Book: Russian Roulette

S >> Sam Vaknin >> Russian Roulette




Russians still hanker after "men of iron" and seek tradition rather
than innovation, prefer unity to pluralism, and appreciate authority
more than individualism. Russia - a ramshackle amalgamation of
competing turfs - is still ill-suited for capitalism or for liberal
democracy, though far less than it was only ten years ago.

Conspicuous consumption of imported products by vulgar parvenus is no
substitute to true modernity and a functioning economy. Russia is
frequently praised by expats with vested interests and by international
financial institutions, the long arms of its newfound ally, the United
States.

But, in truth, "modern", "stable", Russia is merely a glittering veneer
beneath which lurk, festering, the old ills of authoritarianism,
lawlessness, oligarchy, aggression, ignorance, superstition, and
repression mingled with extremes of poverty and disease. Here is one
safe prediction: none of these will diminish next year.

Russia Straddles the Euro-Atlantic Divide

By: Dr. Sam Vaknin

Also published by United Press International (UPI)

Also Read

The Janus Look

Russia's Second Empire

Russian Roulette - The Security Apparatus

Russia as a Creditor

Let My People Go - The Jackson-Vanik Controversy

The Chechen Theatre Ticket

Russia's Israeli Oil Bond

Russia's Idled Spies

Russia in 2003

Russian President Vladimir Putin warned on Tuesday, in an interview he
granted to TF1, a French television channel, that unilateral
American-British military action against Iraq would be a "grave
mistake" and an "unreasonable use of force". Russia might veto it in
the Security Council, he averred.

In a joint declaration with France and Germany, issued the same day, he
called to enhance the number of arms inspectors in Iraq as an
alternative to war.

Only weeks ago Russia was written off, not least by myself, as a
satellite of the United States. This newfound assertiveness has
confounded analysts and experts everywhere. Yet, appearances aside, it
does not signal a fundamental shift in Russian policy or worldview.

Russia could not resist the temptation of playing once more the
Leninist game of "inter-imperialist contradictions". It has long
masterfully exploited chinks in NATO's armor to further its own
economic, if not geopolitical, goals. Its convenient geographic sprawl
- part Europe, part Asia - allows it to pose as both a continental
power and a global one with interests akin to those of the United
States. Hence the verve with which it delved into the war against
terrorism, recasting internal oppression and meddling abroad as its
elements.

As Vladimir Lukin, deputy speaker of the Duma observed recently,
Britain having swerved too far towards America - Russia may yet become
an intermediary between a bitterly disenchanted USA and an irked Europe
and between the rich, industrialized West and developing countries in
Asia. Publicly, the USA has only mildly disagreed with Russia's
reluctance to countenance a military endgame in Iraq - while showering
France and Germany with vitriol for saying, essentially, the same
things.

The United States knows that Russia will not jeopardize the relevance
of the Security Council - one of the few remaining hallmarks of past
Soviet grandeur - by vetoing an American-sponsored resolution. But
Russia cannot be seen to be abandoning a traditional ally and a major
customer (Iraq) and newfound friends (France and Germany) too
expediently.

Nor can Putin risk further antagonizing Moscow hardliners who already
regard his perceived "Gorbachev-like" obsequiousness and far reaching
concessions to the USA as treasonous. The scrapping of the Anti
Ballistic Missile treaty, the expansion of NATO to Russia's borders,
America's presence in central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia's "near
abroad" - are traumatic reversals of fortune.

An agreed consultative procedure with the crumbling NATO hardly
qualifies as ample compensation. There are troubling rumblings of
discontent in the army. A few weeks ago, a Russian general in Chechnya
refused Putin's orders publicly - and with impunity. Additionally,
according to numerous opinion polls, the vast majority of Russians
oppose an Iraqi campaign.

By aligning itself with the fickle France and the brooding and
somnolent Germany, Russia is warning the USA that it should not be
taken for granted and that there is a price to pay for its allegiance
and good services. But Putin is not Boris Yeltsin, his inebriated
predecessor who over-played his hand in opposing NATO's operation in
Kosovo in 1999 - only to be sidelined, ignored and humiliated in the
postwar arrangements.

