Book: Blackwood\'s Edinburgh Magazine, No. CCCXXIX.

V >> Various >> Blackwood\'s Edinburgh Magazine, No. CCCXXIX.




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COMTE.

_Cours de Philosophie Positive_, par M. Auguste Comte.


It is pleasant to find in some extreme, uncompromising, eccentric work,
written for the complete renovation of man, a new establishment of
truth, little else, after all its tempest of thought has swept over the
mind, than another confirmation of old, and long-settled, and temperate
views. Our sober philosophy, like some familiar landscape seen after a
thunder storm, comes out but the more distinct, the brighter, and the
more tranquil, for the bursting cloud and the windy tumult that had
passed over its surface. Some such experience have we just had. Our
Conservative principles, our calm and patient manner of viewing things,
have rarely received a stronger corroboration than from the perusal or
the extraordinary work of M. Comte--a work written, assuredly, for no
such comfortable purpose, but for the express object (so far as we can
at present state it to our readers) of re-organizing political society,
by means of an intellectual reformation amongst political thinkers.

We would not be thought to throw an idle sneer at those generous hopes
of the future destiny of society which have animated some of the noblest
and most vigorous minds. It is no part of a Conservative philosophy to
doubt on the broad question of the further and continuous improvement of
mankind. Nor will the perusal of M. Comte's work induce, or permit, such
a doubt. But while he leaves with his reader a strong impression of the
unceasing development of social man, he leaves a still stronger
impression of the futile or mischievous efforts of those--himself
amongst the number--who are thrusting themselves forward as the peculiar
and exclusive advocates of progress and improvement. He exhibits himself
in the attitude of an innovator, as powerless in effect as he is daring
to design; whilst, at the same time, he deals a _crashing_ blow (as upon
rival machinators) on that malignant party in European politics, whether
it call itself liberal or of the movement, whose most distinct aim seems
to be to unloose men from the bonds of civil government. We, too,
believe in the silent, irresistible progress of human society, but we
believe also that he is best working for posterity, as well as for the
welfare of his contemporaries, who promotes order and tranquil effort in
his own generation, by means of those elements of order which his own
generation supplies.

That which distinguishes M. Comte's work from all other courses of
philosophy, or treatises upon science, is the attempt to reduce to
the _scientific method_ of cogitation the affairs of human
society--morality, politics; in short, all those general topics which
occupy our solitary and perplexed meditation, or sustain the incessant
strife of controversy. These are to constitute a new science, to be
called _Social Physics_, or _Sociology_. To apply the Baconian, or, as
it is here called, the positive method, to man in all phases of his
existence--to introduce the same fixed, indissoluble, imperturbable
order in our ideas of morals, politics, and history, that we attain to
astronomy and mechanics, is the bold object of his labours. He does not
here set forth a model of human society based on scientific conclusions;
something of this kind is promised us in a future work; in the present
undertaking he is especially anxious to compel us to think on all such
topics in the scientific method, _and in no other_. For be it known,
that science is not only weak in herself, and has been hitherto
incompetent to the task of unravelling the complicate proceedings of
humanity, but she has also a great rival in the form of theologic
method, wherein the mind seeks a solution for its difficulties in a
power above nature. The human being has contracted an inveterate habit
of viewing itself as standing in a peculiar relation to a supreme
Architect and Governor of the world--a habit which in many ways, direct
and indirect, interferes, it seems, with the application of the positive
method. This habit is to be corrected; such supreme Architect and
Governor is to be dismissed from the imagination of men; science is to
supply the sole mode of thought, and humanity to be its only object.

