Book: Elements of Military Art and Science

H >> Henry Wager Halleck >> Elements of Military Art and Science




By the British plan of campaign in 1777, the entire force of their
northern army was to concentrate at Albany. One division of fifteen
hundred men, including Indians, advanced by Oswego, Wood Creek, and the
Mohawk; but Fort Stanwix, with a garrison of only six hundred men,
arrested their progress and forced them to return. Another, leaving New
York, ascended the Hudson as far as Esopus; but its progress was so much
retarded by the small forts and water-batteries along that river, that
it would have been too late to assist Burgoyne, even if it could
possibly have reached Albany. The principal division of the enemy's
army, numbering about nine thousand men, advanced by the Champlain
route. Little or no preparations were made to arrest its progress. The
works of Ticonderoga were so out of repair as to be indefensible on the
flanks. Its garrison consisted of only fifteen hundred continental
troops, and about as many militia, over whom the general had no control.
Their supply of provisions was exhausted, and only one man in ten of the
militia had bayonets to their guns. Under these circumstances it was
deemed best to withdraw the garrison six days after the investment.
Burgoyne now advanced rapidly, but with so little precaution as to leave
his communications in rear entirely unprotected. Being repulsed by the
American forces collected at Saratoga, his line of supplies cut off by
our detached forts, his provisions exhausted, his troops dispirited, and
his Indian allies having deserted him, retreat became impossible, and
his whole army was forced to capitulate. This campaign closed the
military operations on our northern frontier during the war of the
Revolution.

We now come to the war of 1812. In the beginning of this war the number
of British regulars in the Canadas did not exceed three thousand men,
who were scattered along a frontier of more than nine hundred miles in
extent. In the whole of Upper Canada there were but seven hundred and
twenty men, and at Montreal, Three Rivers, and on the whole line of the
Sorel the whole defensive force amounted to only thirteen hundred and
thirty men, and the garrison of Quebec was so small, that no detachment
could be made without great inconvenience and danger. The fortifications
of Isle aux Noix, then emphatically the key of central Canada, was
without a garrison during nearly the whole of the first campaign. Under
these circumstances an American force of fifteen hundred or two thousand
men marching rapidly from Albany, might readily have broken the enemy's
line of defence, and cut off all Upper Canada from supplies and
reinforcements from England by way of Quebec. Let us see what course was
pursued.

On the 1st of June an army of two thousand men was collected at Dayton,
in Ohio, placed under the command of an imbecile old officer of the
Revolution, and directed by Detroit against the Canadian Peninsula. The
dilatory march, absurd movements, and traitorous surrender of Hull's
army to a British force of three hundred regulars and four hundred
militia, are but too well known. Another American army of about ten
thousand men was afterwards raised in the west; the main division of
this army under Harrison marched by three separate routes to invade
Canada by way of Malden; but they failed to reach their destination, and
wintered behind the river Portage. The Eastern army was collected at
Albany in the early part of the summer and placed under the command of
General Dearborn, another old officer of the Revolution. Instead of
pushing this force rapidly forward upon the strategic line of Lake
Champlain, the general was directed to divide it into three parts, and
to send one division against the Niagara frontier, a _second_ against
Kingston, and a _third_ against Montreal. These orders were dispatched
from Washington the 26th of June, nearly a month after Hull had begun
his march from Dayton. Dearborn's army, on the first of September,
consisted of six thousand five hundred regulars and seven thousand
militia--thirteen thousand five hundred in all: six thousand three
hundred for the Niagara frontier, two thousand two hundred at Sacketts
Harbor, and five thousand for Lake Champlain. Even with this absurd plan
of campaign and faulty division of the forces, we might have succeeded
if the general had acted with energy, so exceedingly weak were the
Canadian means of defence; but instead of taking advantage of his
superiority in numbers and the favorable circumstances of the time, he
entered into an armistice with the British general, and his whole army
of thirteen thousand five hundred men lay inactive till the 13th of
October, when the absurd project of crossing the Niagara at Lewiston
failed, because the New-York militia had _constitutional scruples_
against crossing a river so long as the enemy were on the other side.
The Lake Champlain column, consisting of three thousand regulars and two
thousand militia, a considerable portion of which had been collected as
early as the first of August, had in four months advanced as far as La
Cole river, a distance of about two hundred miles from Albany. The
unimportant action at this place terminated the campaign, and the army
of the North returned to winter-quarters.

