Book: Elements of Military Art and Science

H >> Henry Wager Halleck >> Elements of Military Art and Science




These remarks are based upon the supposition that we have but the single
harbor of New York; whereas Portland, Portsmouth, Boston, Newport, the
Delaware, the Chesapeake, Charleston, Savannah, Pensacola, Mobile, New
Orleans, and numerous other places, are equally open to attack, and
therefore must be equally defended, for we know not to which the enemy
will direct his assaults. If he come to one of these in the absence of
our fleet, his object is attained without resistance; or, if his whole
force be concentrated upon one but feebly defended, we involve both
fleet and harbor in inevitable ruin. Could our fleet be so arranged as
to meet these enterprises?

"As it cannot be denied that the enemy can select the point of attack
out of the whole extent of coast, where is the prescience that can
indicate the spot? And if it cannot be foretold, how is that ubiquity to
be imparted that shall always place our fleet in the path of the
advancing foe? Suppose we attempt to cover the coast by cruising in
front of it, shall we sweep its whole length--a distance scarcely less
than that which the enemy must traverse in passing from his coast to
ours? Must the Gulf of Mexico be swept, as well as the Atlantic; or
shall we give up the Gulf to the enemy? Shall we cover the southern
cities, or give them up also? We must unquestionably do one of two
things--either relinquish a great extent of coast, confining our
cruisers to a small portion only, or include so much that the chances
of intercepting an enemy would seem to be out of the question."

"On the practicability of covering a small extent of coast by cruising
in front of it--or, in other words, the possibility of anticipating an
enemy's operations, discovering the object of movements of which we get
no glimpse and hear no tidings, and seeing the impress of his footsteps
on the surface of the ocean--it may be well to consult experience."

The naval power of Spain under Philip II. was almost unlimited. With the
treasures of India and America at his command, the fitting out of a
fleet of one hundred and fifty or two hundred sail, to invade another
country, was no very gigantic operation. Nevertheless, this naval force
was of but little avail as a coast defence. Its efficiency for this
purpose was well tested in 1596. England and Holland attacked Cadiz with
a combined fleet of one hundred and seventy ships, which entered the Bay
of Cadiz without, on its approach to their coast, being once seen by the
Spanish navy. This same squadron, on its return to England, passed along
a great portion of the Spanish coast without ever meeting with the
slightest opposition from the innumerable Spanish floating defences.

In 1744, a French fleet of twenty ships, and a land force of twenty-two
thousand men, sailed from Brest to the English coast, without meeting
with any opposition from the superior British fleet which had been sent
out, under Sir John Norris, on purpose to intercept them. The landing of
the troops was prevented by a storm, which drove the fleet back upon the
coast of France to seek shelter.

In 1755, a French fleet of twenty-five sail of the line, and many
smaller vessels, sailed from Brest for America. Nine of these soon
afterwards returned to France, and the others proceeded to the gulf of
St. Lawrence. An English fleet of seventeen sail of the line and some
frigates had been sent out to intercept them; but the two fleets passed
each other in a thick fog, and all the French vessels except two reached
Quebec in safety.

In 1759, a French fleet, blockaded in the port of Dunkirk by a British
force under Commodore Bogs, seizing upon a favorable opportunity,
escaped from the enemy, attacked the coast of Scotland, made a descent
upon Carrickfergus, and cruised about till February, 1760, without
meeting a single British vessel, although sixty-one ships of the line
were then stationed upon the coasts of England and France, and several
of these were actually in pursuit.

