Book: The Memoirs of General Ulysses S. Grant, Part 4.

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At night a division was to be marched up to that point, and at two
o'clock in the morning moved down with the current, thirty men in each
boat. A few were to land east of the mouth of the South Chickamauga,
capture the pickets there, and then lay a bridge connecting the two
banks of the river. The rest were to land on the south side of the
Tennessee, where Missionary Ridge would strike it if prolonged, and a
sufficient number of men to man the boats were to push to the north side
to ferry over the main body of Sherman's command while those left on the
south side intrenched themselves. Thomas was to move out from his lines
facing the ridge, leaving enough of Palmer's corps to guard against an
attack down the valley. Lookout Valley being of no present value to us,
and being untenable by the enemy if we should secure Missionary Ridge,
Hooker's orders were changed. His revised orders brought him to
Chattanooga by the established route north of the Tennessee. He was
then to move out to the right to Rossville.

Hooker's position in Lookout Valley was absolutely essential to us so
long as Chattanooga was besieged. It was the key to our line for
supplying the army. But it was not essential after the enemy was
dispersed from our front, or even after the battle for this purpose was
begun. Hooker's orders, therefore, were designed to get his force past
Lookout Mountain and Chattanooga Valley, and up to Missionary Ridge. By
crossing the north face of Lookout the troops would come into
Chattanooga Valley in rear of the line held by the enemy across the
valley, and would necessarily force its evacuation. Orders were
accordingly given to march by this route. But days before the battle
began the advantages as well as the disadvantages of this plan of action
were all considered. The passage over the mountain was a difficult one
to make in the face of an enemy. It might consume so much time as to
lose us the use of the troops engaged in it at other points where they
were more wanted. After reaching Chattanooga Valley, the creek of the
same name, quite a formidable stream to get an army over, had to be
crossed. I was perfectly willing that the enemy should keep Lookout
Mountain until we got through with the troops on Missionary Ridge. By
marching Hooker to the north side of the river, thence up the stream,
and recrossing at the town, he could be got in position at any named
time; when in this new position, he would have Chattanooga Creek behind
him, and the attack on Missionary Ridge would unquestionably cause the
evacuation by the enemy of his line across the valley and on Lookout
Mountain. Hooker's order was changed accordingly. As explained
elsewhere, the original order had to be reverted to, because of a flood
in the river rendering the bridge at Brown's Ferry unsafe for the
passage of troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring all
the troops together against Missionary Ridge.

The next day after Sherman's arrival I took him, with Generals Thomas
and Smith and other officers, to the north side of the river, and showed
them the ground over which Sherman had to march, and pointed out
generally what he was expected to do. I, as well as the authorities in
Washington, was still in a great state of anxiety for Burnside's safety.
Burnside himself, I believe, was the only one who did not share in this
anxiety. Nothing could be done for him, however, until Sherman's troops
were up. As soon, therefore, as the inspection was over, Sherman
started for Bridgeport to hasten matters, rowing a boat himself, I
believe, from Kelly's Ferry. Sherman had left Bridgeport the night
of the 14th, reached Chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made the
above-described inspection on the morning of the 16th, and started back
the same evening to hurry up his command, fully appreciating the
importance of time.

His march was conducted with as much expedition as the roads and season
would admit of. By the 20th he was himself at Brown's Ferry with the
head of column, but many of his troops were far behind, and one division
(Ewing's) was at Trenton, sent that way to create the impression that
Lookout was to be taken from the south. Sherman received his orders at
the ferry, and was asked if he could not be ready for the assault the
following morning. News had been received that the battle had been
commenced at Knoxville. Burnside had been cut off from telegraphic
communications. The President, the Secretary of War, and General
Halleck, were in an agony of suspense. My suspense was also great, but
more endurable, because I was where I could soon do something to relieve
the situation. It was impossible to get Sherman's troops up for the
next day. I then asked him if they could not be got up to make the
assault on the morning of the 22d, and ordered Thomas to move on that
date. But the elements were against us. It rained all the 20th and
21st. The river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep the
pontoons in place.

General Orlando B. Willcox, a division commander under Burnside, was at
this time occupying a position farther up the valley than Knoxville
--about Maynardville--and was still in telegraphic communication with the
North. A dispatch was received from him saying that he was threatened
from the east. The following was sent in reply:

"If you can communicate with General Burnside, say to him that our
attack on Bragg will commence in the morning. If successful, such a
move will be made as I think will relieve East Tennessee, if he can hold
out. Longstreet passing through our lines to Kentucky need not cause
alarm. He would find the country so bare that he would lose his
transportation and artillery before reaching Kentucky, and would meet
such a force before he got through, that he could not return."

