Book: History of the Expedition to Russia
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Count Philip de Segur >> History of the Expedition to Russia
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He estimated, however, but too accurately all the difficulties of his
enterprise. It was that, perhaps, which drew upon him the reproach of
availing himself of a method which he had rejected in the Austrian war,
and of which the celebrated Pitt had set the example in 1793.
Towards the end of 1811, the prefect of police at Paris learnt, it was
said, that a printer was secretly counterfeiting Russian bank-bills; he
ordered him to be arrested; the printer resisted; but in the result his
house was broken into, and himself taken before the magistrate, whom he
astonished by his assurance, and still more by his appeal from the
minister of police. This printer was instantly released: it has even
been added, that he continued his counterfeiting employment; and that,
from the moment of our first advance into Lithuania, we propagated the
report that we had gained possession at Wilna of several millions of
Russian bank-bills in the military chests of the hostile army.
Whatever may have been the origin of this counterfeit money, Napoleon
contemplated it with extreme repugnance; it is even unknown whether he
resolved on making any use of it; at least, it is certain that during
the period of our retreat, and when we abandoned Wilna, the greater part
of these bills were found there untouched, and burnt by his orders.
CHAP. II.
Prince Poniatowski, however, to whom this expedition appeared to hold
out the prospect of a throne, generously united his exertions with those
of the emperor's ministers in the attempt to demonstrate its danger.
Love of country was in this Polish prince a great and noble passion; his
life and death have proved it; but it never infatuated him. He depicted
Lithuania as an impracticable desert; its nobility as already become
half Russian; the character of its inhabitants as cold and backward:
but the impatient emperor interrupted him; he required information for
the sake of conducting the enterprise, and not to be deterred from it.
It is true that the greater part of these objections were but a feeble
repetition of all those which, for a long time past, had presented
themselves to his own mind. People were not aware of the extent to which
he had appreciated the danger; of his multiplied exertions, from the
30th of December 1810, to ascertain the nature of the territory which,
sooner or later, was destined to become the theatre of a decisive war;
how many emissaries he had despatched for the purpose of survey; the
multitude of memorials which he caused to be prepared for him respecting
the roads to Petersburgh and Moscow; respecting the dispositions of the
inhabitants, especially of the mercantile class; and, finally, the
resources of every kind which the country was enabled to supply. If he
persevered, it was because, far from deceiving himself as to the extent
of his force, he did not share in that confidence which, perhaps,
precluded others from perceiving of how much consequence the humiliation
of Russia was to the future existence of the great French empire.
In this spirit, he once more addressed himself to three[8] of his great
officers, whose well-known services and attachment authorized a tone of
frankness. All three, in the capacity of ministers, envoys, and
ambassadors, had become acquainted with Russia at different epochs. He
exerted himself to convince them of the utility, justice, and necessity
of this war; but one[9] of them, in particular, often interrupted him
with impatience; for when a discussion had once commenced, Napoleon
submitted to all its little breaches of decorum.
[Footnote 8: The Duke of Frioul, the Count de Segur, (the author's
father,) the Duke of Vicenza.]
[Footnote 9: The Duke of Vicenza.]
That great officer, yielding to the inflexible and impetuous frankness
which he derived from his character, from his military education, and,
perhaps, from the province which gave him birth, exclaimed, "That it was
useless to deceive himself, or pretend to deceive others; that after
possessing himself of the Continent, and even of the states belonging to
the family of his ally, that ally could not be accused of abandoning the
continental system. While the French armies covered all Europe, how
could the Russians be reproached for increasing their army? Did it
become the ambition of Napoleon to denounce the ambition of Alexander?
"That, in addition to this, the determination of that prince was made
up; that, Russia once invaded, no peace could be expected, while a
single Frenchman remained upon her soil; that, in that respect, the
national and obstinate pride of the Russians was in perfect harmony with
that of their emperor.
"That, it was true, his subjects accused Alexander of weakness, but very
erroneously; that he was not to be judged of by the complacency which,
at Tilsit and at Erfurt, his admiration, his inexperience, and some
tincture of ambition, had extorted from him. That this prince loved
justice; that he was anxious to have right on his side, and he might,
indeed, hesitate till he thought it was so, but then he became
inflexible; that, finally, looking to his position with reference to his
subjects, he incurred more danger by making a disgraceful peace, than by
sustaining an unfortunate war.
