Book: History of the Expedition to Russia

C >> Count Philip de Segur >> History of the Expedition to Russia




When at last, after several of these dreadful panics, they reached the
opposite bank and fancied themselves saved, a perpendicular steep,
entirely covered with rime, again opposed their landing. Many were
thrown back upon the ice which they broke in their fall, or which
bruised them. By their account, this Russian river and its banks
appeared only to have contributed with regret, by surprise, and as it
were by compulsion, to their escape.

But what seemed to affect them with the greatest horror in their
relation, was the trouble and distraction of the females and the sick,
when it became necessary to abandon, along with the baggage, the remains
of their fortune, their provisions, and in short, their whole resources
against the present and the future. They saw them stripping themselves,
selecting, throwing away, taking up again, and falling with exhaustion
and grief upon the frozen bank of the river. They seemed to shudder
again at the recollection of the horrible sight of so many men scattered
over that abyss, the continual noise of persons falling, the cries of
such as sunk in, and, above all, of the wailing and despair of the
wounded, who, from their carts, which durst not venture on this weak
support, stretched out their hands to their companions, and intreated
not to be left behind.

Their leader then determined to attempt the passage of several waggons,
loaded with these poor creatures; but in the middle of the river, the
ice sunk down and separated. Then were heard, on the opposite bank,
proceeding from the gulf, first, cries of anguish long and piercing,
then stifled and feeble groans, and last of all an awful silence. All
had disappeared!

Ney was looking stedfastly at the abyss with an air of consternation,
when through the darkness, he imagined he saw an object still moving; it
turned out to be one of those unfortunate persons, an officer, named
Briqueville, whom a deep wound in the groin had disabled from standing
upright. A large piece of ice had borne him up. He was soon distinctly
seen, dragging himself from one piece to another on his knees and hands,
and on his getting near enough to the side, the marshal himself caught
hold of, and saved him.

The losses since the preceding day amounted to four thousand stragglers
and three thousand soldiers, either killed, dead, or missing; the cannon
and the whole of the baggage were lost; there remained to Ney scarcely
three thousand soldiers, and about as many disbanded men. Finally, when
all these sacrifices were consummated, and all that had been able to
cross the river were collected, they resumed their march, and the
vanquished river became once more their friend and their guide.

They proceeded at random and uncertain, when one of them happening to
fall, recognised a beaten road; it was but too much so, for those who
were marching first, stooping and using their hands, as well as their
eyes, halted in alarm, exclaiming, "that they saw the marks quite fresh
of a great quantity of cannon and horses." They had, therefore, only
avoided one hostile army to fall into the midst of another; at a time
when they could scarcely walk, they must be again obliged to fight! The
war was therefore everywhere! But Ney made them push on, and without
disturbing himself, continued to follow these menacing traces.

They brought them to a village called Gusinoe, into which they entered
suddenly, and seized every thing; they found in it all that they had
been in want of since they left Moscow, inhabitants, provisions, repose,
warm dwellings, and a hundred Cossacks, who awoke to find themselves
prisoners. Their reports, and the necessity of taking some refreshment
to enable him to proceed, detained the marshal there a few minutes.

About ten o'clock, they reached two other villages, and were resting
themselves there, when suddenly they saw the surrounding forests filled
with movements. They had scarcely time to call to each other, to look
about, and to concentrate themselves in the village which was nearest to
the Boristhenes, when thousands of Cossacks came pouring out from
between the trees, and surrounded the unfortunate troop with their
lances and their cannon.

These were Platof, and his hordes, who were following the right bank of
the Dnieper. They might have burnt the village, discovered the weakness
of Ney's force, and exterminated it; but for three hours they remained
motionless, without even firing; for what reason, is not known. The
account since given by themselves is, that they had no orders; that at
that moment their leader was not in a state to give any: and that in
Russia no one dares to take upon himself a responsibility that does not
belong to him.

The bold countenance of Ney kept them in check. He himself and a few
soldiers were sufficient; he even ordered the rest of his people to
continue their repast till night came on. He then caused the order to be
circulated to decamp in silence, to give notice to each other in a low
tone of voice, and to march as compact as possible. Afterwards, they all
began their march together; but their very first step was like a signal
given to the enemy, who immediately discharged the whole of his
artillery at them: all his squadrons also put themselves in movement at
once.

