Book: History of the Expedition to Russia

C >> Count Philip de Segur >> History of the Expedition to Russia




Saint Cyr only waited for that moment. His numerous artillery was
already silently crossing the river, his divisions were about to follow
it and conceal their retreat, when the soldiers of Legrand, either from
habit, or regret at abandoning their camp entire to the enemy, set fire
to it; the other two divisions, fancying that this was a signal agreed
upon, followed their example, and in an instant the whole line was in a
blaze.

This fire disclosed their movement; the whole of Wittgenstein's
batteries immediately began their fire; his columns rushed forward, his
shells set fire to the town; the French troops were obliged to contend
every inch of ground with the flames, the fire throwing light on the
engagement the same as broad daylight. The retreat, however, was
effected in good order; on both sides the loss was great; but it was not
until three o'clock in the morning of the 20th of October that the
Russian eagle regained possession of Polotsk.

As good luck would have it, Steingell slept soundly at the noise of this
battle, although he might have heard even the shouts of the Russian
militia. He seconded the attack of Wittgenstein during that night as
little as Wittgenstein had seconded his the day before. It was not until
Wittgenstein had finished on the right side, that the bridge of Polotsk
was broken down, and Saint Cyr, with all his force on the left bank, and
then fully able to cope with Steingell, that the latter began to put
himself in motion. But De Wrede, with 6,000 French, surprised him in his
first movement, beat him back several leagues into the woods which he
had quitted, and took or killed 2,000 of his men.




CHAP. II.


Those three days were days of glory. Wittgenstein was repulsed,
Steingell defeated, and ten thousand Russians, with six generals, killed
or put _hors du combat_. But Saint Cyr was wounded, the offensive was
lost, confidence, joy, and plenty reigned in the enemy's corps,
despondency and scarcity in ours; it was necessary to fall back. The
army required a commander: De Wrede aspired to be so, but the French
generals refused even to enter into concert with that officer, from a
knowledge of his character, and a belief that it was impossible to go on
harmoniously with him. Amidst their jarring pretensions Saint Cyr,
although wounded, was obliged to retain the command of these two corps.

Immediately after, he gave orders to retreat on Smoliantzy by all the
roads leading to that place. He himself kept in the centre, regulating
the march of the different columns by that of each other. This was a
mode of retreat completely contrary to that which Napoleon had just
followed.

Saint Cyr's object was to find more provisions, to march with greater
freedom, and more concert; in short, to avoid that confusion which is so
common in the march of numerous columns, when troops, artillery, and
baggage are crowded together on one road. He completely succeeded. Ten
thousand French, Swiss, and Croats, with fifty thousand Russians at
their heels, retired slowly in four columns, without allowing themselves
to be broken, and kept Wittgenstein and Steingell from advancing more
than three marches in eight days.

By retreating in this manner towards the south, they covered the right
flank of the road from Orcha to Borizof, by which the Emperor was
returning from Moscow. One column only, that of the left, met with a
check. It was that of De Wrede and his fifteen hundred Bavarians,
augmented with a brigade of French cavalry, which he retained with him
in spite of Saint Cyr's orders. He marched at his own pleasure; his
wounded pride would no longer suffer him to yield obedience to others;
but it cost him the whole of his baggage. Afterwards, under pretence of
better serving the common cause by covering the line of operations from
Wilna to Witepsk, which the Emperor had abandoned, he separated himself
from the second corps, retreated by Klubokoe on Vileika, and made
himself useless.

The discontent of De Wrede had existed ever since the 19th of August. He
fancied that he had contributed so great a part to the victory of the
18th, that he thought it was made too little of in the report of the
following day. This feeling had rankled in his mind, and was increased
by repeated complaints, and by the instigation of a brother, who it was
said was serving in the Austrian army. Added to this, it was believed,
that at the last period of the retreat, the Saxon general, Thielmann,
had drawn him into his plans for the liberation of Germany.

This defection was scarcely felt at the time. The Duke of Belluno, with
twenty-five thousand men, hastened from Smolensk, and on the 31st of
October effected a junction with Saint Cyr in front of Smoliantzy, at
the very moment that Wittgenstein, ignorant of this junction, and
relying on his superior strength, had crossed the Lukolmlia, imprudently
engaged himself in defiles at his rear, and attacked our out-posts. It
only required a simultaneous effort of the two French corps to have
destroyed his army completely. The generals and soldiers of the second
corps were burning with ardour. But at the moment that victory was in
their hearts, and when, believing it before their eyes, they were
waiting for the signal to engage, Victor gave orders to retreat.