Meantime, Sherman continued his crossing without intermission as fast as
his troops could be got up. The crossing had to be effected in full
view of the enemy on the top of Lookout Mountain. Once over, however,
the troops soon disappeared behind the detached hill on the north side,
and would not come to view again, either to watchmen on Lookout Mountain
or Missionary Ridge, until they emerged between the hills to strike the
bank of the river. But when Sherman's advance reached a point opposite
the town of Chattanooga, Howard, who, it will be remembered, had been
concealed behind the hills on the north side, took up his line of march
to join the troops on the south side. His crossing was in full view
both from Missionary Ridge and the top of Lookout, and the enemy of
course supposed these troops to be Sherman's. This enabled Sherman to
get to his assigned position without discovery.



CHAPTER XLIII.

PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE--THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OF THE ENEMY
--SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE--BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN
--GENERAL HOOKER'S FIGHT.

On the 20th, when so much was occurring to discourage--rains falling so
heavily as to delay the passage of troops over the river at Brown's
Ferry and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge; news coming of
a battle raging at Knoxville; of Willcox being threatened by a force
from the east--a letter was received from Bragg which contained these
words: "As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I
deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early
withdrawal." Of course, I understood that this was a device intended to
deceive; but I did not know what the intended deception was. On the
22d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that Bragg was leaving
our front, and on that day Buckner's division was sent to reinforce
Longstreet at Knoxville, and another division started to follow but was
recalled. The object of Bragg's letter, no doubt, was in some way to
detain me until Knoxville could be captured, and his troops there be
returned to Chattanooga.

During the night of the 21st the rest of the pontoon boats, completed,
one hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to and placed in North
Chickamauga. The material for the roadway over these was deposited out
of view of the enemy within a few hundred yards of the bank of the
Tennessee, where the north end of the bridge was to rest.

Hearing nothing from Burnside, and hearing much of the distress in
Washington on his account, I could no longer defer operations for his
relief. I determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, with the Army of the
Cumberland, what had been intended to be done on the 24th.

The position occupied by the Army of the Cumberland had been made very
strong for defence during the months it had been besieged. The line was
about a mile from the town, and extended from Citico Creek, a small
stream running near the base of Missionary Ridge and emptying into the
Tennessee about two miles below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, on
the left, to Chattanooga Creek on the right. All commanding points on
the line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery. The
important elevations within the line had all been carefully fortified
and supplied with a proper armament. Among the elevations so fortified
was one to the east of the town, named Fort Wood. It owed its
importance chiefly to the fact that it lay between the town and
Missionary Ridge, where most of the strength of the enemy was. Fort
Wood had in it twenty-two pieces of artillery, most of which would reach
the nearer points of the enemy's line. On the morning of the 23d
Thomas, according to instructions, moved Granger's corps of two
divisions, Sheridan and T. J. Wood commanding, to the foot of Fort Wood,
and formed them into line as if going on parade, Sheridan on the right,
Wood to the left, extending to or near Citico Creek. Palmer, commanding
the 14th corps, held that part of our line facing south and southwest.
He supported Sheridan with one division (Baird's), while his other
division under Johnson remained in the trenches, under arms, ready to be
moved to any point. Howard's corps was moved in rear of the centre. The
picket lines were within a few hundred yards of each other. At two
o'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance. By this time the
clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated position
all that was going on. The signal for advance was given by a booming of
cannon from Fort Wood and other points on the line. The rebel pickets
were soon driven back upon the main guards, which occupied minor and
detached heights between the main ridge and our lines. These too were
carried before halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce their
advance guards. But it was not without loss on both sides. This
movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we
occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied up to
this time. The fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other
way. During the following night they were made strong. We lost in this
preliminary action about eleven hundred killed and wounded, while the
enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were
captured. With the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from
Missionary Ridge and Fort Wood until night closed in, this ended the
fighting for the first day.

The advantage was greatly on our side now, and if I could only have been
assured that Burnside could hold out ten days longer I should have
rested more easily. But we were doing the best we could for him and the
cause.

By the night of the 23d Sherman's command was in a position to move,
though one division (Osterhaus's) had not yet crossed the river at
Brown's Ferry. The continuous rise in the Tennessee had rendered it
impossible to keep the bridge at that point in condition for troops to
cross; but I was determined to move that night even without this
division. Orders were sent to Osterhaus accordingly to report to
Hooker, if he could not cross by eight o'clock on the morning of the
24th. Because of the break in the bridge, Hooker's orders were again
changed, but this time only back to those first given to him.

General W. F. Smith had been assigned to duty as Chief Engineer of the
Military Division. To him were given the general direction of moving
troops by the boats from North Chickamauga, laying the bridge after they
reached their position, and generally all the duties pertaining to his
office of chief engineer. During the night General Morgan L. Smith's
division was marched to the point where the pontoons were, and the
brigade of Giles A. Smith was selected for the delicate duty of manning
the boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the south bank of the
river. During this night also General J. M. Brannan, chief of
artillery, moved forty pieces of artillery, belonging to the Army of the
Cumberland, and placed them on the north side of the river so as to
command the ground opposite, to aid in protecting the approach to the
point where the south end of the bridge was to rest. He had to use
Sherman's artillery horses for this purpose, Thomas having none.