At the noise occasioned by this, the disarmed stragglers, of whom there
were yet between three and four thousand, took the alarm. This flock of
men wandered here and there; the great mass of them kept reeling about
in uncertainty, sometimes attempting to throw themselves into the ranks
of the soldiers, who drove them back. Ney contrived to keep them between
him and the Russians, whose fire was principally absorbed by these
useless beings. The most timid, therefore, in this instance, served as a
covering to the bravest.

At the same time that the marshal made a rampart of these poor wretches
to cover his right flank, he regained the banks of the Dnieper, and by
that covered his left flank; he marched on thus between the two,
proceeding from wood to wood, from one turning to another, taking
advantage of all the windings, and of the least accidents of the soil.
Whenever he ventured to any distance from the river, which he was
frequently obliged to do, Platof then surrounded him on all sides.

[Illustration: Portrait of Marshal Ney]

In this manner, for two days and a distance of twenty leagues, did six
thousand Cossacks keep constantly buzzing about the flanks of their
column, now reduced to fifteen hundred men in arms, keeping it in a
state of siege, disappearing before its sallies, and returning again
instantly, like their Scythian ancestors; but with this fatal
difference, that they managed their cannon mounted on sledges, and
discharged their bullets in their flight, with the same agility which
their forefathers exhibited in the management of their bows and the
discharge of their arrows.

The night brought some relief, and at first they plunged into the
darkness with a degree of joy; but then, if any one halted for a moment
to bid a last adieu to some worn out or wounded comrade, who sunk to
rise no more, he ran the risk of losing the traces of his column. Under
such circumstances there were many cruel moments, and not a few
instances of despair. At last, however, the enemy slackened his pursuit.

This unfortunate column was proceeding more tranquilly, groping its way
through a thick wood, when all at once, a few paces before it, a
brilliant light and several discharges of cannon flashed in the faces of
the men in the first rank. Seized with terror, they fancied that there
was an end of them, that they were cut off, that their end was now come,
and they fell down terrified; those who were behind, got entangled among
them, and were brought to the ground. Ney, who saw that all was lost,
rushed forward, ordered the charge to be beat, and, as if he had
foreseen the attack, called out, "Comrades, now is your time: forward!
They are our prisoners!" At these words, his soldiers, who but a minute
before were in consternation, and fancied themselves surprised, believed
they were about to surprise their foes; from being vanquished, they rose
up conquerors; they rushed upon the enemy, who had already disappeared,
and whose precipitate flight through the forest they heard at a
distance.

They passed quickly through this wood; but about ten o'clock at night,
they met with a small river embanked in a deep ravine, which they were
obliged to cross one by one, as they had done the Dnieper. Intent on the
pursuit of these poor fellows, the Cossacks again got sight of them, and
tried to take advantage of that moment: but Ney, by a few discharges of
his musketry, again repulsed them. They surmounted this obstacle with
difficulty, and in an hour after reached a large village, where hunger
and exhaustion compelled them to halt for two hours longer.

The next day, the 19th of Nov., from midnight till ten o'clock in the
morning, they kept marching on, without meeting any other enemy than a
hilly country; about that time Platof's columns again made their
appearance, and Ney halted and faced them, under the protection of the
skirts of a wood. As long as the day lasted, his soldiers were obliged
to resign themselves to see the enemy's bullets overturning the trees
which served to shelter them, and furrowing their bivouacs; for they had
now nothing but small arms, which could not keep the Cossack artillery
at a sufficient distance.

On the return of night, the marshal gave the usual signal, and they
proceeded on their march to Orcha. During the preceding day, he had
already despatched thither Pchebendowski with fifty horse, to require
assistance; they must already have arrived there, unless the enemy had
already gained possession of that town.

Ney's officers concluded their narrative by saying, that during the rest
of their march, they had met with several formidable obstacles, but that
they did not think them worth relating. They continued, however,
speaking enthusiastically of their marshal, and making us sharers of
their admiration of him; for even his equals had no idea of being
jealous of him. He had been too much regretted, and his preservation had
excited too agreeable emotions, to allow envy to have any part in them;
besides, Ney had placed himself completely beyond its reach. As to
himself, in all this heroism, he had gone so little beyond his natural
disposition, that had it not been for the eclat of his glory in the
eyes, the gestures, and the acclamations of every one, he would never
have imagined that he had done a sublime action.

