Book: Elements of Military Art and Science

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The same organization enabled the French to perform their wonderfully
rapid and decisive movements in the Prussian campaign of 1806, and the
northern operations of 1807.

In 1809, Napoleon's army crossed, with the most wonderful rapidity, the
Inn, the Salza, the Traun, and other rivers emptying into the Danube,
and reached Vienna before the wonder-stricken Austrians could prepare
for its defence. It was then necessary for the French to effect a
passage of the Danube, which was much swollen by recent rains and the
melting snow of the mountains. Considering the depth and width of the
river, the positions of the enemy, and his preparations to oppose a
passage, with the disastrous consequences that would result to the
French from any failure in its execution; taking all these things into
consideration, Jomini pronounced it "one of the most hazardous and
difficult of all the operations of War." Here the fate of the army
depended, apparently, upon the skill and efficiency of the engineers and
pontoniers, and nobly did they discharge the trust reposed in them. When
the pontons failed, tressel-bridges were substituted, and even
fifty-four enormous boats were put in requisition. So skilfully were
these operations conducted, that Napoleon's immense army crossed over in
safety, directly in the face of a superior enemy, and the same day
fought the memorable battle of Esling. Forced to retire before numbers
vastly superior to his own, Napoleon concentrated his forces on the
island of Lobau, and intrenched his position. Surrounded by the broad
and deep channel of the Danube, and watched by numerous and skilful
enemies, it required the most constant activity and the greatest good
fortune to effect a passage. Here the skill and efficiency of the
engineers shone conspicuously; a number of bridges were thrown across
the river in the face of the Austrians, and against obstacles almost
insurmountable; the whole French army passed in safety, and soon put the
finishing stroke to that brilliant campaign. So high an estimate did
Napoleon attach to the construction of these bridges, that, when the
passage was completed, he offered to place Bertrand, the constructing
engineer, though of comparatively low rank, at the head of the French
_corps du genie_.

On many occasions during the retreat in 1812-13, from the Beresina to
the left of the Rhine, across the Niemen, the Vistula, the Oder, the
Elbe, and the numerous other rivers which divide that immense country,
the French derived vast advantages from the experience and skill of
their engineers and pontoniers, several times whole corps escaping
through their means from the grasp of their pursuers. When, however, the
disasters of this retreat had absorbed most of the material of the army,
and had sadly thinned the ranks of men of skill and experience, they
sustained many severe, and, in other circumstances, unnecessary losses.
Of this character we may mention the passage of the Elster by the bridge
of Lindnau, where, through the ignorance and carelessness of those
charged with the mines, and through the want of suitable bridge
arrangements, thousands of brave men were buried in the muddy waters of
this small river. So sensibly did Napoleon feel this want of bridge
equipages, in the winter of 1813-14, that he addressed to his minister
of war, on this subject, the following remarkable words: "If I had had
pontons, I should have already annihilated the army of Schwartzenberg,
and closed the war; I should have taken from him eight or ten thousand
wagons, and his entire army in detail; but for want of the proper means
I could not pass the Seine." Again, on the 2d of March he wrote: "If I
had had a bridge equipage this morning, Bluecher's army had been lost."
Whoever will examine the details of the operations of this campaign,
will be convinced of the full force of these remarks.

In Spain in 1808, Sir John Moore, in order to assist the native forces,
had penetrated so near the army of Napoleon, that retreat became
exceedingly difficult, and he was several times on the point of being
lost. The English army was at this time very deficient in engineer
troops, and Moore suffered much for want of miners to destroy bridges,
and pontoniers to construct new ones. In order to cover his retreat and
impede the advance of the French, the commander-in-chief, says Napier,
"directed several bridges to be destroyed, but the engineers [for want
of miners and miner's tools] failed of success in every attempt."

