Book: History of Friedrich II of Prussia V 20

T >> Thomas Carlyle >> History of Friedrich II of Prussia V 20




"This arrogance, however, had furthermore a very bad consequence
for their relation to the rest of the Army. It is well known how
much these people despise all Foreigners. This of itself renders
their co-operating with Troops of other Nations very difficult.
But in this case there was the circumstance that, as the Army was
in English pay, they felt a strong tendency to regard their fellow-
soldiers and copartners as a sort of subordinate war-valets, who
must be ready to put up with anything:--which was far indeed from
being the opinion of the others concerned! The others had not the
smallest notion of consenting to any kind of inferior treatment or
consideration in respect of them. To the Hanoverians especially,
from known political feelings, they were at heart, for most part,
specially indisposed; and this mode of thinking was capable of
leading to very dangerous outbreaks. The Hanoverians, a dull steady
people, brave as need be, but too slow for anything but foot
service, considered silently this War to be their War, and that all
the rest, English as well, were here on their [and Britannic
Majesty's] account.

"Think what difficulties Ferdinand's were, and what his merit in
quietly subduing them; while to the cursory observer they were
invisible, and nobody noticed them but himself!" [Mauvillon, ii.
270-272.]

Yes, doubtless. He needed to know his kinds of men; to regard
intensely the chemic affinities and natural properties, to keep his
phosphorescents his nitres and charcoals well apart; to get out of
these English what they were capable of giving him, namely, heavy
strokes,--and never ask them for what they had not: them or the
others; but treat each according to his kind. Just, candid,
consummately polite: an excellent manager of men, as well as of
war-movements, though Voltaire found him shockingly defective in
ESPRIT. The English, I think, he generally quartered by themselves;
employed them oftenest under the Hereditary Prince,--a man of swift
execution and prone to strokes like themselves. "Oftenest under the
Erbprinz," says Mauvillon: "till, after the Fight of Kloster
Kampen, it began to be noticed that there was a change in that
respect; and the mess-rooms whispered, 'By accident or not?'"--
which shall remain mysterious to me. In Battle after Battle he got
the most unexceptionable sabring and charging from Lord Granby and
the difficult English element; and never was the least discord
heard in his Camp;--nor could even Sackville at Minden tempt him
into a loud word.

But enough of English soldiering, and battling with the French.
For about two months prior to this of Vellinghausen, and for more
than two months after, there is going on, by special Envoys between
Pitt and Choiseul, a lively Peace-Negotiation, which is of more
concernment to us than any Battle. "Congress at Augsburg" split
upon formalities, preliminaries, and never even tried to meet:
but France and England are actually busy. Each Country has sent its
Envoy: the Sieur de Bussy, a tricky gentleman, known here of old,
is Choiseul's, whom Pitt is on his guard against; "Mr. Hans
Stanley," a lively, clear-sighted person, of whom I could never
hear elsewhere, is Pitt's at Paris: and it is in that City between
Choiseul and Stanley, with Pitt warily and loftily presiding in the
distance, that the main stress of the Negotiation lies. Pitt is
lofty, haughty, but very fine and noble; no King or Kaiser could be
more. Sincere, severe, though most soft-shining; high, earnest,
steady, like the stars. Artful Choiseul, again, flashes out in a
cheerily exuberant way; and Stanley's Despatches about Choiseul
("CE FOU PLEIN D'ESPRIT," as Friedrich once christens him), about
Choiseul and the France then round him, and the effects of
Vellinghausen in society and the like,--are the liveliest reading
one almost anywhere meets with in that kind. [In THACKERAY, i.
505-579, and especially ii. 520-626, is the Stanley-and-Pitt
Correspondence: Stanley went "23d May;" returned (got his passports
for returning) "September 20th."] Choiseul frankly admits that he
has come to the worst: ready for concessions, but the question is,
What? Canada is gone, for instance; of Canada you will allow us
nothing: but our poor Fisher-people, toiling in the Newfoundland
waters, cannot they have a rock to dry their fish on; "Isle of
Miquelon, or the like?" "Not the breadth of a blanket,"--that is
Pitt's private expression, I believe; and for certain, that, in
polite official language, is his inexorable determination.
"You shall go home out of those Countries, Messieurs; America is to
be English or YANkee, not FRANGcee: that has turned out to be the
Decree of Heaven; and we will stand by that."

