Book: History of the Expedition to Russia

C >> Count Philip de Segur >> History of the Expedition to Russia




"_Osterode, April_ 3, 1807.

"My ambassador informs me of the bravery and good conduct of the
Mussulmans against our common enemies. Thou hast shown thyself the
worthy descendant of the Selims and the Solimans. Thou hast asked me for
some officers; I send them to thee. I regretted that thou hadst not
required of me some thousand men,--thou hast only asked for five
hundred; I have given orders for their immediate departure. It is my
intention that they shall be paid and clothed at my expense, and that
thou shalt be reimbursed the expenses which they may occasion thee. I
have given orders to the commander of my troops in Dalmatia to send thee
the arms, ammunition, and every thing thou shalt require of me. I have
given the same orders at Naples; and artillery has been already placed
at the disposal of the pasha of Janina. Generals, officers, arms of
every description, even money--I place all at thy disposal. Thou hast
only to ask: do so in a distinct manner, and all which thou shalt
require I will send thee on the instant. Arrange matters with the shah
of Persia, who is also the enemy of the Russians; encourage him to stand
fast, and to attack warmly the common enemy. I have beaten the Russians
in a great battle; I have taken from them seventy-five pieces of cannon,
sixteen standards, and a great number of prisoners. I am at the distance
of eighty leagues beyond Warsaw, and am about to take advantage of the
fifteen days' repose which I have given to my army, to repair thither,
and there to receive thy ambassador. I am sensible of the want thou hast
of artillerymen and troops; I have offered both to thy ambassador; but
he has declined them, from a fear of alarming the delicacy of the
Mussulmans. Confide to me all thy wants; I am sufficiently powerful, and
sufficiently interested in thy prosperity, both from friendship and
policy, to have nothing to refuse thee. Peace has been proposed to me
here. I have been offered all the advantages which I could desire; but
they wished that I should ratify the state of things established
between the Porte and Russia by the treaty of Sistowa, and I refused. My
answer was, _that it was necessary that the Porte should be secured in
complete independence; and that all the treaties extorted from her,
during the time that France was asleep, should be revoked_."

This letter of Napoleon had been preceded and followed by verbal but
formal assurances, that he would not sheath the sword, until the Crimea
was restored to the dominion of the crescent. He had even authorized
Sebastiani to give the divan a copy of his instructions, which contained
these promises.

Such were his words, with which his actions at first corresponded.
Sebastiani demanded a passage through Turkey for an army of 25,000
French, which he was to command, and which was to join the Ottoman army.
An unforeseen circumstance, it is true, deranged this plan; but Napoleon
then made Selim the promise of an auxiliary force of 9000 French,
including 5000 artillerymen, who were to be conveyed in eleven vessels
of the line to Constantinople. The Turkish ambassador was at the same
time treated with the greatest distinction in the French camp; he
accompanied Napoleon in all his reviews: the most flattering attentions
were paid to him, and the grand-equerry (Caulaincourt,) was already
treating with him for an alliance, offensive and defensive, when a
sudden attack by the Russians interrupted the negotiation.

The ambassador returned to Warsaw, where the same respect continued to
be shown him, up to the day of the decisive victory of Friedland. But
on the following day his illusion was dissipated; he saw himself
neglected; for it was no longer Selim whom he represented. A revolution
had just hurled from the throne the monarch who had been the friend of
Napoleon, and with him all hope of giving the Turks a regular army, upon
which he could depend. Napoleon, therefore, judging that he could no
longer reckon upon the assistance of these barbarians, changed his
system. Henceforward it was Alexander whom he wished to gain; and as his
was a genius which never hesitated, he was already prepared to abandon
the empire of the East to that monarch, in order that he might be left
at liberty to possess himself of that of the West.

As his great object was the extension of the continental system, and to
make it surround Europe, the co-operation of Russia would complete its
development. Alexander would shut out the English from the North, and
compel Sweden to go to war with them; the French would expel them from
the centre, from the south, and from the west of Europe. Napoleon was
already meditating the expedition to Portugal, if that kingdom would not
join his coalition. With these ideas floating in his brain, Turkey was
now only an accessary in his plans, and he agreed to the armistice, and
to the conferences at Tilsit.

