Book: Elements of Military Art and Science

H >> Henry Wager Halleck >> Elements of Military Art and Science




The soldier gains great _velocity_ by the use of the horse in war; but
in other respects he is the loser. The great expense and care required
of the cavalier to support his horse; the difficulty experienced in
surmounting ordinary obstacles, and in using his fire-arms to advantage,
are all prejudicial to success.

The unequal size of the horse, and the great diversity in his strength
and breed, have rendered it necessary to divide this arm into _light_
and _heavy_ cavalry, and a mixed class called _dragoons_. The heavy
cavalry is commonly used in masses where _force_ is mainly requisite;
the lighter troops are used singly and in small detachments, where
rapidity of movement is most desired.

The _heavy_ cavalry are divided into carabiniers, cuirassiers, and
sometimes lancers. The two latter are frequently united, the cuirassiers
being armed with the lance. These troops are seldom used for scouts,
vanguards, and convoys; but are frequently employed to sustain the light
cavalry. Their main duty is "_to appear on the field of battle and make
the decisive charges_."

The _light_ cavalry is composed of chasseurs, or troopers, hussars, and
lancers. The latter, when composed of large men and mounted on heavy
horses, are attached to the heavy cavalry.

The _dragoons_ were formerly a mixed body of horse and foot, but it
being found impossible to unite these two distinct arms in one, and the
attempt having destroyed the usefulness of the body to act in either
capacity, the term was applied to a mixed kind of cavalry between the
heavy and the light horse. In more recent wars they have also been
instructed as infantry and employed as foot-soldiers, till horses could
be found in the enemy's country with which to mount them. But we believe
there is no instance in more modern wars in which they have been
employed at the same time in both capacities.

This term is, very improperly, applied to all our cavalry; and some of
the congressional wiseacres have recently experimented on one of our
so-called regiments of _dragoons_, by dismounting it one year, selling
its horses at auction, and changing its arms and equipments, and again,
the next year, purchasing new horses, arms, and equipments for
remounting it; and all this for _economy!_

The Roman cavalry at first wore a round shield and helmet, the rest of
their body being nearly uncovered. Their arms were a sword and long thin
javelin, or lance, with an iron head. They afterwards reduced the shield
to a much smaller size, and made square, and their lance was greatly
increased in size and length, and armed at both ends. In other respects
they were armed in the same way as infantry. The use of the lance and
the shield at the same time, of course rendered both nearly worthless.
The Roman cavalry was superior to that of their enemies, except,
perhaps, the light cavalry of the Parthians.

The heavy armor which was sometimes worn by the ancients, like the _gens
d'armes_ of the middle ages, rendered them greatly inferior to infantry
in a close engagement. Tigranes, king of Armenia, brought an army of one
hundred and fifty thousand horse into the field, against the Roman
general Lucullus, who had only about six thousand horse and fifteen
thousand foot. But the Armenian cavalry, called _cataphratti_ were so
overburdened with armor, that when they fell from their horses they
could scarcely move or make any use of their arms. They were routed by a
mere handful of Roman infantry.

The modern cavalry is much lighter, and, by dispensing with armor,
shields, &c., it can move with much greater rapidity. A modern cavalry
horse carries a weight of from two hundred and fifty to three hundred
pounds, viz.:

Heavy Light
cavalry. cavalry.

The rider, . . . . 160 140 lbs.
His arms and equipments, . . . 55 40
His horse equipments, . . . 60 45
Two days' rations of provisions and grain, 25 25
-----------------
300 250

The horse moves per minute--

At a walk, from 110 yards to 120
At a trot, 220 240
At a gallop, 330 360

But on a march over the ordinary average of good and bad roads, cavalry
will walk about one hundred yards per minute, and at an easy trot, two
hundred.

An ordinary day's march for cavalry is about thirty miles, but on a
forced march this arm can march fifty miles within the twenty-four
hours. A single horseman, or a small detachment, can easily exceed this
distance.