So that Choiseul soon satisfies himself it will be a hard bargain,
this with Pitt; and turns the more assiduously to the Majesty of
Spain (Baby Carlos, our old friend, who has sore grudges of his own
against the English, standing grievance of Campeachy Logwood, of
bitter Naples reminiscences, and enough else), turns to Baby
Carlos, time after time, with his pathetic "See, your Most Catholic
Majesty!" And by rapid degrees induces Most Catholic Majesty to go
wholly into the adventure with Most Christian Ditto;--and to say,
at length, or to let Choiseul say for him, by way of cautious
first-step (15th July, a date worth remembering, if the reader
please): "Might not Most Catholic Majesty be allowed perhaps to
mediate a little in this Business?" "Most Catholic Majesty!"
answers Pitt, with a flash as if from the empyrean: "Who sent for
Most Catholic Majesty?"--and the matter catches fire, totally
explodes, and Spain too declares War; in what way is
generally known.

Details are not permitted us. The Catastrophe we shall give
afterwards, and can here say only: FIRST, That old Earl Marischal,
Friedrich's Spanish Envoy, is a good deal in England, coming and
going, at this time,--on that interesting business of the Kintore
Inheritance, doubtless,--and has been beautifully treated.
Been pardoned, disattainted, permitted to inherit,--by the King on
the instant, by the Parliament so soon as possible; [King's Patent
is of "30th April, 1760 [DATED 29th May, 1759], Act of Parliament
to follow shortly;" "August 16th, 1760, Act having passed, is
Marischal's public Presentation to his Majesty (late Majesty);"
Old GAZETTES in Gentleman's Magazine (for
1760), xxx. 201, 392.]--and is of a naturally grateful turn.
SECONDLY, That in the profoundest secrecy, penetrable only to eyes
near at hand and that see in the dark, a celebrated Bourbon Family
Compact was signed (August 15th, 1761, ten days before the digging
at Bunzelwitz began), of which the first news to the Olympian man
(conveyed by Marischal, as is thought) was like--like news of dead
Pythons pretending to revive upon him. And THIRDLY, That,
postponing the Catastrophe, and recommending the above two dates,
15th JULY, 15th AUGUST, to careful readers, we must hasten to
Colberg for the present.


THIRD SIEGE OF COLBERG.

Readers had, some while ago, a flying Note, which we promised to
take up again; about Tottleben's procedures, and a Third Siege of
Colberg coming. Siege, we have chanced to see, there accordingly
is, and a Platen gone to help against it. Siege, after infinite
delays and haggles, has at length come,--uncommonly vivid during
the final days of Bunzelwitz;--and is, and has been, and continues
to be, much in the King's thoughts. Probably a matter of more
concernment to him, before, during and after Bunzelwitz (though the
Pitt Catastrophe, going on simultaneously, is still more important,
if he knew it), than anything else befalling in the distance.
Let us now give a few farther indications on that matter.

Truce between Werner and Tottleben expired May 12th; but for five
weeks more nothing practical followed; except diligent reinforcing,
revictualling and extraordinary fortifying of Colberg and its
environs, on the Prussian part,--Eugen of Wurtemberg, direct from
Restock and his Anti-Swede business, Eugen 12,000 strong, with a
Werner and other such among them, taking head charge outside the
walls; old Heyde again as Commandant within: while on the Russian
part, under General Romanzow, there is a most tortoise-like
advance,--except that the tortoise carries all his resources with
him, and Romanzow's, multifarious and enormous, are scattered over
seas and lands, and need endless waiting for, in the intervals
of crawling.

