Book: The Memoirs of General Ulysses S. Grant, Part 4.

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The probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as we
were the attacking party. The enemy reported his loss in killed at 361:
but as he reported his missing at 4,146, while we held over 6,000 of
them as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds if not thousands
who deserted, but little reliance can be placed on this report. There
was certainly great dissatisfaction with Bragg on the part of the
soldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away
if they could. Then, too, Chattanooga, following in the same half year
with Gettysburg in the East and Vicksburg in the West, there was much
the same feeling in the South at this time that there had been in the
North the fall and winter before. If the same license had been allowed
the people and press in the South that was allowed in the North,
Chattanooga would probably have been the last battle fought for the
preservation of the Union.

General William F. Smith's services in these battles had been such that
I thought him eminently entitled to promotion. I was aware that he had
previously been named by the President for promotion to the grade of
major-general, but that the Senate had rejected the nomination. I was
not aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore strongly
recommended him for a major-generalcy. My recommendation was heeded and
the appointment made.

Upon the raising of the siege of Knoxville I, of course, informed the
authorities at Washington--the President and Secretary of War--of the
fact, which caused great rejoicing there. The President especially was
rejoiced that Knoxville had been relieved (*18) without further
bloodshed. The safety of Burnside's army and the loyal people of East
Tennessee had been the subject of much anxiety to the President for
several months, during which time he was doing all he could to relieve
the situation; sending a new commander (*19) with a few thousand troops
by the way of Cumberland Gap, and telegraphing me daily, almost hourly,
to "remember Burnside," "do something for Burnside," and other appeals
of like tenor. He saw no escape for East Tennessee until after our
victory at Chattanooga. Even then he was afraid that Burnside might be
out of ammunition, in a starving condition, or overpowered: and his
anxiety was still intense until he heard that Longstreet had been driven
from the field.

Burnside followed Longstreet only to Strawberry Plains, some twenty
miles or more east, and then stopped, believing that Longstreet would
leave the State. The latter did not do so, however, but stopped only a
short distance farther on and subsisted his army for the entire winter
off East Tennessee. Foster now relieved Burnside. Sherman made
disposition of his troops along the Tennessee River in accordance with
instructions. I left Thomas in command at Chattanooga, and, about the
20th of December, moved my headquarters to Nashville, Tennessee.

Nashville was the most central point from which to communicate with my
entire military division, and also with the authorities at Washington.
While remaining at Chattanooga I was liable to have my telegraphic
communications cut so as to throw me out of communication with both my
command and Washington.

Nothing occurred at Nashville worthy of mention during the winter, (*20)
so I set myself to the task of having troops in positions from which
they could move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary supplies
so as to be ready to claim a due share of the enemy's attention upon the
appearance of the first good weather in the spring. I expected to
retain the command I then had, and prepared myself for the campaign
against Atlanta. I also had great hopes of having a campaign made
against Mobile from the Gulf. I expected after Atlanta fell to occupy
that place permanently, and to cut off Lee's army from the West by way
of the road running through Augusta to Atlanta and thence south-west. I
was preparing to hold Atlanta with a small garrison, and it was my
expectation to push through to Mobile if that city was in our
possession: if not, to Savannah; and in this manner to get possession
of the only east and west railroad that would then be left to the enemy.
But the spring campaign against Mobile was not made.

The Army of the Ohio had been getting supplies over Cumberland Gap until
their animals had nearly all starved. I now determined to go myself to
see if there was any possible chance of using that route in the spring,
and if not to abandon it. Accordingly I left Nashville in the latter
part of December by rail for Chattanooga. From Chattanooga I took one of
the little steamers previously spoken of as having been built there,
and, putting my horses aboard, went up to the junction of the Clinch
with the Tennessee. From that point the railroad had been repaired up
to Knoxville and out east to Strawberry Plains. I went by rail
therefore to Knoxville, where I remained for several days. General John
G. Foster was then commanding the Department of the Ohio. It was an
intensely cold winter, the thermometer being down as low as zero every
morning for more than a week while I was at Knoxville and on my way from
there on horseback to Lexington, Kentucky, the first point where I could
reach rail to carry me back to my headquarters at Nashville.

The road over Cumberland Gap, and back of it, was strewn with debris of
broken wagons and dead animals, much as I had found it on my first trip
to Chattanooga over Waldron's Ridge. The road had been cut up to as
great a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons, and in that
condition frozen; so that the ride of six days from Strawberry Plains to
Lexington over these holes and knobs in the road was a very cheerless
one, and very disagreeable.