In 1796, when the French attempted to throw the army of Hoche into
Ireland, the most strenuous efforts were made by the British navy to
intercept the French fleet in its passage. The Channel fleet, of near
thirty sail of the line, under Lord Bridport, was stationed at Spithead;
Sir Roger Curtis, with a smaller force, was cruising to the westward;
Vice-admiral Colpoys was stationed off Brest, with thirteen sail of the
line; and Sir Edward Pellew (afterwards Lord Exmouth) watched the
harbor, with a small squadron of frigates. Notwithstanding this triple
floating bulwark, as it was called--one fleet on the enemy's coast, a
second in the Downs, and a third close on their own shores--the French
fleet of forty-four vessels, carrying a land force of twenty-five
thousand men, reached Bantry Bay in safety! This fleet was eight days on
the passage, and three more in landing the troops; and most of the
vessels might have returned to Brest in safety, had it not been for
disasters by storms, for only _one_ of their whole number was
intercepted by the vast naval force which England had assembled for that
express object. "The result of this expedition," says Alison, "was
pregnant with important instructions to the rulers of both countries.
To the French, as demonstrating the extraordinary risks which attend a
maritime expedition, in comparison with a land campaign; the small
number of forces which can be embarked on board even a great fleet; and
the unforeseen disasters which frequently, on that element, defeat the
best concerted enterprises. To the English, as showing that _the empire
of the seas does not always afford security against invasion;_ that, in
the face of superior maritime forces, her possessions were for sixteen
days at the mercy of the enemy; and that neither the skill of her
sailors nor the valor of her armies, but the fury of the elements, saved
them from danger in the most vulnerable part of their dominions. While
these considerations are fitted to abate the confidence in invasion,
they are calculated, at the same time, to weaken an overweening
confidence in naval superiority, and to demonstrate that _the only base
upon which certain reliance can be placed_, even by an insular power,
_is a well-disciplined army and the patriotism of its own subjects_."

Subsequent events still further demonstrated the truth of these remarks.
In the following year, a French squadron of two frigates and two sloops,
passed the British fleets with perfect impunity, destroyed the shipping
in the port of Ilfracombe, and safely landed their troops on the coast
of Wales. Again, in 1798, the immense British naval force failed to
prevent the landing of General Humbert's army in the bay of Killala;
and, in the latter part of the same year, a French squadron of nine
vessels and three thousand men escaped Sir J.B. Warren's squadron, and
safely reached the coast of Ireland. As a further illustration, we quote
from the report of the Board of National Defence in 1839.

The Toulon fleet, in 1798, consisting of about twenty sail of the line
and twenty smaller vessels of war, and numerous transports, making in
all, three hundred sail and forty thousand troops, slipped out of port
and sailed to Malta. "It was followed by Nelson, who, thinking correctly
that they were bound for Egypt, shaped his course direct for Alexandria.
The French, steering towards Candia, took the more circuitous passage;
so that Nelson arrived at Alexandria before them, and, not finding them
there, returned, by way of Caramania and Candia, to Sicily, missing his
adversary in both passages. Sailing again for Alexandria, he found the
French fleet at anchor in Aboukir bay, and, attacking them there,
achieved the memorable victory of the Nile. When we consider the
narrowness of the sea; the numerous vessels in the French fleet; the
actual crossing of the two fleets on a certain night; and that Nelson,
notwithstanding, could see nothing of the enemy himself, and hear
nothing of them from merchant vessels, we may judge of the probability
of waylaying our adversary on the broad Atlantic."

"The escape of another Toulon fleet in 1805; the long search for them in
the Mediterranean by the same able officer; the pursuit in the West
Indies; their evasion of him among the islands; the return to Europe;
his vain efforts subsequently, along the coast of Portugal, in the bay
of Biscay, and off the English channel; and the meeting at last at
Trafalgar, brought about only because the combined fleets, trusting to
the superiority that the accession of several reinforcements had given,
were willing to try the issue of a battle--these are instances, of the
many that might be cited, to show how small is the probability of
encountering upon the ocean an enemy who desires to avoid a meeting, and
how little the most untiring zeal, the most restless activity, the most
exalted professional skill and judgment, can do to lessen the adverse
chances. For more than a year Nelson most closely watched his enemy, who
seems to have got out of port as soon as he was prepared to do so, and
without attracting the notice of any of the blockading squadron. When
out, Nelson, perfectly in the dark as to the course Villeneuve had
taken, sought for him in vain on the coast of Egypt. Scattered by
tempests, the French fleet again took refuge in Toulon; whence it again
put to sea, when refitted and ready, joining the Spanish fleet at Cadiz."

"On the courage, skill, vigilance, and judgment, acceded on all hands to
belong in a pre-eminent degree to the naval profession in this country,
this system of defence relies to accomplish, against a string of
chances, objects of importance so great that not a doubt or misgiving as
to the result is admissible. It demands of the navy to do perfectly, and
without fail, that which, to do at all, seems impossible. The navy is
required to know the secret purposes of the enemy, in spite of distance,
and the broken intercourse of a state of war, even before these purposes
are known to the leader who is to execute them; nay, more, before the
purpose itself is formed. On an element where man is but the sport of
storms, the navy is required to lie in wait for the foe at the exact
spot and moment, in spite of weather and seasons; to see him in spite of
fogs and darkness."

