoble policy, which
sacrificed its dignity, and the general cause of monarchs, to petty
aggrandizements." Whenever he followed with his finger the traces of the
Prussian frontiers upon the map, he seemed to be angry at seeing them
still so extensive, and exclaimed, "Is it possible that I have left this
man so large a territory?"

This dislike to a mild and pacific monarch was surprising. As there is
nothing in the character of Napoleon unworthy of historical remembrance,
it is worth while to examine the cause of it. Some persons trace back
the origin of it to the rejection which he experienced, when First
Consul, from Louis XVIII. of the propositions which he made to him
through the medium of the king of Prussia; and they suppose that
Napoleon laid the blame of this refusal upon the mediator. Others
attribute it to the seizure of Rumbold, the English agent at Hamburgh,
by the orders of Napoleon, and to his being compelled to give him up by
Frederick, as protector of the neutrality of the north of Germany.
Before that time, Frederick and Napoleon had carried on a secret
correspondence, which was of so intimate a nature, that they used to
confide to each other even the details of their household; that
circumstance, it is said, put an end to it.

At the beginning of 1805, however, Russia, Austria, and England, made
ineffectual attempts to engage Frederick in their third coalition
against France. The court of Berlin, the queen, the princes, the
minister Hardenberg, and all the young Prussian military, excited by the
ardour of displaying the inheritance of glory which had been left them
by the great Frederick, or by the wish of blotting out the disgrace of
the campaign of 1792, entered heartily into the views of the allied
powers; but the pacific policy of the king, and of his minister
Haugwitz, resisted them, until the violation of the Prussian territory,
near Anspach, by the march of a corps of French troops, exasperated the
passions of the Prussians to such a degree, that their cry for immediate
war prevailed.

Alexander was then in Poland; he was invited to Potsdam, and repaired
thither immediately; and on the 3d of November, 1805, he engaged
Frederick in the third coalition. The Prussian array was immediately
withdrawn from the Russian frontiers, and M. de Haugwitz repaired to
Bruenn to threaten Napoleon with it. But the battle of Austerlitz shut
his mouth; and within a fortnight after, the wily minister, having
quickly turned round to the side of the conqueror, signed with him the
participation of the fruits of victory.

Napoleon, however, dissembled his displeasure; for he had his army to
re-organize, to give the grand duchy of Berg to Murat, his
brother-in-law, Neufchatel to Berthier, to conquer Naples for his
brother Joseph, to mediatize Switzerland, to dissolve the Germanic body,
and to create the Rhenish confederation, of which he declared himself
protector; to change the republic of Holland into a kingdom, and to give
it to his brother Louis. These were the reasons which induced him, on
the 15th of December, to cede Hanover to Prussia, in exchange for
Anspach, Cleves, and Neufchatel.

The possession of Hanover at first tempted Frederick, but when the
treaty was to be signed, he appeared to feel ashamed, and to hesitate;
he wished only to accept it by halves, and to retain it merely as a
deposit. Napoleon had no idea of such timid policy. "What!" said he,
"does this monarch dare neither to make peace nor war? Does he prefer
the English to me? Is there another coalition preparing? Does he despise
my alliance?" Indignant at the idea, by a fresh treaty, on the 8th of
March, 1806, he compelled Frederick to declare war against England, to
take possession of Hanover, and to admit French garrisons into _Wesel_
and _Hameln_.

The king of Prussia alone submitted; his court and his subjects were
exasperated; they reproached him with allowing himself to be vanquished
without attempting to fight; and elevating themselves on the remembrance
of their past glory, they fancied that for them alone was reserved the
honour of triumphing over the conqueror of Europe. In their impatience
they insulted the minister of Napoleon; they sharpened their swords on
the threshold of his gate. Napoleon himself they loaded with abuse. Even
the queen, so distinguished by her graces and attractions, put on a
warlike attitude. Their princes, one of them particularly (whose
carriage and features, spirit and intrepidity, seemed to promise them a
hero), offered to be their leaders. A chivalrous ardour and fury
animated the minds of all.

It is asserted, that at the same time there were persons, either
treacherous or deceived, who persuaded Frederick that Napoleon was
obliged to show himself pacific, that that warrior was averse to war;
they added, that he was perfidiously treating for peace with England, on
the terms of restoring Hanover, which he was to take back from Prussia.
Drawn in at last by the general feeling, the king allowed all these
passions to burst forth. His army advanced, and threatened Napoleon;
fifteen days afterwards he had neither army nor kingdom; he fled alone;
and Napoleon dated from Berlin his decrees against England.