Russia wants a free hand in Chechnya and to be heard on international
issues. It aspires to secure its oil contracts in Iraq - worth tens of
billions of dollars - and the repayment of $9 billion in old debts by
the postbellum government. It seeks pledges that the oil market will
not be flooded by a penurious Iraq. It desires a free hand in Ukraine,
Armenia and Uzbekistan, among others. Russia wants to continue to sell
$4 billion a year in arms to China, India, Iran, Syria and other
pariahs unhindered.

Only the United States, the sole superpower, can guarantee that these
demands are met. Moreover, with a major oil producer such as Iraq as a
US protectorate, Russia becomes a hostage to American goodwill. Yet,
hitherto, all Russia received were expression of sympathy, claimed
Valeri Fyodorov, director of Political Friends, an independent Russian
think-tank, in an interview in the Canadian daily, National Post.

These are not trivial concerns. Russia's is a primitive economy, based
on commodities - especially energy products - and an over-developed
weapons industry. Its fortunes fluctuate with the price of oil, of
agricultural produce and with the need for arms, driven by regional
conflicts.

Should the price of oil collapse, Russia may again be forced to resort
to multilateral financing, a virtual monopoly of the long arms of US
foreign policy, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The USA
also has a decisive voice in the World Trade Organization (WTO),
membership thereof being a Russian strategic goal.

It was the United States which sponsored Russia's seat at table of the
G8 - the Group of Eight industrialized states - a much coveted
reassertion of the Russian Federation's global weight. According to
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, a Russian paper, the USA already announced a week
ago that it is considering cutting Russia off American financial aid -
probably to remind the former empire who is holding the purse strings.

But siding with America risks alienating the all-important core of
Europe: Germany and France. Europe - especially Germany - is Russia's
largest export destination and foreign investor. Russia is not
oblivious to that. It would like to be compensated generously by the
United States for assuming such a hazard.

Still, Europe is a captive of geography and history. It has few
feasible alternatives to Russian gas, for instance. As the recent $7
billion investment by British Petroleum proves, Russia - and, by
extension, central and east Europe - is Europe's growth zone and
natural economic hinterland.

Yet, it is America that captures the imagination of Russian oligarchs
and lesser businesses.

Russia aims to become the world's largest oil producer within the
decade. With this in mind, it is retooling its infrastructure and
investing in new pipelines and ports. The United States is aggressively
courted by Russian officials and "oiligarchs" - the energy tycoons.

With the Gulf states cast in the role of anti-American Islamic
militants, Russia emerges as a sane and safe - i.e., rationally driven
by self-interest - alternative supplier and a useful counterweight to
an increasingly assertive and federated Europe.

Russia's affinity with the United States runs deeper that the
confluence of commercial interests.

Russian capitalism is far more "Anglo-Saxon" than Old Europe's. The
Federation has an educated but cheap and abundant labor force, a patchy
welfare state, exportable natural endowments, a low tax burden and a
pressing need for unhindered inflows of foreign investment.

Russia's only hope of steady economic growth is the expansion of its
energy behemoths abroad. Last year it has become a net foreign direct
investor. It has a vested interest in globalization and world order
which coincide with America's. China, for instance, is as much Russia's
potential adversary as it is the United State's.

Russia welcomed the demise of the Taliban and is content with regime
changes in Iraq and North Korea - all American exploits. It can - and
does - contribute to America's global priorities. Collaboration between
the two countries' intelligence services has never been closer. Hence
also the thaw in Russia's relations with its erstwhile foe, Israel.

Russia's population is hungry and abrasively materialistic. Its robber
barons are more American in spirit than any British or French
entrepreneur. Russia's business ethos is reminiscent of 19th century
frontier America, not of 20th century staid Germany.

Russia is driven by kaleidoscopically shifting coalitions within a
narrow elite, not by its masses - and the elite wants money, a lot of
it and now. In Russia's unbreakable cycle, money yields power which
leads to more money. The country is a functioning democracy but
elections there do not revolve around the economy. Most taxes are
evaded by most taxpayers and half the gross national product is anyhow
underground. Ordinary people crave law and order - or, at least a
semblance thereof.

Hence Putin's rock idol popularity. He caters to the needs of the elite
by cozying up to the West and, in particular, to America - even as he
provides the lower classes with a sense of direction and security they
lacked since 1985. But Putin is a serendipitous president. He enjoys
the aftereffects of a sharply devalued, export-enhancing,
imports-depressing ruble and the vertiginous tripling of oil prices,
Russia's main foreign exchange generator.

