Book: The Memoirs of General Ulysses S. Grant, Part 4.

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General Halleck had, long before my coming into this new field, ordered
parts of the 11th and 12th corps, commanded respectively by Generals
Howard and Slocum, Hooker in command of the whole, from the Army of the
Potomac to reinforce Rosecrans. It would have been folly to send them
to Chattanooga to help eat up the few rations left there. They were
consequently left on the railroad, where supplies could be brought to
them. Before my arrival, Thomas ordered their concentration at
Bridgeport.

General W. F. Smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the move
which I was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about the
manner of making it, that I deemed it but just to him that he should
have command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although he
was then acting as a staff officer and was not in command of troops.

On the 24th of October, after my return to Chattanooga, the following
details were made: General Hooker, who was now at Bridgeport, was
ordered to cross to the south side of the Tennessee and march up by
Whitesides and Wauhatchie to Brown's Ferry. General Palmer, with a
division of the 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland, was ordered to move
down the river on the north side, by a back road, until opposite
Whitesides, then cross and hold the road in Hooker's rear after he had
passed. Four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act under
General Smith directly from Chattanooga. Eighteen hundred of them, under
General Hazen, were to take sixty pontoon boats, and under cover of
night float by the pickets of the enemy at the north base of Lookout,
down to Brown's Ferry, then land on the south side and capture or drive
away the pickets at that point. Smith was to march with the remainder
of the detail, also under cover of night, by the north bank of the river
to Brown's Ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the bridge
as soon as the crossing was secured.

On the 26th, Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport and commenced his
eastward march. At three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, Hazen
moved into the stream with his sixty pontoons and eighteen hundred brave
and well-equipped men. Smith started enough in advance to be near the
river when Hazen should arrive. There are a number of detached spurs of
hills north of the river at Chattanooga, back of which is a good road
parallel to the stream, sheltered from the view from the top of Lookout.
It was over this road Smith marched. At five o'clock Hazen landed at
Brown's Ferry, surprised the picket guard, and captured most of it. By
seven o'clock the whole of Smith's force was ferried over and in
possession of a height commanding the ferry. This was speedily
fortified, while a detail was laying the pontoon bridge. By ten o'clock
the bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in Lookout valley, was
fortified and connected with the rest of the army. The two bridges over
the Tennessee River--a flying one at Chattanooga and the new one at
Brown's Ferry--with the road north of the river, covered from both the
fire and the view of the enemy, made the connection complete. Hooker
found but slight obstacles in his way, and on the afternoon of the 28th
emerged into Lookout valley at Wauhatchie. Howard marched on to Brown's
Ferry, while Geary, who commanded a division in the 12th corps, stopped
three miles south. The pickets of the enemy on the river below were now
cut off, and soon came in and surrendered.

The river was now opened to us from Lookout valley to Bridgeport.
Between Brown's Ferry and Kelly's Ferry the Tennessee runs through a
narrow gorge in the mountains, which contracts the stream so much as to
increase the current beyond the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem
it. To get up these rapids, steamers must be cordelled; that is, pulled
up by ropes from the shore. But there is no difficulty in navigating
the stream from Bridgeport to Kelly's Ferry. The latter point is only
eight miles from Chattanooga and connected with it by a good wagon-road,
which runs through a low pass in the Raccoon Mountains on the south side
of the river to Brown's Ferry, thence on the north side to the river
opposite Chattanooga. There were several steamers at Bridgeport, and
abundance of forage, clothing and provisions.

On the way to Chattanooga I had telegraphed back to Nashville for a good
supply of vegetables and small rations, which the troops had been so
long deprived of. Hooker had brought with him from the east a full
supply of land transportation. His animals had not been subjected to
hard work on bad roads without forage, but were in good condition. In
five days from my arrival in Chattanooga the way was open to Bridgeport
and, with the aid of steamers and Hooker's teams, in a week the troops
were receiving full rations. It is hard for any one not an eye-witness
to realize the relief this brought. The men were soon reclothed and
also well fed, an abundance of ammunition was brought up, and a
cheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks. Neither
officers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed. The weak
and languid appearance of the troops, so visible before, disappeared at
once. I do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assume
it must have been correspondingly depressing. Mr. Davis had visited
Bragg but a short time before, and must have perceived our condition to
be about as Bragg described it in his subsequent report. "These
dispositions," he said, "faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's
speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage. Possessed
of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements
must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a
question of time." But the dispositions were not "faithfully
sustained," and I doubt not but thousands of men engaged in trying to
"sustain" them now rejoice that they were not. There was no time during
the rebellion when I did not think, and often say, that the South was
more to be benefited by its defeat than the North. The latter had the
people, the institutions, and the territory to make a great and
prosperous nation. The former was burdened with an institution
abhorrent to all civilized people not brought up under it, and one which
degraded labor, kept it in ignorance, and enervated the governing class.
With the outside world at war with this institution, they could not have
extended their territory. The labor of the country was not skilled, nor
allowed to become so. The whites could not toil without becoming
degraded, and those who did were denominated "poor white trash." The
system of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the people
poor. The non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the small
slaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbor. Soon the
slaves would have outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathy
with them, would have risen in their might and exterminated them. The
war was expensive to the South as well as to the North, both in blood
and treasure, but it was worth all it cost.

The enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a line of
supplies. He appreciated its importance, and hastened to try to recover
the line from us. His strength on Lookout Mountain was not equal to
Hooker's command in the valley below. From Missionary Ridge he had to
march twice the distance we had from Chattanooga, in order to reach
Lookout Valley; but on the night of the 28th and 29th an attack was made
on Geary at Wauhatchie by Longstreet's corps. When the battle
commenced, Hooker ordered Howard up from Brown's Ferry. He had three
miles to march to reach Geary. On his way he was fired upon by rebel
troops from a foot-hill to the left of the road and from which the road
was commanded. Howard turned to the left, charged up the hill and
captured it before the enemy had time to intrench, taking many
prisoners. Leaving sufficient men to hold this height, he pushed on to
reinforce Geary. Before he got up, Geary had been engaged for about
three hours against a vastly superior force. The night was so dark that
the men could not distinguish one from another except by the light of
the flashes of their muskets. In the darkness and uproar Hooker's
teamsters became frightened and deserted their teams. The mules also
became frightened, and breaking loose from their fastenings stampeded
directly towards the enemy. The latter, no doubt, took this for a
charge, and stampeded in turn. By four o'clock in the morning the
battle had entirely ceased, and our "cracker line" was never afterward
disturbed.

In securing possession of Lookout Valley, Smith lost one man killed and
four or five wounded. The enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry,
captured. In the night engagement of the 28th-9th Hooker lost 416
killed and wounded. I never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troops
buried over one hundred and fifty of his dead and captured more than a
hundred.

After we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring our
supplies to the army, I made a personal inspection to see the situation
of the pickets of the two armies. As I have stated, Chattanooga Creek
comes down the centre of the valley to within a mile or such a matter of
the town of Chattanooga, then bears off westerly, then north-westerly,
and enters the Tennessee River at the foot of Lookout Mountain. This
creek, from its mouth up to where it bears off west, lay between the two
lines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew their water from
the same stream. As I would be under short-range fire and in an open
country, I took nobody with me, except, I believe, a bugler, who stayed
some distance to the rear. I rode from our right around to our left.
When I came to the camp of the picket guard of our side, I heard the
call, "Turn out the guard for the commanding general." I replied,
"Never mind the guard," and they were dismissed and went back to their
tents. Just back of these, and about equally distant from the creek,
were the guards of the Confederate pickets. The sentinel on their post
called out in like manner, "Turn out the guard for the commanding
general," and, I believe, added, "General Grant." Their line in a
moment front-faced to the north, facing me, and gave a salute, which I
returned.

The most friendly relations seemed to exist between the pickets of the
two armies. At one place there was a tree which had fallen across the
stream, and which was used by the soldiers of both armies in drawing
water for their camps. General Longstreet's corps was stationed there
at the time, and wore blue of a little different shade from our uniform.
Seeing a soldier in blue on this log, I rode up to him, commenced
conversing with him, and asked whose corps he belonged to. He was very
polite, and, touching his hat to me, said he belonged to General
Longstreet's corps. I asked him a few questions--but not with a view of
gaining any particular information--all of which he answered, and I rode
off.



CHAPTER XLII.

CONDITION OF THE ARMY--REBUILDING THE RAILROAD--GENERAL BURNSIDE'S
SITUATION--ORDERS FOR BATTLE--PLANS FOR THE ATTACK--HOOKER'S POSITION
--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS.

Having got the Army of the Cumberland in a comfortable position, I now
began to look after the remainder of my new command. Burnside was in
about as desperate a condition as the Army of the Cumberland had been,
only he was not yet besieged. He was a hundred miles from the nearest
possible base, Big South Fork of the Cumberland River, and much farther
from any railroad we had possession of. The roads back were over
mountains, and all supplies along the line had long since been
exhausted. His animals, too, had been starved, and their carcasses
lined the road from Cumberland Gap, and far back towards Lexington, Ky.
East Tennessee still furnished supplies of beef, bread and forage, but
it did not supply ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, or small
rations, such as coffee, sugar, salt and rice.

