Book: History of the Expedition to Russia

C >> Count Philip de Segur >> History of the Expedition to Russia




In the beginning of 1810, France restored Pomerania and the Island of
Rugen to Sweden, as the price of her accession to the continental
system. The Swedes, worn out, impoverished, and become almost islanders,
in consequence of the loss of Finland, were very loath to break with
England, and yet they had no remedy; on the other side they stood in awe
of the neighbouring and powerful government of Russia. Finding
themselves weak and isolated, they looked round for support.

Bernadotte had just been appointed to the command of the French army
which took possession of Pomerania; his military reputation, and still
more that of his nation and its sovereign, his fascinating mildness, his
generosity, and his flattering attentions to the Swedes, with whom he
had to treat, induced several of them to cast their eyes upon him. They
appeared to know nothing of the misunderstanding between this marshal
and the emperor; they fancied that by electing him for their prince,
they should not only obtain an able and experienced general, but also a
powerful mediator between France and Sweden, and a certain protector in
the emperor: it happened quite the contrary.

During the intrigues to which this circumstance gave rise, Bernadotte
fancied that to his previous complaints against Napoleon he had to add
others. When, in opposition to the king, and the majority of the members
of the diet, he was proposed as successor to the crown of Sweden; when
his pretensions were supported by Charles's prime minister, (a man of no
family, who owed, like him, all his illustration to himself,) and the
count de Wrede, the only member of the diet who had reserved his vote
for him; when he came to solicit Napoleon's interference, why did he,
when Charles XIII. desired to know his wishes, exhibit so much
indifference? Why did he prefer the union of the three northern crowns
on the head of a prince of Denmark? If he, Bernadotte, succeeded in the
enterprise, he was not at all indebted for it to the emperor of France;
he owed it to the pretensions of the king of Denmark, which
counteracted those of the duke of Augustenburg[3], his most dangerous
rival; to the grateful audacity of the baron de Moerner, who was the
first to come to him, and offer to put him on the lists, and to the
aversion of the Swedes to the Danes; above all he owed it to a passport
which had been adroitly obtained by his agent from Napoleon's minister.
It was said that this document was audaciously produced by Bernadotte's
secret emissary, as a proof of an autograph mission with which he
pretended to be charged, and of the formal desire of the French emperor
to see one of his lieutenants, and the relation of his brother, placed
upon the throne of Sweden.

[Footnote 3: Brother of the deceased prince of that name.]

Bernadotte also felt that he owed this crown to the chance, which
brought him in communication with the Swedes, and made them acquainted
with his characteristic qualities; to the birth of his son, which
secured the heredity succession; to the address of his agents, who,
either with or without his authority, dazzled the poverty of the
Scandinavians with the promise of fourteen millions with which his
election was to enrich their treasury; and finally to his flattering
attentions, which had gained him the voices of several Swedish officers
who had been his prisoners. But as to Napoleon, what did he owe to him?
What was his reply to the news of the offer of several Swedes, when he
himself waited upon him to inform him of it? "I am at too great a
distance from Sweden, to mix myself up in her affairs. You must not
reckon upon my support." At the same time it is true, that either from
necessity, from his dreading the election of the duke of Oldenburg; or
finally from respect for the wishes of fortune, Napoleon declared that
he would leave it to her to decide: and Bernadotte was in consequence
elected crown prince of Sweden.

The newly-elected prince immediately paid his respects to the emperor,
who received him frankly. "As you are offered the crown of Sweden, I
permit you to accept it. I had another wish, as you know; but, in short,
it is your sword which has made you a king, and you are sensible that it
is not for me to stand in the way of your good fortune." He then entered
very fully with him into the whole plan of his policy, in which
Bernadotte appeared entirely to concur; every day he attended the
emperor's levee together with his son, mixing with the other courtiers.
By such marks of deference, he completely gained the heart of Napoleon.
He was about to depart, poor. Unwilling that he should present himself
to the Swedish throne in that necessitous state, like a mere adventurer,
the emperor generously gave him two millions out of his own treasury; he
even granted to his family the dotations which as a foreign prince he
could no longer retain himself; and they parted on apparent terms of
mutual satisfaction.