"How was it possible, moreover, to avoid seeing that in this war every
thing was to be feared, even our allies? Did not Napoleon hear their
discontented kings murmuring that they were only his prefects? When
they, all of them, only waited a suitable occasion in order to turn
against him, why run the risk of giving that occasion birth?"
At the same time, supported by his two colleagues, the duke added, "that
since 1805 a system of war which compelled the most disciplined soldier
to plunder, had sown the seeds of hatred throughout the whole of that
Germany, which the emperor now designed to traverse. Was he then going
to precipitate himself and his army beyond all those nations whose
wounds, for which they were indebted to us, were not yet healed? What an
accumulation of enmity and revenge would he not, by so doing, interpose
between himself and France!
"And upon whom did he call, to be his _points d'appui_?--on Prussia,
whom for five years we had been devouring, and whose alliance was hollow
and compulsive? He was about, therefore, to trace the longest line of
military operations ever drawn, through countries whose fear was
taciturn, supple, and perfidious, and which, like the ashes of
volcanoes, hid terrific flames, the eruption of which might be provoked
by the smallest collision[10].
[Footnote 10: The Duke of Vicenza, the Count de Segur.]
"To sum up all[11], what would be the result of so many conquests? To
substitute lieutenants for kings, who, more ambitious than those of
Alexander, would, perhaps, imitate their example, without, like them,
waiting for the death of their sovereign,--a death, moreover, which he
would inevitably meet among so many fields of battle; and that, before
the consolidation of his labours, each war reviving in the interior of
France the hopes of all kinds of parties, and reviving discussions which
had been regarded as at an end.
[Footnote 11: The Count de Segur.]
"Did he wish to know the opinion of the army? That opinion pronounced
that his best soldiers were then in Spain; that the regiments, being too
often recruited, wanted unity; that they were not reciprocally
acquainted; that each was uncertain whether, in case of danger, it could
depend upon the other; that the front rank vainly concealed the weakness
of the two others; that already, from youth and weakness, many of them
sank in their first march beneath the single burden of their knapsacks
and their arms.
"And, nevertheless, in this expedition, it was not so much the war
which was disliked, as the country where it was to be carried on[12].
The Lithuanians, it was said, desired our presence; but on what a soil?
in what a climate? in the midst of what peculiar manners? The campaign
of 1806 had made those circumstances too well known! Where could they
ever halt, in the midst of these level plains, divested of every species
of position fortified by nature or by art?
[Footnote 12: The Duke of Frioul, the Count de Segur, the Duke of
Vicenza.]
"Was it not notorious, that all the elements protected these countries
from the first of October to the first of June? that, at any other time
than the short interval comprised between these two epochs, an army
engaged in those deserts of mud and ice might perish there entirely, and
ingloriously?" And, they added, "that Lithuania was much more Asiatic
than Spain was African; and that the French army, already all but
banished from France by a perpetual war, wished at least to preserve its
European character.
"Finally, when face to face with the enemy in these deserts, what
different motives must actuate the different armies! On the side of the
Russians were country, independence, every description of interest,
private and public, even to the secret good wishes of our allies! On our
side, and in the teeth of so many obstacles, glory alone, unassociated
even with that desire of gain, to which the frightful poverty of these
countries offered no attraction.
"And what is the end of so many exertions? The French already no longer
recognized each other, in the midst of a country now uncircumscribed by
any natural frontier; and in which the diversity was so great in
manners, persons, and languages." On this particular point, the
eldest[13] of these great officers added, "That such an extension was
never made without proportionate exhaustion; that it was blotting out
France to merge it in Europe; for, in fact, when France should become
Europe, it would be France no longer. Would not the meditated departure
leave her solitary, deserted, without a ruler, without an army,
accessible to every diversion? Who then was there to defend her?" "_My
renown!_" exclaimed the emperor: "_I leave my name behind me, and the
fear inspired by a nation in arms._"
[Footnote 13: M. de Segur.]