Whether this prudence, which was then considered unseasonable, arose
from his unacquaintance with a country, which he then saw for the first
time, or from his distrust of soldiers whom he had not yet tried, we
know not. It is possible that he did not feel himself justified in
risking a battle, the loss of which would certainly have involved that
of the grand army and its leader.

After falling back behind the Lukolmlia, and keeping on the defensive
the whole of the day, he took advantage of the night to gain Sienno. The
Russian general then became sensible of the peril of his position; it
was so critical, that he only took advantage of our retrograde movement,
and the discouragement which it occasioned, to effect his retreat.

The officers who gave us these details added, that ever since that time
Wittgenstein seemed to think of nothing but retaking Witepsk, and
keeping on the defensive. He probably thought it too rash to turn the
Berezina at its sources, in order to join Tchitchakof; for a vague
rumour had already reached us of the march of this army from the south
upon Minsk and Borizof, and of the defection of Schwartzenberg.

It was at Mikalewska, on the 6th of November, that unfortunate day when
he had just received information of Mallet's conspiracy, that Napoleon
was informed of the junction of the second and the ninth corps, and of
the unfortunate engagement at Czazniki. Irritated at the intelligence,
he sent orders to the Duke of Belluno immediately to drive Wittgenstein
behind the Duena, as the safety of the army depended upon it. He did not
conceal from the marshal that he had arrived at Smolensk with an army
harassed to death and his cavalry entirely dismounted.

Thus, therefore, the days of good fortune were passed, and from all
quarters nothing but disastrous intelligence arrived. On one side
Polotsk, the Duena, and Witepsk lost, and Wittgenstein already within
four days march of Borizof; on the other, towards Elnia, Baraguay
d'Hilliers defeated. That general had allowed the enemy to cut off the
brigade of Augereau, and to take the magazines, and the Elnia road, by
the possession of which Kutusoff was now enabled to anticipate us at
Krasnoe, as he had done at Wiazma.

At the same time, at one hundred leagues in advance of us,
Schwartzenberg informed the Emperor, that he was covering Warsaw; in
other words, that he had uncovered Minsk and Borizof, the magazine, and
the retreat of the grand army, and that probably, the Emperor of Austria
would deliver up his son-in-law to Russia.

At the same moment, in our rear and our centre, Prince Eugene was
conquered by the Wop; the draught-horses which had been waiting for us
at Smolensk were devoured by the soldiers; those of Mortier carried off
in a forage; the cattle at Krasnoe captured; the army exhibiting
frightful symptoms of disease; and at Paris the period of conspiracies
appeared to have returned; in short, every thing seemed to combine to
overwhelm Napoleon.

The daily reports which he received of the state of each corps of the
army were like so many bills of mortality; in these he saw his army,
which had conquered Moscow, reduced from an hundred and eighty thousand,
to thirty thousand men, still capable of fighting. To this mass of
calamities, he could only oppose an inert resistance, an impassable
firmness, and an unshaken attitude. His countenance remained the same;
he changed none of his habits, nothing in the form of his orders; in
reading them, you would have supposed that he had still several armies
under his command. He did not even expedite his march. Irritated only at
the prudence of Marshal Victor, he repeated his orders to him to attack
Wittgenstein, and thereby remove the danger which menaced his retreat.
As to Baraguay d'Hilliers, whom an officer had just accused, he had him
brought before him, and sent him off to Berlin, where that general,
overwhelmed by the fatigues of the retreat, and sinking under the weight
of chagrin, died before he was able to make his defence.

The unshaken firmness which the Emperor preserved was the only attitude
which became so great a spirit, and so irreparable a misfortune. But
what appears surprising, is, that he allowed fortune to strip him of
every thing, rather than sacrifice a part to save the rest. It was at
first without his orders that the commanders of corps burnt the baggage
and destroyed their artillery; he only allowed it to be done. If he
afterwards gave similar instructions, they were absolutely extorted from
him; he seemed as if he was tenacious, above every thing, that no action
of his should confess his defeat; either from a feeling that he thus
respected his misfortunes, and by his inflexibility set the example of
inflexible courage to those around him, or from that proud feeling of
men who have been long fortunate, which precipitates their downfall.