In Soult's retreat, in 1809, he crossed the Duero at Oporto, and
destroyed the bridges so as to cut off the pursuit of Wellington. But
while Soult, deceived by treachery in his own corps, neglected to guard
the river with proper vigilance, Wellington collected boats at different
points, crossed over his army, surprised the French, and, had it not
been for the singular delay and indecision of General Murray, would most
certainly have forced the entire army to capitulate; as it was, his
operation produced a decided influence on the campaign, and effected the
safety of Beresford's corps. Soult destroyed his artillery and baggage,
and hastily retreated through the mountain passes; but his army was
again arrested at the river Cavado, and placed on the very brink of
destruction, when the brave and skilful Dulong succeeded in effecting a
passage at the Ponte Nova; the same daring officer opened, on the same
day, a way for the further escape of the French across the Misarella by
the Saltador.

In the pursuit of Massena, in 1810, it was important to the English to
cross the Guadiana, and attack the French before Badajos could be put in
a state of defence. Beresford was directed by Wellington to pass this
river at Jerumina, where the Portuguese had promised to furnish pontons;
but they neglected to fulfil their engagement, and the army had to wait
till Capt. Squire, an able and efficient officer of engineers, could
construct other means for effecting a passage. Every thing was done
that genius could devise and industry execute; nevertheless, the
operations of the army were greatly delayed--"_a delay,_" says the
historian, "_that may be considered as the principal cause of those long
and bloody operations which afterwards detained Lord Wellington more
than a year on the frontiers of Portugal._"

We might prolong these remarks by discussing the passages of the Ceira
and Alva, and their influence on the pursuit of Massena; Wellington's
passage of the Tagus, and his retreat from Burgos in 1812; the passage
of the Adour and Garonne in 1814; and the failure of the mines to blow
up the bridges of Saltador, Alcantara, &c.; but a sufficient number of
examples, it is believed, has already been adduced to show the advantage
of maintaining a properly organized and instructed body of sappers,
miners, and pontoniers, and the fatal results attending the want of such
troops, as a component part of an army organization.

It has already been remarked that the infantry of an army must always
form the basis of the apportionment; and by the general rule laid down
by military writers, the cavalry should be from one-fourth to one-sixth
of the infantry, according to the character of the war; the artillery
about two-thirds of the cavalry, or one-seventh of the infantry; and the
engineers from one-half to three-fourths of the artillery,--say about
two-thirds. The staff and administrative corps must vary according to
the nature of the organization, and the character of the theatre of war.
The former ought to be from two to five in a thousand, and the latter
from twenty-five to seventy-five,[40] as a general rule. These ratios
would give for a good army organization;

Staff, about ................................... 5
Administrative service--pay, medical, commissary,
quarter-master, &c. .............................65
Infantry, ......................................650
Cavalry, .......................................130
Artillery, ......................................90
Engineers, ......................................60
-----
Total, ...................1,000

In a broken country, and against savage and undisciplined foes, like the
Indians in this country, the natives opposed to the English in India, to
the French in Algeria, or to the Russians in Circassia, the cavalry,
artillery, and engineers would be diminished, and the infantry and
administrative corps proportionably increased; the former because light
troops are always preferable against an undisciplined foe, and the
latter because of the difficulty of moving and procuring supplies in new
and uncultivated countries. The French forces in Algeria, in 1844,
amounted to about sixty thousand men, in the following proportion:--

Staff, ...................................4.7
Administrative, &c., ...................112.3
Infantry, ..............................687.3
Cavalry, ................................86.6
Artillery, ..............................61.2
Engineers, ..............................47.9
---------
1000 men.

[Footnote 40: This supposes the teamsters, wagon-masters,
hospital-servants, &c., to be enlisted men, and not persons hired for
the occasion as is done in our army.]

In small peace establishments the relative proportion of infantry and
cavalry should be much less than when prepared for the field, because
troops for these two arms can be much more readily formed in case of
emergency, than for those which require more scientific information, and
technical skill and instruction. The staff and engineers are evidently
the most difficult to be formed in case of war, and next to these the
artillery and administrative corps.

In this country we can maintain, in time of peace, only the framework of
an army, looking to our citizen soldiery to form, in case of need, the
great mass of our military force. This is the starting point in our
military system, and the basis of our army organization. Let us see
whether this principle is carried out in practice.