"Light cavalry," says Napoleon, in his Memoirs, "ought to reconnoitre
and watch the motions of the enemy, considerably in advance of the army;
it is not an appendage to the infantry: it should be sustained and
protected especially by the cavalry of the line. Rivalry and emulation
have always existed between the infantry and cavalry: light cavalry is
indispensable to the vanguard, the rearguard, and the wings of the army;
it, therefore, cannot properly be attached to, and forced to follow the
movements of any particular corps of infantry. It would be more natural
to attach it to the cavalry of the line, than to leave it in dependence
upon the infantry, with which it has no connection; but it should be
independent of both."

"If the light cavalry is to form vanguards, it must be organized into
squadrons, brigades, and divisions, for the purpose of manoeuvring; for
that is all vanguards and rearguards do: they pursue or retreat by
platoons, form themselves into several lines, or wheel into column, or
change their position with rapidity for the purpose of outfronting a
whole wing. By a combination of such evolutions, a vanguard, of inferior
numbers, avoids brisk actions and general engagements, and yet delays
the enemy long enough to give time for the main army to come up, for the
infantry to deploy, for the general-in-chief to make his dispositions,
and for the baggage and parks to file into their stations. The art of a
general of the vanguard, or of the rear-guard, is, without hazarding a
defeat, to hold the enemy in check, to impede him, to compel him to
spend three or four hours in moving a single league: tactics point out
the methods of effecting these important objects, and are more necessary
for cavalry than for infantry, and in the vanguard, or the rear-guard,
than in any other position. The Hungarian Insurgents, whom we saw in
1797, 1805, and 1809, were pitiful troops. If the light troops of Maria
Theresa's times became formidable, it was by their excellent
organization, and, above every thing, by their numbers. To imagine that
such troops could be superior to Wurmser's hussars, or to the dragoons
of Latour, or to the Archduke John, would be entertaining strange ideas
of things; but neither the Hungarian Insurgents, nor the Cossacks, ever
formed the vanguards of the Austrian and Russian armies; because to
speak of a vanguard or a rear-guard, is to speak of troops which
manoeuvre. The Russians considered a regiment of Cossacks who had been
trained worth three regiments untrained. Every thing about these troops
is despicable, except the Cossack himself, who is a man of fine person,
powerful, adroit, subtle, a good horseman, and indefatigable; he is born
on horseback, and bred among civil wars; he is in the field, what the
Bedouin is in the desert, or the Barbet in the Alps; he never enters a
house, never lies in a bed; and he always changes his bivouac at sunset,
that he may not pass a night in a place where the enemy may possibly
have observed him."

"Two Mamelukes kept three Frenchmen at bay, because they were better
armed, better mounted, and better exercised; they had two pairs of
pistols, a _tromblon_, a carbine, a helmet with a visor, a coat of mail,
several horses, and several men on foot to attend them. But a hundred
French did not fear a hundred Mamelukes; three hundred were more than a
match for an equal number; and one thousand would beat fifteen hundred:
so powerful is the influence of tactics, order, and evolutions! Murat,
Leclerc, and Lasalle, cavalry generals, presented themselves to the
Mamelukes in several lines: when the latter were upon the point of
outfronting the first line, the second came to its assistance on the
right and left; the Mamelukes then stopped, and wheeled, to turn the
wings of this new line: this was the moment seized for charging them;
they were always broken."

"The duty of a vanguard, or a rear-guard, does not consist in advancing
or retiring, but in manoeuvring. It should be composed of a good light
cavalry, supported by a good reserve of cavalry of the line, by
excellent battalions of foot, and strong batteries of artillery: the
troops must be well trained; and the generals, officers, and soldiers,
should all be equally well acquainted with their tactics, each according
to his station. An undisciplined troop would only embarrass the
advanced guard."

"It is admitted that for facility in manoeuvring, the squadron should
consist of one hundred men, and that every three or four squadrons
should have a superior officer."