Smolensk, however, which was twice fatal to the army, was a place of
rest for some. During the respite which this afforded to their
sufferings, these were asking each other, "how it happened, that at
Moscow every thing had been forgotten; why there was so much useless
baggage; why so many soldiers had already died of hunger and cold under
the weight of their knapsacks, which were loaded with gold, instead of
food and raiment; and, above all, if three and thirty days rest had not
allowed sufficient time to make snow shoes for the artillery, cavalry,
and draught-horses, which would have made their march more sure and
rapid?

"If that had been done, we should not have lost our best men at Wiazma,
at the Wop, at the Dnieper, and along the whole road; in short, even
now, Kutusoff, Wittgenstein, and perhaps Tchitchakof would not have had
time to prepare more fatal days for us.

"But why, in the absence of orders from Napoleon, had not that
precaution been taken by the commanders, all of them kings, princes, and
marshals? Had not the winter in Russia been foreseen? Was it that
Napoleon, accustomed to the active intelligence of his soldiers, had
reckoned too much upon their foresight? Had the recollection of the
campaign in Poland, during a winter as mild as that of our own climate,
deceived him, as well as an unclouded sun, whose continuance, during the
whole of the month of October, had astonished even the Russians
themselves? What spirit of infatuation is it that has seized the whole
army as well as its leader? What has every one been reckoning upon? as
even supposing that at Moscow the hope of peace had dazzled us all, it
was always necessary to return, and nothing had been prepared, even for
a pacific journey homeward!"

The greater number could not account for this general infatuation,
otherwise than by their own carelessness, and because in armies, as well
as in despotic governments, it is the office of one to think for all; in
this case that _one_ was alone regarded as responsible, and misfortune,
which authorizes distrust, led every one to condemn him. It had been
already remarked, that in this important fault, this forgetfulness, so
improbable in an active genius during so long and unoccupied a
residence, there was something of that spirit of error, "the fatal
forerunner of the fall of kings!"

Napoleon had been at Smolensk for five days. It was known that Ney had
received orders to arrive there as late as possible, and Eugene to halt
for two days at Doukhowtchina. "Then it was not the necessity of waiting
for the army of Italy which detained him! To what then must we attribute
this delay, when famine, disease and the winter, and three hostile
armies were gradually surrounding us?

"While we had been penetrating to the heart of the Russian Colossus, had
not his arms remained advanced and extended towards the Baltic and the
Black Sea? was he likely to leave them motionless now, when, instead of
striking him mortal blows, we had been struck ourselves? Was not the
fatal moment arrived when this Colossus was about to surround us with
his threatening arms? Could we imagine that we had either tied them up,
or paralysed them, by opposing to them the Austrians in the south, and
the Prussians in the north? Was it not rather a method of rendering the
Poles and the French, who were mixed with these dangerous allies,
entirely useless?

"But without going far in search of causes of uneasiness, was the
Emperor ignorant of the joy of the Russians, when three months before he
stopped to attack Smolensk, instead of marching to the right to Elnia,
where he would have cut off the enemy's army from a retreat upon their
capital? Now that the war has returned back to the same spots, will the
Russians, whose movements are much more free than ours were then,
imitate our error? Will they keep in our rear when they can so easily
place themselves before us, on the line of our retreat?

"Is Napoleon unwilling to allow that Kutusoff's attack may be bolder and
more skilful than his own had been? Are the circumstances still the
same? Was not every thing favourable to the Russians during their
retreat, and, on the contrary, has not every thing been unfavourable to
us, in our retreat? Will not the cutting off Augereau and his brigade
upon that road open his eyes? What business had we in the burnt and
ravaged Smolensk, but to take a supply of provisions and proceed rapidly
onwards?

"But the Emperor no doubt fancied that by dating his despatches five
days from that city, he would give to his disorderly flight the
appearance of a slow and glorious retreat! This was the reason of his
ordering the destruction of the towers which surround Smolensk, from the
wish, as he expressed it, of not being again stopped short by its walls!
as if there was any idea of our returning to a place, which we did not
even know whether we should ever get out of.

