Book: Blackwood\'s Edinburgh Magazine, No. CCCXXIX.

V >> Various >> Blackwood\'s Edinburgh Magazine, No. CCCXXIX.




All this "craves wary walking." It is a trying course, this _method_,
for the uninitiated. How it strains the mind by the very limitations it
imposes on its outlook! How mysterious is this very sharp, and
well-defined separation from all mystery! How giddy is this path that
leads always so close over the unknowable! Giddy as that bridge of
steel, framed like a scimitar, and as fine, which the faithful Moslem,
by the aid of his Prophet, will pass with triumph on his way to
Paradise. But of our bridge, it cannot be said that it has one foot on
earth and one in heaven. Apparently, it has no foundation whatever; it
rises from cloud, it is lost in cloud, and it spans an inpenetrable
abyss. A mist, which no wind disperses, involves both extremities of our
intellectual career, and we are seen to pass like shadows across the
fantastic, inexplicable interval.

We now open the fourth volume, which is emblazoned with the title of
_Physique Social_. And here we will at once extract a passage, which, if
our own remarks have been hitherto of an unattractive character, shall
reward the reader for his patience. It is taken from that portion of the
work--perhaps the most lucid and powerful of the whole--where, in order
to demonstrate the necessity of his new science of Sociology, M. Comte
enters into a review of the two great political parties which, with more
or less distinctness, divide every nation of Europe; his intention being
to show that both of them are equally incompetent to the task of
organizing society. We shall render our quotation as brief as the
purpose of exposition will allow:--

"It is impossible to deny that the political world is
intellectually in a deplorable condition. All our ideas of
_order_ are hitherto solely borrowed from the ancient system of
religious and military power, regarded especially in its
constitution, catholic and feudal; a doctrine which, from the
philosophic point of view of this treatise, represents
incontestably the _theologic_ state of the social science. All
our ideas of _progress_ continue to be exclusively deduced from
a philosophy purely negative, which, issuing from
Protestantism, has taken in the last age its final form and
complete development; the doctrines of which constitute, in
reality, the _metaphysic_ state of politics. Different classes
of society adopt the one or the other of these, just as they
are disposed to feel chiefly the want of conservation or that
of amelioration. Rarely, it is true, do these antagonist
doctrines present themselves in all their plenitude, and with
their primitive homogeneity; they are found less and less in
this form, except in minds purely speculative. But the
monstrous medley which men attempt in our days of their
incompatible principles, cannot evidently be endowed with any
virtue foreign to the elements which compose it, and tends
only, in fact, to their mutual neutralization.

"However pernicious may be at present the theologic doctrine,
no true philosophy can forget that the formation and first
development of modern societies were accomplished under its
benevolent tutelage; which I hope sufficiently to demonstrate
in the historical portion of this work. But it is not the less
incontestably true that, for about three centuries, its
influence has been, amongst the nations most advanced,
essentially retrograde, notwithstanding the partial services it
has throughout that period rendered. It would be superfluous to
enter here into a special discussion of this doctrine, in order
to show its extreme insufficiency at the present day. The
deplorable absence of all sound views of social organization
can alone account for the absurd project of giving, in these
times, for the support of social order, a political system
which has already been found unable to sustain itself before
the spontaneous progress of intelligence and of society. The
historical analysis which we shall subsequently institute of
the successive changes which have gradually brought about the
entire dissolution of the catholic and feudal system, will
demonstrate, better than any direct argument, its radical and
irrevocable decay. The theologic school has generally no other
method of explaining this decomposition of the old system than
by causes merely accidental or personal, out of all reasonable
proportion with the magnitude of the results; or else, when
hard driven, it has recourse to its ordinary artifice, and
attempts to explain all by an appeal to the will of Providence,
to whom is ascribed the intention of raising a time of trial
for the social order, of which the commencement, the duration,
and the character, are all left equally obscure."...--P.14

"In a point of view strictly logical, the social problem might
be stated thus:--construct a doctrine that shall be so
rationally conceived that it shall be found, as it develops
itself, to be still always consistent with its own principles.
Neither of the existing doctrines satisfies this condition,
even by the rudest approximation. Both display numerous and
direct contradictions, and on important points. By this alone
their utter insufficiency is clearly exhibited. The doctrine
which shall fulfil this condition, will, from this test, be
recognized as the one capable of reorganizing society; for it
is an _intellectual reorganization_ that is first wanted--a
re-establishment of a real and durable harmony amongst our
social ideas, disturbed and shaken to the very foundation.
Should this regeneration be accomplished in one intelligence
only, (and such must necessarily be its manner of
commencement,) its extension would be certain; for the number
of intelligences to be convinced can have no influence except
as a question of time. I shall not fail to point out, when the
proper opportunity arrives, the eminent superiority, in this
respect, of the positive philosophy, which, once extended to
social phenomena, will necessarily combine the ideas of men in
a strict and complete manner, which in no other way can be
attained."--P. 20.