And, without appearing in the least shaken by so many objections, he
announced "that he was about to organize the empire into cohorts of
_Ban_ and _Arriere Ban_; and without mistrust to leave to Frenchmen the
protection of France, of his crown, and of his glory.
"That as to Prussia, he had secured her tranquillity by the
impossibility in which he had placed her of moving, even in case of his
defeat, or of a descent of the English on the coasts of the North Sea,
and in our rear; that he held in his hands the civil and military power
of that kingdom; that he was master of Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Torgau,
Spandau, and Magdeburg; that he would post some clear-sighted officers
at Colberg, and an army at Berlin; and that with these means, and
supported by the fidelity of Saxony, he had nothing to fear from
Prussian hatred.
"That as for the rest of Germany, an ancient system of policy, as well
as the recent intermarriages with Baden, Bavaria, and Austria, attached
her to the interest of France; that he made sure of such of her kings as
were indebted to him for their new titles: that after having suppressed
anarchy, and ranged himself on the side of kings, strong as he was, the
latter could not attack him without inciting their people by the
principles of democracy; but that it was scarcely probable that
sovereigns would ally themselves with that natural enemy of thrones--an
enemy, which, had it not been for him, would have overthrown them, and
against which he alone was capable of defending them.
"That, besides, the Germans were a tardy and methodical people, and that
in dealing with them he should always have time on his side; that he
commanded all the fortresses of Prussia; that Dantzic was a second
Gibraltar." This was incorrect, especially in winter. "That Russia ought
to excite the apprehension of all Europe, by her military and conquering
government, as well as by her savage population, already so numerous,
and which augmented annually in the proportion of half a million. Had
not her armies been seen in all parts of Italy, in Germany, and even on
the Rhine? That by demanding the evacuation of Prussia, she required an
impossible concession; since to abandon Prussia, morally ulcerated as
she was, was to surrender her into the hands of Russia, in order to be
turned against ourselves."
Proceeding afterwards with more animation, he exclaimed, "Why menace my
absence with the different parties still alleged to exist in the
interior of the empire? Where are they? I see but a single one against
me; that of a few royalists, the principal part of the ancient
_noblesse_, superannuated and inexperienced. But they dread my downfall
more than they desire it. This is what I told them in Normandy. I am
cried up as a great captain, as an able politician, but I am scarcely
mentioned as an administrator: that which I have, however, accomplished,
of the most difficult and most beneficial description, is the stemming
the revolutionary torrent; it would have swallowed up every thing,
Europe and yourselves. I have united the most opposite parties,
amalgamated rival classes, and yet there exist among you some obstinate
nobles who resist; they refuse my places! Very well! what is that to me?
It is for your advantage, for your security, that I offer them to you.
What would you do singly by yourselves, and without me? You are a mere
handful opposed to masses. Do you not see that it is necessary to put an
end to the struggle between the _tiers-etat_ and the _noblesse_, by a
complete fusion of all that is best worth preservation in the two
classes? I offer you the hand of amity, and you reject it! but what need
have I of you? While I support you, I do myself an injury in the eyes of
the people; for what am I but the king of the _tiers-etat_: is not that
sufficient?"
Passing more calmly to another question: "He was quite aware," he said,
"of the ambition of his generals; but it was diverted by war, and would
never be sanctioned in its excesses by French soldiers, who were too
proud of, and too much attached to their country. That if war was
dangerous, peace had also its dangers: that in bringing back his armies
into the interior, it would enclose and concentrate there too many
daring interests and passions, which repose and their association would
tend to ferment, and which he should no longer be able to keep within
bounds: that it was necessary to give free vent to all such aspirations;
and that, after all, he dreaded them less without the empire than within
it."
He concluded thus: "Do you dread the war, as endangering my life? It was
thus that, in the times of conspiracy, attempts were made to frighten me
about Georges; he was said to be every where upon my track: that
wretched being was to fire at me. Well! suppose he had! He would at the
utmost have killed my _aide-de-camp_: but to kill me was impossible! Had
I at that time accomplished the decrees of fate? I feel myself impelled
towards a goal of which I am ignorant. As soon as I shall have reached
it, so soon shall I no longer be of service,--an atom will then suffice
to put me down; but till then, all human efforts can avail nothing
against me. Whether I am in Paris, or with the army, is, therefore,
quite indifferent. When my hour comes, a fever, or a fall from my horse
in hunting, will kill me as effectually as a bullet: our days are
numbered."