But a deputation had just come from Wilna, soliciting the restoration of
their national independence, and professing the same devotion to his
cause as had been shown by Warsaw; Berthier, whose ambition was
satisfied, and who began to be tired of war, dismissed these envoys
rudely, styling them traitors to their sovereign. The Prince of Eckmuehl,
on the contrary, favoured their object, and presented them to Napoleon,
who was irritated with Berthier for his treatment of these Lithuanians,
and received them graciously, without, however, promising them his
support. In vain did Davoust represent to him that the opportunity was
favourable, owing to the destruction of the Russian army; Napoleon's
reply was, "that Sweden had just declared her armistice to him; that
Austria offered her mediation between France and Russia, which he looked
upon as a hostile step; that the Prussians, seeing him at such a
distance from France, might recover from their intimidation; and
finally, that Selim, his faithful ally, had just been dethroned, and his
place filled by Mustapha IV., of whose dispositions he knew nothing."

The emperor of France continued, therefore, to negotiate with Russia;
and the Turkish ambassador, neglected and forgotten, wandered about our
camp, without being summoned to take any part in the negotiations which
terminated the war; he returned to Constantinople soon after, in great
displeasure. Neither the Crimea, nor even Moldavia and Wallachia, were
restored to that barbarous court by the treaty of Tilsit; the
restitution of the two latter provinces was only stipulated by an
armistice, the conditions of which were never meant to be executed. But
as Napoleon professed to be the mediator between Mustapha and Alexander,
the ministers of the two powers repaired to Paris. But there, during
the long continuance of that feigned mediation, the Turkish
plenipotentiaries were never admitted to his presence.

If we must even tell the whole truth, it is asserted, that at the
interview at Tilsit, and subsequently, a treaty for the partition of
Turkey was under discussion. It was proposed to Russia to take
possession of Wallachia, Moldavia, Bulgaria, and a part of Mount Hemus.
Austria was to have Servia and a part of Bosnia; France the other part
of that province, Albania, Macedonia, and all Greece as far as
Thessalonica: Constantinople, Adrianople, and Thrace, were to be left to
the Turks.

Whether the conferences respecting this partition were really of a
serious nature, or merely the communication of a great idea, is
uncertain; so much is certain, that shortly after the interview at
Tilsit, Alexander's ambition was very sensibly moderated. The
suggestions of prudence had shown him the danger of substituting for the
ignorant, infatuated, and feeble Turkey, an active, powerful, and
unaccommodating neighbour. In his conversations on the subject at that
time, he remarked, "that he had already too much desert country; that he
knew too well, by the occupation of the Crimea, which was still
depopulated, the value of conquest over foreign and hostile religions
and manners; that besides, France and Russia were too strong to become
such near neighbours; that two such powerful bodies coming into
immediate contact, would be sure to jostle; and that it was much better
to leave intermediate powers between them."

On the other side, the French emperor urged the matter no further; the
Spanish insurrection diverted his attention, and imperiously required
his presence with all his forces. Even previous to the interview at
Erfurt, after Sebastiani's return from Constantinople, although Napoleon
still seemed to adhere to the idea of dismembering Turkey in Europe, he
had admitted the correctness of his ambassador's reasoning: "That in
this partition, the advantages would be all against him; that Russia and
Austria would acquire contiguous provinces, which would make their
dominions more complete, while we should be obliged to keep 80,000 men
continually in Greece to retain it in subjection; that such an army,
from the distance and losses it would sustain from long marches, and the
novelty and unhealthiness of the climate, would require 30,000 recruits
annually, a number which would quite drain France: that a line of
operation extending from Athens to Paris, was out of all proportion;
that besides, it was strangled in its passage at Trieste, at which point
only two marches would enable the Austrians to place themselves across
it, and thereby cut off our army of observation in Greece from all
communication with Italy and France."