I found a great many people at home along that route, both in Tennessee
and Kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely loyal. They would
collect in little places where we would stop of evenings, to see me,
generally hearing of my approach before we arrived. The people
naturally expected to see the commanding general the oldest person in
the party. I was then forty-one years of age, while my medical director
was gray-haired and probably twelve or more years my senior. The crowds
would generally swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity of
quietly dismounting and getting into the house. It also gave me an
opportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to another
about their general. Those remarks were apt to be more complimentary to
the cause than to the appearance of the supposed general, owing to his
being muffled up, and also owing to the travel-worn condition we were
all in after a hard day's ride. I was back in Nashville by the 13th of
January, 1864.

When I started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some person
along who could turn dispatches into cipher, and who could also read the
cipher dispatches which I was liable to receive daily and almost hourly.
Under the rules of the War Department at that time, Mr. Stanton had
taken entire control of the matter of regulating the telegraph and
determining how it should be used, and of saying who, and who alone,
should have the ciphers. The operators possessed of the ciphers, as
well as the ciphers used, were practically independent of the commanders
whom they were serving immediately under, and had to report to the War
Department through General Stager all the dispatches which they received
or forwarded.

I was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator back at Nashville,
because that was the point at which all dispatches to me would come, to
be forwarded from there. As I have said, it was necessary for me also
to have an operator during this inspection who had possession of this
cipher to enable me to telegraph to my division and to the War
Department without my dispatches being read by all the operators along
the line of wires over which they were transmitted. Accordingly I
ordered the cipher operator to turn over the key to Captain Cyrus B.
Comstock, of the Corps of Engineers, whom I had selected as a wise and
discreet man who certainly could be trusted with the cipher if the
operator at my headquarters could.

The operator refused point blank to turn over the key to Captain
Comstock as directed by me, stating that his orders from the War
Department were not to give it to anybody--the commanding general or any
one else. I told him I would see whether he would or not. He said that
if he did he would be punished. I told him if he did not he most
certainly would be punished. Finally, seeing that punishment was certain
if he refused longer to obey my order, and being somewhat remote (even
if he was not protected altogether from the consequences of his
disobedience to his orders) from the War Department, he yielded. When I
returned from Knoxville I found quite a commotion. The operator had
been reprimanded very severely and ordered to be relieved. I informed
the Secretary of War, or his assistant secretary in charge of the
telegraph, Stager, that the man could not be relieved, for he had only
obeyed my orders. It was absolutely necessary for me to have the
cipher, and the man would most certainly have been punished if he had
not delivered it; that they would have to punish me if they punished
anybody, or words to that effect.

This was about the only thing approaching a disagreeable difference
between the Secretary of War and myself that occurred until the war was
over, when we had another little spat. Owing to his natural disposition
to assume all power and control in all matters that he had anything
whatever to do with, he boldly took command of the armies, and, while
issuing no orders on the subject, prohibited any order from me going out
of the adjutant-general's office until he had approved it. This was
done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders that came from
me to be issued from the adjutant-general's office until he had examined
them and given his approval. He never disturbed himself, either, in
examining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him; so that
orders which I had prepared would often lie there three or four days
before he would sanction them. I remonstrated against this in writing,
and the Secretary apologetically restored me to my rightful position of
General-in-Chief of the Army. But he soon lapsed again and took control
much as before.

After the relief of Knoxville Sherman had proposed to Burnside that he
should go with him to drive Longstreet out of Tennessee; but Burnside
assured him that with the troops which had been brought by Granger, and
which were to be left, he would be amply prepared to dispose of
Longstreet without availing himself of this offer. As before stated
Sherman's command had left their camps north of the Tennessee, near
Chattanooga, with two days' rations in their haversacks, without coats
or blankets, and without many wagons, expecting to return to their camps
by the end of that time. The weather was now cold and they were
suffering, but still they were ready to make the further sacrifice, had
it been required, for the good of the cause which had brought them into
service. Sherman, having accomplished the object for which he was sent,
marched back leisurely to his old camp on the Tennessee River.



CHAPTER XLVI.

OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI--LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE--COMMISSIONED
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL--COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES--FIRST
INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

Soon after his return from Knoxville I ordered Sherman to distribute his
forces from Stevenson to Decatur and thence north to Nashville; Sherman
suggested that he be permitted to go back to Mississippi, to the limits
of his own department and where most of his army still remained, for the
purpose of clearing out what Confederates might still be left on the
east bank of the Mississippi River to impede its navigation by our
boats. He expected also to have the co-operation of Banks to do the
same thing on the west shore. Of course I approved heartily.

About the 10th of January Sherman was back in Memphis, where Hurlbut
commanded, and got together his Memphis men, or ordered them collected
and sent to Vicksburg. He then went to Vicksburg and out to where
McPherson was in command, and had him organize his surplus troops so as
to give him about 20,000 men in all.