Sherman had started from Memphis for Corinth on the 11th of October.
His instructions required him to repair the road in his rear in order to
bring up supplies. The distance was about three hundred and thirty
miles through a hostile country. His entire command could not have
maintained the road if it had been completed. The bridges had all been
destroyed by the enemy, and much other damage done. A hostile community
lived along the road; guerilla bands infested the country, and more or
less of the cavalry of the enemy was still in the West. Often Sherman's
work was destroyed as soon as completed, and he only a short distance
away.

The Memphis and Charleston Railroad strikes the Tennessee River at
Eastport, Mississippi. Knowing the difficulty Sherman would have to
supply himself from Memphis, I had previously ordered supplies sent from
St. Louis on small steamers, to be convoyed by the navy, to meet him at
Eastport. These he got. I now ordered him to discontinue his work of
repairing roads and to move on with his whole force to Stevenson,
Alabama, without delay. This order was borne to Sherman by a messenger,
who paddled down the Tennessee in a canoe and floated over Muscle
Shoals; it was delivered at Iuka on the 27th. In this Sherman was
notified that the rebels were moving a force towards Cleveland, East
Tennessee, and might be going to Nashville, in which event his troops
were in the best position to beat them there. Sherman, with his
characteristic promptness, abandoned the work he was engaged upon and
pushed on at once. On the 1st of November he crossed the Tennessee at
Eastport, and that day was in Florence, Alabama, with the head of
column, while his troops were still crossing at Eastport, with Blair
bringing up the rear.

Sherman's force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery, and
trains, all to be supplied by the single track road from Nashville. All
indications pointed also to the probable necessity of supplying
Burnside's command in East Tennessee, twenty-five thousand more, by the
same route. A single track could not do this. I gave, therefore, an
order to Sherman to halt General G. M. Dodge's command, of about eight
thousand men, at Athens, and subsequently directed the latter to arrange
his troops along the railroad from Decatur north towards Nashville, and
to rebuild that road. The road from Nashville to Decatur passes over a
broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of
considerable width, and with valleys far below the road-bed. All the
bridges over these had been destroyed, and the rails taken up and
twisted by the enemy. All the cars and locomotives not carried off had
been destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them. All
bridges and culverts had been destroyed between Nashville and Decatur,
and thence to Stevenson, where the Memphis and Charleston and the
Nashville and Chattanooga roads unite. The rebuilding of this road
would give us two roads as far as Stevenson over which to supply the
army. From Bridgeport, a short distance farther east, the river
supplements the road.

General Dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experienced
railroad builder. He had no tools to work with except those of the
pioneers--axes, picks, and spades. With these he was able to intrench
his men and protect them against surprises by small parties of the
enemy. As he had no base of supplies until the road could be completed
back to Nashville, the first matter to consider after protecting his men
was the getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country. He
had his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or all
they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as could
be found. Millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along
the line of the army. When these were not near enough to the troops for
protection they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road.
Blacksmith shops, with all the iron and steel found in them, were moved
up in like manner. Blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the
tools necessary in railroad and bridge building. Axemen were put to
work getting out timber for bridges and cutting fuel for locomotives
when the road should be completed. Car-builders were set to work
repairing the locomotives and cars. Thus every branch of railroad
building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with
food, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or
laborer except what the command itself furnished. But rails and cars
the men could not make without material, and there was not enough
rolling stock to keep the road we already had worked to its full
capacity. There were no rails except those in use. To supply these
deficiencies I ordered eight of the ten engines General McPherson had at
Vicksburg to be sent to Nashville, and all the cars he had except ten.
I also ordered the troops in West Tennessee to points on the river and
on the Memphis and Charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotives
and rails from all the railroads except the Memphis and Charleston to
Nashville. The military manager of railroads also was directed to
furnish more rolling stock and, as far as he could, bridge material.
General Dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days after
receiving his orders. The number of bridges to rebuild was one hundred
and eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms; the length of
road repaired was one hundred and two miles.

The enemy's troops, which it was thought were either moving against
Burnside or were going to Nashville, went no farther than Cleveland.
Their presence there, however, alarmed the authorities at Washington,
and, on account of our helpless condition at Chattanooga, caused me much
uneasiness. Dispatches were constantly coming, urging me to do
something for Burnside's relief; calling attention to the importance of
holding East Tennessee; saying the President was much concerned for the
protection of the loyal people in that section, etc. We had not at
Chattanooga animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much less a
supply train. Reinforcements could not help Burnside, because he had
neither supplies nor ammunition sufficient for them; hardly, indeed,
bread and meat for the men he had. There was no relief possible for him
except by expelling the enemy from Missionary Ridge and about
Chattanooga.