Here Napoleon exclaimed, "that Austria certainly complicated every
thing; that she was there like a dead weight; that she must be got rid
off; and Europe must be divided into two empires: that the Danube, from
the Black Sea to Passau, the mountains of Bohemia to Koenigsgratz, and
the Elbe to the Baltic, should be their lines of demarcation. Alexander
should become the emperor of the north, and he of the south of Europe."
Abandoning, subsequently, these lofty ideas, and reverting to
Sebastiani's observations on the partition of European Turkey, he
terminated the conferences, which had lasted three days, with these
words: "You are right, and no answer can be given to that! I give it up.
Besides, that accords with my views on Spain, which I am going to unite
to France."--"What do I hear?" exclaimed Sebastiani, astonished, "unite
it! And your brother!"--"What signifies my brother?" retorted Napoleon;
"does one give away a kingdom like Spain? I am determined to unite it to
France. I will give that nation a great national representation. I will
make the emperor Alexander consent to it, by allowing him to take
possession of Turkey to the Danube, and I will evacuate Berlin. As to
Joseph, I will indemnify him."

The congress at Erfurt took place just after this. He could have no
motive at that time for supporting the rights of the Turks. The French
army, which had advanced imprudently into the very heart of Spain, had
met with reverses. The presence of its leader, and that of his armies of
the Rhine and the Elbe, became there every day more and more necessary,
and Austria had availed herself of the opportunity to take up arms.
Uneasy respecting the state of Germany, Napoleon was therefore anxious
to make sure of the dispositions of Alexander, to conclude an alliance
offensive and defensive with him, and even to engage him in a war. Such
were the reasons which induced him to abandon Turkey as far as the
Danube to that emperor.

The Porte therefore had very soon reason to reproach us for the war
which was renewed between it and Russia. Notwithstanding, in July, 1808,
when Mustapha was dethroned, and succeeded by Mahmoud, the latter
announced his accession to the French emperor; but Napoleon had then to
keep upon terms with Alexander, and felt too much regret at the death of
Selim, detestation of the barbarity of the Mussulmans, and contempt for
their unstable government, to allow him to notice the communication. For
three years he had returned no reply to the sultan, and his silence
might be interpreted into a refusal to acknowledge him.

He was in this ambiguous position with the Turks, when all of a sudden,
on the 21st of March, 1812, only six weeks before the war with Russia
commenced, he solicited an alliance with Mahmoud: he demanded that,
within five days from the period of the communication, all negotiation
between the Turks and Russians should be broken off; and that an army of
100,000 men, commanded by the sultan himself, should march to the Danube
within nine days. The return which he proposed to make for this
assistance was, to put the Porte in possession of the very same Moldavia
and Wallachia, which, under the circumstances, the Russians were but too
happy to restore as the price of a speedy peace; and the promise of
procuring the restoration of the Crimea, which he had made six years
before to Selim, was again renewed.

We know not whether the time which this despatch would take to arrive at
Constantinople had been badly calculated, whether Napoleon believed the
Turkish army to be stronger than it really was, or whether he had
flattered himself with surprising and captivating the determination of
the divan by so sudden and advantageous a proposition. It can hardly be
supposed that he was ignorant of the long invariable custom of the
Mussulmans, which prevented the grand signor from ever appearing in
person at the head of his army.

It appears as if the genius of Napoleon could not stoop so low as to
impute to the divan the brutish ignorance which it exhibited of its real
interests. After the manner in which he had abandoned the interests of
Turkey in 1807, perhaps he did not make sufficient allowance for the
distrust which the Mussulmans were likely to entertain of his new
promises; he forgot that they were too ignorant to appreciate the change
which recent circumstances had effected in his political views; and that
barbarians like them could still less comprehend the feelings of dislike
with which they had inspired him, by their deposition and murder of
Selim, to whom he was attached, and in conjunction with whom he had
hoped to make European Turkey a military power capable of coping with
Russia.

Perhaps he might still have gained over Mahmoud to his cause, if he had
sooner made use of more potent arguments; but, as he has since expressed
himself, it revolted his pride to make use of corruption. We shall
besides shortly see him hesitating about beginning a war with Alexander,
or laying too much stress on the alarm with which his immense
preparations would inspire that monarch. It is also possible, that the
last propositions which he made to the Turks, being tantamount to a
declaration of war against the Russians, were delayed for the express
purpose of deceiving the Czar as to the period of his invasion. Finally,
whether it was from all these causes, from a confidence founded on the
mutual hatred of the two nations, and on his treaty of alliance with
Austria, which had just guaranteed Moldavia and Wallachia to the Turks,
he detained the ambassador whom he sent to them on his road, and waited,
as we have just seen, to the very last moment.