Humbled and conquered as Prussia thus was, it was impossible for
Napoleon to abandon his hold of her; she would have immediately rallied,
under the cannon of the Russians. Finding it impossible to gain her to
his interests, like Saxony, by a great act of generosity, the next plan
was to divide her; and yet, either from compassion, or the effect of
Alexander's presence, he could not resolve to dismember her. This was a
mistaken policy, like most of those where we stop half-way; and Napoleon
was not long before he became sensible of it. When he exclaimed,
therefore, "Is it possible that I have left this man so large a
territory?" it is probable that he did not forgive Prussia the
protection of Alexander; he hated her, because he felt that she hated
him.

In fact, the sparks of a jealous and impatient hatred escaped from the
youth of Prussia, whose ideas were exalted by a system of education,
national, liberal, and mystical. It was among them that a formidable
power arose in opposition to that of Napoleon. It included all whom his
victories had humbled or offended; it had all the strength of the weak
and the oppressed, the law of nature, mystery, fanaticism, and revenge!
Wanting support on earth, it looked up for aid to Heaven, and its moral
forces were wholly out of the reach of the material power of Napoleon.
Animated by the devoted and indefatigable spirit of an ardent sect, it
watched the slightest movements and weakest points of its enemy,
insinuated itself into all the interstices of his power, and holding
itself ready to strike at every opportunity, it waited quietly with the
patience and phlegm which are the peculiar characteristics of the
Germans, which were the causes of their defeat, and against which our
victory wore itself out.

This vast conspiracy was that of the _Tugendbund_[1], or _Friends of
Virtue_. Its head, in other words, the person who first gave a precise
and definite direction to its views, was _Stein_. Napoleon perhaps might
have gained him over to his interests, but preferred punishing him. His
plan happened to be discovered by one of those chances to which the
police owes the best part of its miracles; but when conspiracies enter
into the interests, passions, and even the consciences of men, it is
impossible to seize their ramifications: every one understands without
communicating; or rather, all is communication--a general and
simultaneous sympathy.

[Footnote 1: In 1808, several literary men at Koenigsberg, afflicted with
the evils which desolated their country, ascribed it to the general
corruption of manners. According to these philosophers, it had stifled
true patriotism in the citizens, discipline in the army, and courage in
the people. Good men therefore were bound to unite to regenerate the
nation, by setting the example of every sacrifice. An association was in
consequence formed by them, which took the title of _Moral and
Scientific Union_. The government approved of it, merely interdicting it
from political discussions. This resolution, noble as it was, would
probably have been lost, like many others, in the vagueness of German
metaphysics; but about that time William, Duke of Brunswick, who had
been stripped of his duchy, had retired to his principality of Oels in
Silesia. In the bosom of this retreat he is said to have observed the
first progress of the _Moral Union_ among the Prussians. He became a
member of it; and his heart swelling with hatred and revenge, he formed
the idea of another association, which was to consist of men resolved to
overthrow the confederation of the Rhine, and to drive the French
entirely out of Germany. This society, whose object was more real and
positive than that of the first, soon swallowed up the other; and from
these two was formed that of the _Tugendbund_, or _Friends of Virtue_.

About the end of May, 1809, three enterprises--those of Katt, Doernberg,
and Schill--had already given proofs of its existence. That of Duke
William began on the 14th of May. He was at first supported by the
Austrians. After a variety of adventures, this leader, abandoned to his
own resources in the midst of subjugated Europe, and left with only 2000
men to combat with the whole power of Napoleon, refused to yield: he
stood his ground, and threw himself into Saxony and Hanover; but finding
it impossible to raise them into insurrection, he cut his way through
several French corps, which he defeated, to Elsfleth, where he found an
English vessel waiting to receive and to convey him to England, with the
laurels he had acquired.]

This focus spread its fires and gained new partizans every day; it
attacked the power of Napoleon in the opinion of all Germany, extended
itself into Italy, and threatened its complete overthrow. It was already
easy to see that, if circumstances became unfavourable to us, there
would be no want of men to take advantage of them. In 1809, even before
the disaster of Esslingen, the first who had ventured to raise the
standard of independence against Napoleon were Prussians. He sent them
to the galleys; so important did he feel it to smother that cry of
revolt, which seemed to echo that of the Spaniards, and might become
general.