"Will any one believe that he wished to give time to the artillerymen to
shoe their horses against the ice? as if he could expect any labour from
workmen emaciated with hunger and long marches; from poor wretches who
hardly found, the day long enough to procure provisions and dress them,
whose forges were thrown away or damaged, and who besides wanted the
indispensable materials for a labour so considerable.

"But perhaps he wished to allow himself time to drive on before him, out
of danger and clear of the ranks, the troublesome crowd of soldiers, who
had become useless, to rally the better sort, and to re-organize the
army? as if it were possible to convey any orders whatever to men so
scattered about, or to rally them, without lodgings, or distribution of
provisions, to _bivouacs_; in short, to think of re-organization for
corps of dying soldiers, all of whom had no longer any thing to adhere
to, and whom the least touch would dissolve."

Such, around Napoleon, were the conversations of his officers; or rather
their secret reflexions: for their devotion to him remained entire for
two whole years longer, in the midst of the greatest calamities, and of
the general revolt of nations.

The Emperor, however, made an effort which was not altogether fruitless;
namely, to rally, under one commander, all that remained of the cavalry:
of thirty-seven thousand cavalry which were present at the passage of
the Niemen, there were now only eighteen hundred left on horseback. He
gave the command of them to Latour-Maubourg; whether from the esteem
felt for him, or from fatigue, no one objected to it.

As to Latour-Maubourg, he received the honour or the charge without
expressing either pleasure or regret. He was a character of peculiar
stamp; always ready without forwardness, calm and active, remarkable for
his extreme purity of morals, simple and unostentatious; in other
respects, unaffected and sincere in his relations with others, and
attaching the idea of glory only to actions, and not to words. He always
marched with the same order and moderation in the midst of the most
immoderate disorder; and yet, what does honour to the age, he attained
to the highest distinctions as quickly and as rapidly as any who could
be named.

This feeble re-organization, the distribution of a part of the
provisions, the plunder of the rest, the repose which the Emperor and
his guard were enabled to take, the destruction of part of the artillery
and baggage, and finally, the expedition of a number of orders, were
nearly all the benefits which were derived from that fatal delay. In
other respects, all the misfortunes happened which had been foreseen. A
few hundred men were only rallied for a moment. The explosion of the
mines scarcely blew up the outside of some of the walls, and was only of
use on the last day, in driving out of the town the stragglers whom we
had been unable to set in motion.

The soldiers who had totally lost heart, the women, and several thousand
sick and wounded, were here abandoned. This was when Augereau's disaster
near Elnia made it but too evident that Kutusoff, now become the
pursuer, did not confine himself to the high road; that he was marching
from Wiazma by Elnia, direct upon Krasnoe; finally, when we ought to
have foreseen that we should be obliged to cut our way through the
Russian army, it was only on the 14th of November that the grand army
(or rather thirty-six thousand troops) commenced its march.

The old and young guard had not then more than from nine to ten thousand
infantry, and two thousand cavalry; Davoust and the first corps, from
eight to nine thousand; Ney and the third corps, five to six thousand;
Prince Eugene and the army of Italy, five thousand; Poniatowski, eight
hundred; Junot and the Westphalians, seven hundred; Latour-Maubourg and
the rest of the cavalry, fifteen hundred; there might also be about one
thousand light horse, and five hundred dismounted cavalry, whom we had
succeeded in collecting together.

This army had left Moscow one hundred thousand strong; in
five-and-twenty days it had been reduced to thirty-six thousand men. The
artillery had already lost three hundred and fifty of their cannon, and
yet these feeble remains were always divided into eight armies, which
were encumbered with sixty thousand unarmed stragglers, and a long train
of cannon and baggage.

Whether it was this incumbrance of so many men and carriages, or a
mistaken sense of security, which led the Emperor to order a day's
interval between the departure of each marshal, is uncertain; most
probably it was the latter. Be that as it may, he, Eugene, Davoust, and
Ney only quitted Smolensk in succession; Ney was not to leave it till
the 16th or 17th. He had orders to make the artillery saw the trunnions
of the cannon left behind, and bury them; to destroy the ammunition, to
drive all the stragglers before him, and to blow up the towers which
surrounded the city.