"It is not advisable for all the cavalry of the line to wear cuirasses:
dragoons, mounted upon horses of four feet nine inches in height, armed
with straight sabres, and without cuirasses, should form a part of the
heavy cavalry; they should be furnished with infantry-muskets, with
bayonets: should have the _shakot_ of the infantry, pantaloons covering
the half-boot-buskin, cloaks with sleeves, and portmanteaus small enough
to be carried slung across the back when the men are on foot. Cavalry of
all descriptions should be furnished with fire-arms, and should know how
to manoeuvre on foot. Three thousand light cavalry, or three thousand
cuirassiers, should not suffer themselves to be stopped by a thousand
infantry posted in a wood, or on ground impracticable to cavalry; and
three thousand dragoons ought not to hesitate to attack two thousand
infantry, should the latter, favored by their position, attempt to stop
them.

"Turenne, Prince Eugene of Savoy, and Vendome, attached great importance
to dragoons, and used them successfully. The dragoons gained great glory
in Italy, in 1796 and 1797. In Egypt and in Spain, during the campaigns
of 1806 and 1807, a degree of prejudice sprung up against them. The
divisions of dragoons had been mustered at Compiegne and Amiens, to be
embarked without horses for the expedition of England, in order to serve
on foot until they should be mounted in that country. General Baraguay
d'Hilliers, their first inspector, commanded them; he had them equipped
with gaiters, and incorporated with them a considerable number of
recruits, whom he exercised in infantry manoeuvres alone. These were no
longer cavalry regiments: they served in the campaign of 1806 on foot,
until after the battle of Jena, when they were mounted on horses taken
from the Prussian cavalry, three-fourths of which were unserviceable.
These combined circumstances injured the dragoons; but in 1813 and 1814
their divisions acquired honor in rivalling the cuirassiers. Dragoons
are necessary for the support of light cavalry in the vanguard, the
rear-guard, and the wings of an army; cuirassiers are little adapted for
van and rearguards: they should never be employed in this service but
when it is requisite to keep them in practice and accustom them to war."

Napoleon further recommends that light cavalry be divided into two
kinds, chasseurs or troopers, and light horse; and the heavy to be
composed of dragoons and cuirassiers; the troopers to be mounted on
horses of 4 ft 6 in.; light cavalry on horses of 4 ft. 7 or 8 in.;
dragoons on horses of 4 ft. 9 in.; and cuirassiers on horses of 4 ft. 10
or 11 in.; which employ horses of all kinds for mounting the troops.

All cavalry must receive the same instruction; and all should be
capable, in case of need, of performing any of the duties of mounted
troops. The shock is the principal effect produced by this arm;
therefore, the greater the velocity the greater must be this effect,
provided the troops can be kept in mass. But it is found, by experience,
that it is impossible to preserve them in line when put to the height of
their speed. The best authorities therefore prefer, as we have said
elsewhere, the charge at the trot, or at any rate the gallop should not
be taken up till within a very short distance of the enemy. The charge
of a compact mass at a trot is much greater than that of a wavering one
at a gallop.

On the field of battle the cavalry of the line is considered as the arm
of the shock, to break through any corps that may be in opposition; but
it is unable of itself to resist a shock, and therefore should on no
account wait to receive the charge of another body of mounted troops. It
was on this account that Frederick directed his cavalry officers, under
the severest penalties, never to receive a charge, but always to meet
the attacking force half way. This is the only mode of preventing
defeat.

A good infantry can always sustain itself against the charges of
cavalry. At the battle of Auerstedt, in 1806, Davoust ordered the
divisions of Gudin to form squares to resist the Prussian cavalry,
which, by means of a fog, had gained a most advantageous position.
Bluecher led his cavalry in repeated and impetuous charges, but all was
in vain; the French infantry presented a front of iron. At the combat of
Krasnoi, in 1812, the cavalry of Grouchy, Nansonty, and Bordesoult,
attacked and overthrew the dragoons of Clarkof, but the Russian infantry
under Neveroffskoi sustained itself against the repeated charges of
vastly superior numbers of these French horse. At the battle of Molwitz,
the grenadiers sustained the charges of the enemy's cavalry, although
the cavalry of the great Frederick had already been completely
overthrown.