"Finally, after all the devices and reliances of the system are
satisfactorily accomplished, and all the difficulties subdued, it
submits to the issue of a single battle, on equal terms, the fate of the
war, having no hope or reserve beyond."

"The proper duty of our navy is, not coast or river defence; it has a
more glorious sphere--that of the _offensive_. In our last war, instead
of lying in harbor, and contenting themselves with keeping a few more of
the enemy's vessels in watch over them than their own number--instead of
leaving the enemy's commerce in undisturbed enjoyment of the sea, and
our commerce without countenance or aid, they scattered themselves over
the wide surface of the ocean, penetrated to the most remote seas,
everywhere acting with the most brilliant success against the enemy's
navigation. And we believe, moreover, that in the amount of the enemy's
property thus destroyed, of American property protected or recovered,
and in the number of hostile ships kept in pursuit of our scattered
vessels, ships evaded if superior, and beaten if equal--they rendered
benefits a thousand-fold greater, to say nothing of the glory they
acquired for the nation, and the character they imparted to it, than any
that would have resulted from a state of passiveness within the harbors.
Confident that this is the true policy as regards the employment of the
navy proper, we doubt not that it will in the future be acted on, as it
has been in the past; and that the results, as regards both honor and
advantage, will be expanded commensurately with its own enlargement. In
order, however, that the navy may always assume and maintain that active
and energetic deportment, in offensive operations, which is at the same
time so consistent with its functions, and so consonant with its spirit,
we have shown that it must not be occupied with mere coast defence."

A few remarks on the relative cost of ships and forts, and the economy
of their support, and we will close this discussion. We do not regard
this question, however, as a matter of any great importance, for it can
seldom be decisive in the choice of these two means of defence. No
matter what their relative cost may be, the one cannot often be
substituted for the other. There are some few cases, however, where this
might be taken into consideration, and would be decisive. Let us
endeavor to illustrate our meaning. For the defence of New York city,
the Narrows and East River must be secured by forts; ships cannot, in
this case, be substituted. But let us suppose that the _outer_ harbor of
New York furnishes no favorable place for the debarkation of troops, or
that the place of debarkation is so far distant that the troops cannot
reach the city before the defensive forces can be prepared to repel
them. This outer harbor would be of great importance to the enemy as a
shelter from storms, and as a place of debarkation or of rendezvous
preparatory to a forcible passage of the Narrows; while to us its
possession would not be absolutely essential, though very important.
Strong fortifications on Sandy Hook, and one of the shoals, might
probably be so constructed as to furnish a pretty sure barrier to the
entrance of this outer harbor; on the other hand, a naval force
stationed within the inner harbor, and acting under the protection of
forts at the Narrows, might also furnish a good, though perhaps less
certain protection for this outer roadstead. Here, then, we might well
consider the question of relative cost and economy of support of the
proposed fortifications, and of a home squadron large enough to effect
the same object, and to be kept continually _at home_ for that special
purpose. If we were to allow it to go to sea for the protection of our
commerce, its character and efficiency as a _harbor_ defence would be
lost. We can therefore regard it only as a local force--fixed within the
limits of the defence of this particular place--and our estimates must
be made accordingly.

The average durability of ships of war in the British navy, has been
variously stated at seven and eight years in time of war, and from ten
to twelve and fourteen years in time of peace. Mr. Perring, in his
"Brief Inquiry," published in 1812, estimates the average durability at
about eight years. His calculations seem based upon authentic
information. A distinguished English writer has more recently arrived at
the same result, from estimates based upon the returns of the Board of
Admiralty during the period of the wars of the French Revolution. The
data in our own possession are less complete; the appropriations for
_building_ and _repairing_ having been so expended as to render it
impossible to draw any accurate line of distinction. But, in the returns
now before us, there are generally separate and distinct amounts of the
_timbers_ used for these two purposes; and consequently, so far as this
(the main item of expense) is concerned, we may form pretty accurate
comparisons.