At two o'clock in the morning, November 24th, Giles A. Smith pushed out
from the North Chickamauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, each
loaded with thirty brave and well-armed men. The boats with their
precious freight dropped down quietly with the current to avoid
attracting the attention of any one who could convey information to the
enemy, until arriving near the mouth of South Chickamauga. Here a few
boats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the
picket guard known to be at that point. The guard were surprised, and
twenty of their number captured. The remainder of the troops effected a
landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally good
results. The work of ferrying over Sherman's command from the north
side of the Tennessee was at once commenced, using the pontoons for the
purpose. A steamer was also brought up from the town to assist. The
rest of M. L. Smith's division came first, then the division of John E.
Smith. The troops as they landed were put to work intrenching their
position. By daylight the two entire divisions were over, and well
covered by the works they had built.

The work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery and
cavalry, was now begun. The ferrying over the infantry was continued
with the steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, however, as fast
as they were wanted to put in their place in the bridge. By a little
past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the South
Chickamauga connecting the troops left on that side with their comrades
below, and all the infantry and artillery were on the south bank of the
Tennessee.

Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on Missionary Ridge. By
one o'clock he started with M. L. Smith on his left, keeping nearly the
course of Chickamauga River; J. E. Smith next to the right and a little
to the rear; and Ewing still farther to the right and also a little to
the rear of J. E. Smith's command, in column, ready to deploy to the
right if an enemy should come from that direction. A good skirmish line
preceded each of these columns. Soon the foot of the hill was reached;
the skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their supports.
By half-past three Sherman was in possession of the height without
having sustained much loss. A brigade from each division was now
brought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand.
The enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of the
hill was gained. There had been a drizzling rain during the day, and
the clouds were so low that Lookout Mountain and the top of Missionary
Ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley. But now the
enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts with
their skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail. Later in the
day a more determined attack was made, but this, too, failed, and
Sherman was left to fortify what he had gained.

Sherman's cavalry took up its line of march soon after the bridge was
completed, and by half-past three the whole of it was over both bridges
and on its way to strike the enemy's communications at Chickamauga
Station. All of Sherman's command was now south of the Tennessee.
During the afternoon General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded and
carried from the field.

Thomas having done on the 23d what was expected of him on the 24th,
there was nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen his
position. Howard, however, effected a crossing of Citico Creek and a
junction with Sherman, and was directed to report to him. With two or
three regiments of his command he moved in the morning along the banks
of the Tennessee, and reached the point where the bridge was being laid.
He went out on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end,
and saw Sherman superintending the work from the north side and moving
himself south as fast as an additional boat was put in and the roadway
put upon it. Howard reported to his new chief across the chasm between
them, which was now narrow and in a few minutes closed.

While these operations were going on to the east of Chattanooga, Hooker
was engaged on the west. He had three divisions: Osterhaus's, of the
15th corps, Army of the Tennessee; Geary's, 12th corps, Army of the
Potomac; and Cruft's, 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland. Geary was on
the right at Wauhatchie, Cruft at the centre, and Osterhaus near Brown's
Ferry. These troops were all west of Lookout Creek. The enemy had the
east bank of the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and three
brigades of troops in the rear to reinforce them if attacked. These
brigades occupied the summit of the mountain. General Carter L.
Stevenson was in command of the whole. Why any troops, except artillery
with a small infantry guard, were kept on the mountain-top, I do not
see. A hundred men could have held the summit--which is a palisade for
more than thirty feet down--against the assault of any number of men
from the position Hooker occupied.

The side of Lookout Mountain confronting Hooker's command was rugged,
heavily timbered, and full of chasms, making it difficult to advance
with troops, even in the absence of an opposing force. Farther up, the
ground becomes more even and level, and was in cultivation. On the east
side the slope is much more gradual, and a good wagon road, zigzagging
up it, connects the town of Chattanooga with the summit.

Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved Geary's division,
supported by a brigade of Cruft's, up Lookout Creek, to effect a
crossing. The remainder of Cruft's division was to seize the bridge
over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. Osterhaus was to move
up to the bridge and cross it. The bridge was seized by Gross's brigade
after a slight skirmish with the pickets guarding it. This attracted
the enemy so that Geary's movement farther up was not observed. A heavy
mist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of the
mountain. He crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured the
picket of over forty men on guard near by. He then commenced ascending
the mountain directly in his front. By this time the enemy was seen
coming down from their camps on the mountain slope, and filing into
their rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the bridge. By eleven
o'clock the bridge was complete. Osterhaus was up, and after some sharp
skirmishing the enemy was driven away with considerable loss in killed
and captured.