We have called M. Comte's an extraordinary book, and this is an epithet
which our readers are already fully prepared to apply. But the book, in
our judgment, is extraordinary in more senses than one. It is as
remarkable for the great mental energy it displays, for its originality
and occasional profundity of thought, as it is for the astounding
conclusions to which it would conduct us, for its bold paradoxes, and
for what we can designate no otherwise than its egregious errors. As a
discipline of the mind, so far as a full appreciation is concerned of
the scientific method, it cannot be read without signal advantage. The
book is altogether an anomaly; exhibiting the strangest mixture that
ever mortal work betrayed of manifold blunder and great intellectual
power. The man thinks at times with the strength of a giant. Neither
does he fail, as we have already gathered, in the rebellious and
destructive propensities for which giants have been of old renowned.
Fable tells us how they could have no gods to reign over them, and how
they threatened to drive Jupiter himself from the skies. Our
intellectual representative of the race nourishes designs of equal
temerity. Like his earth-born predecessors, his rage, we may be sure,
will be equally vain. No thunder will be heard, neither will the hills
move to overwhelm him; but in due course of time he will lie down, and
be covered up with his own earth, and the heavens will be as bright and
stable as before, and still the abode of the same unassailable Power.

For the _style_ of M. Comte's work, it is not commendable. The
philosophical writers of his country are in general so distinguished for
excellence in this particular, their exposition of thought is so
remarkably felicitous, that a failure in a Frenchman in the mere art of
writing, appears almost as great an anomaly as any of the others which
characterize this production. During the earlier volumes, which are
occupied with a review of the recognized branches of science, the vices
of style are kept within bounds, but after he has entered on what is the
great subject of all his lucubrations, his social physics, they grow
distressingly conspicuous. The work extends to six volumes, some of them
of unusually large capacity; and by the time we arrive at the last and
the most bulky, the style, for its languor, its repetitions, its
prolixity, has become intolerable.

Of a work of this description, distinguished by such bold features,
remarkable for originality and subtlety, as well as for surprising
hardihood and eccentricity of thought, and bearing on its surface a
manner of exposition by no means attractive, we imagine that our readers
will not be indisposed to receive some notice. Its errors--supposing we
are capable of coping with them--are worthy of refutation. Moreover, as
we have hinted, the impression it conveys is, in relation to politics,
eminently Conservative; for, besides that he has exposed, with peculiar
vigour, the utter inadequacy of the movement, or liberal party, to
preside over the organization of society, there is nothing more
calculated to render us content with an _empirical_ condition of
tolerable well-being, than the exhibition (and such, we think, is here
presented to us) of a strong mind palpably at fault in its attempt to
substitute, out of its own theory of man, a better foundation for the
social structure than is afforded by the existing unphilosophical medley
of human thought. Upon that portion of the _Cours de Philosophie
Positive_ which treats of the sciences usually so called, we do not
intend to enter, nor do the general remarks we make apply to it. Our
limited object is to place our reader at the point of view which M.
Comte takes in his new science of Sociology; and to do this with any
justice to him or to ourselves, in the space we can allot to the
subject, will be a task of sufficient difficulty.

And first, as to the title of the work, _Philosophie Positive_, which
has, perhaps, all this while been perplexing the reader. The reasons
which induced M. Comte to adopt it, shall be given in his own words;
they could not have been appreciated until some general notion had been
given of the object he had in view.

"There is doubtless," he says, in his _Avertissement_, "a close
resemblance between my _Philosophie Positive_, and what the
English, especially since the days of Newton, understand by
_Natural Philosophy_. But I would not adopt this last
expression, any more than that of _Philosophy of the Sciences_,
which would have perhaps been still more precise, because
neither of these has yet been extended to all orders of
phenomena, whilst _Philosophie Positive_, in which I comprehend
the study of the social phenomena, as well as all others,
designs a uniform manner of reasoning applicable to all
subjects on which the human mind can be exerted. Besides which,
the expression _Natural Philosophy_ is employed in England to
denote the aggregate of the several sciences of observation,
considered even in their most minute details; whereas, by the
title of _Philosophie Positive_, I intimate, with regard to the
several positive sciences, a study of them only in their
generalities, conceiving them as submitted to a uniform method,
and forming the different parts of a general plan of research.
The term which I have been led to construct is, therefore, at
once more extended and more restricted than other
denominations, which are so far similar that they have
reference to the same fundamental class of ideas."