But when the infantry is engaged with the infantry of the enemy, the
charges of cavalry are generally successful, and sometimes decide the
fate of the battle, as was the case at Rosbach, Zornsdorf, Wurtsburg,
Marengo, Eylau, Borodino, &c.

Cavalry may also be very efficacious against infantry in wet weather,
when the rain or snow renders it impossible for the foot soldiers to use
their fire-arms to advantage, as was the case with the corps of
Augereau, at Eylau, and with the Austrian left, at the battle of
Dresden. Again, if the infantry be previously weakened, or thrown into
disorder by the fire of batteries. The charge of the Russian cavalry at
Hohenfriedberg, in 1745, is a remarkable example of this kind.

Cavalry should always be immediately sustained in its efforts either by
infantry or other bodies of horse; for as soon as the charge is made,
the strength of this arm is for a time exhausted, and, if immediately
attacked, defeat becomes inevitable. The charge of the cavalry of Ney on
Prince Hohenlohe at the battle of Jena, and of the French horse on Gossa
at Leipsic, are fine examples of the successful charges of cavalry when
properly sustained. Kunnersdorf and Waterloo are examples of the
disastrous consequences of leaving such charges without support.

The choice of the field of battle is sometimes such as to render cavalry
almost useless. Such was the case at the battle of Cassano, between the
Duke of Vendome and the Prince Eugene. The field was so cut up by the
Adda and the canals of Rittorto and Pendina, that Prince Eugene could
make no use of his horse. If, when master of the bridge of Rittorto, he
had been able to charge the French with a body of cavalry, there had
been no doubt of his complete success.

After a battle, and in the pursuit of a flying enemy, cavalry is
invaluable. If Napoleon had possessed a suitable number of mounted
troops, with an able commander, at the battles of Lutzen and Ligny, the
results of these victories had been decisive; whereas they were really
without consequence. On the other hand, the Prussian army in 1806, after
the battle of Jena, and Napoleon's army in 1815 at Waterloo, were
completely cut to pieces by the skilful use of cavalry in the pursuit of
a defeated and dispirited foe.

The want of good cavalry was severely felt in the war of the American
Revolution. Had Washington possessed a few good squadrons of horse, his
surprise and defeat in the lines of Brooklyn, and the consequent loss of
New York, had never taken place. The efficient employment of a few good
squadrons of cavalry might readily have prevented the defeat at
Bladensburg, and the loss of the capitol, in 1814.

In a well-organized army, the cavalry should be from one-fourth to
one-sixth of the infantry, according to the nature of the war.[32]

[Footnote 32: To gain a competent knowledge of the duties connected with
the two arms of service mentioned in this chapter, the officer should
make himself thoroughly acquainted with Scott's System of Infantry
Tactics, for the United States' Infantry, or at least with Major
Cooper's abridged edition of Infantry Tactics, and with the system of
Cavalry Tactics, adopted in our army; also with the directions for the
use of these two arms in a campaign, and their employment on the
battle-field, given in the writings of Jomini, Decker, Okouneff,
Rocquancourt, and Jacquinot de Presle.]

The following books may be referred to for further information
respecting the history, organization, use, and instruction of infantry
and cavalry:--

_Essai general de tactique._ Guibert.

_Considerations generales sur l'infanterie francaise,_ par un general en
retraite. A work of merit.

_De l'infanterie,_ par l'auteur de l'histoire de l'expedition de Russie.

_Histoire de la guerre de la peninsule._ Foy. This work contains many
interesting and valuable remarks on the French and English systems of
tactics, and particularly on the tactics of Infantry.

_Cours d'art et d'histoire militaires._ Jacquinot de Presle.

_Art de la guerre._ Rogniat.