While the operations at the bridge were progressing, Geary was pushing
up the hill over great obstacles, resisted by the enemy directly in his
front, and in face of the guns on top of the mountain. The enemy,
seeing their left flank and rear menaced, gave way, and were followed by
Cruft and Osterhaus. Soon these were up abreast of Geary, and the whole
command pushed up the hill, driving the enemy in advance. By noon Geary
had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with his
right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strong
fortifications in his front. The rest of the command coming up, a line
was formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth of
Chattanooga Creek.

Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knob. Hooker's advance now made
our line a continuous one. It was in full view, extending from the
Tennessee River, where Sherman had crossed, up Chickamauga River to the
base of Mission Ridge, over the top of the north end of the ridge to
Chattanooga Valley, then along parallel to the ridge a mile or more,
across the valley to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek, thence up the slope
of Lookout Mountain to the foot of the upper palisade. The day was
hazy, so that Hooker's operations were not visible to us except at
moments when the clouds would rise. But the sound of his artillery and
musketry was heard incessantly. The enemy on his front was partially
fortified, but was soon driven out of his works. During the afternoon
the clouds, which had so obscured the top of Lookout all day as to hide
whatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down and
made it so dark where Hooker was as to stop operations for the time. At
four o'clock Hooker reported his position as impregnable. By a little
after five direct communication was established, and a brigade of troops
was sent from Chattanooga to reinforce him. These troops had to cross
Chattanooga Creek and met with some opposition, but soon overcame it,
and by night the commander, General Carlin, reported to Hooker and was
assigned to his left. I now telegraphed to Washington: "The fight
to-day progressed favorably. Sherman carried the end of Missionary
Ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and his left at Chickamauga
Creek. Troops from Lookout Valley carried the point of the mountain, and
now hold the eastern slope and a point high up. Hooker reports two
thousand prisoners taken, besides which a small number have fallen into
our hands from Missionary Ridge." The next day the President replied:
"Your dispatches as to fighting on Monday and Tuesday are here. Well
done. Many thanks to all. Remember Burnside." And Halleck also
telegraphed: "I congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans.
I fear that Burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay may
prove fatal. I know you will do all in your power to relieve him."

The division of Jefferson C. Davis, Army of the Cumberland, had been
sent to the North Chickamauga to guard the pontoons as they were
deposited in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress of
citizens. On the night of the 24th his division, having crossed with
Sherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper bridge over the plain
to the north base of Missionary Ridge. Firing continued to a late hour
in the night, but it was not connected with an assault at any point.



CHAPTER XLIV.

BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA--A GALLANT CHARGE--COMPLETE ROUT OF THE ENEMY
--PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES--GENERAL BRAGG--REMARKS ON CHATTANOOGA.

At twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, I began to give orders
for the next day, and sent a dispatch to Willcox to encourage Burnside.
Sherman was directed to attack at daylight. Hooker was ordered to move
at the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he
still remained; if he had gone, then to move directly to Rossville and
operate against the left and rear of the force on Missionary Ridge.
Thomas was not to move until Hooker had reached Missionary Ridge. As I
was with him on Orchard Knob, he would not move without further orders
from me.

The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was
in full view from the top of Orchard Knob. It remained so all day.
Bragg's headquarters were in full view, and officers--presumably staff
officers--could be seen coming and going constantly.

The point of ground which Sherman had carried on the 24th was almost
disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. A low pass, over
which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and near which there is a
railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills. The problem now was
to get to the main ridge. The enemy was fortified on the point; and back
farther, where the ground was still higher, was a second fortification
commanding the first. Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to
see, and by sunrise his command was in motion. Three brigades held the
hill already gained. Morgan L. Smith moved along the east base of
Missionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base, supported by two brigades
of John E. Smith's division; and Corse with his brigade was between the
two, moving directly towards the hill to be captured. The ridge is
steep and heavily wooded on the east side, where M. L. Smith's troops
were advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the west
side. The troops advanced rapidly and carried the extreme end of the
rebel works. Morgan L. Smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy
off from the railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by
rail from Chickamauga Station, where the main depot was located. The
enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from the
position we had gained, but without success. The contest lasted for two
hours. Corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded in
this assault. Sherman now threatened both Bragg's flank and his stores,
and made it necessary for him to weaken other points of his line to
strengthen his right. From the position I occupied I could see column
after column of Bragg's forces moving against Sherman. Every
Confederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the Union forces was
concentrated upon him. J. E. Smith, with two brigades, charged up the
west side of the ridge to the support of Corse's command, over open
ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry,
and reached the very parapet of the enemy. He lay here for a time, but
the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he was
compelled to fall back, followed by the foe. A few hundred yards
brought Smith's troops into a wood, where they were speedily reformed,
when they charged and drove the attacking party back to his
intrenchments.

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