All the early part of the campaign of 1813, on the northern frontier,
was spent in a war of detachments, in which our troops captured Fort
George and York, and repelled the predatory excursions of the enemy. In
these operations our troops exhibited much courage and energy, and the
young officers who led them, no little skill and military talent. But
nothing could have been more absurd than for a general, with superior
forces in the vicinity of an enemy, to act only by detachments at a time
when his opponents were daily increasing in number. This useless war of
outposts and detachments was continued till July, when General Dearborn
was recalled, and General Wilkinson, another old officer of the
Revolution, put in his place. It was now determined to make a push for
Montreal, with the combined forces of the Northern army. Wilkinson, with
8,000 men, descended the St. Lawrence, but did not reach Prescott till
the 6th of November, thus affording to the English plenty of leisure to
prepare for his reception. Hampton, another old officer of the
Revolution, ascended Lake Champlain with another column of 4,000 men,
but refused to form any co-operation with Wilkinson, and after the
unimportant combat of Chrystler's Field, the whole army again retired
to winter-quarters.

In the mean time the army of the West, under Harrison, who was assisted
by the military skill and science of McCrea and Wood, and the bravery of
Croghan and Johnson, held in check the British and Indians; and the
battle of the Thames and the victory of Lake Erie formed a brilliant
termination to the campaign in that quarter. Had such victories been
gained on the Montreal or eastern portion of the frontier, they would
have led to the most important results.

The plan of operations for the campaign of 1814 was of the same diverse
and discordant character as before. But the command of the troops had
now fallen into the hands of young and energetic officers, and Brown,
assisted by such men as Wood, McCrea, Scott, Ripley, Miller, soon gained
the victories of Fort Erie, Chippewa, and Lundy's Lane; while McComb and
McDonough drove back the enemy from the line of Lake Champlain. With
these operations terminated the Northern campaign of 1814, the last
which has been conducted on that frontier.

Let us now turn to the system of works projected for the defence of this
line.

The first works are at the Falls of St. Mary, on the western extremity
of the line.

The second works are at Mackinaw.

The third works are at the foot of Lake Huron.

The fourth works are near Detroit.

The fifth works are near Buffalo.

The sixth works are at the mouth of the Niagara river.

The seventh works are at Oswego.

The eighth works are at Sacketts Harbor.

The ninth works are below Ogdensburg.

The tenth works are at Rouse's Point.

The eleventh works are near the head-waters of the Kennebec or the
Penobscot.

The twelfth works are at Calais, on the St. Croix.

All these works are small, and simple in their character, well
calculated to assist the operations of armed forces in the field, but
incapable of resisting a protracted siege. They are entirely different
in their character from those on the coast, the latter being intended
principally for the use of our citizen-soldiery, in the defence of our
seaport towns, while the former are intended merely as auxiliaries to
the operations of more disciplined troops.

This system of defence for our Northern frontier has been much commented
on by men professing some knowledge of the military art, and various
opinions have been advanced respecting its merits. Some have thought
that more and larger works should be placed on the western extremity of
this line; others attach by far the greatest importance to the central
or Montreal portion of the frontier; while others, again, attach a
higher value to the eastern extremity of the line.