It was natural that the expectations of Napoleon as to the alliance with
Sweden should be heightened by this election, and by the favours which
he had bestowed. At first Bernadotte's correspondence with him was that
of a grateful inferior, but the very moment he was fairly out of France,
feeling himself as it were relieved from a state of long and painful
constraint, it is said that his hatred to Napoleon vented itself in
threatening expressions, which, whether true or false, were reported to
the emperor.

On his side, that monarch, forced to be absolute in his continental
system, cramped the commerce of Sweden; he wished her even to exclude
American vessels from her ports; and at last he declared that he would
only regard as friends the enemies of Great Britain. Bernadotte was
obliged to make his election; the winter and the sea separated him from
the assistance, or protected him from the attacks, of the English; the
French were close to his ports; a war with France therefore would be
real and effective; a war with England would be merely on paper. The
prince of Sweden adopted the latter alternative.

Napoleon, however, being as much a conqueror in peace as in war, and
suspecting the intentions of Bernadotte, had demanded from Sweden
several supplies of rigging for his Brest fleet, and the despatch of a
body of troops, which were to be in his pay; in this manner weakening
his allies to subdue his enemies, so as to allow him to be the master of
both. He also required that colonial produce should be subjected in
Sweden, the same as in France, to a duty of five per cent. It is even
affirmed that he applied to Bernadotte to allow French custom-house
officers to be placed at Gottenburg. These demands were eluded.

Soon after, Napoleon proposed an alliance between Sweden, Denmark, and
the grand duchy of Warsaw; a northern confederation, of which he would
have declared himself protector, like that of the Rhine. The answer of
Bernadotte, without being absolutely negative, had the same effect; it
was the same with the offensive and defensive treaty which Napoleon
again proposed to him. Bernadotte has since declared, that in four
successive letters written with his own hand, he had frankly stated the
impossibility he was under of complying with his wishes, and repeated
his protestations of attachment to his former sovereign, but that the
latter never deigned to give him any reply. This impolitic silence (if
the fact be true,) can only be attributed to the pride of Napoleon,
which was piqued at Bernadotte's refusals. No doubt he considered his
protestations as too false to deserve any answer.

The irritation increased; the communications became disagreeable; they
were interrupted by the recall of Alquier, the French minister in
Sweden. As the pretended declaration of war by Bernadotte against
England remained a dead letter, Napoleon, who was not to be denied or
deceived with impunity, carried on a sharp war against the Swedish
commerce by means of his privateers. By them, and the invasion of
Swedish Pomerania on the 27th of January, 1812, he punished Bernadotte
for his deviations from the continental system, and obtained as
prisoners several thousand Swedish soldiers and sailors, whom he had in
vain demanded as auxiliaries.

Then also our communications with Russia were broken off. Napoleon
immediately addressed himself to the prince of Sweden; his notes were
couched in the style of a lord paramount who fancies he speaks in the
interest of his vassal, who feels the claims he has upon his gratitude
or submission, and who calculates upon his obedience. He demanded that
Bernadotte should declare a real war against England, shut her out from
the Baltic, and send an army of 40,000 Swedes against Russia. In return
for this, he promised him his protection, the restoration of Finland,
and twenty millions, in return for an equal amount of colonial produce,
which the Swedes were first to deliver. Austria undertook to support
this proposition; but Bernadotte, already feeling himself settled on the
throne, answered like an independent monarch. Ostensibly he declared
himself neutral, opened his ports to all nations, proclaimed his rights
and his grievances, appealed to humanity, recommended peace, and offered
himself as a mediator; secretly, he offered himself to Napoleon at the
price of Norway, Finland, and a subsidy.