M. Comte then mentions some of the inconsistencies of the theologic
school.

"Analyze, for example, the vain attempts, so frequently renewed
during two centuries by so many distinguished minds, to
subordinate, according to the theologic formula, reason to
faith; it is easy to recognize the radical contradiction this
attempt involves, which establishes reason herself as supreme
judge of this very submission, the extent and the permanence of
which is to depend upon her variable and not very rigid
decisions. The most eminent thinker of the present catholic
school, the illustrious _De Maistre_, himself affords a proof,
as convincing as involuntary, of this inevitable contradiction
in his philosophy, when, renouncing all theologic weapons, he
labours in his principal work to re-establish the Papal
supremacy on purely historical and political reasonings,
instead of limiting himself to command it by right divine--the
only mode in true harmony with such a doctrine, and which a
mind, at another epoch, would not certainly have hesitated to
adopt."--P. 25.

After some further observations on the theologic or retrograde school,
he turns to the _metaphysic_, sometimes called the anarchical, sometimes
_doctrine critique_, for M. Comte is rich in names.

"In submitting, in their turn, the _metaphysic_ doctrine to a
like appreciation, it must never be overlooked that, though
exclusively critical, and therefore purely revolutionary, it
has not the less merited, for a long time, the title of
progressive, as having in fact presided over the principal
political improvements accomplished in the course of the three
last centuries, and which have necessarily been of a _negative_
description. If, when conceived in an absolute sense, its
dogmas manifest, in fact, a character directly anarchical, when
viewed in an historical position, and in their antagonism to
the ancient system, they constitute a provisional state,
necessary to the introduction of a new political organization.

"By a necessity as evident as it is deplorable, a necessity
inherent in our feeble nature, the transition from one social
system to another can never be direct and continuous; it
supposes always, during some generations at least, a sort of
interregnum, more or less anarchical, whose character and
duration depend on the importance and extent of the renovation
to be effected. (While the old system remains standing, though
undermined, the public reason cannot become familiarized with a
class of ideas entirely opposed to it.) In this necessity we
see the legitimate source of the present _doctrine critique_--a
source which at once explains the indispensable services it has
hitherto rendered, and also the essential obstacles it now
opposes to the final reorganization of modern societies....

"Under whatever aspect we regard it, the general spirit of the
metaphysic revolutionary system consists in erecting into a
normal and permanent state a necessarily exceptional and
transitory condition. By a direct and total subversion of
political notions, the most fundamental, it represents
government as being, by its nature, the necessary enemy of
society, against which it sedulously places itself in a
constant state of suspicion and watchfulness; it is disposed
incessantly to restrain more and more its sphere of activity,
in order to prevent its encroachments, and tends finally to
leave it no other than the simple functions of general police,
without any essential participation in the supreme direction of
the action of the collective body or of its social development.

"Approaching to a more detailed examination of this doctrine,
it is evident that the absolute right of free examination
(which, connected as it is with the liberty of the press and
the freedom of education, is manifestly its principal and
fundamental dogma) is nothing else, in reality, but the
consecration, under the vicious abstract form common to all
metaphysic conceptions, of that transitional state of unlimited
liberty in which the human mind has been spontaneously placed,
in consequence of the irrevocable decay of the theologic
philosophy, and which must naturally remain till the
establishment in the social domain of the positive method.[49]
... However salutary and indispensable in its historical
position, this principle opposes a grave obstacle to the
reorganization of society, by being erected into an absolute
and permanent dogma. To examine always without deciding ever,
would be deemed great folly in any individual. How can the
dogmatic consecration of a like disposition amongst all
individuals, constitute the definitive perfection of the social
order, in regard, too, to ideas whose finity it is so
peculiarly important, and so difficult, to establish? Is it not
evident, on the contrary, that such a disposition is, from its
nature, radically anarchical, inasmuch as, if it could be
indefinitely prolonged, it must hinder every true mental
organization?

"No association whatever, though destined for a special and
temporary purpose, and though limited to a small number of
individuals, can subsist without a certain degree of reciprocal
confidence, both intellectual and moral, between its members,
each one of whom finds a continual necessity for a crowd of
notions, to the formation of which he must remain a stranger,
and which he cannot admit but on the faith of others. By what
monstrous exception can this elementary condition of all
society be banished from that total association of mankind,
where the point of view which the individual takes, is most
widely separated from that point of view which the collective
interest requires, and where each member is the least capable,
whether by nature or position, to form a just appreciation of
these general rules, indispensable to the good direction of his
personal activity. Whatever intellectual development we may
suppose possible, in the mass of men it is evident, that social
order will remain always necessarily incompatible with the
permanent liberty left to each, to throw back every day into
endless discussion the first principles even of society....