_Instruction destinee aux troupes legeres,_ &c., redigee sur une
instruction de Frederick II. a ses officiers.

_English Infantry Regulations._

_Ordonnance_ (French) _pour l'exercice et les manoeuvres de
l'infanterie,_ par le commission de manoeuvres.

_Aide-memoires des officiers generaux et superieurs, et des capitaines._

_Essai sur l'histoire generale de l'art militaire._ Carion-Nisas.

_Histoire de la milice francaise._ Daniel.

_Cours elementaire d'art et d'histoire militaires._ Rocquancourt.

_Traite elementaire d'art militaire,_ &c. Gay de Vernon.

_Introduction a l'etude de l'art de la guerre._ La Roche-Amyou.

_Tactique des trois armes._ Decker.

_Examen raisonne des trois armes,_ &c. Okouneff.

The last two are works of great merit. The writings of Okouneff,
however, are very diffuse.

_Instruction pour le service de l'infanterie legere._ Guyard.

_Instruction de l'infanterie,_ &c. Schauenbourg.

_Traite de tactique._ Ternay et Koch.

_Mecanism des manoeuvres de guerre de l'infanterie polonaise._
Vroniecki.

_Traite sur l'infanterie legere._ Beurmann.

_English Cavalry Regulations._

_Ordonnance_ (French) _sur l'exercice et les evolutions de la
cavalerie._

_Les troupes a cheval de France,_ &c. De Bourge.

_Avant-postes de cavalerie legere._ Brack. The author served with
distinction under Lassale, Colbert, Maison, Pujol, and Excelmans.

_Reflexions sur l'emploi de la cavalerie,_ &c. Caraman.

_Observations sur l'ordonnance, &c., de la cavalerie._ Dejean.

_Tactique de la cavalerie._ Itier.

_Elements de tactique pour la cavalerie,_ par Mottin de la Balme. A work
of rare merit.

_De l'emploi de la cavalerie a la guerre._ Schauenbourg.

_Remarques sur la cavalerie._ Warnery. This work has long enjoyed a high
reputation among the cavalry officers of the European services. The
Paris edition is enriched with notes by a French general officer.

_Nachrichten und Betrachtungen ueber die Thaten und Schicksale der
Reiterei,_ &c. This work discusses the operations of cavalry in the
campaigns of Frederick the Great and of Napoleon, down to the battle of
Lutzen in 1813.

_Examen du livret provisoire,_ &c. Marbot.

_Le Spectateur Militaire,_ contains many essays by cavalry officers on
the various questions connected with the organization and use of this
arm.

_Die Gefechtslehre der beiden verbundenen Waffen-Kavallerie und
reitenden Artillerie._ Decker.

_Manuel de l'officier._ Ruhle de Lilienstern.

_Aide-memoire, a l'usage des officiers de cavalerie._

_Journal de l'infanterie et de la cavalerie._

_Traite de tactique pour les officiers d'infanterie et de cavalerie._

_Histoire des exploits et des vicissitudes de la cavalerie prussienne._
Coutz.




CHAPTER XI.

ARMY ORGANIZATION.--ARTILLERY.


_Artillery_.--Previous to the invention of gunpowder in the thirteenth
century, the machines of war were divided between two classes of
military men, the engineers (_engignours_, as they were called in the
middle ages) and the artillery, (_artilliers_, as they were formerly
called,) the latter being particularly charged with the management of
the lighter and more portable projectile machines, such as the balistas
and arco-balistas, which were used for throwing different kinds of
arrows--_fleches, viretons, carreaux, matras_, &c., while the former
managed the battering-rams, cranes, helipoles, &c. And, indeed, for a
long time after the discovery of gunpowder, this distinction was kept
up, and the artillery retained all the more ordinary projectile
machines, while the engineers constructed and managed the more ponderous
weapons of attack and defence. But the new artillery was gradually
introduced, without, however, immediately displacing the old, and there
were for a time, if we may be allowed the expression, _two_ artilleries,
the one employing the old projectile machines, and the other those of
the new invention. The latter were called _canoniers_, to distinguish
them from the former, who still retained the name of _artilliers_.

