Book: The Memoirs of General Ulysses S. Grant, Part 4.

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It was my plan then, as it was on all other occasions, to take the
initiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his intrenchments if
we were not intrenched ourselves. Warren had not yet reached the point
where he was to halt, when he discovered the enemy near by. Neither
party had any advantage of position. Warren was, therefore, ordered to
attack as soon as he could prepare for it. At nine o'clock Hancock was
ordered to come up to the support of Getty. He himself arrived at
Getty's front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the rear.
Getty was directed to hold his position at all hazards until relieved.
About this hour Warren was ready, and attacked with favorable though not
decisive results. Getty was somewhat isolated from Warren and was in a
precarious condition for a time. Wilson, with his division of cavalry,
was farther south, and was cut off from the rest of the army. At two
o'clock Hancock's troops began to arrive, and immediately he was ordered
to join Getty and attack the enemy. But the heavy timber and narrow
roads prevented him from getting into position for attack as promptly as
he generally did when receiving such orders. At four o'clock he again
received his orders to attack, and General Getty received orders from
Meade a few minutes later to attack whether Hancock was ready or not.
He met the enemy under Heth within a few hundred yards.

Hancock immediately sent two divisions, commanded by Birney and Mott,
and later two brigades, Carroll's and Owen's, to the support of Getty.
This was timely and saved Getty. During the battle Getty and Carroll
were wounded, but remained on the field. One of Birney's most gallant
brigade commanders--Alexander Hays--was killed.

I had been at West Point with Hays for three years, and had served with
him through the Mexican war, a portion of the time in the same regiment.
He was a most gallant officer, ready to lead his command wherever
ordered. With him it was "Come, boys," not "Go."

Wadsworth's division and Baxter's brigade of the 2d division were sent
to reinforce Hancock and Getty; but the density of the intervening
forest was such that, there being no road to march upon, they did not
get up with the head of column until night, and bivouacked where they
were without getting into position.

During the afternoon Sheridan sent Gregg's division of cavalry to Todd's
Tavern in search of Wilson. This was fortunate. He found Wilson
engaged with a superior force under General Rosser, supported by
infantry, and falling back before it. Together they were strong enough
to turn the tables upon the enemy and themselves become aggressive.
They soon drove the rebel cavalry back beyond Corbin's Bridge.

Fighting between Hancock and Hill continued until night put a close to
it. Neither side made any special progress.

After the close of the battle of the 5th of May my orders were given for
the following morning. We knew Longstreet with 12,000 men was on his
way to join Hill's right, near the Brock Road, and might arrive during
the night. I was anxious that the rebels should not take the initiative
in the morning, and therefore ordered Hancock to make an assault at 4.30
o'clock. Meade asked to have the hour changed to six. Deferring to his
wishes as far as I was willing, the order was modified and five was
fixed as the hour to move.

Hancock had now fully one-half of the Army of the Potomac. Wadsworth
with his division, which had arrived the night before, lay in a line
perpendicular to that held by Hill, and to the right of Hancock. He was
directed to move at the same time, and to attack Hill's left.

Burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, was directed to get in
between Warren and Wadsworth, and attack as soon as he could get in
position to do so. Sedgwick and Warren were to make attacks in their
front, to detain as many of the enemy as they could and to take
advantage of any attempt to reinforce Hill from that quarter. Burnside
was ordered if he should succeed in breaking the enemy's centre, to
swing around to the left and envelop the right of Lee's army. Hancock
was informed of all the movements ordered.

Burnside had three divisions, but one of them--a colored division--was
sent to guard the wagon train, and he did not see it again until July.

Lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on his
right until Longstreet got up. This is evident from the fact that
notwithstanding the early hour at which I had ordered the assault, both
for the purpose of being the attacking party and to strike before
Longstreet got up, Lee was ahead in his assault on our right. His
purpose was evident, but he failed.

Hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in time
that Longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the Catharpin Road,
thus threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, commanded
by General Barlow, with all his artillery, to cover the approaches by
which Longstreet was expected. This disposition was made in time to
attack as ordered. Hancock moved by the left of the Orange Plank Road,
and Wadsworth by the right of it. The fighting was desperate for about
an hour, when the enemy began to break up in great confusion.

I believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now, that if
the country had been such that Hancock and his command could have seen
the confusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it would have been
taken advantage of so effectually that Lee would not have made another
stand outside of his Richmond defences.

Gibbon commanded Hancock's left, and was ordered to attack, but was not
able to accomplish much.

On the morning of the 6th Sheridan was sent to connect with Hancock's
left and attack the enemy's cavalry who were trying to get on our left
and rear. He met them at the intersection of the Furnace and Brock
roads and at Todd's Tavern, and defeated them at both places. Later he
was attacked, and again the enemy was repulsed.

Hancock heard the firing between Sheridan and Stuart, and thinking the
enemy coming by that road, still further reinforced his position
guarding the entrance to the Brock Road. Another incident happened
during the day to further induce Hancock to weaken his attacking column.
Word reached him that troops were seen moving towards him from the
direction of Todd's Tavern, and Brooke's brigade was detached to meet
this new enemy; but the troops approaching proved to be several hundred
convalescents coming from Chancellorsville, by the road Hancock had
advanced upon, to join their respective commands. At 6.50 o'clock A.M.,
Burnside, who had passed Wilderness Tavern at six o'clock, was ordered
to send a division to the support of Hancock, but to continue with the
remainder of his command in the execution of his previous order. The
difficulty of making a way through the dense forests prevented Burnside
from getting up in time to be of any service on the forenoon of the
sixth.

Hancock followed Hill's retreating forces, in the morning, a mile or
more. He maintained this position until, along in the afternoon,
Longstreet came upon him. The retreating column of Hill meeting
reinforcements that had not yet been engaged, became encouraged and
returned with them. They were enabled, from the density of the forest,
to approach within a few hundred yards of our advance before being
discovered. Falling upon a brigade of Hancock's corps thrown to the
advance, they swept it away almost instantly. The enemy followed up his
advantage and soon came upon Mott's division, which fell back in great
confusion. Hancock made dispositions to hold his advanced position, but
after holding it for a time, fell back into the position that he had
held in the morning, which was strongly intrenched. In this engagement
the intrepid Wadsworth while trying to rally his men was mortally
wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. The enemy followed up,
but made no immediate attack.

The Confederate General Jenkins was killed and Longstreet seriously
wounded in this engagement. Longstreet had to leave the field, not to
resume command for many weeks. His loss was a severe one to Lee, and
compensated in a great measure for the mishap, or misapprehensions,
which had fallen to our lot during the day.

After Longstreet's removal from the field Lee took command of his right
in person. He was not able, however, to rally his men to attack
Hancock's position, and withdrew from our front for the purpose of
reforming. Hancock sent a brigade to clear his front of all remnants
that might be left of Longstreet's or Hill's commands. This brigade
having been formed at right angles to the intrenchments held by
Hancock's command, swept down the whole length of them from left to
right. A brigade of the enemy was encountered in this move; but it
broke and disappeared without a contest.

Firing was continued after this, but with less fury. Burnside had not
yet been able to get up to render any assistance. But it was now only
about nine in the morning, and he was getting into position on Hancock's
right.

At 4.15 in the afternoon Lee attacked our left. His line moved up to
within a hundred yards of ours and opened a heavy fire. This status was
maintained for about half an hour. Then a part of Mott's division and
Ward's brigade of Birney's division gave way and retired in disorder.
The enemy under R. H. Anderson took advantage of this and pushed through
our line, planting their flags on a part of the intrenchments not on
fire. But owing to the efforts of Hancock, their success was but
temporary. Carroll, of Gibbon's division, moved at a double quick with
his brigade and drove back the enemy, inflicting great loss. Fighting
had continued from five in the morning sometimes along the whole line,
at other times only in places. The ground fought over had varied in
width, but averaged three-quarters of a mile. The killed, and many of
the severely wounded, of both armies, lay within this belt where it was
impossible to reach them. The woods were set on fire by the bursting
shells, and the conflagration raged. The wounded who had not strength
to move themselves were either suffocated or burned to death. Finally
the fire communicated with our breastworks, in places. Being
constructed of wood, they burned with great fury. But the battle still
raged, our men firing through the flames until it became too hot to
remain longer.