This very announcement of M. Comte's intention to comprehend in his
course of natural philosophy the study of the several phenomena, compels
us to enquire how far these are fit subjects for the strict application
of the scientific method. We waive the metaphysical question of the free
agency of man, and the theological question of the occasional
interference of the Divine Power; and presuming these to be decided in a
manner favourable to the project of our Sociologist, we still ask if it
be possible to make of the affairs of society--legislation and politics,
for instance--a department of science?

The mere multiplicity and complication of facts in this department of
enquiry, have been generally regarded as rendering such an attempt
hopeless. In any social problem of importance, we invariably feel that
to embrace the whole of the circumstances, with all their results and
dependencies, is really out of our power, and we are forced to content
ourselves with a judgment formed on what appear to us the principal
facts. Thus arise those limited truths, admitting of exceptions, of
qualification, of partial application, on which we are fain to rely in
the conduct of human affairs. In framing his measures, how often is the
statesman, or the jurist, made aware of the utter impossibility of
guarding them against every species of objection, or of so constructing
them that they shall present an equal front on every side! How still
more keenly is the speculative politician made to feel, when giving in
his adherence to some great line of policy, that he cannot gather in
under his conclusions _all_ the political truths he is master of! He
reluctantly resigns to his opponent the possession, or at least the
usufruct, of a certain class of truths which he is obliged to postpone
to others of more extensive or more urgent application.

But this multiplicity and complication of facts may merely render the
task of the Sociologist extremely difficult, not impossible; and the
half truths, and the perplexity of thought above alluded to, may only
prove that his scientific task has not yet been accomplished. Nothing is
here presented in the nature of the subject to exclude the strict
application of _the method_. There is, however, one essential,
distinctive attribute of human society which constitutes a difference in
the nature of the subject, so as to render impossible the same
scientific survey and appreciation of the social phenomena of the world
that we may expect to obtain of the physical. This is the gradual and
incessant _developement_ which humanity has displayed, and is still
displaying. Who can tell us that that _experience_ on which a fixed and
positive theory of social man is to be formed, is all before us? From
age to age that experience is enlarging.

In all recognized branches of science nature remains the same, and
continually repeats herself; she admits of no novelty; and what appears
new to us, from our late discovery of it, is as old as the most palpable
sequence of facts that, generation after generation, catches the eye of
childhood. The new discovery may disturb our theories, it disturbs not
the condition of things. All is still the same as it ever was. What we
possessed of real knowledge is real knowledge still. We sit down before
a maze of things bewildering enough; but the vast mechanism,
notwithstanding all its labyrinthian movements, is constant to itself,
and presents always the same problem to the observer. But in this
department of humanity, in this sphere of social existence, the case is
otherwise. The human being, with hand, with intellect, is incessantly at
work--has a progressive movement--_grows_ from age to age. He discovers,
he invents, he speculates; his own inventions react upon the inventor;
his own thoughts, creeds, speculations, become agents in the scene. Here
_new facts_ are actually from time to time starting into existence; new
elements are introduced into society, which science could not have
foreseen; for if they could have been foreseen, they would already have
been there. A new creed, even a new machine, may confound the wisest of
speculations. Man is, in relation to the science that would survey
society, a _creator_. In short, that stability in the order of events,
that invariable recurrence of the same linked series, on which science
depends for its very existence, here, in some measure, fails us. In such
degree, therefore, as humanity can be described as progressive, or
developing itself, in such degree is it an untractable subject for the
scientific method. We have but one world, but one humanity before us,
but one specimen of this self developing creature, and that perhaps but
half grown, but half developed. How can we know whereabouts _we are_ in
our course, and what is coming next? We want the history of some
extinguished world in which a humanity has run its full career; we need
to extend our observation to other planets peopled with similar but
variously developed inhabitants, in order scientifically to understand
such a race as ours.