According to Edge, (pp. 20, 21,) the average cost of timber, for hulls,
masts, and yards, in _building_ an English 74 gun ship, is L61,382. Let
us now compare this cost of timber for _building_, with that of the same
item for _repairs_, for the following fifteen ships, between 1800 and
1820. The list would have been still further enlarged, but the returns
for other ships during some portion of the above period are imperfect:

============================================================
Name of Ship. |No. of| When | Repaired from | Cost.
|Guns. |built.| |
------------------------------------------------------------
Vengeance,...........| 74 | -- | 1800 to 1807 | L84,720
Ildefonso,...........| 74 | -- | 1807 to 1808 | 85,195
Scipio,..............| 74 | -- | 1807 to 1809 | 60,785
Tremendous,..........| 74 | -- | 1807 to 1810 | 135,397
Elephant,............| 74 | -- | 1808 to 1811 | 67,007
Spencer,.............| 74 | 1800 | 1809 to 1813 | 124,186
Romulus,.............| 74 | -- | 1810 to 1812 | 73,141
Albion,..............| 74 | 1802 | 1810 to 1813 | 102,295
Donegal,.............| 74 | -- | 1812 to 1815 | 101,367
Implacable,..........| 74 | -- | 1813 to 1815 | 59,865
Illustrious,.........| 74 | 1803 | 1813 to 1816 | 74,184
Northumberland,......| 74 | -- | 1814 to 1815 | 59,795
Kent,................| 74 | -- | 1814 to 1818 | 88,357
Sultan,..............| 74 | 1807 | 1816 to 1818 | 61,518
Sterling Castle,.....| 74 | -- | 1816 to 1818 | 65,280
------------------------------------------------------------

This table, although incomplete, gives for the above fifteen ships,
during a period of less than twenty years, the cost of _timber alone_
used in their repair, an average of about $400,000 each. More timber
than this was used, in all probability, upon the same vessels, and paid
for out of the funds appropriated "for such as may be ordered in course
of the year to be repaired." But the amount specifically appropriated
for timber for these fifteen ships, would, in every twelve or fifteen
years, equal the entire _first cost_ of the same items. If we add to
this amount, the cost of labor required in the application of timber to
the operations of repair, and take into consideration the expense of
other materials and labor, and the decayed condition of many of the
ships at the end of this period, we should not be surprised to find the
whole sum _expended_ under these heads to equal the first cost, even
within the minimum estimate of seven years. The whole cost of timber
used for hulls, masts, and yards, in building between 1800 and 1820, was
L18,727,551; in repairs and "ordinary wear and tear," L17,449,780;
making an annual average of $4,560,158 for building timber, and
$4,273,371 for that used in repairs. A large portion of the vessels
_built_ were intended to replace others which had been lost, or were so
decayed as to be broken up.

But it may be well to add here, the actual supplies voted for the
sea-service, and for wear and tear, and the extraordinary expenses in
building and repairing of ships from 1800 to 1815.

===============================================================
| | For the wear|Ext. Expenses| For entire |
| Year | and tear of |for building,| sea-service. |
| | Ships. |repairing,&c.| |
|---------------------------------------------------|
| 1800 | L4,350,000 | L772,140 | L13,619,079 |
| 1801 | 5,850,000 | 933,900 | 16,577,037 |
| 1802 | 3,684,000 | 773,500 | 11,833,571 |
| 1803 | 3,120,000 | 901,140 | 10,211,378 |
| 1804 | 3,900,000 | 948,520 | 12,350,606 |
| 1805 | 4,680,000 | 1,553,690 | 15,035,630 |
| 1806 | 4,680,000 | 1,980,830 | 18,864,341 |
| 1807 | 5,070,000 | 2,134,903 | 17,400,337 |
| 1808 | 5,070,000 | 2,351,188 | 18,087,544 |
| 1809 | 3,295,500 | 2,296,030 | 19,578,467 |
| 1810 | 3,295,500 | 1,841,107 | 18,975,120 |
| 1811 | 3,675,750 | 2,046,200 | 19,822,000 |
| 1812 | 3,675,750 | 1,696,621 | 19,305,759 |
| 1813 | 3,549,000 | 2,822,031 | 20,096,709 |
| 1814 | 3,268,000 | 2,086,274 | 19,312,070 |
| 1815 | 2,386,500 | 2,116,710 | 19,032,700 |
---------------------------------------------------------------

It appears from this table that the appropriations for the service,
during the first fifteen years of the present century, amounted to a
little less than _ninety millions_ of dollars per annum; and for the
wear and tear of ships, and "the extraordinary expenses in building and
repairing ships, &c.," the annual appropriations amounted to near
_thirty millions_.