Lee was now in distress. His men were in confusion, and his personal
efforts failed to restore order. These facts, however, were learned
subsequently, or we would have taken advantage of his condition and no
doubt gained a decisive success. His troops were withdrawn now, but I
revoked the order, which I had given previously to this assault, for
Hancock to attack, because his troops had exhausted their ammunition and
did not have time to replenish from the train, which was at some
distance.

Burnside, Sedgwick, and Warren had all kept up an assault during all
this time; but their efforts had no other effect than to prevent the
enemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in their front.

I had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the Rapidan to be taken
up except one at Germania Ford.

The troops on Sedgwick's right had been sent to enforce our left. This
left our right in danger of being turned, and us of being cut off from
all present base of supplies. Sedgwick had refused his right and
intrenched it for protection against attack. But late in the afternoon
of the 6th Early came out from his lines in considerable force and got
in upon Sedgwick's right, notwithstanding the precautions taken, and
created considerable confusion. Early captured several hundred
prisoners, among them two general officers. The defence, however, was
vigorous; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown into as much
confusion as our troops, engaged, were. Early says in his Memoirs that
if we had discovered the confusion in his lines we might have brought
fresh troops to his great discomfort. Many officers, who had not been
attacked by Early, continued coming to my headquarters even after
Sedgwick had rectified his lines a little farther to the rear, with news
of the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy was
pushing on and would soon be upon me.

During the night all of Lee's army withdrew within their intrenchments.
On the morning of the 7th General Custer drove the enemy's cavalry from
Catharpin Furnace to Todd's Tavern. Pickets and skirmishers were sent
along our entire front to find the position of the enemy. Some went as
far as a mile and a half before finding him. But Lee showed no
disposition to come out of his Works. There was no battle during the
day, and but little firing except in Warren's front; he being directed
about noon to make a reconnoissance in force. This drew some sharp
firing, but there was no attempt on the part of Lee to drive him back.
This ended the Battle of the Wilderness.



CHAPTER LI.

AFTER THE BATTLE--TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE--MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT
FLANK.

More desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent than
that of the 5th and 6th of May. Our victory consisted in having
successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the face of an
enemy, and in getting the army together as a unit. We gained an
advantage on the morning of the 6th, which, if it had been followed up,
must have proven very decisive. In the evening the enemy gained an
advantage; but was speedily repulsed. As we stood at the close, the two
armies were relatively in about the same condition to meet each other as
when the river divided them. But the fact of having safely crossed was
a victory.

Our losses in the Wilderness were very severe. Those of the
Confederates must have been even more so; but I have no means of
speaking with accuracy upon this point. The Germania Ford bridge was
transferred to Ely's Ford to facilitate the transportation of the
wounded to Washington.