Independently of all these causes of hatred, the position of Prussia,
between France and Russia, compelled Napoleon to remain her master; he
could not reign there but by force--he could not be strong there but by
her weakness.

He ruined the country, although he must have known well that poverty
creates audacity; that the hope of gain becomes the moving principle of
those who have nothing more to lose; and finally, that in leaving them
nothing but the sword, he in a manner obliged them to turn it against
himself. In consequence, on the approach of the year 1812, and of the
terrible struggle which it was to produce, Frederick, uneasy and tired
of his subservient position, was determined to extricate himself from
it, either by an alliance or by war. In March, 1811, he offered himself
to Napoleon as an auxiliary in the expedition which he was preparing. In
the month of May, and again in the month of August, he repeated that
offer; and as he received no satisfactory answer, he declared, that as
the great military movements which surrounded, crossed, or drained his
kingdom, were such as to excite his apprehension that his entire
destruction was meditated, "he took up arms, because circumstances
imperiously called upon him to do so, deeming it far preferable to die
sword in hand than to fall with disgrace."

It was said at the same time, that Frederick secretly offered to
Alexander to give him possession of Graudentz, and his magazines, and
to put himself at the head of his insurgent subjects, if the Russian
army should advance into Silesia. If the same authorities are to be
believed, Alexander received this proposition, very favourably. He
immediately sent to Bagration and Wittgenstein sealed marching orders.
They were instructed not to open them until they received another letter
from their sovereign, which he never wrote, having changed his
resolution. A variety of causes might have dictated that change; 1st, a
wish not to be the first to commence so great a war, and his anxiety to
have divine justice and the opinion of mankind on his side, by not
appearing the aggressor; 2d, that Frederick, becoming less uneasy as to
the plans of Napoleon, had resolved to follow his fortunes. It is
probable, after all, that the noble sentiments which Alexander expressed
in his reply to the king were his only motives: we are assured that he
wrote to him, "That in a war which might begin by reverses, and in which
perseverance was required, he only felt courageous for himself, and that
the misfortunes of an ally might shake his resolution; that it would
grieve him to chain Prussia to his fortune if it was bad; that if it was
good he should always be ready to share it with her, whatever line of
conduct necessity might oblige her to pursue."

These details have been certified to us by a witness, although an
inferior one. However, whether this counsel proceeded from the
generosity or the policy of Alexander, or Frederick was determined
solely by the necessity of the case, it is certain that it was high
time for him to come to a decision; for in February, 1812, these
communications with Alexander, _if there were such_, or the hope of
obtaining better terms from France having made him hesitate in replying
to the definitive propositions of Napoleon, the latter, becoming
impatient, sent additional forces to Dantzic, and made Davoust enter
Pomerania. His orders for this invasion of a Swedish province were
repeated and pressing; they were grounded on the illicit commerce
carried on by the Pomeranians with the English, and subsequently on the
necessity of compelling Prussia to accede to his terms. The Prince of
Eckmuehl even received orders to hold himself in readiness to take
immediate possession of that kingdom, and to seize the person of her
sovereign, if within eight days from the date of these orders the latter
had not concluded the offensive alliance dictated to him by France; but
while the marshal was tracing the few marches necessary for this
operation, he received intelligence that the treaty of the 21st of
February, 1812, had been ratified.

This submission did not altogether satisfy Napoleon. To his strength he
added artifice; his suspicions still led him to covet the occupation of
the fortresses, which he was ashamed not to leave in Frederick's hands;
he required the king to keep only 50 or 80 invalids in some, and desired
that some French officers should be admitted into others; all of whom
were to send their reports to him, and to follow his orders. His
solicitude extended to every thing. "Spandau," said he, in his letters
to Davoust, "is the citadel of Berlin, as Pillau is that of Koenigsberg;"
and French troops had orders to be ready to introduce themselves at the
first signal: the manner he himself pointed out. At Potsdam, which the
king had reserved for himself, and which our troops were interdicted
from entering, his orders were, that the French officers should
frequently show themselves, in order to observe, and to accustom the
people to the sight of them. He recommended every degree of respect to
be shown, both to the king and his subjects; but at the same time he
required that every sort of arms should be taken from the latter, which
might be of use to them in an insurrection; and he pointed out every
thing of the kind, even to the smallest weapon. Anticipating the
possibility of the loss of a battle, and the chances of Prussian
_vespers_, he ordered that his troops should be either put into barracks
or encampments, with a thousand other precautions of the minutest
description. As a final security, in case of the English making a
descent between the Elbe and the Vistula, although Victor, and
subsequently Augereau, were to occupy Prussia with 50,000 men, he
engaged by treaty the assistance of 10,000 Danes.