Sherman knew that General (Bishop) Polk was occupying Meridian with his
headquarters, and had two divisions of infantry with a considerable
force of cavalry scattered west of him. He determined, therefore, to
move directly upon Meridian.

I had sent some 2,500 cavalry under General Sooy Smith to Sherman's
department, and they had mostly arrived before Sherman got to Memphis.
Hurlbut had 7,000 cavalry, and Sherman ordered him to reinforce Smith so
as to give the latter a force of about 7,000 with which to go against
Forrest, who was then known to be south-east from Memphis. Smith was
ordered to move about the 1st of February.

While Sherman was waiting at Vicksburg for the arrival of Hurlbut with
his surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain the position and
strength of the enemy and to bring back all the information they could
gather. When these scouts returned it was through them that he got the
information of General Polk's being at Meridian, and of the strength and
disposition of his command.

Forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him, composed of thoroughly
well-disciplined men, who under so able a leader were very effective.
Smith's command was nearly double that of Forrest, but not equal, man to
man, for the lack of a successful experience such as Forrest's men had
had. The fact is, troops who have fought a few battles and won, and
followed up their victories, improve upon what they were before to an
extent that can hardly be counted by percentage. The difference in
result is often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat. This
same difference, too, is often due to the way troops are officered, and
for the particular kind of warfare which Forrest had carried on neither
army could present a more effective officer than he was.

Sherman got off on the 3d of February and moved out on his expedition,
meeting with no opposition whatever until he crossed the Big Black, and
with no great deal of opposition after that until he reached Jackson,
Mississippi. This latter place he reached on the 6th or 7th, Brandon on
the 8th, and Morton on the 9th. Up to this time he moved in two columns
to enable him to get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite the
march. Here, however, there were indications of the concentration of
Confederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his army close
together. He had no serious engagement; but he met some of the enemy
who destroyed a few of his wagons about Decatur, Mississippi, where, by
the way, Sherman himself came near being picked up.

He entered Meridian on the 14th of the month, the enemy having retreated
toward Demopolis, Alabama. He spent several days in Meridian in
thoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and south, and also for
the purpose of hearing from Sooy Smith, who he supposed had met Forrest
before this time and he hoped had gained a decisive victory because of a
superiority of numbers. Hearing nothing of him, however, he started on
his return trip to Vicksburg. There he learned that Smith, while
waiting for a few of his men who had been ice-bound in the Ohio River,
instead of getting off on the 1st as expected, had not left until the
11th. Smith did meet Forrest, but the result was decidedly in Forrest's
favor.

Sherman had written a letter to Banks, proposing a co-operative movement
with him against Shreveport, subject to my approval. I disapproved of
Sherman's going himself, because I had other important work for him to
do, but consented that he might send a few troops to the aid of Banks,
though their time to remain absent must be limited. We must have them
for the spring campaign. The trans-Mississippi movement proved
abortive.

My eldest son, who had accompanied me on the Vicksburg campaign and
siege, had while there contracted disease, which grew worse, until he
had grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of January I obtained
permission to go to St. Louis, where he was staying at the time, to see
him, hardly expecting to find him alive on my arrival. While I was
permitted to go, I was not permitted to turn over my command to any one
else, but was directed to keep the headquarters with me and to
communicate regularly with all parts of my division and with Washington,
just as though I had remained at Nashville.

When I obtained this leave I was at Chattanooga, having gone there again
to make preparations to have the troops of Thomas in the southern part
of Tennessee co-operate with Sherman's movement in Mississippi. I
directed Thomas, and Logan who was at Scottsboro, Alabama, to keep up a
threatening movement to the south against J. E. Johnston, who had again
relieved Bragg, for the purpose of making him keep as many troops as
possible there.

I learned through Confederate sources that Johnston had already sent two
divisions in the direction of Mobile, presumably to operate against
Sherman, and two more divisions to Longstreet in East Tennessee. Seeing
that Johnston had depleted in this way, I directed Thomas to send at
least ten thousand men, besides Stanley's division which was already to
the east, into East Tennessee, and notified Schofield, who was now in
command in East Tennessee, of this movement of troops into his
department and also of the reinforcements Longstreet had received. My
object was to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee as a part of the
preparations for my spring campaign.

About this time General Foster, who had been in command of the
Department of the Ohio after Burnside until Schofield relieved him
(*21), advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keep
Longstreet just where he was; that he was perfectly quiet in East
Tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there, his whole well-equipped
army would be free to go to any place where it could effect the most for
their cause. I thought the advice was good, and, adopting that view,
countermanded the orders for pursuit of Longstreet.