For every thousand men in our present organization[41] we have,


For the staff, 2
Administrative, 20[42]
Infantry, 513
Cavalry, 150
Artillery, 310
Engineers, 5
----
1000

[Footnote 41: These numbers are the real rather than the _nominal_
proportions, many of our officers being called _staff_, who properly
belong to one of the other classes.]

[Footnote 42: Much of the administrative duty in our army is done by
unenlisted men, or by soldiers detached from their companies. Where such
is the case, the ratio of this branch of the service ought to be no
higher than is represented above.]

We see from this table, that while our artillery is nearly six times as
numerous as in ordinary armies, our staff is less by one-half, and our
engineers not more than one-half what ought to be their proportion in a
war establishment. To this excess of artillery over infantry and cavalry
in our army in time of peace there is no objection, inasmuch as the
latter could be more easily expanded in case of war than the artillery.
But for a still stronger reason our staff and engineers should also be
proportionally increased, instead of being vastly diminished, as is
actually the case.

Experience in the first campaigns of the American Revolution strongly
impressed on the mind of Washington the absolute necessity of forming a
regular and systematic army organization. But so difficult was it to
obtain properly instructed engineers, that he was obliged to seek his
engineer officers in the ranks of foreign adventurers, and to make
drafts from the other arms of service, and have them regularly
instructed in the duties of engineer troops, and commanded by the
officers of this corps. An order, in his own handwriting, giving the
details of this temporary arrangement, is dated March 30th, 1779. Until
men are enlisted for the purpose, companies of sappers and miners shall
be formed by drafts from the line. "The duties of the companies of
sappers and miners," he continues, "shall be under the direction of the
engineers, to construct field-works of every kind, and all works
necessary for the attack or defence of places, as circumstances may
require. On a march in the vicinity of an enemy, a detachment of the
companies of sappers and miners shall be stationed at the head of the
column, directly after the vanguard, for the purpose of opening and
mending the roads, and removing obstructions," &c. &c.

The great difficulties encountered by Washington in instructing his
inexperienced forces in the more difficult branches of the art, made him
the more earnest, in after years, to impress on us how important it was
for us _In peace to prepare for war._ The preparation here meant is not
the keeping up, in time of peace, of a large standing army, ever ready
to take the field; but rather the formation of a small body, educated
and practised in all the scientific and difficult parts of the
profession; a body which shall serve as the _cadre_ or framework of a
large army, capable of imparting to the new and inexperienced soldiers
of the republic that skill and efficiency which has been acquired by
practice. How far have we accomplished this object, and what will be the
probable operations in case of another contest with a European power?
New and inexperienced troops will be called into the field to oppose a
veteran and disciplined army. From these troops we shall expect all the
bravery and energy resulting from ardent patriotism and an enthusiastic
love of liberty. But we cannot here expect much discipline, military
skill, or knowledge of the several branches of the military art. The
peaceful habits of our citizens tend but little to the cultivation of
the military character. How, then, are we to oppose the hostile force?
Must human blood be substituted for skill and preparation, and dead
bodies of our citizens serve as epaulements against the inroads of the
enemy? To some extent, we fear it must be the case; but not entirely so,
for government has not altogether neglected to make preparation for such
an event. Fortifications have been planned or erected on the most
important and exposed positions; military materials and munitions have
been collected in the public arsenals; a military school has been
organized to instruct in the military sciences; there are regularly kept
up small bodies of infantry and cavalry, weak in numbers, but capable of
soon making good soldiers of a population so well versed as ours is in
the use of the musket and the horse; an artillery force, proportionally
much larger, is also regularly maintained, with a sufficient number of
men and officers to organize and make good artillery-men of citizens
already partially acquainted with the use of the cannon. But an
acquaintance with infantry, cavalry, and artillery duties is not the
only practical knowledge requisite in war. In the practical operations
of an army in the field, rivers are to be crossed, bridges suddenly
erected and suddenly destroyed, fieldworks constructed and defended,
batteries captured and destroyed; fortifications are to be put in order
and defended, or to be besieged and recaptured; trenches must be opened,
mines sprung, batteries established, breaches made and stormed;
trous-de-loup, abattis, palisades, gabions, fascines, and numerous other
military implements and machinery are to be constructed. Have our
citizens a knowledge of these things, or have we provided in our
military establishment for a body of men instructed and practised in
this branch of the military art, and capable of imparting to an army the
necessary efficiency for this service? Unfortunately this question must
be answered in the negative; and it is greatly to be feared that the
future historian will have to say of us, as Napier has said of the
English:--"_The best officers and soldiers were obliged to sacrifice
themselves in a lamentable manner, to compensate for the negligence and
incapacity of a government always ready to plunge the nation into a war,
without the slightest care of what was necessary to obtain success.
Their sieges were a succession of butcheries; because the commonest
materials, and the means necessary to their art, were denied the
engineers_."[43]