Our own naval returns are also so imperfect that it is impossible to
form any very accurate estimate of the relative cost of construction and
repairs of our men-of-war. The following table, compiled from a report
of the Secretary of the Navy, in 1841, (Senate Doc. No. 223, 26th
Congress,) will afford data for an approximate calculation:--

======================================================================
Name of No. Total Cost When Cost of Repaired
Ship. of of building, completed. Repairs, between.
Guns. exclusive of exclusive
armament, of
stores, ordnance,
&c. &c. &c. &c.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Delaware, 74 $543,368 00 1820 $354,132 56 1827 and 1838
N. Carolina, 74 431,852 00 1825 317,628 92 1824 and 1836
Constitution, 44 302,718 84 1797 266,878 34 1833 and 1839
United States 44 299,336 56 1797 571,972 77 1821 and 1841
Brandywine, 44 [23]299,218 12 1825 [23]377,665 95 1826 and 1838
Potomac, 44 [23]231,013 02 1822 [23] 82,597 03 1829 and 1835
Concord, 20 115,325 80 1828 72,796 22 1832 and 1840
Falmouth, 20 94,093 27 1827 130,015 43 1828 and 1837
John Adams, 20 110,670 69 1829 119,641 93 1834 and 1837
Boston, 20 91,973 19 1825 189,264 37 1826 and 1840
St. Louis, 20 102,461 95 1828 135,458 75 1834 and 1839
Vincennes, 20 111,512 79 1826 178,094 81 1830 and 1838
Vandalia, 20 90,977 88 1828 59,181 34 1832 and 1834
Lexington, 20? 114,622 35 1826 83,386 52 1827 and 1837
Warren, 20? 99,410 01 1826 152,596 03 1830 and 1838
Fairfield, 20 100,490 35 1826 65,918 26 1831 and 1837
Natches,[24] 20? 106,232 19 1827 129,969 80 1829 and 1836
Boxer, 10 30,697 88 1831 28,780 48 1834 and 1840
Enterprise, 10 27,938 63 1831 20,716 59 1834 and 1840
Grampus, 10 23,627 42 1821 96,086 36 1825 and 1840
Dolphin, 10 38,522 62 1836 15,013 35 1839 and 1840
Shark, 10 23,627 42 1821 93,395 84 1824 and 1839
----------------------------------------------------------------------

[Footnote 23: Returns incomplete.]

[Footnote 24: Broken up in 1840.]

It appears from the above table, that the cost of constructing ships of
the line is about $6,600 per gun; of frigates, $6,500 per gun; of
smaller vessels of war, a little less than $5,000 per gun: making an
average cost of vessels of war to be _more than six thousand dollars per
gun._ And the expense of repairs for these vessels is _more than seven
per cent. per annum_ on their first cost.

We have as yet had but little experience in the use of war-steamers. The
Fulton, four guns, built in 1838-'39, cost three hundred and
thirty-three thousand seven hundred and seventy dollars and
seventy-seven cents; the Mississippi and Missouri, ten guns each, built
in 1841, cost about six hundred thousand dollars a piece; making an
average cost for war-steamers of _over sixty thousand dollars per gun._
The cost of repairs of steam ships will be much greater than those for
vessels of war; but we have not yet had sufficient experience to
determine the exact amount. It has been estimated, however, by competent
judges, that when kept, the expense of repairs will at least equal
twelve per cent. of the first cost. The expense of keeping them in
commission is enormously great. "Their engines," says the Secretary of
the Navy, in his annual report in 1842, "consume so much fuel as to add
enormously to their expenses; and the necessity that they should return
to port, after short intervals of time, for fresh supplies, renders it
impossible to send them on any distant service. They cannot be relied on
as cruisers, and are altogether too expensive for service in time of
peace. I have therefore determined to take them out of commission, and
substitute for them other and less expensive vessels."

The average cost of permanent fortifications is but _little more than
three thousand dollars per gun_. And it must be obvious, from the nature
of the materials of which they are constructed, that the expense of
their support must be inconsiderable. It is true that for some years
past a large item of annual expenditure for fortifications has been
under the head of "repairs;" but much of this sum is for alterations and
enlargements of temporary and inefficient works, erected anterior to the
war of 1812. Some of it, however, has been for actual repairs of decayed
or injured portions of the forts; these injuries resulting from the
nature of the climate, the foundations, the use of poor materials and
poor workmanship, and from neglect and abandonment. But if we include
the risk of abandonment at times, it is estimated, upon data drawn from
past experience, that _one-third of one per cent. per annum_, of the
first cost, will keep in perfect repair any of our forts that have been
constructed since the last war.

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