At the reading of a letter conceived in this new and unexpected style,
Bonaparte was seized with rage and astonishment. He saw in it, and not
without reason, a premeditated defection on the part of Bernadotte, a
secret agreement with his enemies! He was filled with indignation; he
exclaimed, striking violently on the letter, and the table on which it
lay open: "He! the rascal! he presume to give me advice! to dictate the
law to me! to dare propose such an infamous act[4] to me! And this from
a man who owes every thing to my bounty! What ingratitude!" Then, pacing
the room with rapid strides, at intervals he gave vent to such
expressions as these: "I ought to have expected it! he has always
sacrificed every thing to his interests! This is the same man, who,
during his short ministry, attempted the resurrection of the infamous
Jacobins! When he looked only to gain by disorder, he opposed the 18th
Brumaire! He it was who was conspiring in the west against the
re-establishment of law and religion! Has not his envious and perfidious
inaction already betrayed the French army at Auerstadt? How many times,
from regard to Joseph, have I pardoned his intrigues and concealed his
faults! And yet I have made him general-in-chief, marshal, duke, prince,
and finally king! But see how all these favours and the pardon of so
many injuries, are thrown away on a man like this! If Sweden, half
devoured by Russia, for a century past, has retained her independence,
she owes it to the support of France. But it matters not; Bernadotte
requires the baptism of the ancient aristocracy! a baptism of blood, and
of French blood! and you will soon see, that to satisfy his envy and
ambition, he will betray both his native and adopted country."

[Footnote 4: Napoleon no doubt spoke of the proposal which Bernadotte
made to him to take Norway from Denmark, his faithful ally, in order by
this act of treachery to purchase the assistance of Sweden.]

In vain did they attempt to calm him. They represented the difficulties
which Bernadotte's new situation had imposed on him; that the cession of
Finland to Russia had separated Sweden from the continent, almost made
an island of that country, and thereby enlisted her in the English
system.--In such critical circumstances, all the need which he had of
this ally was unable to vanquish his pride, which revolted at a
proposition which he regarded as insulting; perhaps also in the new
prince of Sweden he still saw the same Bernadotte who was lately his
subject, and his military inferior, and who at last affected to have cut
out for himself a destiny independent of his. From that moment his
instructions to his minister bore the impress of that disposition; the
latter, it is true, softened the bitterness of them, but a rupture
became inevitable.

It is uncertain which contributed most to it, the pride of Napoleon, or
the ancient jealousy of Bernadotte; it is certain that on the part of
the former the motives of it were honourable. "Denmark" he said, "was
his most faithful ally; her attachment to France had cost her the loss
of her fleet and the burning of her capital. Must he repay a fidelity
which had been so cruelly tried, by an act of treachery such as that of
taking Norway from her to give to Sweden?"

As to the subsidy which Sweden required of him, he answered, as he had
done to Turkey, "that if the war was to be carried on with money,
England would always be sure to outbid him;" and above all, "that there
was weakness and baseness in triumphing by corruption." Reverting by
this to his wounded pride, he terminated the conference by exclaiming,
"Bernadotte impose conditions on me! Does he fancy then that I have need
of him? I will soon bind him to my victorious career, and compel him to
follow my sovereign impulse."

But the active and speculative English, who were out of his reach, made
a judicious estimate of the weak points of his system, and found the
Russians ready to act upon their suggestions. They it was who had been
endeavouring for the last three years to draw the forces of Napoleon
into the defiles of Spain, and to exhaust them; it was they also who
were on the watch to take advantage of the vindictive enmity of the
prince of Sweden.

Knowing that the active and restless vanity of men newly risen from
obscurity is always uneasy and susceptible, in the presence of ancient
_parvenus_, George and Alexander were lavish of their promises and
flattery, in order to cajole Bernadotte. It was thus that they caressed
him, at the time that the irritated Napoleon was threatening him; they
promised him Norway and a subsidy, when the other, forced to refuse him
that province of a faithful ally, took possession of Pomerania. While
Napoleon, a monarch deriving his elevation from himself, relying on the
faith of treaties, on the remembrance of past benefits, and on the real
interests of Sweden, required succours from Bernadotte, the hereditary
monarchs of London and Petersburgh required his opinion with deference,
and submitted themselves by anticipation to the counsels of his
experience. Finally, while the genius of Napoleon, the grandeur of his
elevation, the importance of his enterprise, and the habit of their
former relations, still classed Bernadotte as his lieutenant, these
monarchs appeared already to treat him as their general. How was it
possible for him not to seek to escape on the one hand from this sense
of inferiority, and on the other to resist a mode of treatment, and
promises so seductive? Thus the future prospects of Sweden were
sacrificed, and her independence for ever laid at the mercy of Russian
faith by the treaty of Petersburgh, which Bernadotte signed on the 24th
of March, 1812. That of Bucharest, between Alexander and Mahmoud, was
concluded on the 28th of May.--Thus did we lose the support of our two
wings.