These last would have us concentrate our main forces on the head-waters
of the Kennebec and the Penobscot, and then advance upon Quebec, a
distance of some 250 miles, along the isolated carriage-road, through
the valley of the Chaudiere. Here is only a single road, but little
travelled, and penetrating a wide and almost uninhabited wilderness.
General Jomini says emphatically, that _a line of operations should
always offer two or three roads for the movement of an army in the
sphere of its enterprises_,--an insuperable objection to the Kennebec
route, except as a diversion to the main attack. But there are still
stronger objections to this route, than its want of feasibility for the
transportation of the main army; for even should that army succeed in
reaching Quebec in safety, the expedition would be entirely without
military results, unless that fortress could be immediately reduced,--a
contingency which would be extremely doubtful under the most favorable
circumstances; and even should we be ever so fortunate in our
operations, the siege of such a place would occupy a considerable length
of time. It would be throwing our forces along the most difficult line
of operations, against the strongest point in the enemy's line of
defence, and making the success of the whole plan depend upon the
contingency of a reduction, in a few days, of one of the strongest
fortresses in the world. What principle in military science would
justify such a plan of campaign? We are fully aware of the great
advantages to be derived from the reduction of Quebec; and we are also
aware of the great difficulties to be encountered in any attempt to
accomplish that object. It may, and probably will ere long, be made to
surrender to our arms; but it would be utter folly to base our military
operations on the contingency of a short and successful siege. By
advancing upon Montreal by the Lake Champlain route, we could cut off
the Canadian forces in the West from all reinforcements; and then, as
circumstances might direct, could besiege Quebec, or attack the enemy in
the field, or perhaps, manoeuvring as the French did at the siege of
Mantua, accomplish both objects at the same time.

We have seen that it was one of Napoleon's maxims that _an army should
choose the shortest and most direct line of operations, which should
either pierce the enemy's line of defence, or cut off his communications
with his base_. It is the opinion of men of the best military talent in
our army that the Lake Champlain line satisfies all these conditions at
the same time;--that it is the most direct, most feasible, and most
decisive line which can be pursued in case of operations against Canada;
and that it is indispensable to success in war that this line be well
fortified in time of peace. All agree that the St. Lawrence above
Quebec constitutes the _key_ point of the enemy's defence, and the
_objective_ point towards which all our operations should be directed.
To reach this point, all our Boards of Engineers have deemed it best to
collect our troops at Albany and advance by Lake Champlain, a distance
of only two hundred miles. Besides the advantages of a good water
communication the whole distance for the transportation of military
stores, there are several roads on each side, all concentrating on this
line within our own territory. It has already been shown by the brief
sketch of our northern wars, that this line has been the field of strife
and blood for _fifteen campaigns_. Nature has marked it out as our
shortest and easiest line of intercourse with Canada, both in peace and
war. Military diversions will always be made on the eastern and western
extremities of this frontier, and important secondary or auxiliary
operations be carried on by the eastern and western routes; but until we
overthrow the whole system of military science as established by the
Romans, revived by Frederick and practised and improved by Napoleon, the
_central and interior line_, under all ordinary circumstances, will
furnish the greatest probabilities of success.

If the line of Lake Champlain is, as we have endeavored to show, the
most important line in the north; its security by fortifications is a
matter of the greatest interest. The works recommended by the Board,
consist of a single fort, costing $600,000, at Rouse's Point, on the
extreme frontier, and unfortified depots at Plattsburg and Albany. But
is this sufficient to accomplish the object? If the hostile army should
pass the extreme frontier barrier, what is to retard his advance,--what
defensive works are to protect the debouche of the Northern canal, or
even to save the great central depot? We know of no foreign engineer who
has recommended less than _three_ lines of fortifications for the
security of a land frontier; and Napoleon, the Archduke Charles, and
General Jomini, agree in recommending at least this number of lines.
There may be circumstances that render it unnecessary to resort to a
three-fold defence throughout the whole extent of our northern frontier;
but upon our main line of communication with Canada,--a line of maximum
importance both to us and to the enemy, we know of no reason for
violating the positive rules of the art,--rules which have been
established for ages; and sanctioned by the best engineers and greatest
generals of modern times.

Ticonderoga has more than once stayed the waves of northern invasion;
and we know of no change in the art of war, or in the condition of the
country, that renders less important than formerly the advantages of an
intermediate point of support between Albany and the Canadian lines.
Indeed it would seem that the connection of the Hudson with the lake by
the northern canal had even increased the value of such a point.