This is the Romanzow who failed at Colherg once already (on the
heel of Zorndorf in 1758, if readers recollect); and is the more
bound to be successful now. From sea and from land, for five weeks,
there is rumor of a Romanzow in overwhelming force, and with
intentions very furious upon Colberg,--upon the outposts, under
Werner, as first point. Five weeks went, before anything of
Romanzow was visible even to Werner (22d June, at Coslin, forty
miles to eastward); after which his advance (such waiting for the
ships, for the artilleries, the this and the that) was slower than
ever; and for about eight weeks more, he haggles along through
Coslin, through Corlin, Belgard again, flowing slowly forward upon
Werner's outposts, like a summer glacier with its rubbishes;
or like a slow lava-tide,--a great deal of smoke on each side of
him (owing to the Cossacks), as usual. Romanzow's progress is of
the slowest; and it is not till August 19th that he practically
gets possession of Corlin, Belgard and those outposts on the
Persante River, and comes within sight of Colberg and his problem.
By which time, he finds Eugen of Wurtemberg encamped and intrenched
still ahead of him, still nearer Colberg, and likely to give him
what they call "DE LA TABLATURE," or extremely difficult music
to play.

"It was on AUGUST 19th [very eve of Friedrich's going into
Bunzelwitz] that Romanzow,--Werner, for the sake of those poor
Towns he holds, generally retiring without bombardment or utter
conflagration,--had got hold of Corlin and of the River Persante
[with "Quetzin and Degow," if anybody knew them, as his main posts
there]: and was actually now within sight of Colberg,--only 7 or 8
miles west of him, and a river more or less in his way:--when,
singular to see, Eugen of Wurtemberg has rooted himself into the
ground farther inward, environing Colberg with a fortified Camp as
with a second wall; and it will be a difficult problem indeed!

"But Sea Armaments, Swedish-Russian, with endless siege-material
and red-hot balls, are finally at hand; and this pitiful Colberg
must be done, were it only by falling flat, on it, and smothering
it by weight of numbers and of red-hot iron. The day before
yesterday, August 17th, after such rumoring and such manoeuvring as
there has been, six Russian ships-of-war showed themselves in
Colberg Roads, and three of them tried some shooting on Heyde's
workpeople, busy at a redoubt on the beach; but hit nothing, and
went away till Romanzow himself should come. Romanzow come, there
is utmost despatch; and within the eight days following, the
Russian ships, and then the Swedish as well, have all got to their
moorings,--12 sail of the line, with 42 more of the frigate and
gunboat kind, 54 ships in all;--and from August 24th, especially
from August 28th, bombardment to the very uttermost is going on.
[Tempelhof, v. 311.] Bombardment by every method, from sea and from
land, continues diligent for the next fortnight,--with little or no
result; so diligent are Eugen and veteran Heyde.

"SEPTEMBER 4th. The Swedish-Russian gunboats have been much shot
down by Heyde's batteries on the beach; no success had, owing to
Heyde and Eugen: paltry little Colberg as impossible as Bunzelwitz,
it seems? 'Double our diligence, therefore!' That is Romanzow's and
everybody's sentiment here. Romanzow comes closer in, September
4th; besieges in form, since not Colberg, Eugen's CAMP, or brazen
wall of Colberg; and there rises in and round this poor little
Colberg (a 2,000 balls daily, red-hot and other) such a volcano as
attracts the eyes of all the world thither.

"SEPTEMBER 12th. News yesterday of reinforcement, men and
provender, coming from Stettin; is to be at Treptow on the 13th.
Werner, night of the 11th, stealthily sets out to meet it, IT in
the first place; then, joined with it, to take by rearward a
certain inconvenient battery, which Romanzow is building to
westward of us, out that way; to demolish said battery, and be
generally distressful to the rear of Romanzow. At Treptow, after
his difficult night's march, Werner is resting, secure now of the
adventure;--too contemptuous of his slow Russians, as appeared!
Who, for once, surprise HIM; and, at and round Treptow, next
morning, Werner finds himself suddenly in a most awkward
predicament. Werner, one of the rapidest and stormiest of skilful
men, plunged valiantly into the affair; would still have managed
it, they say, had not, in some sudden swoop,--charge, or something
of critical or vital nature,--rapid Werner's horse got shot, and
fallen with him; whereby not only the charge failed, but Werner
himself was taken prisoner. A loss of very great importance, and
grievous to everybody: though, I believe, the reinforcement and
supply, for this time, got mostly through, and the dangerous
battery was got demolished by other means. [Seyfarth,
Beylagen, iii. 238; Tempelhof, v. 314.] This is
Romanzow's first item of success, this of getting such a Werner
snatched out of the game [and sent to Petersburg instead as we
shall hear]; and other items fell to Romanzow thenceforth by the
aid of time and hunger.