The last years of Yeltsin have been so traumatic that the bickering
cogs and wheels of Russia's establishment united behind the only
vote-getter they could lay their hands on: Putin, an obscure politician
and former KGB officer. To a large extent, he proved to be an agreeable
puppet, concerned mostly with self-preservation and the imaginary
projection of illusory power.

Putin's great asset is his pragmatism and realistic assessment of the
shambles that Russia has become and of his own limitations. He has
turned himself into a kind of benevolent and enlightened arbiter among
feuding interests - and as the merciless and diligent executioner of
the decisions of the inner cabals of power.

Hitherto he kept everyone satisfied. But Iraq is his first real test.
Everyone demands commitments backed by actions. Both the Europeans and
the Americans want him to put his vote at the Security Council where
his mouth is. The armed services want him to oppose war in Iraq. The
intelligence services are divided. The Moslem population inside Russia
- and surrounding it on all sides - is restive and virulently
anti-American.

The oil industry is terrified of America' domination of the world's
second largest proven reserves - but also craves to do business in the
United States. Intellectuals and Russian diplomats worry about
America's apparent disregard for the world order spawned by the horrors
of World War II. The average Russian regards the Iraqi stalemate as an
internal American affair. "It is not our war", is a common refrain,
growing commoner.

Putin has played it admirably nimbly. Whether he ultimately succeeds in
this impossible act of balancing remains to be seen. The smart money
says he would. But if the last three years have taught us anything it
is that the smart money is often disastrously wrong.

Russia's Stealth Diplomacy

By: Dr. Sam Vaknin

Also published by United Press International (UPI)

Also Read

The Janus Look

Russia's Second Empire

Russia as a Creditor

The Chechen Theatre Ticket

Russia's Israeli Oil Bond

Russia's Idled Spies

Russia in 2003

Russia Straddles the Euro-Atlantic Divide

Russian Roulette - The Security Apparatus

Let My People Go - The Jackson-Vanik Controversy

Possibly irked by persistent American U-2 aerial spy missions above its
fringes, Russia fired yesterday, from a mobile launcher, a "Topol"
RS-12M Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM).

On Wednesday, Agriculture Minister Alexei Gordeyev, offered Iraq aid in
the form of wheat. The Russian Grain Union, the industry lobby group,
claims to have already provided the besieged country with half a
million tons of grain under the oil-for-food program.

Russia linked with Syria in declining to approve the new oil-for-food
draft resolution as long as it implied a regime change in Iraq. The
Duma - having failed to ratify a key nuclear treaty with the USA -
called to increase defense spending by at least 3.5 percent of gross
domestic product, or about $4 billion this year.

Only 28 percent of Russians polled now view the United States
favorably, compared with 68 percent a mere few months ago. A majority
of 55 percent disapprove of the USA in a country that was, until very
recently, by far the most pro-American in Europe. A Russian telecom,
Excom, is offering unlimited free phone calls to the White House to
protest U.S. "aggression".

Washington, on its part, has accused the Russian firm, Aviaconversiya,
of helping Iraqi forces to jam global positioning system (GPS) signals.
Other firms - including anti-tank Kornet missile manufacturer, KBP Tula
- have also been fingered for supplying Iraq with sensitive military
technologies.

These allegations were vehemently denied by President Vladimir Putin in
a phone call to Bush - and ridiculed by the companies ostensibly
involved. Russia exported c. $5 billion of military hardware and
another $2.6 billion in nuclear equipment and expertise last year,
mostly to India and China - triple the 1994 figure.

Russia and the United States have continually exchanged barbs over the
sale of fission technology to Iran. In retaliation, Atomic Energy
Minister, Alexander Rumyantsev, exposed an Anglo-German-Dutch deal with
the Iranians, which, he said, included the sale of uranium enrichment
centrifuges.

Is Putin reviving the Cold War to regain his nationalist credentials,
tarnished by the positioning, unopposed, of American troops in central
Asia, the unilateral American withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) treaty and the expansion of NATO and the European Union
to Russia's borders?

Or, dependent as it is on energy exports, is Russia opposed to the war
because it fears an American monopoly on the second largest known
reserves of crude? Russia announced on Thursday that it would insist on
honoring all prewar contracts signed between Iraq and Russian oil
companies and worth of billions of dollars - and on the repayment of
$8-9 billion in Iraqi overdue debt to Russia.