And this was not an enthusiasm of surprise. Each of the latter days had
had its remarkable men; amongst others, that of the 16th had Eugene,
that of the 17th Mortier; but from this time, Ney was universally
proclaimed the hero of the retreat.

The distance between Smolensk and Orcha is hardly five days' march. In
that short passage, what a harvest of glory had been reaped! how little
space and time are required to establish an immortal renown! Of what
nature then are these great inspirations, that invisible and impalpable
germ of great devotion, produced in a few moments, issuing from a single
heart, and which must fill time and eternity?

When Napoleon, who was two leagues farther on, heard that Ney had just
re-appeared, he leaped and shouted for joy, and exclaimed, "I have then
saved my eagles! I would have given three hundred millions from my
treasury, sooner than have lost such a man."




BOOK XI.




CHAP. I.


The army had thus for the third and last time repassed the Dnieper, a
river half Russian and half Polish, but of Russian origin. It runs from
east to west as far as Orcha, where it appears as if it would penetrate
into Poland; but there the heights of Lithuania oppose its farther
progress, and compel it to turn towards the south, and to become the
frontier of the two countries.

Kutusoff and his eighty thousand Russians halted before this feeble
obstacle. Hitherto they had been rather the spectators than the authors
of our calamities; we saw them no more; our army was released from the
punishment of their joy.

In this war, and as always happens, the character of Kutusoff availed
him more than his talents. So long as it was necessary to deceive and
temporize, his crafty spirit, his indolence, and his great age, acted of
themselves; he was the creature of circumstances, which he ceased to be
as soon as it became necessary to march rapidly, to pursue, to
anticipate, and to attack.

But after passing Smolensk, Platof passed over to the right flank of the
road, in order to join Wittgenstein. The war was then entirely
transferred to that side.

On the 22d of November, the army had a disagreeable march from Orcha to
Borizof, on a wide road, (skirted by a double row of large birch trees,)
in which the snow had melted, and through a deep and liquid mud. The
weakest were drowned in it; it detained and delivered to the Cossacks
such of our wounded, as, under the idea of a continuance of the frost,
had exchanged their waggons for sledges.

In the midst of this gradual decay, an action was witnessed exhibiting
something of antique energy. Two marines of the guard were cut off from
their column by a band of Cossacks, who seemed determined to take them.
One became discouraged, and wished to surrender; the other continued to
fight, and called out to him, that if he was coward enough to do so, he
would certainly shoot him. In fact, seeing his companion throw away his
musket, and stretching out his arms to the enemy, he brought him to the
ground just as he fell into the hands of the Cossacks; then profiting by
their surprise, he quickly reloaded his musket, with which he threatened
the most forward. He kept them thus at bay, retreated from tree to tree,
gained ground upon them, and succeeded in rejoining his troop.

It was during the first days of the march to Borizof, that the news of
the fall of Minsk became generally known in the army. The leaders
themselves began then to look around them with consternation; their
imagination, tormented with such a long continuance of frightful
spectacles, gave them glimpses of a still more fatal futurity. In their
private conversations, several exclaimed, that, "like Charles XII. in
the Ukraine, Napoleon had carried his army to Moscow only to destroy
it."

Others would not agree in attributing the calamities we at present
suffered to that incursion. Without wishing to excuse the sacrifices to
which we had submitted, by the hope of terminating the war in a single
campaign, they asserted, "that that hope had been well founded; that in
pushing his line of operation as far as Moscow, Napoleon had given to
that lengthened column a base sufficiently broad and solid."

They showed "the trace of this base marked out by the Duena, the Dnieper,
the Ula, and the Berezina, from Riga to Bobruisk; they said that
Macdonald, Saint Cyr and De Wrede, Victor and Dombrowski were there
waiting for them; there were thus, including Schwartzenberg, and even
Augereau, (who protected the interval between the Elbe and the Niemen
with fifty thousand men,) nearly two hundred and eighty thousand
soldiers on the defensive, who, from the north to the south, supported
the attack of one hundred and fifty thousand men upon the east; and from
thence they argued, that this _point_ upon Moscow, however hazardous it
might appear, had been both sufficiently prepared, and was worthy of the
genius of Napoleon, and that its success was possible; in fact, its
failure had been entirely occasioned by errors of detail."