All these precautions were still insufficient to remove his distrust;
when the Prince of Hatzfeld came to require of him a subsidy of 25
millions of francs to meet the expenses of the war which was preparing,
his reply to Daru was, "that he would take especial care not to furnish
an enemy with arms against himself." In this manner did Frederick,
entangled as it were in a net of iron, which surrounded and held him
tight in every part, put between 20 and 30,000 of his troops, and his
principal fortresses and magazines, at the disposal of Napoleon[2].

[Footnote 2: By this treaty, Prussia agreed to furnish two hundred
thousand quintals of rye, twenty-four thousand of rice, two million
bottles of beer, four hundred thousand quintals of wheat, six hundred
and fifty thousand of straw, three hundred and fifty thousand of hay,
six million bushels of oats, forty-four thousand oxen, fifteen thousand
horses, three thousand six hundred waggons, with harness and drivers,
each carrying a load of fifteen hundred weight; and finally, hospitals
provided with every thing necessary for twenty thousand sick. It is
true, that all these supplies were to be allowed in deduction of the
remainder of the taxes imposed by the conquest.]




CHAP. III.


These two treaties opened the road to Russia to Napoleon; but in order
to penetrate into the interior of that empire, it was necessary to make
sure of Sweden and Turkey.

Military combinations were then so much aggrandized, that in order to
sketch a plan of warfare, it was no longer necessary to study the
configuration of a province, or of a chain of mountains, or the course
of a river. When monarchs, such as Alexander and Napoleon, were
contending for the dominion of Europe, it was necessary to regard the
general and relative position of every state with a universal _coup
d'oeil_; it was no longer on single maps, but on that of the whole
globe, that their policy had to trace its plans of hostility.

Russia is mistress of the heights of Europe; her flanks are supported by
the seas of the north and south. Her government can only with great
difficulty be driven into a straight, and forced to submit, in a space
almost beyond the imagination to conceive: the conquest of which would
require long campaigns, to which her climate is completely opposed. From
this, it follows, that without the concurrence of Turkey and Sweden,
Russia is less vulnerable. The assistance of these two powers was
therefore requisite in order to surprise her, to strike her to the heart
in her modern capital, and to turn at a distance, in the rear of its
left, her grand army of the Niemen,--and not merely to precipitate
attacks on a part of her front, in plains where the extent of space
prevented confusion, and left a thousand roads open to the retreat of
that army.

The meanest soldier in our ranks, therefore, expected to hear of the
combined march of the Grand Vizir towards Kief, and of Bernadotte
against Finland. Eight sovereigns were already enlisted under the
banners of Napoleon; but the two who had the greatest interest in the
quarrel were still deaf to his call. It was an idea worthy of the great
emperor to put all the governments and all the religions of Europe in
motion for the accomplishment of his great designs: their triumph would
have been then secured; and if the voice of another Homer had been
wanting to this king of so many kings, the voice of the nineteenth
century, the great century, would have supplied it; and the cry of
astonishment of a whole age, penetrating and piercing through futurity,
would have echoed from generation to generation, to the latest
posterity!

So much glory was not in reserve for us.

Which of us, in the French army, can ever forget his astonishment, in
the midst of the Russian plains, on hearing the news of the fatal
treaties of the Turks and Swedes with Alexander; and how anxiously our
looks were turned towards our right uncovered, towards our left
enfeebled, and upon our retreat menaced? _Then_ we only looked at the
fatal effects of the peace between our allies and our enemy; _now_ we
feel desirous of knowing the causes of it.

The treaties concluded about the end of the last century, had subjected
the weak sultan of the Turks to Russia; the Egyptian expedition had
armed him against us. But ever since Napoleon had assumed the reins of
power, a well-understood common interest, and the intimacy of a
mysterious correspondence, had reconciled Selim with the first consul: a
close connexion was established between these two princes, and they had
exchanged portraits with each other. Selim attempted to effect a great
revolution in the Turkish customs. Napoleon encouraged him, and was
assisting him in introducing the European discipline into the Ottoman
army, when the victory of Jena, the war of Poland, and the influence of
Sebastiani, determined the sultan to throw off the yoke of Alexander.
The English made hasty attempts to oppose this, but they were driven
from the sea of Constantinople. Then it was that Napoleon wrote the
following letter to Selim.

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