[Footnote 43: The subjects discussed in this chapter are also treated by
most authors on Military Organization and Military History, and by the
several writers on Military Engineering. Allent, Vauban, Cormontaigne,
Rocquancourt, Pasley, Douglas, Jones, Belmas, Napier, Gay de Vernon, may
be referred to with advantage. Pasley, Douglas, Jones, and Napier, speak
in the strongest terms of the importance of engineer troops in the
active operations of a war, and of the absolute necessity of organizing
this force in time of peace. A list of books of reference on Military
Engineering will be given at the close of the following chapters.

While these pages are passing through the press, Congress has authorized
the President to raise _one company_ of engineer troops! This number is
altogether too small to be of any use in time of war.]




CHAPTER XIII.

PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS.


_Fortification_ is defined,--the art of disposing the ground in such a
manner as to enable a small number of troops to resist a larger army the
longest time possible. If the work be placed in a position of much
importance, and its materials be of a durable character, it is called
permanent; if otherwise, it receives the appellation of _field_, or
_temporary_. Fieldworks are properly confined to operations of a single
campaign, and are used to strengthen positions which are to be occupied
only for a short period. Generally these works are of earth, thrown up
by the troops in a single day. They are intimately connected with a
system of permanent fortifications, but from the facility of their
construction, no provision need be made for them before the actual
breaking out of war. Indeed, they could not well be built before
hostilities commenced, as their locality in each case must be determined
by the position of the hostile forces.

Having already described the general influence of permanent
fortifications as a means of national defence, we shall here speak
merely of the principles of their construction. It is not proposed to
enter into any technical discussion of matters that especially belong
to the instruction of the engineer, but merely to give the nomenclature
and use of the more important parts of a military work; in a word, such
general information as should belong to officers of every grade and
corps of an army.

The first species of fortification among the ancients was of course very
simple, consisting merely of an earthen mound, or palisades. A wall was
afterwards used, and a ditch was then added to the wall. It was found
that a straight wall could be easily breached by the enemy's
battering-rams; to remedy this evil, towers were built at short
intervals from each other, forming a broken line of salient and
re-entering parts. These towers or salient points gradually assumed a
shape approximating to the modern bastion.

After the invention of gunpowder and the application of cannon to the
attack and defence of places, it became necessary to arrange earthen
ramparts behind the thin walls of the ancient works, for the reception
of the new artillery. Moreover these walls were soon found inadequate to
resist the missiles of the besiegers, and it became necessary to replace
them by parapets of earth. In order to cover the retaining walls of
these parapets from the besieging batteries, it was also found to be
necessary to lower these walls as much as possible, and to raise the
counterscarps. The traces or plans of the works, however, received no
material change till about the close of the fifteenth century.

It is not known who first changed the ancient towers into bastions. Some
attribute it to an Italian, and with considerable show of reason, for a
bastion was built at Turin as early as 1461. Achmet Pacha, it is said,
fortified Otranto in this way, in 1480, but whether the system was
previously known among the Turks cannot be determined. Others attribute
the invention to Ziska, the celebrated leader of the Hussites. It is
most probable that the transition from the tower to the bastion was a
very gradual one, and that the change was perfected in several countries
at about the same time.