"In the way of storming, battering or otherwise capturing Eugen's
Camp, not to speak of Heyde's town, Romanzow finds, on trial after
trial, that he can do as good as nothing; and his unwieldy sea-
comrades (equinoctial gales coming on them, too) are equally
worthless. September 19th [a week after this of Werner, tenth day
after Bunzelwitz had ended], Romanzow made his fiercest attempt
that way; fiercest and last: furious extremely, from 2 in the
morning onwards; had for some time hold of the important 'Green
Redoubt;' but was still more furiously battered and bayoneted out
again, with the loss of above 3,000 men; and tried that no farther.
Impossible by that method. But he can stand between the Eugen-Heyde
people and supplies; and by obstinacy hunger them out: this,
added to the fruitless bombardment, is now his more or less
fruitful industry.

"In the end of September, the effects of Bunzelwitz are felt:
Platen, after burning the Butturlin Magazine at Gostyn, has
hastened hither; in what style we know. Blaten arrives 25th
September; cuts his way through Romanzow into Eugen's Camp, raises
Eugen to about 15,000; [Tempelhof, v. 350.] renders Eugen, not to
speak of Heyde, more impossible than ever. Butturlin did truly send
reinforcements, a 10,000, a 12,000, 'As many as you like, my
Romanzow!' And, in the beginning of October, came rolling
thitherward bodily; hoping, they say, to make a Maxen of it upon
those Eugens and Platens: but after a fortnight's survey of them,
found there was not the least feasibility;--and that he himself
must go home, on the score of hunger. Which he did, November 2d;
leaving Romanzow reinforced at discretion [40,000, but with him too
provisions are fallen low], and the advice, 'Cut off their
supplies: time and famine are our sole chances here!'
Butturlin's new Russians, endless thousands of them, under Fermor
and others, infesting the roads from Stettin, are a great comfort
to Romanzow. Nor could any Eugen--with his Platens, Thaddens, and
utmost expenditure of skill and of valor and endurance, which are
still memorable in soldier-annals, [ Tagebuch der
Unternehmungen des Platenschen Corps vom September bis November
1761 (Seyfarth, Beylagen, iii.
32-76). Bericht von der Unternehmungen des Thaddenschen
Corps vom Jenner bis zum December 1761 (ibid.
77-147).]--suffice to convey provisions through that disastrous
Wilderness of distances and difficulties.

"From Stettin, which lies southwest, through Treptow Gollnow and
other wild little Prussian Towns is about 100 miles; from Landsberg
south, 150: Friedrich himself is well-nigh 300 miles away;
in Stettin alone is succor, could we hold the intervening Country.
But it is overrun with Russians, more and ever more. A Country of
swamps and moors, winter darkness stealing over it,--illuminated by
such a volcano as we see: a very gloomy waste scene; and traits of
stubborn human valor and military virtue plentiful in it with utter
hardship as a constant quantity; details not permissible here only
the main features and epochs, if they could be indicated.

"The King is greatly interested for Colberg; sends orders to
collect from every quarter supplies at Stettin, and strain every
nerve for the relief of that important little Haven. Which is done
by the diligent Bevern, the collecting part; could only the
conveying be accomplished. But endless Russians are afield, Fermor
with a 15,000 of them waylaying; the conveyance is the difficulty."
[ Bericht von den Unternehmungen der Wurtembergischen Corps
in Pommern, vom May 1761 bis December 1761 (Seyfarth,
Beylagen, iii. 147-258). Tempelhof, v.
313-326. Helden-Geschichte, vi. 669-708.]