The first cannon were invented in the early part of the fourteenth
century, or, perhaps, among the Arabs as early as the middle of the
thirteenth century, but they were not much known in Europe till about
1350. Cannon are said to have been employed by the Moors as early as
1249, and by the French in 1338. The English used artillery at the
battle of Crecy in 1346. Both cannon and the ancient projectile machines
were employed at the siege of Aiguillon in 1339, at Zara in 1345, at
Rennes in 1357, and at Naples in 1380. At this last siege the ancient
balista was employed to throw into the castle of Naples barrels of
infectious matter and mutilated limbs of prisoners of war. We read of
the same thing being done in Spain at a later period.

Cannon in France were at first called _bombards_ and _couleuverines_,
but were afterwards named from certain figures marked on them, such as
_serpentines, basilisks, scorpions,_&c. In the infancy of the art they
were made small, weighing only from twenty to fifty pounds, and were
mounted on small moveable carriages. This species of fire-arms became
quite numerous about the beginning of the fifteenth century. They were
followed by heavier pieces, used in the attack and defence of towns.
This siege artillery continued to be increased in dimensions till,
towards the latter part of the fifteenth century, they reached such an
enormous size as to be almost useless as a military machine. Louis XI.
had an immense piece constructed at Tours, in 1770, which, it was said,
carried a ball from the Bastille to Charenton, (about six miles!) Its
caliber was that of five hundred pounds. It was intended for experiment,
and burst on the second discharge. The famous culverin of Bolduc was
said to carry a ball from that city to Bommel. The culverin of Nancy,
made in 1598, was more than twenty-three feet in length. There is now an
ancient cannon in the arsenal at Metz of about this length, which
carries a ball of one hundred and forty pounds. Cannon balls were found
at Paris as late as 1712, weighing near two hundred pounds, and from
twelve to sixteen inches in diameter. At the siege of Constantinople in
1453, there was a famous metallic bombard which threw stone balls of an
incredible size; at the siege of Bourges in 1412, a cannon was used
which, it was said, threw stone balls "of the size of mill-stones." The
Gantois, under Arteville, made a bombard fifty feet in length, whose
report was heard at a distance of ten leagues!

The first cannon were made of wood, and covered with sheet-iron, or
embraced by iron rings: longitudinal bars of iron were afterwards
substituted for the wooden form. Towards the end of the fourteenth
century, brass, tin, copper, wrought and cast iron, were successively
used for this purpose. The bores of the pieces were first made in a
conical shape, and it was not until a much later period that the
cylindrical form was introduced.

In the wars between the Spaniards and Moors in the latter part of the
fifteenth century, very great use was made of artillery in sieges and
battles. Ferdinand the Catholic had at this time, probably, a larger
artillery train than any other European power. The Spanish cannon,
generally very large, were composed of iron bars about two inches in
breadth, held together by bolts and rings of the same metal. The pieces
were firmly attached to their carriages, and incapable of either
horizontal or vertical movement. The balls thrown by them were usually
of marble, though sometimes of iron. Many of the pieces used at the
siege of Baza, in 1486, are still to be seen in that city, and also the
cannon balls then in use. Some of the latter are fourteen inches in
diameter, and weigh one hundred and seventy-five pounds. The length of
the cannon was about twelve feet. These dimensions are a proof of a
slight improvement in this branch of military science, which was,
nevertheless, still in its infancy. The awkwardness of artillery at this
period may be judged of by its slowness of fire. At the siege of
Zeteuel, in 1407, five "bombards," as the heavy pieces of ordnance were
then called, were able to discharge only forty shot in the course of a
day; and it is noticed as a remarkable circumstance at the siege of
Albahar, that two batteries discharged one hundred and forty balls in
the course of the twenty-four hours!

Copyright (c) 2007. knowncrafts.net. All rights reserved.