Fortifications, like other arts and sciences, greatly flourished in
Italy under the Medicis, and that country furnished Europe with its most
skilful engineers. Catharine of Medicis introduced into France many of
her countrymen, distinguished in this profession; among these may be
named Bellamat, Bephano, Costritio, Relogio, Vorganno, the two Marini,
Campi, and Hieronimo, who built several important places and directed
the sieges of others. These able foreigners were rivalled by some
distinguished French engineers, who laid the foundation of the "_corps
du Genie_" which has since become a school of military instruction for
the world. Among the early French engineers may be distinguished
Lafontaine De Serre, Feuquieres, and St. Remy. Pedro Navarro had been
appointed a member of this corps, but his attention was more specially
directed to mining, and we do not learn that he distinguished himself in
the construction of any fortification.

In Germany, in the beginning of the sixteenth century, Albert Durer
distinguished himself as a writer on fortification; his book is
remarkable as containing the germs of many of the improvements which
were made by those who followed him. This is the more to be wondered at
as he was not a professed engineer. After him followed Spekel, a native
of Strasburg, who died in 1589. His writings are valuable as showing the
state of the art at that time, and the changes which he himself
introduced. He was an engineer of much practical knowledge and
experience, having assisted at the sieges of Malta, Golletta, Vienna,
Jula, Nicosia, Famagusta, &c.

The first French engineer who wrote on fortification was Errard de
Bar-le-Duc, who published near the close of the sixteenth century. As an
engineer, he was rivalled by Chatillon, a man of distinguished merit.
Errard fortified Amiens, built a part of the castle of Sedan, and a
portion of the defences of Calais. Under the reign of Louis XIII.,
Desnoyers, Deville, Pagan, and Fabre were greatly distinguished. Deville
published in 1628. He was a man of much learning and experience; but he
is said to have adopted, both in his theory and practice, the principles
of the Italian school, with most of its errors. Pagan began his military
career while young, and became _marechal de champ_ at the age of 38,
when, having the misfortune to become blind, he was compelled to
relinquish his brilliant hopes. He was the ablest engineer of his age,
and was also greatly distinguished in other branches of science. In his
plans he inclined to the Dutch rather than the Italian school of
fortification. He published in 1645.

At the close of the sixteenth century, the Dutch had been forced to
resort to military defences to protect themselves against the
aggressions of the Spaniards. As the Dutch were inferior in other
military means, fortification became one of the vital resources of the
country. Their works, however, thrown up in much haste, were in many
respects defective, although well adapted to the exigencies of the time.
Freytag, their principal engineer, wrote in 1630. Some of his
improvements were introduced into France by Pagan. He was preceded by
Marolois, (a cotemporary of Pagan,) who published in 1613.

In Germany, Rimpler, a Saxon, wrote on fortification in 1671. He was a
man of great experience, having served at the sieges of Candia,
Phillipsburg, Bonn, Riga, Bremen, Dansburg, Bommeln, &c. He fell at the
siege of Vienna in 1683. His writings are said to contain the groundwork
of Montalembert's system.

In Italy, after the time of Tartaglia, Marchi, Campi, &c., we find no
great improvement in this art. Several Italians, however, distinguished
themselves as engineers under the Spaniards. The fortifications of
Badajos are a good example of the state of the art in Italy and Spain a
that epoch. The citadel of Antwerp, built by two Italian engineers,
Pacciotti and Cerbelloni, in 1568, has become celebrated for the siege
it sustained in 1832.

The age of Louis XIV. effected a great revolution in the art of
fortification, and carried it to such a degree of perfection, that it
has since received but slight improvement. The years 1633 and 1634 are
interesting dates in the history of this art, as having given birth
respectively to Vauban and Coehorn. The former was chief engineer of
France under Louis XIV., and the latter held a corresponding position
under the Dutch republic. Coehorn's ideas upon fortification are
conceived with an especial view to the marshy soil of his own country,
and, although well suited to the object in view, are consequently of
less general application than those of his more distinguished
cotemporary and rival. The best specimens of his mode of construction
that exist at the present day, are the fortresses of Manheim,
Bergen-op-Zoom, Nimiguen, and Breda.

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