This opinion, useful as it may be in the moment of danger, is too apt to
blind conquerors to the price at which the great results which they
obtain are purchased. They indulge a belief in pre-destination, either
because they have experienced, more than other men, whatever is most
unexpected in human destiny, or because it relieves their consciences of
too heavy a load of responsibility. It was like a return to the times of
the crusades, when these words, _it is the will of God_, were considered
a sufficient answer to all the objections of a prudent and pacific
policy.
Indeed, the expedition of Napoleon into Russia bears a mournful
resemblance to that of St. Louis into Egypt and Africa. These invasions,
the one undertaken for the interests of Heaven, the other for those of
the earth, terminated in a similar manner; and these two great examples
admonish the world, that the vast and profound calculations of this age
of intelligence may be followed by the same results as the irregular
impulses of religious frenzy in ages of ignorance and superstition.
In these two expeditions, however, there can be no comparison between
their opportunities or their chances of success. The last was
indispensable to the completion of a great design on the point of being
accomplished: its object was not out of reach; the means for reaching it
were not inadequate. It may be, that the moment for its execution was
ill chosen; that the progress of it was sometimes too precipitate, at
other times unsteady; but on these points facts will speak sufficiently:
it is for them to decide.
CHAP. III.
In this manner did Napoleon reply to all objections. His skilful hand
was able to comprehend and turn to his purpose every disposition; and,
in fact, when he wanted to persuade, there was a kind of charm in his
deportment which it was impossible to resist. One felt overpowered by
his superior strength, and compelled, as it were, to submit to his
influence. It was, if it may be so expressed, a kind of magnetic
influence; for his ardent and variable genius infused itself entirely
into all his desires, the least as well as the greatest: whatever he
willed, all his energies and all his faculties united to effect: they
appeared at his beck; they hastened forward; and, obedient to his
dictation, simultaneously assumed the forms which he desired.
It was thus that the greater part of those whom he wished to gain over
found themselves, as it were, fascinated by him in spite of themselves.
It was flattering to your vanity to see the master of Europe appearing
to have no other ambition, no other desire than that of convincing you;
to behold those features, so formidable to multitudes, expressing
towards you no other feeling but a mild and affecting benevolence; to
hear that mysterious man, whose every word was historical, yielding, as
if for your sake alone, to the irresistible impulse of the most frank
and confiding disclosure; and that voice, so caressing while it
addressed you, was it not the same, whose lowest whisper rang throughout
all Europe, announced wars, decided battles, settled the fate of
empires, raised or destroyed reputations? What vanity could resist a
charm of so great potency? Any defensive position was forced on all
points; his eloquence was so much more persuasive, as he himself
appeared to be persuaded.
On this occasion, there was no variety of tints with which his brilliant
and fertile imagination did not adorn his project, in order to convince
and allure. The same text supplied him with a thousand different
commentaries, with which the character and position of each of his
interlocutors inspired him; he enlisted each in his undertaking, by
presenting it to him under the form and colour, and point of view, most
likely to gratify him.
We have just seen in what way he silenced the one who felt alarmed at
the expenses of the conquest of Russia, which he wished him to approve,
by holding out the perspective, that another would be made to defray
them.
He told the military man, who was astonished by the hazard of the
expedition, but likely to be easily seduced by the grandeur of ambitious
ideas, that peace was to be conquered at Constantinople; that is to say,
at the extremity of Europe; the individual was thus free to anticipate,
that it was not merely to the staff of a marshal, but to a royal
sceptre, that he might elevate his pretensions.
To a minister[14] of high rank under the ancient _regime_, whom the idea
of shedding so much blood, to gratify ambition, filled with dismay, he
declared "that it was a war of policy exclusively; that it was the
English alone whom he meant to attack through Russia; that the campaign
would be short; that afterwards France would be at rest; that it was the
fifth act of the drama--the _denouement_."