It may be as well here as elsewhere to state two things connected with
all movements of the Army of the Potomac: first, in every change of
position or halt for the night, whether confronting the enemy or not,
the moment arms were stacked the men intrenched themselves. For this
purpose they would build up piles of logs or rails if they could be
found in their front, and dig a ditch, throwing the dirt forward on the
timber. Thus the digging they did counted in making a depression to
stand in, and increased the elevation in front of them. It was
wonderful how quickly they could in this way construct defences of
considerable strength. When a halt was made with the view of assaulting
the enemy, or in his presence, these would be strengthened or their
positions changed under the direction of engineer officers. The second
was, the use made of the telegraph and signal corps. Nothing could be
more complete than the organization and discipline of this body of brave
and intelligent men. Insulated wires--insulated so that they would
transmit messages in a storm, on the ground or under water--were wound
upon reels, making about two hundred pounds weight of wire to each reel.
Two men and one mule were detailed to each reel. The pack-saddle on
which this was carried was provided with a rack like a sawbuck placed
crosswise of the saddle, and raised above it so that the reel, with its
wire, would revolve freely. There was a wagon, supplied with a
telegraph operator, battery and telegraph instruments for each division,
each corps, each army, and one for my headquarters. There were wagons
also loaded with light poles, about the size and length of a wall tent
pole, supplied with an iron spike in one end, used to hold the wires up
when laid, so that wagons and artillery would not run over them. The
mules thus loaded were assigned to brigades, and always kept with the
command they were assigned to. The operators were also assigned to
particular headquarters, and never changed except by special orders.

The moment the troops were put in position to go into camp all the men
connected with this branch of service would proceed to put up their
wires. A mule loaded with a coil of wire would be led to the rear of
the nearest flank of the brigade he belonged to, and would be led in a
line parallel thereto, while one man would hold an end of the wire and
uncoil it as the mule was led off. When he had walked the length of the
wire the whole of it would be on the ground. This would be done in rear
of every brigade at the same time. The ends of all the wires would then
be joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole army. The
men, attached to brigades or divisions, would all commence at once
raising the wires with their telegraph poles. This was done by making a
loop in the wire and putting it over the spike and raising the pole to a
perpendicular position. At intervals the wire would be attached to
trees, or some other permanent object, so that one pole was sufficient
at a place. In the absence of such a support two poles would have to be
used, at intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm in
its place. While this was being done the telegraph wagons would take
their positions near where the headquarters they belonged to were to be
established, and would connect with the wire. Thus, in a few minutes
longer time than it took a mule to walk the length of its coil,
telegraphic communication would be effected between all the headquarters
of the army. No orders ever had to be given to establish the telegraph.

The signal service was used on the march. The men composing this corps
were assigned to specified commands. When movements were made, they
would go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize upon high points of
ground giving a commanding view of the country, if cleared, or would
climb tall trees on the highest points if not cleared, and would denote,
by signals, the positions of different parts of our own army, and often
the movements of the enemy. They would also take off the signals of the
enemy and transmit them. It would sometimes take too long a time to
make translations of intercepted dispatches for us to receive any
benefit from them. But sometimes they gave useful information.

On the afternoon of the 7th I received news from Washington announcing
that Sherman had probably attacked Johnston that day, and that Butler
had reached City Point safely and taken it by surprise on the 5th. I
had given orders for a movement by the left flank, fearing that Lee
might move rapidly to Richmond to crush Butler before I could get there.

My order for this movement was as follows:


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S., May 7, 1864, 6.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P.

Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take position
at Spottsylvania C. H. with one army corps, at Todd's Tavern with one,
and another near the intersection of the Piney Branch and Spottsylvania
road with the road from Alsop's to Old Court House. If this move is
made the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the Ny
River.

I think it would be advisable in making the change to leave Hancock
where he is until Warren passes him. He could then follow and become
the right of the new line. Burnside will move to Piney Branch Church.
Sedgwick can move along the pike to Chancellorsville and on to his
destination. Burnside will move on the plank road to the intersection
of it with the Orange and Fredericksburg plank road, then follow
Sedgwick to his place of destination.

All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troops
move, and then move off quietly.

It is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy attack
on Hancock this afternoon. In case they do we must be prepared to
resist them, and follow up any success we may gain, with our whole
force. Such a result would necessarily modify these instructions.