It would seem, moreover, that the great value of a central depot near
Albany would warrant a resort to the best means of security which can be
afforded by defensive works. Here we already have one of our largest
arsenals of construction; here are to be located magazines for the
collection and deposit, in time of peace, of gunpowder; here, in time of
war, is to be formed the grand military depot for our whole northern
armies; and here is the point of junction of the lines of communication
of our northern and eastern states, and the great central rallying point
where troops are to be collected for the defence of our northern
frontier, or for offensive operations against Canada. Such a place
should never be exposed to the _coup-de-main_ of an enemy. The chance
operations of a defensive army are never sufficient for the security of
so important a position. We do not here pretend to say what its defences
should be. Perhaps strong _tetes-de-pont_ on the Mohawk and Hudson
rivers, and detached works on the several lines of communication, may
accomplish the desired object; perhaps more central and compact works
may be found necessary. But we insist on the importance of securing this
position by _some_ efficient means. The remarks of Napoleon, (which have
already been given,) on the advantages to be derived from fortifying
such a central place, where the military wealth of a nation can be
secured, are strikingly applicable to this case.

But let us look for a moment at what is called the _western_ plan of
defence for our northern frontier.

Certain writers and orators of the western states, in their plans of
military defence, would have the principal fortifications of the
northern frontier established on Lake Erie, the Detroit river, the St.
Clair, and Lake Huron; and the money proposed for the other frontier and
coast works, expended in establishing military and naval depots at
Memphis and Pittsburg, and in the construction of a ship-canal from the
lower Illinois to Lake Michigan,--for the purpose of obtaining the naval
control of the northern lakes.

It is said that British military and steam naval forces will ascend the
St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario; that to counteract these operations we
must build an opposition steam-navy at Pittsburg and Memphis, and
collect out troops on the Ohio and Mississippi, ascend the Mississippi
and Illinois, Lake Michigan, Lake Huron, and the Georgian Bay, cross
over to the Ottawa by French river and Lake Nipissing, or Moon river and
the Muskago, then descend the Ottawa river to Montreal. But as there
might be some difficulty in conveying their war-steamers over some
twelve or fifteen portages between the Georgian Bay and the Ottawa, and
as the upper waters of that river are not navigable by such craft, it
has, by some of the military writers before alluded to, been deemed
preferable to descend Lake Huron, St. Clair river and lake, run the
gauntlet past the British forts on the Detroit, descend Lake Erie and
the Niagara[26] into Lake Ontario, so as to meet the English as they
come steaming up the St. Lawrence!

[Footnote 26: How they are to pass the Falls was not determined either
by Harry Bluff or the Memphis Convention.]

It is agreed upon all sides that the British must first collect their
forces at Quebec, and then pass along the line of the St. Lawrence and
Lake Ontario to reach the Niagara and Detroit frontiers. Our boards of
engineers have deemed it best to collect troops on the Champlain line,
and, by penetrating between Montreal and Quebec, separate the enemy's
forces and cut off all the remainder of Canada from supplies and
reinforcements from England. But it has been discovered by certain
western men that to cut the _trunk_ of a tree is not the proper method
of felling it: we must climb to the _top_ and pinch the buds, or, at
most, cut off a few of the smaller limbs. To blow up a house, we should
not place the mine under the foundation, but attach it to one of the
shingles of the roof! We have already shown that troops collected at
Albany may reach the great strategic point on the St. Lawrence by an
easy and direct route of _two hundred miles_; but forces collected at
Pittsburg and Memphis must pass over a difficult and unfrequented route
of _two thousand miles_.

Our merchant marine on the lakes secures to us a naval superiority in
that quarter at the beginning of a war; and our facilities for
ship-building are there equal if not superior to any possessed by the
enemy. The only way, therefore, in which our ascendency on the lakes can
be lost, is by the introduction of steam craft from the Atlantic. The
canals and locks constructed for this object will pass vessels of small
dimensions and drawing not over eight and a half feet water.

How are we to prevent the introduction of these Atlantic steamers into
our lakes? Shall we, at the first opening of hostilities, march with
armed forces upon the enemy's line of artificial communication and blow
up the locks of their ship-canals, thus meeting the enemy's marine at
the very threshold of its introduction into the interior seas; or shall
we build opposition steam-navies at Pittsburg and Memphis, some two
thousand miles distant, and then expend some forty or fifty millions[27]
in opening an artificial channel to enable them to reach Lake Ontario,
after its borders have been laid waste by the hostile forces? Very few
disinterested judges would hesitate in forming their opinion on this
question.[28]

[Footnote 27: The construction of the Illinois ship-canal, for vessels
of eight and a half feet draught, is estimated at fifteen millions; to
give the same draught to the Mississippi and lower Illinois, would
require at least ten millions more; a ship canal of the corresponding
draught around Niagara Falls, will cost, say, ten millions; the navy
yard at Memphis, with docks, storehouses, &c., will cost about two
millions, and steamers sent thence to the lakes will cost about fifty
thousand dollars per gun. On the other hand, the military defences which
it is deemed necessary to erect in time of peace for the security of the
Champlain frontier, will cost only about two thousand dollars per gun;
the whole expenditure not exceeding, at most, two millions of dollars!