[Footnote 14: Count Mole.]
To others, he pleaded the ambition of Russia, and the force of
circumstances, which dragged him into the war in spite of himself. With
superficial and inexperienced individuals, to whom he neither wished to
explain nor dissemble, he cut matters short, by saying, "You understand
nothing of all this; you are ignorant of its antecedents and its
consequents."
But to the princes of his own family he had long revealed the state of
his thoughts; he complained that they did not sufficiently appreciate
his position. "Can you not see," said he to them, "that as I was not
born upon a throne, I must support myself on it, as I ascended it, by
my renown? that it is necessary for it to go on increasing; that a
private individual, become a sovereign like myself, can no longer stop;
that he must be continually ascending, and that to remain stationary
will be his ruin?"
He then depicted to them all the ancient dynasties armed against his,
devising plots, preparing wars, and seeking to destroy, in his person,
the dangerous example of a _roi parvenu_. It was on that account that
every peace appeared in his eyes a conspiracy of the weak against the
strong, of the vanquished against the victor; and especially of the
great by birth against the great by their own exertions. So many
successive coalitions had confirmed him in that apprehension! Indeed, he
often thought of no longer tolerating an ancient power in Europe, of
constituting himself into an epoch, of becoming a new era for thrones;
in short, of making every thing take its date from him.
It was in this manner that he disclosed his inmost thoughts to his
family by those vivid pictures of his political position, which, at the
present day, will probably appear neither false nor over-coloured: and
yet the gentle Josephine, always occupied with the task of restraining
and calming him, often gave him to understand "that, along with the
consciousness of his superior genius, he never seemed to possess
sufficient consciousness of his own power: that, like all jealous
characters, he incessantly required fresh proofs of its existence. How
came it, amidst the noisy acclamations of Europe, that his anxious ear
could hear the few solitary voices which disputed his legitimacy? that
in this manner his troubled spirit was always seeking agitation as its
element: that strong as he was to desire, but feeble to enjoy, he
himself, therefore, would be the only one whom he could never conquer."
But in 1811 Josephine was separated from Napoleon, and although he still
continued to visit her in her seclusion, the voice of that empress had
lost the influence which continual intercourse, familiar habits of
affection, and the desire of mutual confidence, impart.
Meanwhile, fresh disagreements with the pope complicated the relations
of France. Napoleon then addressed himself to cardinal Fesch. Fesch was
a zealous churchman, and overflowing with Italian vivacity: he defended
the papal pretensions with obstinate ardour; and such was the warmth of
his discussions with the emperor, on a former occasion, that the latter
got into a passion, and told him, "that he would compel him to obey."
"And who contests your power?" returned the cardinal: "but force is not
argument; for if I am right, not all your power can make me wrong.
Besides, your majesty knows that I do not fear martyrdom."--"Martyrdom!"
replied Buonaparte, with a transition from violence to laughter; "do not
reckon on that, I beseech you, M. le Cardinal: martyrdom is an affair in
which there must be two persons concerned; and as to myself, I have no
desire to make a martyr of any individual."
It is said that these discussions assumed a more serious character
towards the end of 1811. An eye-witness asserts that the cardinal, till
that time a stranger to politics, then began to mix them up with his
religious controversies; that he conjured Napoleon not thus to fly in
the face of men, the elements, religion, earth and heaven, at the same
time; and that, at last, he expressed his apprehension of seeing him
sink under such a weight of enmity.
The only reply which the emperor made to this vehement attack was to
take him by the hand, and leading him to the window, to open it, and
inquire, "Do you see that star above us?"--"No, sire."--"Look
again."--"Sire, I do not see it."--"Very well! _I_ see it!" replied
Napoleon. The cardinal, seized with astonishment, remained silent,
concluding that there was no human voice sufficiently loud to make
itself heard by an ambition so gigantic, that it already reached the
heavens.
As to the witness of this singular scene, he understood in quite a
different sense these words of his sovereign. They did not appear to him
like the expression of an overweening confidence in his destiny, but
rather of the great distinction which Napoleon meant to infer as
existing between the grasp of his genius and that of the cardinal's
policy.
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