All the hospitals should be moved to-day to Chancellorsville.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


During the 7th Sheridan had a fight with the rebel cavalry at Todd's
Tavern, but routed them, thus opening the way for the troops that were
to go by that route at night. Soon after dark Warren withdrew from the
front of the enemy, and was soon followed by Sedgwick. Warren's march
carried him immediately behind the works where Hancock's command lay on
the Brock Road. With my staff and a small escort of cavalry I preceded
the troops. Meade with his staff accompanied me. The greatest
enthusiasm was manifested by Hancock's men as we passed by. No doubt it
was inspired by the fact that the movement was south. It indicated to
them that they had passed through the "beginning of the end" in the
battle just fought. The cheering was so lusty that the enemy must have
taken it for a night attack. At all events it drew from him a furious
fusillade of artillery and musketry, plainly heard but not felt by us.

Meade and I rode in advance. We had passed but a little way beyond our
left when the road forked. We looked to see, if we could, which road
Sheridan had taken with his cavalry during the day. It seemed to be the
right-hand one, and accordingly we took it. We had not gone far,
however, when Colonel C. B. Comstock, of my staff, with the instinct of
the engineer, suspecting that we were on a road that would lead us into
the lines of the enemy, if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at a
rapid gallop and all alone. In a few minutes he returned and reported
that Lee was moving, and that the road we were on would bring us into
his lines in a short distance. We returned to the forks of the road,
left a man to indicate the right road to the head of Warren's column
when it should come up, and continued our journey to Todd's Tavern,
where we arrived after midnight.

My object in moving to Spottsylvania was two-fold: first, I did not
want Lee to get back to Richmond in time to attempt to crush Butler
before I could get there; second, I wanted to get between his army and
Richmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into the open field. But
Lee, by accident, beat us to Spottsylvania. Our wagon trains had been
ordered easterly of the roads the troops were to march upon before the
movement commenced. Lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the Army
of the Potomac to Fredericksburg, and so informed his government.
Accordingly he ordered Longstreet's corps--now commanded by Anderson--to
move in the morning (the 8th) to Spottsylvania. But the woods being
still on fire, Anderson could not go into bivouac, and marched directly
on to his destination that night. By this accident Lee got possession
of Spottsylvania. It is impossible to say now what would have been the
result if Lee's orders had been obeyed as given; but it is certain that
we would have been in Spottsylvania, and between him and his capital.
My belief is that there would have been a race between the two armies to
see which could reach Richmond first, and the Army of the Potomac would
have had the shorter line. Thus, twice since crossing the Rapidan we
came near closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, from
the Rapidan to the James River or Richmond. The first failure was
caused by our not following up the success gained over Hill's corps on
the morning of the 6th, as before described: the second, when fires
caused by that battle drove Anderson to make a march during the night of
the 7th-8th which he was ordered to commence on the morning of the 8th.
But accident often decides the fate of battle.

Sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fighting during the afternoon of
the 7th, lasting at Todd's Tavern until after night, with the field his
at the close. He issued the necessary orders for seizing Spottsylvania
and holding the bridge over the Po River, which Lee's troops would have
to cross to get to Spottsylvania. But Meade changed Sheridan's orders
to Merritt--who was holding the bridge--on his arrival at Todd's Tavern,
and thereby left the road free for Anderson when he came up. Wilson,
who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his division of cavalry;
but he could not hold it against the Confederate corps which had not
been detained at the crossing of the Po, as it would have been but for
the unfortunate change in Merritt's orders. Had he been permitted to
execute the orders Sheridan gave him, he would have been guarding with
two brigades of cavalry the bridge over the Po River which Anderson had
to cross, and must have detained him long enough to enable Warren to
reinforce Wilson and hold the town.

Anderson soon intrenched himself--if indeed the intrenchments were not
already made--immediately across Warren's front. Warren was not aware of
his presence, but probably supposed it was the cavalry which Merritt had
engaged earlier in the day. He assaulted at once, but was repulsed. He
soon organized his men, as they were not pursued by the enemy, and made
a second attack, this time with his whole corps. This time he succeeded
in gaining a position immediately in the enemy's front, where he
intrenched. His right and left divisions--the former Crawford's, the
latter Wadsworth's, now commanded by Cutler--drove the enemy back some
distance.

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