Kutusoff, meanwhile, was waiting for us at some leagues distance from
thence, and preparing to cut in pieces successively those remnants of
corps thus extended and parcelled out.




CHAP. III.


It was on the 14th of November, about five in the morning, that the
imperial column at last quitted Smolensk. Its march was still firm, but
gloomy and silent as night, and mute and discoloured as the aspect of
the country through which it was advancing.

This silence was only interrupted by the cracking of the whips applied
to the poor horses, and by short and violent imprecations when they met
with ravines; and when upon these icy declivities, men, horses, and
artillery were rolling in obscurity, one over the other. The first day
they advanced five leagues. The artillery of the guard took twenty-two
hours to get over that ground.

Nevertheless, this first column arrived, without any great loss of men,
at Korythinia, which Junot had passed with his Westphalian corps, now
reduced to seven hundred men. A vanguard had pushed on as far as
Krasnoe. The wounded and disbanded men were on the point of reaching
Liady. Korythinia is five leagues from Smolensk; Krasnoe five leagues
from Korythinia; Liady four leagues from Krasnoe. The Boristhenes flows
at two leagues on the right of the high road from Korythinia to Krasnoe.

Near Korythinia another road, that from Elnia to Krasnoe, runs close to
the great road. That very day Kutusoff advanced upon that road with
ninety thousand men, which completely covered it; his march was parallel
with that of Napoleon, whom he soon outstripped; on the cross-roads he
sent forward several vanguards to intercept our retreat.

One of these, said to be commanded by Ostermann, made its appearance at
Korythinia at the same time with Napoleon, and was driven back.

A second, consisting of twenty thousand men, and commanded by
Miloradowitch, took a position three leagues in advance of us, towards
Merlino and Nikoulina, behind a ravine which skirts the left side of the
great road; and there, lying in ambush on the flank of our retreat, it
awaited our passage.

At the same time a third reached Krasnoe, which it surprised during the
night, but was driven out by Sebastiani, who had just arrived there.

Finally, a fourth, pushed still more in advance, got between Krasnoe and
Liady, and carried off, upon the high road, several generals and other
officers who were marching singly.

Kutusoff, at the same time, with the bulk of his army, advanced, and
took a position in the rear of these vanguards, and within reach of them
all, and felicitated himself on the success of his manoeuvres, which
would have inevitably failed, owing to his tardiness, had it not been
for our want of foresight; for this was a contest of errors, in which
ours being the greatest, we could have no thought of escaping total
destruction. Having made these dispositions, the Russian commander must
have believed that the French army was entirely in his power; but this
belief saved us. Kutusoff was wanting to himself at the moment of
action; his old age executed only half and badly the plans which it had
combined wisely.

During the time that all these masses were arranging themselves round
Napoleon, he remained perfectly tranquil in a miserable hut, the only
one left standing in Korythinia, apparently quite unconscious of all
these movements of troops, artillery, and cavalry, which were
surrounding him in all directions; at least he sent no orders to the
three corps which had halted at Smolensk to expedite their march, and he
himself waited for daylight to proceed.

His column was advancing, without precaution, preceded by a crowd of
stragglers, all eager to reach Krasnoe, when at two leagues from that
place, a row of Cossacks, placed from the heights on our left all across
the great road, appeared before them. Seized with astonishment, these
stragglers halted; they had looked for nothing of the kind, and at first
were inclined to believe that relentless fate had traced upon the snow
between them and Europe, that long, black, and motionless line as the
fatal term assigned to their hopes.

Some of them, stupified and rendered insensible by the misery of their
situation, with their eyes mentally fixed on home, and pursuing
mechanically and obstinately that direction, would listen to no warning,
and were about to surrender; the others collected together, and on both
sides there was a pause, in order to consider each other's force.
Several officers, who then came up, put these disbanded soldiers in some
degree of order; seven or eight riflemen, whom they sent forward, were
sufficient to break through that threatening curtain.

The French were smiling at the audacity of this idle demonstration, when
all at once, from the heights on their left, an enemy's battery began
firing. Its bullets crossed the road; at the same time thirty squadrons
showed themselves on the same side, threatening the Westphalian corps
which was advancing, the commander of which was so confused, that he
made no disposition to meet their attack.

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