It is not to be denied that a water communication between the
Mississippi and the northern lakes will have great commercial
advantages, and that, in case of a protracted war, auxiliary troops and
military stores may be drawn from the valley of the Mississippi to
assist the North and East in preventing any great accessions to the
British military forces in the Canadas. We speak only of the policy of
expending vast sums of money on this _military_ (?) _project_, to the
neglect of matters of more immediate and pressing want. We have nothing
to say of its character as a _commercial project_, or of the ultimate
military advantages that might accrue from such a work. We speak only of
the present condition and wants of the country, and not of what that
condition and those wants may be generations hence!]

[Footnote 28: There are no books devoted exclusively to the subjects
embraced in this chapter; but the reader will find many remarks on the
northern frontier defences in the histories of the war of 1812, in
congressional reports, (vide House Doc. 206, XXVIth Congress, 2d
session; and Senate Doc., No. 85, XXVIIIth Congress, 2d session,) and in
numerous pamphlets and essays that have appeared from the press within
the last few years.]




CHAPTER IX.

ARMY ORGANIZATION--STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS.


By the law of the 12th of December, 1790, on the organization of the
public force of France, the Army was defined, "A standing force drawn
from the public force, and designed to act against external enemies."
[_Une force habituelle extraite de la force publique, et destinee
essentiellement a agir contre les ennemis du dehors_.]

In time of peace, the whole organized military force of the State is
intended when we speak of _the army_; but in time of war this force is
broken up into two or more fractions, each of which is called an _army_.
These armies are usually named from the particular duty which may be
assigned to them--as, _army of invasion, army of occupation, army of
observation, army of reserve, &c._; or from the country or direction in
which they operate--as, _army of the North, of the South, of Mexico, of
Canada, of the Rhine, &c._; or from the general who commands it--as, the
_army of Soult, army of Wellington, army of Bluecher, &c._

All modern armies are organized on the same basis. They are made up of a
Staff and Administrative departments, and four distinct arms--Infantry,
Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers; each having distinct duties, but all
combining to form one and the same military body. In the actual
operations of a campaign, these forces are formed into _corps d'armee_,
each _corps d'armee_ being composed of two or more _grand-divisions_;
each grand-division, of two or more _brigades_; and each brigade, of
several _companies, squadrons_, or _batteries_.

In speaking of an army in the field, it is sometimes supposed to be
divided into two classes of men--the _Staff_ and _the line_. We here
include in the first class--

All officers, of whatever arm, above the rank of colonel;

All officers of the staff corps of whatever grade, and

All officers attached to the staff as aides, &c.;

All officers of the administrative departments;

All officers of artillery and engineer staffs;

The corps of geographical or topographical engineers, and

The guards.

In the second class are included all troops, of whatever arm, which
belong to the active army, in infantry, cavalry, artillery, and
engineers. All troops on detached service, such as recruiting, guarding
posts and depots, escorting convoys, &c., as well as all sedentary
corps, garrisons of fortified places, &c., are not regarded in this
classification as composing any part of the _line_ of the army.

_Troops of the line_ is a term applied only to such troops as form the
principal line on the battle-field, viz:--The heavy infantry and heavy
cavalry. These are technically called _infantry of the line_, and
_cavalry of the line_. In this sense of the term, light infantry, light
cavalry or dragoons, artillery, and engineers, are not classed as troops
of the _line_. But this distinction is now pretty much fallen into
disuse, and the division of an army into Staff and Administrative
departments, and four arms of service--Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and
Engineers--is now regarded as the most convenient, from being precise
and definite in its meaning.

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