"The dogma of _equality_ is the most essential and the most
influential after that which I have just examined, and is,
besides, in necessary relation to the principle of the
unrestricted liberty of judgment; for this last indirectly
leads to the conclusion of an equality of the most fundamental
character--an equality of intelligence. In its bearing on the
ancient system, it has happily promoted the development of
modern civilization, by presiding over the final dissolution of
the old social classification. But this function constitutes
the sole progressive destination of this energetic dogma, which
tends in its turn to prevent every just reorganization, since
its destructive activity is blindly directed against the basis
of every new classification. For, whatever that basis may be,
it cannot be reconciled with a pretended equality, which, to
all intelligent men, can now only signify the triumph of the
inequalities developed by modern civilization, over those which
had predominated in the infancy of society....

"The same philosophical appreciation is applicable with equal
ease to the dogma of the _sovereignty of the people_. Whilst
estimating, as is fit, the indispensable transitional office of
this revolutionary dogma, no true philosopher can now
misunderstand the fatal anarchical tendency of this
metaphysical conception, since in its absolute application it
opposes itself to all regular institution, condemning
indefinitely all superiors to an arbitrary dependence on the
multitude of their inferiors, by a sort of transference to the
people of the much-reprobated right of kings."

[49] "There is," says M. Comte here in a note, which consists
of an extract from a previous work--"there is no liberty of
conscience in astronomy, in physics, in chemistry, even in
physiology; every one would think it absurd not to give credit
to the principles established in these sciences by competent
men. If it is otherwise in politics, it is because the ancient
principles having fallen; and new ones not being yet formed,
there are, properly speaking, in this interval no established
principles."

As our author had shown how the _theologic_ philosophy was inconsistent
often with itself, so, in criticising the _metaphysics_, he exposes here
also certain self-contradictions. He reproaches it with having, in its
contests with the old system, endeavoured, at each stage, to uphold and
adopt some of the elementary principles of that very system it was
engaged in destroying.

"Thus," he says, "there arose a Christianity more and more
simplified, and reduced at length to a vague and powerless
theism, which, by a strange medley of terms, the metaphysicians
distinguished by the title of _natural religion_, as if all
religion was not inevitably _supernatural_. In pretending to
direct the social reorganization after this vain conception,
the metaphysic school, notwithstanding its destination purely
revolutionary, has always implicitly adhered, and does so,
especially and distinctly, at the present day, to the most
fundamental principle of the ancient political doctrine--that
which represents the social order as necessarily reposing on a
theological basis. This is now the most evident, and the most
pernicious inconsistency of the metaphysic doctrine. Armed with
this concession, the school of Bossuet and De Maistre will
always maintain an incontestable logical superiority over the
irrational detractors of Catholicism, who, while they proclaim
the want of a religious organization, reject, nevertheless, the
elements indispensable to its realization. By such a concession
the revolutionary school concur in effect, at the present day,
with the retrograde, in preventing a right organization of
modern societies, whose intellectual condition more and more
interdicts a system of politics founded on theology."

Our readers will doubtless agree with us, that this review of political
parties (though seen through an extract which we have been compelled to
abbreviate in a manner hardly permissible in quoting from an author)
displays a singular originality and power of thought; although each one
of them will certainly have his own class of objections and exceptions
to make. We said that the impression created by the work was decidedly
_conservative_, and this quotation has already borne us out. For without
implying that we could conscientiously make use of every argument here
put into our hands, we may be allowed to say, as the lawyers do in
Westminster Hail, _if this be so_, then it follows that we of the
retrograde, or as we may fairly style ourselves in England--seeing this
country has not progressed so rapidly as France--we of the stationary
party are fully justified in maintaining our position, unsatisfactory
though it may be, till some better and more definite system has been
revealed to us, than any which has yet made its advent in the political
world. If the revolutionary, metaphysic, or liberal school have no
proper office but that of destruction--if its nature be essentially
transitional--can we be called upon to forego this position, to quit our
present anchorage, until we know whereto we are to be transferred? Shall
we relinquish the traditions of our monarchy, and the discipline of our
church, before we hear what we are to receive in exchange? M. Comte
would not advise so irrational a proceeding.

But M. Comte has himself a _constructive_ doctrine; M. Comte will give
us in exchange--what? The Scientific Method!