According to Rosbalt, every drop of $1 in oil prices translates into
annual losses to the Russian treasury of $2 billion. Aggregate
corporate profits rose in January by one fifth year on year, mostly on
the strength of surging crude quotes. The Economist Intelligence Unit
expects this year's GDP to grow by 3.8 percent. Foreign exchange
reserves are stable at $54 billion.

The threat to Russia's prominence and market share is not imminent.
Iraqi oil is unlikely to hit world markets in the next few years, as
Iraq's dilapidated and outdated infrastructure is rebuilt. Moreover,
Russian oil is cheap compared to the North Sea or Alaskan varieties and
thus constitutes an attractive investment opportunity as the recent
takeover of Tyumen Oil by British Petroleum proves. Still, the
long-term risk of being unseated by a reconstructed Iraq as the second
largest oil producer in the world is tangible.

Russia has spent the last six months enhancing old alliances and
constructing new bridges. According to Interfax, the Russian news
agency, yesterday, Russia has made yet another payment of $27 million
to the International Monetary Fund. The Russian and Romanian prime
ministers met and signed bilateral agreements for the first time since
1989. This week, after 12 years of abortive contacts, the republics of
the former Yugoslavia agreed with the Russian Federation on a framework
for settling its $600 million in clearing debts.

Recent spats notwithstanding, the Anglo-Saxon alliance still regards
Russia as a strategically crucial ally. Last week, British police, in a
sudden display of unaccustomed efficacy, nabbed Russian oligarch and
mortal Putin-foe, Boris Berezovsky, charged by the Kremlin with
defrauding the Samara region of $13 million while he was director of
LogoVaz in 1994-5.

The Russian foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, did not remain oblivious to
these overtures. Russia and the USA remain partners, he asserted. RIA
Novosti, the Russian news agency, quoted him as saying: "If we settle
the Iraqi problem by political means and in an accord, the road will
open to teamwork on other, no less involved problems."

As Robert Kagan correctly observes in his essay "Of Paradise and Power:
America and Europe in the New World Order", the weaker a polity is
militarily, the stricter its adherence to international law, the only
protection, however feeble, from bullying. Putin, presiding over a
decrepit and bloated army, naturally insists that the world must be
governed by international regulation and not by the "rule of the fist".

But Kagan - and Putin - get it backwards as far as the European Union
is concerned. Its members are not compelled to uphold international
prescripts by their indisputable and overwhelming martial deficiency.
Rather, after centuries of futile bloodletting, they choose not to
resort to weapons and, instead, to settle their differences
juridically.

Thus, Putin is not a European in the full sense of the word. He
supports an international framework of dispute settlement because he
has no armed choice, not because it tallies with his deeply held
convictions and values. According to Kagan, Putin is, in essence, an
American: he believes that the world order ultimately rests on military
power and the ability to project it.

Russia aspires to be America, not France. Its business ethos, grasp of
realpolitik, nuclear arsenal and evolving values place it firmly in the
Anglo-Saxon camp. Its dalliance with France and Germany is hardly an
elopement. Had Russia been courted more aggressively by Secretary of
State, Colin Powell and its concerns shown more respect by the American
administration, it would have tilted differently. It is a lesson to be
memorized in Washington.

Russia's Second Empire

By: Dr. Sam Vaknin

Also published by United Press International (UPI)

History teaches us little except how little we can learn from it.
Still, there is nothing new under the sun. Thus, drawing too many
parallels between the environmentalist movements of the late 19th
century and their counterparts in the second half of the twentieth
century - would probably prove misleading. Similarly, every fin de
siecle has its Fukuyama, proclaiming the end of history and the victory
of liberalism and capitalism.

Liberal parliamentarianism (coupled with unbridled individualistic
capitalism) seemed to irreversibly dominate the political landscape by
1890 - when it was suddenly and surprisingly toppled by the confluence
of revolutionary authoritarian nationalism and revolutionary
authoritarian socialism.

Yet, every ostensibly modern (or post-modern) phenomenon has roots and
mirrors in history. The spreading of the occult, materialism,
rationalism, positivism, ethnic cleansing, regionalism, municipal
autonomy, environmentalism, alienation ("ennui"), information
networking, globalization, anti-globalization, mass migration, capital
and labour mobility, free trade - are all new mantras but very old
phenomena.

Sometimes the parallels are both overwhelming and instructive.

Overview

Karl Marx regarded Louis-Napoleon's Second Empire as the first modern
dictatorship - supported by the middle and upper classes but
independent of their patronage and, thus, self-perpetuating. Others
went as far as calling it proto-fascistic.