What, for example, could be more safely stated as an eternal law of
society than that of property?--a law which so justly governs all our
political reasonings, and determines the character of our political
measures the most prospective--a law which M. Comte has not failed
himself to designate as fundamental. And yet, by what right of
demonstration can we pronounce this law to be inherent in humanity, so
that it shall accompany the race during every stage of its progress?
That industry should be rewarded by a personal, exclusive property in
the fruits of industry, is the principle consecrated by our law of
property, and to which the spontaneous passions of mankind have in all
regions of the earth conducted. Standing where we do, and looking out as
far as our intellectual vision can extend, we pronounce it to be the
basis of society; but if we added that, as long as the world lasts, it
must continue to be the basis of society, that there are no elements in
man to furnish forth, if circumstances favoured their development, a
quite different principle for the social organization, we feel that we
should be overstepping the modest bounds of truth, and stating our
proposition in terms far wider and more absolute than we were warranted.
Experiments have been made, and a tendency has repeatedly been
manifested, to frame an association of men in which the industry of the
individual should have its immediate reward and motive in the
participated prosperity of the general body--where the good of the whole
should be felt as the interest of each. _How_ such a principle is to be
established, we confess ourselves utterly at a loss to divine; but that
no future events unforeseen by us, no unexpected modification of the
circumstances affecting human character, shall ever develop and
establish such a principle--this is what no scientific mind would
venture to assert. Our knowledge is fully commensurate to our sphere of
activity, nor need it, nor _can_ it, pass beyond that sphere. We know
that the law of property now forms the basis of society; we know that an
attempt to abrogate it would be the signal for war and anarchy, and we
know this also, that _at no time_ can its opposite principle be
established by force, because its establishment will require a wondrous
harmony in the social body; and a civil war, let the victory fall where
it may, must leave mankind full of dissension, rancour, and revenge. Our
convictions, therefore, for all practical purposes, can receive no
confirmation. If the far future is to be regulated by different
principles, of what avail the knowledge of them, or how can they be
intelligible to us, to whom are denied the circumstances necessary for
their establishment, and for the demonstration of their reasonableness?

"The great Aristotle himself," says M. Comte, speaking of the
impossibility of any man elevating himself above the circumstances of
his age--"The great Aristotle himself, the profoundest thinker of
ancient times, (_la plus forte tete de toute l'antiquite_,) could not
conceive of a state of society not based on slavery, the irrevocable
abolition of which commenced a few generations afterwards."--Vol. iv.
p.38. In the sociology of Aristotle, slavery would have been a
fundamental law.

There is another consideration, not unworthy of being mentioned, which
bears upon this matter. In one portion of M. Comte's work, (we cannot
now lay our hand upon the passage,) the question comes before him of the
comparative _happiness_ of the savage and the civilized man. He will not
entertain it, refuses utterly to take cognizance of the question, and
contents himself with asserting the fuller _development_ of his nature
displayed by the civilized man. M. Comte felt that science had no scale
for this thing happiness. It was not ponderable, nor measurable, nor was
there an uniformity of testimony to be collected thereon. How many of
our debates and controversies terminate in a question of this kind--of
the comparative happiness of two several conditions? Such questions are,
for the most part, practically decided by those who have to _feel_; but
to estimate happiness by and for the feelings of others, would be the
task of science. Some future Royal Society must be called upon to
establish a _standard measure_ for human felicity.

We are speaking, it will be remembered, of the production of a science.
A scientific discipline of mind is undoubtedly available in the
examination of social questions, and may be of eminent utility to the
moralist, the jurist, and the politician--though it is worthy of
observation that even the habit of scientific thought, if not in some
measure tempered to the occasion, may display itself very inconveniently
and prejudicially in the determination of such questions. Our author,
for instance, after satisfying himself that marriage is a fundamental
law of society, is incapable of tolerating any infraction whatever of
this law in the shape of a divorce. He would give to it the rigidity of
a law of mechanics; he finds there should be cohesion here, and he will
not listen to a single case of separation: forgetful that a law of
society may even be the more stable for admitting exceptions which
secure for it the affection of those by whom it is to be reverenced and
obeyed.