On the 4th of November Longstreet left our front with about fifteen
thousand troops, besides Wheeler's cavalry, five thousand more, to go
against Burnside. The situation seemed desperate, and was more
aggravating because nothing could be done until Sherman should get up.
The authorities at Washington were now more than ever anxious for the
safety of Burnside's army, and plied me with dispatches faster than
ever, urging that something should be done for his relief. On the 7th,
before Longstreet could possibly have reached Knoxville, I ordered
Thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy's right, so as to force the
return of the troops that had gone up the valley. I directed him to
take mules, officers' horses, or animals wherever he could get them to
move the necessary artillery. But he persisted in the declaration that
he could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how he
could possibly comply with the order. Nothing was left to be done but
to answer Washington dispatches as best I could; urge Sherman forward,
although he was making every effort to get forward, and encourage
Burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he should be
relieved. All of Burnside's dispatches showed the greatest confidence
in his ability to hold his position as long as his ammunition held out.
He even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he held
south and west of Knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his
base and make it more difficult for him to get back to Chattanooga when
the battle should begin. Longstreet had a railroad as far as Loudon;
but from there to Knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains. Burnside's
suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted. On the 14th
I telegraphed him:

"Sherman's advance has reached Bridgeport. His whole force will be
ready to move from there by Tuesday at farthest. If you can hold
Longstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing and falling back
can avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time, I will be able to
force the enemy back from here and place a force between Longstreet and
Bragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passes
by every available road, to get to his supplies. Sherman would have
been here before this but for high water in Elk River driving him some
thirty miles up that river to cross."

And again later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief, as
follows:

"Your dispatch and Dana's just received. Being there, you can tell
better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct. With your
showing you had better give up Kingston at the last moment and save the
most productive part of your possessions. Every arrangement is now made
to throw Sherman's force across the river, just at and below the mouth
of Chickamauga Creek, as soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on his
left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry Missionary
Ridge, and from there push a force on to the railroad between Cleveland
and Dalton. Hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carry
Lookout Mountain. The enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on
his left flank. This favors us. To further confirm this, Sherman's
advance division will march direct from Whiteside to Trenton. The
remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from
Whiteside to Kelly's Ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and
leave him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout Valley.
Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport. The rear will only
reach there on the 16th. This will bring it to the 19th as the earliest
day for making the combined movement as desired. Inform me if you think
you can sustain yourself until this time. I can hardly conceive of the
enemy breaking through at Kingston and pushing for Kentucky. If they
should, however, a new problem would be left for solution. Thomas has
ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I will
ascertain if they have started, and inform you. It will be entirely out
of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot be
spared, but how would they be fed after they got even one day east from
here?"

Longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at Loudon until the 13th.
That being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probable
he was directed to remain there awaiting orders. He was in a position
threatening Knoxville, and at the same time where he could be brought
back speedily to Chattanooga. The day after Longstreet left Loudon,
Sherman reached Bridgeport in person and proceeded on to see me that
evening, the 14th, and reached Chattanooga the next day.

My orders for battle were all prepared in advance of Sherman's arrival
(*15), except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to be
engaged were so far away. The possession of Lookout Mountain was of no
special advantage to us now. Hooker was instructed to send Howard's
corps to the north side of the Tennessee, thence up behind the hills on
the north side, and to go into camp opposite Chattanooga; with the
remainder of the command, Hooker was, at a time to be afterwards
appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lower
palisades, and so get into Chattanooga valley.

The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack the enemy's right flank,
form a line across it, extend our left over South Chickamauga River so
as to threaten or hold the railroad in Bragg's rear, and thus force him
either to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his
base at Chickamauga Station. Hooker was to perform like service on our
right. His problem was to get from Lookout Valley to Chattanooga Valley
in the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley rapidly to
Rossville, south of Bragg's line on Missionary Ridge, form line there
across the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended to
Chickamauga Valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's rear
on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also. Thomas, with
the Army of the Cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assault
while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks.

To carry out this plan, Sherman was to cross the Tennessee at Brown's
Ferry and move east of Chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of
Mission Ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out of
sight of the enemy on the ridge. There are two streams called
Chickamauga emptying into the Tennessee River east of Chattanooga--North
Chickamauga, taking its rise in Tennessee, flowing south, and emptying
into the river some seven or eight miles east; while the South
Chickamauga, which takes its rise in Georgia, flows northward, and
empties into the Tennessee some three or four miles above the town.
There were now one hundred and sixteen pontoons in the North Chickamauga
River, their presence there being unknown to the enemy.

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