Nevertheless, the emperor of the French, at the head of more than six
hundred thousand men, and already too far advanced to think of
retreating, flattered himself that his strength would decide every
thing; that a victory on the Niemen would cut the knot of all these
diplomatic difficulties, which he despised, probably too much; that
then all the monarchs of Europe, compelled to acknowledge his
ascendancy, would be eager to return into his system, and that all those
satellites would be drawn into its vortex.




BOOK II.




CHAPTER I.


Napoleon meanwhile was still at Paris, in the midst of his great
officers, who were alarmed by the terrible encounter which was
preparing. The latter had nothing more to acquire, but much to preserve;
their personal interest, therefore, was united with the general desire
of nations, which were fatigued with war; and without disputing the
utility of this expedition, they dreaded its approach. But they only
confessed this to each other in secret, either from fear of giving
umbrage, of impairing the confidence of nations, or of being proved
wrong by the result. For that reason, in Napoleon's presence they
remained silent, and even appeared to be uninformed as to a war, which
for a considerable time had furnished a subject of conversation to the
whole of Europe.

But at length this respectful taciturnity, which he himself had taken
pains to impose, became disagreeable; he suspected that it proceeded
more from disapprobation than reserve. Obedience was not sufficient for
him; it was his wish to combine it with conviction: that was like
another conquest. Besides, no one was more convinced than himself of
the power of public opinion, which, according to him, _created or
destroyed sovereigns_. In short, whether through policy or self-love, it
was his desire to persuade.

Such were the dispositions of Napoleon and of the grandees who
surrounded him, when the veil being about to be rent, and war evident,
their silence towards him assumed a greater appearance of indiscretion
than hazarding a few timely words. Some of them, therefore, commenced
the task, and the emperor anticipated the others.

A show was made[5] at first of comprehending all the emergencies of his
position. "It was necessary to complete what had been begun; it was
impossible to stop in the midst of so rapid an acclivity, and so near
the summit. The empire of Europe was adapted to his genius; France would
become its centre and its base; great and entire, she would perceive
around her none but states so feeble and so divided, that all coalition
among them would become contemptible or impossible; but with such an
object why did he not commence the task by subjecting and partitioning
the states immediately around him?"

[Footnote 5: The arch-chancellor.]

To this objection Napoleon replied, "That such had been his project in
1809, in the war with Austria, but that the misfortune of Esslingen had
deranged his plan; that that event, and the doubtful dispositions which
Russia had since exhibited, had led him to marry an Austrian princess,
and strengthen himself by an alliance with the Austrian against the
Russian emperor.

"That he did not create circumstances, but that he would not allow them
to escape him; that he comprehended them all, and held himself in as
much readiness as possible for their appearance; that in order to
accomplish his designs, he was fully aware that twelve years were
necessary, but that he could not afford to wait so long.

"That besides, he had not provoked this war; that he had been faithful
to his engagements with Alexander; proofs of which were to be found in
the coldness of his relations with Turkey and Sweden, which had been
delivered up to Russia, one almost entirely, the other shorn of Finland,
and even of the Isle of Aland, which was so near Stockholm. That he had
only replied to the distressed appeal of the Swedes, by advising them to
make the cession.

"That, nevertheless, since 1809, the Russian army destined to act in
concert with Poniatowski in Austrian Gallicia had come forward too late,
was too weak, and had acted perfidiously; that since that time,
Alexander, by his ukase of the 31st of December, 1810, had abandoned the
continental system, and by his prohibitions declared an actual war
against French commerce; that he was quite aware that the interest and
national spirit of the Russians might have compelled him to that, but
that he had then communicated to their emperor that he was aware of his
position, and would enter into every kind of arrangement which his
repose required; in spite of which, Alexander, instead of modifying his
ukase, had assembled 80,000 men, under pretence of supporting his
custom-house officers; that he had suffered himself to be seduced by
England; that, lastly, he even now refused to recognize the
thirty-second military division, and demanded the evacuation of Prussia
by the French; which was equivalent to a declaration of war."