With relation to the _past_, and in one point of view--namely, so far as
regards the development of man in his speculative career--our
Sociologist has endeavoured to supply a law which shall meet the
peculiar exigencies of his case, and enable him to take a scientific
survey of the history of a changeful and progressive being. At the
threshold of his work we encounter the announcement of a _new law_,
which has regulated the development of the human mind from its rudest
state of intellectual existence. As this law lies at the basis of M.
Comte's system--as it is perpetually referred to throughout his work--as
it is by this law he proceeds to view history in a scientific
manner--as, moreover, it is by aid of this law that he undertakes to
explain the _provisional existence_ of all theology, explaining it in
the past, and removing it from the future--it becomes necessary to enter
into some examination of its claims, and we must request our readers'
attention to the following statement of it:--

"In studying the entire development of the human intelligence
in its different spheres of activity, from its first efforts
the most simple up to our own days, I believe I have discovered
a great fundamental law, to which it is subjected by an
invariable necessity, and which seems to me capable of being
firmly established, whether on those proofs which are furnished
by a knowledge of our organization, or on those historical
verifications which result from an attentive examination of the
past. The law consists in this--that each of our principal
conceptions, each branch of our knowledge, passes successively
through three different states of theory: the _theologic_, or
fictitious; the _metaphysic_, or abstract; the scientific, or
_positive_. In other terms, the human mind, by its nature,
employs successively, in each of its researches, three methods
of philosophizing, the character of which is essentially
different, and even radically opposed; at first the theologic
method, then the metaphysical, and last the positive method.
Hence three distinct philosophies, or general systems of
conceptions on the aggregate of phenomena, which mutually
exclude each other; the first is the necessary starting-point
of the human intelligence; the third is its fixed and definite
state; the second is destined to serve the purpose only of
transition.

"In the _theologic_ state, the human mind, directing its
researches to the intimate nature of things, the first causes
and the final causes of all those effects which arrest its
attention, in a word, towards an absolute knowledge of things,
represents to itself the phenomena as produced by the direct
and continuous action of supernatural agents, more or less
numerous, whose arbitrary intervention explains all the
apparent anomalies of the universe.

"In the _metaphysic_ state, which is, in its essence, a
modification of the former, the supernatural agents are
displaced by abstract forces, veritable entities (personified
abstractions) inherent in things, and conceived as capable of
engendering by themselves all the observed phenomena--whose
explanation, thenceforth, consists in assigning to each its
corresponding entity.

"At last, in the _positive_ state the human mind, recognizing
the impossibility of obtaining absolute notions, renounces the
search after the origin and destination of the universe, and
the knowledge of the intimate causes of phenomena, to attach
itself exclusively to the discovery, by the combined efforts of
ratiocination and observation, of their effective laws; that is
to say, their invariable relations of succession and of
similitude. The explanation of things, reduced now to its real
terms, becomes nothing more than the connexion established
between the various individual phenomena and certain general
facts, the number of which the progress of science tends
continually to diminish.

"The _theologic_ system has reached the highest state of
perfection of which it is susceptible, when it has substituted
the providential action of one only being for the capricious
agency of the numerous independent divinities who had
previously been imagined. In like manner, the last term of the
_metaphysic_ system consists in conceiving, instead of the
different special entities, one great general entity, _nature_,
considered as the only source of all phenomena. The perfection
of the _positive_ system, towards which it unceasingly tends,
though it is not probable it can ever attain to it, would be
the ability to represent all observable phenomena as particular
cases of some one general fact; such, for instance, as that of
gravitation."--Vol. I. p. 5.

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