We have just seen something of this scientific method. M. Comte himself
is well aware that it is a style of thought by no means adapted to the
multitude. Therefore there will arise with the scientific method an
altogether new class, an intellectual aristocracy, (not the present race
of _savans_ or their successors, whom he is particularly anxious to
exclude from all such advancement,) who will expound to the people the
truths to which that method shall give birth. This class will take under
its control all that relates to education. It will be the seat of the
moral power, not of the administrative. This, together with some
arguments to establish what few are disposed to question, the
fundamental character of the laws of property and of marriage, is all
that we are here presented with towards the definite re-organization of
society.

We shall not go back to the question, already touched upon, and which
lies at the basis of all this--how far it is possible to construct a
science of Sociology. There is only one way in which the question can be
resolved in the affirmative--namely, by constructing the science.

Meanwhile we may observe, that the general consent of a cultivated order
of minds to a certain class of truths, is not sufficient for the
purposes of government. We take, says M. Comte, our chemistry from the
chemist, our astronomy from the astronomer; if these were fixed
principles, we should take our politics with the same ease from the
graduated politician. But it is worth while to consider what it is we do
when we take our chemistry from the chemist, and our astronomy from the
astronomer. We assume, on the authority of our teacher, certain facts
which it is not in our power to verify; but his reasonings upon these
facts we must be able to comprehend. We follow him as he explains the
facts by which knowledge has been obtained, and yield to his statement a
rational conviction. Unless we do this, we cannot be said to have any
knowledge whatever of the subject--any chemistry or astronomy at all.
Now, presuming there were a science of politics, as fixed and perfect as
that of astronomy, the people must, at all events, be capable of
understanding its exposition, or they could not possibly be governed by
it. We need hardly say that those ideas, feelings, and sentiments, which
can be made general, are those only on which government can rest.

In the course of the preceding extract, our author exposes the futility
of that attempt which certain churchmen are making, as well on this side
of the Channel as the other, to reason men back into a submission of
their reason. Yet, if the science of Sociology should be above the
apprehension of the vulgar, (as M. Comte seems occasionally to presume
it would be,) he would impose on his intellectual priesthood a task of
the very same kind, and even still more hopeless. A multitude once
taught to argue and decide on politics, must be reasoned back into a
submission of their reason to political teachers--teachers who have no
sacred writings, and no traditions from which to argue a delegated
authority, but whose authority must be founded on the very
reasonableness of the entire system of their doctrine. But this is a
difficulty we are certainly premature in discussing, as the true
Catholic church in politics has still itself to be formed.

We are afraid, notwithstanding all his protestations, M. Comte will be
simply classed amongst the _Destructives_, so little applicable to the
generality of minds is that mode of thought, to establish which (and it
is for this we blame him) he calls, and so prematurely, for so great
sacrifices.

The fifth volume--the most remarkable, we think, of the whole--contains
that historical survey which has been more than once alluded to in the
foregoing extracts. This volume alone would make the fortune of any
expert Parisian scribe who knew how to select from its rich store of
original materials, who had skill to arrange and expound, and, above
all, had the dexterity to adopt somewhat more ingeniously than M. Comte
has done, his abstract statements to our reminiscences of historical
facts. Full of his own generalities, he is apt to forget the concrete
matter of the annalist. Indeed, it is a peculiarity running through the
volume, that generalizations, in themselves of a valuable character, are
shown to disadvantage by an unskilful alliance with history.

We will make one quotation from this portion of the work, and then we
must leave M. Comte. In reviewing the theological progress of mankind,
he signalizes three epochs, that of Fetishism, of Polytheism, and of
Monotheism. Our extract shall relate to the first of these, to that
primitive state of religion, or idolatry, in which _things themselves_
were worshipped; the human being transferring to them immediately a
life, or power, somewhat analogous to its own.

"Exclusively habituated, for so long a time, to a theology
eminently metaphysic, we must feel at present greatly
embarrassed in our attempt to comprehend this gross primitive
mode of thought. It is thus that fetishism has often been
confounded with polytheism, when to the latter has been applied
the common expression of idolatry, which strictly relates to
the former only; since the priests of Jupiter or Minerva would,
no doubt, have as justly repelled the vulgar reproach of
worshipping images, as do the Catholic doctors of the present
day a like unjust accusation of the Protestants. But though we
are happily sufficiently remote from fetishism to find a
difficulty in conceiving it, yet each one of us has but to
retrace his own mental history, to detect the essential
characters of this initial state. Nay, even eminent thinkers of
the present day, when they allow themselves to be involuntarily
ensnared (under the influence, but partially rectified, of a
vicious education) to attempt to penetrate the mystery of the
essential production of any phenomenon whose laws are not
familiar to them, they are in a condition personally to
exemplify this invariable instinctive tendency to trace the
generation of unknown effects to a cause analogous to life,
which is no other, strictly speaking, than the principle of
fetishism....

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