But the divan was surrounded by the Russian, English, Austrian, and
Swedish envoys, who with one voice represented to it, "that the Turks
were indebted for their existence in Europe solely to the divisions
which existed among the Christian monarchs; that the moment these were
united under one influence, the Mahometans in Europe would be
overwhelmed; and that as the French emperor was advancing rapidly to the
attainment of universal empire, it was him whom the Turks had most
reason to dread."

To these representations were added the intrigues of the two Greek
princes Morozi. They were of the same religion with Alexander, and they
looked to him for the possession of Moldavia and Wallachia. Grown rich
by his favours and by the gold of England, these dragomans enlightened
the unsuspecting ignorance of the Turks, as to the occupation and
military surveys of the Ottoman frontiers by the French. They did a
great deal more; the first of them influenced the dispositions of the
divan and the capital, and the second those of the grand vizir and the
army; and as the proud Mahmoud resisted, and would only accept an
honourable peace, these treacherous Greeks contrived to disband his
army, and compelled him, by insurrections, to sign the degrading treaty
of Bucharest with the Russians.

Such is the power of intrigue in the seraglio; two Greeks whom the Turks
despised, there decided the fate of Turkey, in spite of the sultan
himself. As the latter depended for his existence on the intrigues of
his palace, he was, like all despots who shut themselves up in them,
obliged to yield: the Morozi carried the day; but afterwards he had them
both beheaded.




CHAP. IV.


In this manner did we lose the support of Turkey; but Sweden still
remained to us; her monarch had sprung from our ranks; a soldier of our
army, it was to that he owed his glory and his throne: was it likely
that he would desert our cause on the first opportunity he had of
showing his gratitude? It was impossible to anticipate such ingratitude;
still less, that he would sacrifice the real and permanent interests of
Sweden to his former jealousy of Napoleon, and perhaps to a weakness too
common among the upstart favourites of fortune; unless it be that the
submission of men who have newly attained to greatness to those who
boast of a transmitted rank, is a necessity of their position rather
than an error of their self-love.

In this great contest between aristocracy and democracy, the ranks of
the former had been joined by one of its most determined enemies.
Bernadotte being thrown almost singly among the ancient courts and
nobility, did every thing to merit his adoption by them, and succeeded.
But his success must have cost him dear, as in order to obtain it, he
was first obliged to abandon his old companions, and the authors of his
glory, in the hour of peril. At a later period he did more; he was seen
marching over their bleeding corses, joining with all their, and
formerly his, enemies, to overwhelm the country of his birth, and
thereby lay that of his adoption at the mercy of the first czar who
should be ambitious of reigning over the Baltic.

On the other hand, it would appear that the character of Bernadotte, and
the importance of Sweden in the decisive struggle which was about to
commence, were not sufficiently weighed in the political balance of
Napoleon. His ardent and exclusive genius hazarded too much; he
overloaded a solid foundation so much that he sank it. Thus it was, that
after justly appreciating the Swedish interests as naturally bound up
with his, the moment he wished to weaken the power of Russia, he fancied
that he could exact every thing from the Swedes without promising them
any thing in return: his pride did not make any allowance for theirs,
judging that they were too much interested in the success of his cause,
for them ever to think of separating themselves from it.

We must, however, take up the history a little earlier; facts will prove
that the defection of Sweden was as much attributable to the jealous
ambition of Bernadotte as to the unbending pride of Napoleon. It will be
seen that her new monarch assumed to himself a great part of the
responsibility of the rupture, by offering his alliance at the price of
an act of treachery.

When Napoleon returned from Egypt, he did not become the chief of his
equals with all their concurrence. Such of them as were already jealous
of his glory then became still more envious of his power. As they could
not dispute the first, they attempted to refuse obedience to the second.
Moreau, and several other generals, either by persuasion or surprise,
had co-operated in the revolution of the 18th Brumaire: they afterwards
repented having done so. Bernadotte had refused all participation in it.
Alone, during the night, in Napoleon's own residence, amidst a thousand
devoted officers, waiting only for the conqueror's orders, Bernadotte,
then a strenuous republican, was daring enough to oppose his arguments,
to refuse the second place in the republic, and to retort upon his anger
by threats. Napoleon saw him depart, bearing himself proudly, and pass
through the midst of his partizans, carrying with him his secrets, and
declaring himself his enemy, and even his denouncer. Either from respect
to his brother, to whom Bernadotte was allied by marriage, from
moderation, the usual companion of strength, or from astonishment, he
suffered him to depart quietly.