But now we must return to Bunzelwitz, and September 25th, in Head-
quarters there.



Chapter VIII.

LOUDON POUNCES UPON SCHWEIDNITZ ONE NIGHT (LAST OF SEPTEMBER, 1761).

It was September 25th, more properly 26th, [Tempelhof, v. 327.]
when Friedrich quitted Bunzelwitz; we heard on what errand.
Early that morning he marches with all his goods, first to Pilzen
(that fine post on the east side of Schweidnitz); and from that,
straightway,--southwestward, two marches farther,--to Neisse
neighborhood (Gross-Nossen the name of the place); Loudon making
little dispute or none. In Neisse are abundant Magazines:
living upon these, Friedrich intends to alarm Loudon's rearward
country, and draw him towards Bohemia. As must have gradually
followed; and would at once,--had Loudon been given to alarms,
which he was not. Loudon, very privately, has quite different game
afield. Loudon merely detaches this and the other small Corps to
look after Friedrich's operations, which probably he believes to be
only a feint:--and, before a week passes, Friedrich will have news
he little expects!

Friedrich, pausing at Gross-Nossen, and perhaps a little surprised
to find no Loudon meddling with him, pushes out, first one party
and then another,--Dalwig, Bulow, towards Landshut Hill-Country, to
threaten Loudon's Bohemian roads;--who, singular to say, do not
hear the least word of Loudon thereabouts. A Loudon strangely
indifferent to this new Enterprise of ours. On the third day of
Gross-Nossen (Friday, October 2d), Friedrich detaches General
Lentulus to rearward, or the way we came, for news of Loudon.
Rearward too, Lentulus sees nothing whatever of Loudon: but, from
the rumor of the country, and from two Prussian garrison-soldiers,
whom he found wandering about,--he hears, with horror and
amazement, That Loudon, by a sudden panther-spring, the night
before last, has got hold of Schweidnitz: now his wholly, since
5 A.M. of yesterday; and a strong Austrian garrison in it by this
time! That was the news Lentulus brought home to his King;
the sorest Job's-post of all this War.

Truly, a surprising enterprise this of Loudon's; and is allowed by
everybody to have been admirably managed. Loudon has had it in his
head for some time;--ever since that colic of forty-eight hours, I
should guess; upon the wrecks of which it might well rise as a new
daystar. He kept it strictly in his own head; nobody but Daun and
the Kaiser had hint of it, both of whom assented, and agreed to
keep silence.

"On Friedrich's removal towards Neisse and threatening of Bohemia,"
says my Note on this subject, "Loudon's time had come.
Friedrich had disappeared to southwestward, Saturday, September
26th: 'Gone to Pilzen,' reported Loudon's scouts; 'rests there over
Sunday. Gone to Sigeroth, 28th; gone to Gross-Nossen, Tuesday,
September 29th.' [Tempelhof, v. 330.] That will do, thinks Loudon;
who has sat immovable at Kunzendorf all this while;--and,
WEDNESDAY, 30th, instantly proceeds to business.

"Draws out, about 10 A.M. of Wednesday, all round Schweidnitz at
some miles distance, a ring, or complete girdle, of Croat-Cossack
people; blocking up every path and road: 'Nobody to pass, this day,
towards Schweidnitz, much less into it, on any pretext.' That is
the duty of the Croat people. To another active Officer he intrusts
the task of collecting from the neighboring Villages (outside the
Croat girdle) as many ladders, planks and the like, as will be
requisite; which also is punctually done. For the Attack itself,
which is to be Fourfold, our picked Officers are chosen, with the
20 best Battalions in the Army: Czernichef is apprised; who warmly
assents, and offers every help:--'800 of your Grenadiers,' answers
Loudon; 'no more needed.' Loudon's arrangements for management of
the ladders, for punctuality about the routes, the times, the
simultaneity, are those of a perfect artist; no Friedrich could
have done better.