On the 12th of February I ordered Thomas to take Dalton and hold it, if
possible; and I directed him to move without delay. Finding that he had
not moved, on the 17th I urged him again to start, telling him how
important it was, that the object of the movement was to co-operate with
Sherman, who was moving eastward and might be in danger. Then again on
the 21st, he not yet having started, I asked him if he could not start
the next day. He finally got off on the 22d or 23d. The enemy fell
back from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite as
strong and farther to the rear. Thomas reported that he could not go
any farther, because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearly
starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired. He soon
fell back.

Schofield also had to return for the same reason. He could not carry
supplies with him, and Longstreet was between him and the supplies still
left in the country. Longstreet, in his retreat, would be moving
towards his supplies, while our forces, following, would be receding
from theirs. On the 2d of March, however, I learned of Sherman's
success, which eased my mind very much. The next day, the 3d, I was
ordered to Washington.

The bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general of the army had
passed through Congress and became a law on the 26th of February. My
nomination had been sent to the Senate on the 1st of March and confirmed
the next day (the 2d). I was ordered to Washington on the 3d to receive
my commission, and started the day following that. The commission was
handed to me on the 9th. It was delivered to me at the Executive
Mansion by President Lincoln in the presence of his Cabinet, my eldest
son, those of my staff who were with me and and a few other visitors.

The President in presenting my commission read from a paper--stating,
however, as a preliminary, and prior to the delivery of it, that he had
drawn that up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in public,
and handed me a copy in advance so that I might prepare a few lines of
reply. The President said:

"General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its
reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great
struggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting you
lieutenant-general in the Army of the United States. With this high
honor, devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. As the
country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I
scarcely need to add, that, with what I here speak for the nation, goes
my own hearty personal concurrence."

To this I replied: "Mr. President, I accept the commission, with
gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noble
armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it
will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel
the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and I know
that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, to
the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men."

On the 10th I visited the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac at
Brandy Station; then returned to Washington, and pushed west at once to
make my arrangements for turning over the commands there and giving
general directions for the preparations to be made for the spring
campaign.

It had been my intention before this to remain in the West, even if I
was made lieutenant-general; but when I got to Washington and saw the
situation it was plain that here was the point for the commanding
general to be. No one else could, probably, resist the pressure that
would be brought to bear upon him to desist from his own plans and
pursue others. I determined, therefore, before I started back to have
Sherman advanced to my late position, McPherson to Sherman's in command
of the department, and Logan to the command of McPherson's corps. These
changes were all made on my recommendation and without hesitation. My
commission as lieutenant-general was given to me on the 9th of March,
1864. On the following day, as already stated, I visited General Meade,
commanding the Army of the Potomac, at his headquarters at Brandy
Station, north of the Rapidan. I had known General Meade slightly in
the Mexican war, but had not met him since until this visit. I was a
stranger to most of the Army of the Potomac, I might say to all except
the officers of the regular army who had served in the Mexican war.
There had been some changes ordered in the organization of that army
before my promotion. One was the consolidation of five corps into
three, thus throwing some officers of rank out of important commands.
Meade evidently thought that I might want to make still one more change
not yet ordered. He said to me that I might want an officer who had
served with me in the West, mentioning Sherman specially, to take his
place. If so, he begged me not to hesitate about making the change. He
urged that the work before us was of such vast importance to the whole
nation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in the
way of selecting the right men for all positions. For himself, he would
serve to the best of his ability wherever placed. I assured him that I
had no thought of substituting any one for him. As to Sherman, he could
not be spared from the West.

This incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of Meade than did
his great victory at Gettysburg the July before. It is men who wait to
be selected, and not those who seek, from whom we may always expect the
most efficient service.

Meade's position afterwards proved embarrassing to me if not to him. He
was commanding an army and, for nearly a year previous to my taking
command of all the armies, was in supreme command of the Army of the
Potomac--except from the authorities at Washington. All other general
officers occupying similar positions were independent in their commands
so far as any one present with them was concerned. I tried to make
General Meade's position as nearly as possible what it would have been
if I had been in Washington or any other place away from his command. I
therefore gave all orders for the movements of the Army of the Potomac
to Meade to have them executed. To avoid the necessity of having to
give orders direct, I established my headquarters near his, unless there
were reasons for locating them elsewhere. This sometimes happened, and
I had on occasions to give orders direct to the troops affected. On the
11th I returned to Washington and, on the day after, orders were
published by the War Department placing me in command of all the armies.
I had left Washington the night before to return to my old command in
the West and to meet Sherman whom I had telegraphed to join me in
Nashville.

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