In the course of the same night, a conventicle, consisting of ten
deputies of the Council of Five Hundred, met at the house of S----;
thither Bernadotte repaired. They settled, that at nine o'clock next
morning the Council should hold a sitting, to which those only should be
invited who were of the same way of thinking; that there a decree should
be passed, that in imitation of the Council of Ancients, which had
prudently named Bonaparte general of its guard, the Council of Five
Hundred had appointed Bernadotte to command theirs; and that the latter,
properly armed, should be in readiness to be summoned to it. It was at
S----'s house that this plan was formed. S---- himself immediately
afterwards ran to Napoleon, and disclosed the whole to him. A threat
from the latter was quite sufficient to keep the conspirators in order;
not one of them dared show his face at the Council, and the next day the
revolution of the 18th Brumaire was completed.

Bernadotte was prudent enough afterwards to feign submission, but
Napoleon had not forgotten his opposition. He kept a watchful eye on all
his movements. Not long after, he suspected his being at the head of a
republican conspiracy which had been forming against him in the west. A
premature proclamation discovered it; an officer who had been arrested
for other causes, and an accomplice of Bernadotte, denounced the
authors. On that occasion Bernadotte's ruin would have been sealed, if
Napoleon had been able to convict him of it.

He was satisfied with banishing him to America, under the title of
minister of the Republic. But fortune favoured Bernadotte, who was
already at Rochefort, by delaying his embarkation until the war with
England was renewed. He then refused to go, and Napoleon could no longer
compel him.

All the relations between them had thus been those of hatred; and this
check only served to aggravate them. Soon after, Napoleon was heard
reproaching Bernadotte with his envious and treacherous inaction during
the battle of Auerstadt, and his order of the day at Wagram, in which
he had assumed the honour of that victory. He also spoke reproachfully
of his character, as being much more ambitious than patriotic; and
perhaps of the fascination of his manners,--all of them things
considered dangerous to a recently established government; and yet he
had showered rank, titles, and distinctions upon him, while Bernadotte,
always ungrateful, seemed to accept them merely as in justice due to his
merits, or to the want which was felt of him. These complaints of
Napoleon were not without foundation.

Bernadotte, on his side, abusing the emperor's moderation and desire to
keep on terms with him, gradually incurred an increase of his
displeasure, which his ambition was pleased to call enmity. He demanded
why Napoleon had placed him in such a dangerous and false position at
Wagram? why the report of that victory had been so unfavourable to him?
to what was he to attribute the jealous anxiety to weaken his eulogium
in the journals by artful notes? Up to that time, however, the obscure
and underhand opposition of this general to his emperor had been of no
importance; but a much wider field was then opened to their
misunderstanding.

By the treaty of Tilsit, Sweden, as well as Turkey, had been sacrificed
to Russia and the continental system. The mistaken or mad politics of
Gustavus IV. had been the cause of this. Ever since 1804 that monarch
appeared to have enlisted himself in the pay of England; it was he also
who had been the first to break the ancient alliance between France and
Sweden. He had obstinately persevered in that false policy to such an
extent at first, as to contend against France when she was victorious
over Russia, and afterwards with Russia and France united. The loss of
Pomerania, in 1807, and even that of Finland and the islands of Aland,
which were united to Russia in 1808, were not sufficient to shake his
obstinacy.

It was then that his irritated subjects resumed that power which had
been wrested from them, in 1772 and 1788, by Gustavus III., and of which
his successor made so bad a use. Gustavus Adolphus IV. was imprisoned
and dethroned; his lineal descendants were excluded from the throne; his
uncle was put in his place, and the prince of Holstein-Augustenburg
elected hereditary prince of Sweden. As the war had been the cause of
this revolution peace was the result of it; it was concluded with Russia
in 1809; but the newly-elected hereditary prince then died suddenly.

Copyright (c) 2007. knowncrafts.net. All rights reserved.