Yet, the Second Empire was insufficiently authoritarian or
revolutionary to warrant this title. It did foster and encourage a
personality cult, akin to the "Fuhrerprinzip" -but it derived its
legitimacy, conservatively, from the Church and from the electorate. It
was an odd mixture of Bonapartism, militarism, clericalism,
conservatism and liberalism.

In a way, the Second Republic did amount to a secular religion, replete
with martyrs and apostles. It made use of the nascent mass media to
manipulate public opinion. It pursued industrialization and
administrative modernization. But these features characterized all the
political movements of the late 19th century, including socialism, and
other empires, such as the Habsburg Austro-Hungary.

The Second Empire was, above all, inertial. It sought to preserve the
bureaucratic, regulatory, and economic frameworks of the First Empire.

It was a rationalist, positivist, and materialist movement - despite
the deliberate irrationalism of the young Louis-Napoleon. It was not
affiliated to a revolutionary party, nor to popular militias. It was
not collectivist. And its demise was the outcome of military defeat.

The Second Empire is very reminiscent of Vladimir Putin's reign in
post-Yeltsin Russia.

Like the French Second Empire, it follows a period of revolutions and
counter-revolutions. It is not identified with any one class but does
rely on the support of the middle class, the intelligentsia, the
managers and industrialists, the security services, and the military.

Putin is authoritarian, but not revolutionary. His regime derives its
legitimacy from parliamentary and presidential elections based on a
neo-liberal model of government. It is socially conservative but seeks
to modernize Russia's administration and economy. Yet, it manipulates
the mass media and encourages a personality cult.

Disparate Youths

Like Napoleon III, Putin started off as president (he was shortly as
prime minister under Yeltsin). Like him, he may be undone by a military
defeat, probably in the Caucasus or Central Asia.

The formative years of Putin and Louis-Napoleon have little in common,
though.

The former was a cosseted member of the establishment and witnessed,
first hand, the disintegration of his country. Putin was a KGB
apparatchik. The KGB may have inspired, conspired in, or even
instigated the transformation in Russian domestic affairs since the
early 1980's - but to call it "revolutionary" would be to stretch the
term.

Louis-Napoleon, on the other hand, was a true revolutionary. He
narrowly escaped death at the hands of Austrian troops in a rebellion
in Italy in 1831. His brother was not as lucky. Louis-Napoleon's claim
to the throne of France (1832) was based on a half-baked ideology of
imperial glory, concocted, disseminated and promoted by him. In 1836
and 1840 he even initiated (failed) coups d'etat. He was expelled even
from neutral Switzerland and exiled to the USA. He spent six years in
prison.

An Eerie Verisimilitude

Still, like Putin, Napoleon III was elected president. Like him, he was
regarded by his political sponsors as merely a useful and disposable
instrument. Like Putin, he had no parliamentary or political
experience. Both of them won elections by promising "order" and
"prosperity" coupled with "social compassion". And, like Putin,
Louis-Napoleon, to the great chagrin of his backers, proved to be his
own man - independent-minded, determined, and tough.

Putin, like Louis-Napoleon before him, proceeded to expand his powers
and installed loyalists in every corner of the administration and the
army. Like Louis-Napoleon, Putin is a populist, traveling throughout
the country, posing for photo opportunities, responding to citizens'
queries in Q-and-A radio shows, siding with the "average bloke" on
every occasion, taking advantage of Russia's previous economic and
social disintegration to project an image of a "strong man".

Putin is as little dependent on the Duma as Napoleon III was on his
parliament. But Putin reaped what Boris Yeltsin, his predecessor, has
sown when he established an imperial presidency after what amounted to
a coup d'etat in 1993 (the bombing of the Duma). Napoleon had to
organize his own coup d'etat all by himself in 1852.

The Balancing Act

Napoleon III - as does Putin now - faced a delicate balancing act
between the legitimacy conferred by parliamentary liberalism and the
need to maintain a police state. When he sought to strengthen the
enfeebled legislature he reaped only growing opposition within it to
his domestic and foreign policies alike.

He liberalized the media and enshrined in France's legal code various
civil freedoms. But he also set in motion and sanctioned a penumbral,
all-pervasive and clandestine security apparatus which regularly
gathered information on millions of Frenchmen and foreigners.

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