Through all these complaints, some persons thought they perceived that
the pride of Napoleon was wounded by the independent attitude which
Russia was daily resuming. The dispossession of the Russian Princess of
Oldenburg of her duchy led to other conjectures; it was said that hints
had been given both at Tilsit and Erfurt about a divorce, after which a
closer alliance might be contracted with Russia; that these hints had
not been encouraged, and that Napoleon retained a resentful remembrance
of it. This fact is affirmed by some, and denied by others.

But all those passions which so despotically govern other men, possessed
but a feeble influence over a genius so firm and vast as his: at the
utmost, they may have imparted the first momentum which impelled him
into action earlier than he would have wished; but without penetrating
so deeply beneath the folds of his great mind, a single idea, an obvious
fact, was enough to hurry him, sooner or later, into that decisive
struggle,--that was, the existence of an empire, which rivalled his own
in greatness, but was still young, like its prince, and growing every
day; while the French empire, already mature, like its emperor, could
scarcely anticipate any thing but its decrease.

Whatever was the height to which Napoleon had raised the throne of the
south and west of Europe, he perceived the northern throne of Alexander
ever ready to overshadow him by its eternally menacing position. On
those icy summits of Europe, whence, in former times, so many floods of
barbarians had rushed forth, he perceived all the elements of a new
inundation collecting and maturing. Till then, Austria and Prussia had
opposed sufficient barriers; but these he himself had humbled and
overthrown: he stood, therefore, single, front to front with what he
feared; he alone remained the champion of the civilization, the riches,
and the enjoyments of the nations of the south, against the rude
ignorance, and the fierce cupidity, of the poorer people of the north,
and against the ambition of their emperor and his nobility.

It was obvious, that war alone could decide this great
arbitrament,--this great and eternal struggle between the poor and the
rich; and, nevertheless, this war, with reference to us, was neither
European, nor even national. Europe entered into it against her
inclination, because the object of the expedition was to add to the
strength of her conqueror. France was exhausted, and anxious for repose;
her grandees, who formed the court of Napoleon, were alarmed at the
double-headed character of the war, at the dispersion of our armies from
Cadiz to Moscow; and even when admitting the _eventual_ necessity of the
struggle, its _immediate_ urgency did not appear to them so
legitimately proved.

They knew that it was more especially by an appeal to his political
interest that they had any chance of shaking the resolution of a prince,
whose principle was, "that there exist individuals whose conduct can but
rarely be regulated by their private sentiments, but always by
surrounding circumstances." In this persuasion, one of his ministers[6]
said to him, "that his finances required tranquillity;" but he replied,
"On the contrary, they are embarrassed, and require war." Another[7]
added, "that the state of his revenues never, in fact, had been more
flourishing; that, independent of a furnished account of from three to
four millions, it was really wonderful to find France unencumbered with
any urgent debts; but that this prosperous condition was approaching its
termination, since it appeared that with the year 1812 a ruinous
campaign was to commence; that hitherto, war had been made to support
the expense of war; that we had every where found the table laid out;
but that, in future, we could no longer live at the expense of Germany,
since she had become our ally; but, on the contrary, it would be
necessary to support her contingents, and that without any hope of
remuneration, whatever the result might be; that we should have to pay
at Paris for every ration of bread which would be consumed at Moscow, as
the new scenes of action offered us no harvest to reap, independent of
glory, but cordage, pitch, and shipping-tackle, which would certainly go
but a small way towards the discharge of the expenses of a continental
war. That France was not in a condition to subsidize all Europe in this
manner, especially at a moment when her resources were drained by the
war in Spain; that it was like lighting a fire at both ends at once,
which, gaining ground upon the centre, exhausted by so many
efforts,--would probably end in consuming ourselves."

[Footnote 6: Count Mollien.]

[Footnote 7: The Duke of Gaeta.]

This minister was listened to; the emperor surveyed him with a smiling
air, accompanied with one of his familiar caresses. He imagined that he
had secured conviction, but Napoleon said to him,--"So you think that I
shall not be able to find a paymaster to discharge the expenses of the
war?" The duke endeavoured to learn upon whom the burden was to fall,
when the emperor, by a single word, disclosing all the grandeur of his
designs, closed the lips of his astonished minister.

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