"About 4 in the afternoon, all the Captains and Battalions, with
their ladders and furnitures, everybody with Instruction very
pointed and complete, are assembled at Kunzendorf: Loudon addresses
the Troops in a few fiery words; assures himself of victory by
them; promises them 10,060 pounds in lieu of plunder, which he
strictly prohibits. Officers had better make themselves acquainted
with the Four Routes they are to take in the dark: proper also to
set all your watches by the chief General's, that there be no
mistake as to time. [In TEMPELHOF (v. 332-349) and ARCHENHOLTZ
(ii. 272-280) all these details.] At 9, all being now dark, and the
Croat girdle having gathered itself closer round the place since
nightfall, the Four Divisions march to their respective starting-
places; will wait there, silent; and about 2 in the morning, each
at its appointed minute, step forward on their business. With fixed
bayonets all of them; no musketry permitted till the works are won.
Loudon will wait at the Village of Schonbrunn [not WARKOTSCH'S
Schonbrunn, of which by and by, and which also is not far [See
ARCHENHOLTZ, ii. 287; and correct his mistake of the two places.]]
--at Schonbrunn, within short distance; give Loudon notice when you
are within 600 yards;--there shall, if desirable, be
reinforcements, farther orders. Loudon knows Schweidnitz like his
own bedroom. He was personally there, in Leuthen time, improving
the Works. By nocturnal Croat parties, in the latter part of
Bunzelwitz time; and since then, by deserters and otherwise,--he
knows the condition of the Garrison, of the Commandant, and of
every essential point. Has calculated that the Garrison is hardly
third part of what it ought to be,--3,800 in whole, and many of
them loose deserter fellows; special artillery-men, instead of
about 400, only 191;--most important of all, that Commandant
Zastrow is no wizard in his trade; and, on the whole, that the
Enterprise is likely to succeed.

"Zastrow has been getting married lately; and has many things to
think of, besides Schweidnitz. Some accounts say this was his
wedding-night,--which is not true, but only that he had meant to
give a Ball this last night of September; and perhaps did give it,
dancing over BEFORE 2, let us hope! Something of a jolter-head
seemingly, though solid and honest. I observe he is a kind of butt,
or laughing-stock, of Friedrich's, and has yielded some gleams of
momentary fun, he and this marriage of his, between Prince Henri
and the King, in the tragic gloom all round. [Schoning, ii.
SOEPIUS.] Nothing so surprises me in Friedrich as his habitual
inattention to the state of his Garrisons. He has the best of
Commandants and also the worst: Tauentzien in Breslau, Heyde in
Colberg, unsurpassable in the world; in Glatz a D'O, in Schweidnitz
a Zastrow, both of whom cost him dear. Opposition sneers secretly,
'It is as they happen to have come to hand.' Which has not much
truth, though some. Tauentzien he chose; D'O was Fouquet's choice,
not his; Zastrow he did choose; Heyde he had by accident; of Heyde
he had never heard till the defence of Colberg began to be a
world's wonder. And in regard to his Garrisons, it is indisputable
they were often left palpably defective in quantity and quality;
and, more than once, fatally gave way at the wrong moment. We can
only say that Friedrich was bitterly in want of men for the field;
that 'a Garrison-Regiment' was always reckoned an inferior article;
and that Friedrich, in the press of his straits, had often had to
say: 'Well, these [plainly Helots, not Spartans], these will have
to do!' For which he severely suffered: and perhaps repented,--
who knows?

"Zastrow, in spite of Loudon's precautionary Girdle of Croats, and
the cares of a coming Ball, had got sufficient inkling of something
being in the wind. And was much on the Walls all day, he and his
Officers; scanning with their glasses and their guesses the
surrounding phenomena, to little purpose. At night he sent out
patrols; kept sputtering with musketry and an occasional cannon
into the vacant darkness ('We are alert, you see, Herr Loudon!').
In a word, took what measures he could, poor man;--very stupid
measures, thinks Tempelhof, and almost worse than none, especially
this of sputtering with musketry;--and hoped always there would be
no Attack, or none to speak of. Till, in fine, between 2 and 3 in
the morning, his patrols gallop in, 'Austrians on march!' and
Zastrow, throwing out a rocket or two, descries in momentary
illumination that the Fact is verily here.

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