They then brought to mind our useless waste of lives before Smolensk,
Junot's inaction at Valoutina, and they maintained, "that in spite of
all these losses, Russia would have been completely conquered on the
field of battle of the Moskwa, if Marshal Ney's first successes had been
followed up.

"Even at the last, although the expedition had failed in a military
point of view, by the indecision of that day, and politically by the
burning of Moscow, the army might still have returned from it safe and
sound. From the time of our entrance into that capital, had not the
Russian general and the Russian winter allowed us, the one forty, and
the other fifty days, to recover ourselves, and to make our retreat?"

Deploring afterwards the rash obstinacy of losing so much time at
Moscow, and the fatal hesitation at Malo-Yaroslawetz, they proceeded to
reckon up their losses. Since their leaving Moscow, they had lost all
their baggage, five hundred cannon, thirty-one eagles, twenty-seven
generals, forty thousand prisoners, sixty thousand dead: all that
remained were forty thousand stragglers, unarmed, and eight thousand
effective soldiers.

Last of all, when their column of attack had been destroyed, they asked,
"by what fatality it had happened, that the remains of this column, when
collected at its base, which had been vigorously supported, were left
without knowing where to halt, or to take breath? Why could they not
even concentrate themselves at Minsk and at Wilna, behind the marshes of
the Berezina, and there keep back the enemy, at least for some time,
take advantage of the winter and recruit themselves?

"But no, all is lost by another side, by the fault of entrusting an
Austrian to guard the magazines, and cover the retreat of all these
brave armies, and not placing a military leader at Wilna or Minsk, with
a force sufficient either to supply the insufficiency of the Austrian
army to meet the combined armies of Moldavia and Volhynia, or to prevent
its betraying us."

Those who made such complaints were not unaware of the presence of the
Duke of Bassano at Wilna; but notwithstanding the talents of that
minister, and the great confidence the Emperor placed in him, they
considered that being a stranger to the art of war, and overloaded with
the cares of a great administration, and of every thing political, the
direction of military affairs should not have been left to him. Such
were the complaints of those, whose sufferings left them the leisure
necessary for observation. That a fault had been committed, it was
impossible to deny; but to say how it might have been avoided, to weigh
the value of the motives which had occasioned it, in so great a crisis,
and in the presence of so great a man, is more than one would venture to
undertake. Who is there besides that does not know, that in these
hazardous and gigantic enterprises, every thing becomes a fault, when
the object of them has failed?

Although the treachery of Schwartzenberg was by no means so evident, it
is certain, that, with the exception of the three French generals who
were with him, the whole of the grand army considered it as beyond a
doubt. They said, "that Walpole's only object at Vienna was to act as a
secret agent of England; that he and Metternich composed between them
the perfidious instructions which were sent to Schwartzenberg. Hence it
was that ever since the 20th of September, the day when the arrival of
Tchitchakof and the battle of Lutsk closed the victorious career of
Schwartzenberg, that marshal had repassed the Bug, and covered Warsaw by
uncovering Minsk; hence his perseverance in that false manoeuvre:
hence, after a feeble effort towards Bresk-litowsky on the 10th of
October, his neglect to avail himself of Tchitchakof's inaction by
getting between him and Minsk, and hence his losing his time in military
promenades, and insignificant marches towards Briansk, Bialystok, and
Volkowitz.

"He had thus allowed the admiral to take rest, and rally his sixty
thousand men, to divide them into two, to leave one half with Sacken to
oppose him, and to set out on the 27th of October with the other half to
take possession of Minsk, of Borizof, of the magazine, of the passage of
Napoleon, and of his winter quarters. Then only did Schwartzenberg put
himself in the rear of this hostile movement, instead of anticipating
it, as he had orders to do, leaving Regnier in the presence of Sacken,
and marching so slowly, that from the very first the admiral had got
five marches the start of him.

