Book: The Memoirs of General Ulysses S. Grant, Part 4.

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At this time my headquarters had been advanced to Piney Branch Church.
I was anxious to crush Anderson before Lee could get a force to his
support. To this end Sedgwick who was at Piney Branch Church, was
ordered to Warren's support. Hancock, who was at Todd's Tavern, was
notified of Warren's engagement, and was directed to be in readiness to
come up. Burnside, who was with the wagon trains at Aldrich's on our
extreme left, received the same instructions. Sedgwick was slow in
getting up for some reason--probably unavoidable, because he was never
at fault when serious work was to be done--so that it was near night
before the combined forces were ready to attack. Even then all of
Sedgwick's command did not get into the engagement. Warren led the last
assault, one division at a time, and of course it failed.

Warren's difficulty was twofold: when he received an order to do
anything, it would at once occur to his mind how all the balance of the
army should be engaged so as properly to co-operate with him. His ideas
were generally good, but he would forget that the person giving him
orders had thought of others at the time he had of him. In like manner,
when he did get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligent
instructions to division commanders, he would go in with one division,
holding the others in reserve until he could superintend their movements
in person also, forgetting that division commanders could execute an
order without his presence. His difficulty was constitutional and
beyond his control. He was an officer of superior ability, quick
perceptions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that could be
done with a small command.

Lee had ordered Hill's corps--now commanded by Early--to move by the
very road we had marched upon. This shows that even early in the
morning of the 8th Lee had not yet become acquainted with my move, but
still thought that the Army of the Potomac had gone to Fredericksburg.
Indeed, he informed the authorities at Richmond he had possession of
Spottsylvania and was on my flank. Anderson was in possession of
Spottsylvania, through no foresight of Lee, however. Early only found
that he had been following us when he ran against Hancock at Todd's
Tavern. His coming detained Hancock from the battle-field of
Spottsylvania for that day; but he, in like manner, kept Early back and
forced him to move by another route.

Had I ordered the movement for the night of the 7th by my left flank, it
would have put Hancock in the lead. It would also have given us an hour
or earlier start. It took all that time for Warren to get the head of
his column to the left of Hancock after he had got his troops out of
their line confronting the enemy. This hour, and Hancock's capacity to
use his whole force when necessary, would, no doubt, have enabled him to
crush Anderson before he could be reinforced. But the movement made was
tactical. It kept the troops in mass against a possible assault by the
enemy. Our left occupied its intrenchments while the two corps to the
right passed. If an attack had been made by the enemy he would have
found the 2d corps in position, fortified, and, practically, the 5th and
6th corps in position as reserves, until his entire front was passed.
By a left flank movement the army would have been scattered while still
passing the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got by
it would have been very much exposed. Then, too, I had not yet learned
the special qualifications of the different corps commanders. At that
time my judgment was that Warren was the man I would suggest to succeed
Meade should anything happen to that gallant soldier to take him from
the field. As I have before said, Warren was a gallant soldier, an able
man; and he was beside thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and
importance of the duty he had to perform.

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