"On the 14th of November, at Volkowitz, Sacken attacked Regnier,
separated him from the Austrians, and pressed him so closely, that he
was obliged to call Schwartzenberg to his aid. Immediately, the latter,
as if he had been expecting the summons, retrograded, leaving Minsk to
its fate. It is true that he released Regnier, that he beat Sacken and
destroyed half his army, pursuing him as far as the Bug; but on the 16th
of November, the very day of his victory, Minsk was taken by
Tchitchakof: this was a double victory for Austria. Thus all appearances
were preserved; the new field-marshal satisfied the wishes of his
government, which was equally the enemy of the Russians whom he had just
weakened on one side, and of Napoleon, whom on the other he had betrayed
to them."

Such was the language of almost the whole of the grand army; its leader
was silent, either because he expected no more zeal on the part of an
ally, or from policy, or because he believed that Schwartzenberg had
acted with sufficient honour, in sending him the sort of notice which he
did six weeks before, when he was at Moscow.

However, he did address some reproaches to the field-marshal. To these
the latter replied, by complaining bitterly, first, of the double and
contradictory instructions which he had received, to cover Warsaw and
Minsk at the same time; and second, of the false news which had been
transmitted to him by the Duke of Bassano.

He said, "that minister had constantly represented to him that the grand
army was retreating safe and sound, in good order, and always
formidable. Why had he been trifled with, by sending him bulletins made
to deceive the idlers of the capital? His only reason for not making
greater efforts to join the grand army was, because he believed that it
was fully able to protect itself."

He also alleged his own weakness. "How could it be expected that with
twenty-eight thousand men he could so long keep sixty thousand in check?
In that situation, if Tchitchakof stole a few marches on him, was it at
all wonderful? Had he then hesitated to follow him, to leave Gallicia,
his point of departure, his magazines, and his depot? If he ceased his
pursuit, it was only because Regnier and Durutte, the two French
generals, summoned him in the most urgent manner to come to their
assistance. Both they and he had reason to expect that Maret, Oudinot,
or Victor, would provide for the safety of Minsk."




CHAP. II.


In fact, no one had any right to accuse another of treachery, when we
had betrayed ourselves, for all had been wanting in the time of need.

At Wilna, they appeared to have had no suspicion of the real state of
affairs; and at a time when the garrisons, the depots, the marching
battalions, and the divisions of Durutte, Loison, and Dombrowski,
between the Berezina and the Vistula, might have formed at Minsk an army
of thirty thousand men, three thousand men, headed by a general of no
reputation, were the only forces which Tchitchakof found there to oppose
him. It was a known fact that this handful of young soldiers was exposed
in front of a river, into which they were precipitated by the admiral,
whereas, if they had been placed on the other side, that obstacle would
have protected them for some time.

For thus, as frequently happens, the faults of the general plan had led
to faults of detail. The governor of Minsk had been negligently chosen.
He was, it was said, one of those men who undertake every thing, who
promise every thing, and who do nothing. On the 16th of November, he
lost that capital, and with it four thousand seven hundred sick, the
warlike ammunition, and two million rations of provisions. It was five
days since the news of this loss had reached Dombrowna, and the news of
a still greater calamity came on the heels of it.

This same governor had retreated towards Borizof. There he neglected to
inform Oudinot, who was only at the distance of two marches, to come to
his assistance; and failed to support Dombrowski, who made a hasty march
thither from Bobruisk and Igumen. The latter did not arrive, however, in
the night of the 20th and 21st, at the _tete-du-pont_, until after the
enemy had taken possession of it; notwithstanding, he expelled
Tchitchakof's vanguard, took possession of it, and defended himself
gallantly there until the evening of the 21st; but being then
overwhelmed by the fire of the Russian artillery, which took him in
flank, and attacked by a force more than double his own, he was driven
across the river, and out of the town, as far as the road to Moscow.

Napoleon was wholly unprepared for this disaster; he fancied that he had
completely prevented it by the instructions he had sent to Victor from
Moscow, on the 6th of October. These instructions "anticipated a warm
attack from Wittgenstein or Tchitchakof; they recommended Victor to keep
within reach of Polotsk and of Minsk; to have a prudent, discreet, and
intelligent officer about Schwartzenberg; to keep up a regular
correspondence with Minsk, and to send other agents in different
directions."

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